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Abstract
This thesis analyses religion’s place within the public order of the European 
Union. It argues that the Union’s approach to religion is characterised by the 
pursuit of balance between Europe’s mainly Christian religious tradition and 
its strong humanist traditions which place limitations on religious influence 
over law and politics. Balance between these traditions is sought by treating 
religion as a form of individual and collective identity. Such an approach 
protects individual religious identity rights while enabling Member States, on 
grounds of cultural autonomy, to pursue their own relationships to religion, 
including the maintenance of institutional and cultural links to individual faiths 
and the promotion religious morality as part of the legal protection of a broader 
public morality. However, such facilitation of religious identities is limited by 
the Union’s identification of the autonomy of the public sphere from religious 
domination and the protection of individual autonomy from the promotion of 
collective morality as key elements of its public order and prerequisites of EU 
membership. Religions seen as unable to reconcile themselves to such 
limitations are regarded as contrary to the Union’s public order. Linking 
religious influence over law to religion’s cultural role enables religions which 
are culturally entrenched at national level to exercise greater influence than 
outsider religions whose attempts to influence law can be seen as political 
rather than cultural and therefore as threatening to the principle of balance. The 
thesis therefore shows that the EU’s public order is influenced by a Christian- 
humanist tradition which facilitates religion’s cultural role but restricts its 
political influence. This distinction between religion’s cultural and political 
roles, though complex and problematic in terms of equal treatment of insider 
and outsider faiths, represents an attempt to ensure respect for the Union’s 
cultural and legal pluralism while constructing a distinctive public order with 
identifiable fundamental norms.
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Chapter I: Introduction
1. Introduction
2. The Argument
3. Features of the Balance between Religious, Cultural and Humanist 
Influences
4. Chapters
1. Introduction
Religion has not generally been seen as a central concern of the EU.1 The 
Union has no specific policy on religion, nor any explicit competence in 
relation to religious matters. As a central and sensitive element of national 
identity and culture, religion would appear to be remote from core Community 
competences such as the regulation of the Single Market. Indeed, the few 
direct references to religion in the treaties stress the Union’s desire to defer to 
Member State preferences in this area.2 Most of the limited existing literature 
on the relationship between religion and EU law has focused heavily on the 
issue of freedom of religion and the degree to which the Union has embraced 
“positive” religious freedom including active facilitation of the rights of 
religious institutions.3 This focus on the facilitation of religious freedom tends 
to underplay the complexity of the broader issues raised by the relationship 
between religion and the law. In particular, such an approach can fail to 
acknowledge sufficiently that more religious freedom for some can come at the 
cost of less freedom for others. In any event, while respect for the fundamental 
right to religious freedom is, indeed, an important part of the Union’s 
approach, the relationship between EU law and religion is much broader.
The European Union, in exercising its functions and constructing its own 
identity, is inevitably required to legislate and adjudicate in relation to the 
claims which religion continues to make in the public and private arenas in
1 C. Crouch “The Quiet Continent: Religion and Politics in Europe” in D. Marquand and R. L. 
Nettler (eds.) Religion and Democracy (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
2 See Chapter III.
3 See for example G. Robbers (ed.), State and Church in the European Union. (Nomos, Baden- 
Baden, 2005).
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Europe. Religion still influences law at national level through notions of public 
morality which provide the basis for laws restricting activities which are 
considered to be undesirable for religious or cultural reasons.4 EU law in areas 
such as the Single Market can impact on such laws by limiting the ability of 
states to control or suppress certain economic activities. Religion’s important 
institutional role in many Member States means that religious organisations are 
important employers. EU law in relation to employment must reach decisions 
which influence the degree to which religious bodies can continue to promote 
their ethos in these contexts as well as the ability of Member States to reflect 
religious norms in market structures.5 In areas such as broadcasting and 
trademarks, Community law can affect efforts to protect religious symbols and 
ideas as well as freedom of expression.6 More broadly, the Union’s 
commitments to upholding fundamental rights and liberal democracy are also 
relevant to religion. While it has recognised that religious freedom must be 
protected, the EU has also identified limitations on religious influence as an 
important principle and has monitored national relationships between religion, 
the law and the state in order to ensure that those countries which become 
members uphold the principles of the autonomy of the public sphere from 
religious domination as well as respect for individual autonomy, including 
freedom from religion, in the private sphere.8 EU law can therefore potentially 
impact on the role of religion in contemporary Europe. However, the 
relationship between the Union and religion operates in both directions and 
Community law is itself shaped by religion. The EU recognises the promotion 
of public morality as a valid basis of law thus enabling religious norms to 
influence the content of Community law. Religion is also recognised as part of 
national cultures which the Union is required to respect. Furthermore, religion 
has been recognised as a source of the EU’s constitutional values while 
religious organisations have been acknowledged as making a “particular 
contribution” to the Union’s lawmaking process.9
4 See Chapter II.
5 See Chapter V.
6 Ibid.
7 See Chapter IV.
8 See Chapter VI.
9 See Chapter III.
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The public order of the Union is therefore required to develop an approach to 
religion beyond merely undertaking to respect religious freedom. Indeed, the 
EU is a particularly interesting context in which to study the issues of 
competing rights, goals and interests which characterise the increasingly 
controversial and complex relationship between religion, law and polity in the 
contemporary world. Most states approach religion in the context of a dense 
cultural identity which has been heavily influenced by particular religious 
traditions and where certain views of religion and its role in society are the 
subject of unspoken shared historical and cultural assumptions.10 The 
European Union, by contrast, lacks a strong cultural identity of its own and is 
still in the process of developing its political institutions. The weakness of its 
identity means that the Union lacks the authority to effect fundamental change 
in the relationship between religion, law and the state in Europe. As an 
independent legal order encompassing 27 states with widely differing 
approaches to religion, the Community must, in carrying out its functions, 
devise its own approach to this relationship which synthesises a common 
framework within which respect for Member State autonomy is reconciled 
with the need for a coherent EU approach which remains true to the Union's 
fundamental values. Indeed, although it must be extremely careful not to 
interfere with Member State autonomy in this sensitive area, the very facts of 
the weakness of its cultural identity and the newness of its institutions mean 
that the EU is required to spell out in more explicit terms than most nation 
states, the relationship between religion, the law and the polity. Issues of 
religion and identity have come to assume increasing importance in Europe in 
recent times and, as the controversy in relation to the making of a reference to 
God in the preamble to the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties showed, the 
nature of the EU in this regard has become the subject of major dispute and is 
seen as bearing on fundamental issues in relation to the future of the Union and 
of Europe in general.
This thesis gives a broader account of the role of religion in public order of the 
EU and addresses both issue of the relationship of religion to law and politics
10 See J.T.S. Madeley and Z. Enyedi (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The 
Chimera of Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 2003).
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and the question of nature of the European Union. It analyses the relationship 
between religion, individual autonomy, the state and the promotion of 
communal norms in the context of EU law and in doing so sheds light on the 
nature of the EU as a polity. In particular it assesses the degree to which the 
Union can be seen as a secular polity or as one which regards religion, or 
certain versions of religion, as a legitimate basis for the exercise of legal 
power. Thus, the thesis addresses the controversial issue of the contemporary 
role and influence of religion in private and public life. This analysis touches 
on key issues such as the balancing of individual autonomy with the desire of 
communities to constitute themselves through the promotion through law of 
particular norms and the reconciliation of the principles of equal treatment and 
state neutrality with the accommodation of cultural identity and notions of 
community. It also assesses the degree to which the Union’s approach to this 
issue impacts on the relationship between the law, the state and religion at 
Member State level as well as the extent to which the public order of the EU 
can be seen as reflecting a particular, Christian humanist, tradition.
2. The Argument
This thesis argues that the EU integrates religion into its public order and 
adjudicates upon religion's claims on the basis of a commitment to balancing 
what it regards as the overlapping and at times, conflicting, religious, cultural 
and humanist influences underpinning its constitutional tradition and public 
order. The thesis describes and investigates the features of this balance. It 
demonstrates how the Union has seen the relationship between religion and 
identity as key to such balance. The notion of identity operates in two inter­
related ways in this regard. The idea of balance between religious, cultural and 
humanist influences is seen as a part of Europe's ethical inheritance and as a 
reflection of a predominant contemporary European approach to religion which 
arises from European history and culture. This principle of balance is regarded 
both as normatively desirable and as an element of European identity. At the 
same time, the Union's commitment to balance is seen as requiring that 
religion be treated primarily as a matter of identity. Balance between religious, 
humanist and cultural influences within the EU legal order is therefore seen 
both as an element of European identity in itself and as requiring the treatment
13
of religion largely as a form of identity. In this way the notions of identity and 
balance can be seen as mutually reinforcing.
3. Features of the Balance between Religious, Cultural and Humanist 
Influences
The regulation of religion through the framework of identity raises certain 
complications. Identity has various forms whose accommodation can, at times, 
be mutually inconsistent. For instance, the facilitation of collective religious 
identity through the promotion of communal norms, can be inconsistent with 
the freedom of individuals to develop their own identity in contravention of 
such norms.11 On the other hand, protection for individual identity in contexts 
such as employment may impact on the collective and institutional religious 
identity of others. The thesis shows how the EU's commitment to balancing 
cultural, religious and humanist traditions gives scope for the assertion of 
collective religious identity through its recognition of collective cultural 
identity rights as including the promotion through law of notions of public 
morality, of particular religio-cultural practices such as restrictions on Sunday 
trading and the protection of the national institutional role and status of 
culturally entrenched faiths. On the other hand, although EU law permits the 
legal promotion of collective identities, Europe’s shared identity has a self- 
limiting element in this regard as it is seen as also encompassing a strong 
tradition of respect for individual autonomy which requires the limitation of
1 o
the imposition of collective identities. The humanist tradition recognised by 
the Union as part of its ethical inheritance is also hostile to the promotion of 
religious norms per se and resists the promotion of those religious norms 
which cannot be accommodated under the rubric of cultural identity. The thesis 
investigates how such conflicts have been regulated by the EU. In doing so it 
measures the degree to which the Union's public order can be seen as having a 
particular religious identity, as well as assessing what the EU's approach tells 
us about its view on key issues such as the balancing of individual and
11 See for example K. Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for  
International Relations, (London and New York, I B Tauris ,1998).
12 See Chapters III, V and VI.
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collective rights and the degree to which the Union impacts on the right of 
Member States to pursue their own arrangements in relation to religion.
Beyond the potential conflicts between identity’s individual and collective 
elements, treating religion as a form of identity also affects the role it can play 
within the public order and the influence it can exercise over law. Identities are 
both attributed and chosen and, in a diverse world, are inevitably 
heterogeneous. Therefore, linking the legal status and role of religion within 
the public order to its status as an element of identity, pluralises religion as it 
inevitably involves the recognition of more than one kind of religious identity. 
Such an approach also links and values religion's role in public and private life, 
not on the basis of the truth of religious claims, but as human choices, both 
collective and individual. Accordingly, such an approach renders it difficult for 
religions to achieve recognition for claims to a monopoly on truth within the 
political arena and would appear to regard religion as a voluntary matter, a 
view which is not shared by all the major religions.13 Regarding religion as an 
element of identity links it to notions of culture and of a way of life. Although 
culture can be a site of political conflict, it is also a state of affairs rather than 
inherently normative phenomenon and is seen as in some way separate from 
the rationalism and ideological nature of the political sphere.14 Accordingly, 
this view of religion can depoliticise religion in that it values what religions 
regard as normative practices and views on the basis of a normatively neutral 
status, namely that of element of cultural norms and practices. This emphasis 
on religion as an element of culture and identity also has the effect of linking 
the role of religion within EU law to the most powerful source of culture 
within the Union, the nation state. The Union's approach characterises religion 
not merely as an individual or collective choice but as part of a national way of 
life which Member States are entitled to uphold. In taking this view, EU law 
connects the role of religion to ideas of inheritance and enables certain
13 See Chapter IV.
14 See F. Inglis, Culture (Cambridge UK and Malden MA, USA Polity Press, 2004)
28-29. See also C. Barker “Culture” in The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies Sage. 
(London, New Dehli, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2004) 45. In relation to the non-political and non- 
ideological characterisation of culture see A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 
(New York, International Publishers, 1971) 238 and S. Zizek, In Defence of Lost Causes, 
(London, Verso, 2008) 21. See also the discussion in section 4 of Chapter VII.
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religious traditions which have achieved elevated status within national 
cultures to exercise a greater degree of influence and privilege than "outsider" 
faiths which lack such a national cultural role. Thus, the Union's approach 
involves the promotion of certain collective identities to a greater degree than 
others. While it does not require a libertarian approach and envisages the use 
of the law to promote these national collective identities, such promotion must 
nevertheless respect the overall notion of balance and the humanist elements 
thereof.
Many of these features, particularly those of pluralism, the linking of religion 
to choice and to culture and the restriction of truth claims within in the public 
sphere, reinforce other elements of the balance between religious, humanist 
and cultural influences which the Union sees as elements of its heritage and as 
necessary features of its public order. This enables the accommodation of 
religion to take place in a manner which does not threaten established political 
structures and collective identities which have grown from Europe's historical 
experience of conflict between different religions and between religious and 
secular powers. In particular, the pluralisation of religion inherent in an 
identity-based approach helps to secure the autonomy of the public sphere 
from domination by any single form of religion, particularly at EU level, where 
no single cultural identity predominates. The focus on individual identity and 
choice also underlines the commitment to individual choice which underpins 
the protection of individual autonomy in the private sphere. These two features 
have been identified by the Union as key elements of its public order whose 
protection can impinge on the desires of those forms of religion who wish to 
dominate the public sphere or to use the law to force individuals to adhere to 
religious teachings in the private arena.15
As noted above, the degree of separation between the political and religious 
spheres and the individual-centred notions of personal autonomy this entails, 
are both results of the historical and cultural events and influences which gave 
rise to contemporary European culture and can in themselves be seen as
15 See Chapter VI.
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elements of an identity or as the markers of the parameters of acceptable 
religious identity, which characterise the public order of the Union. The focus 
on religion as identity as an element of a commitment to balancing religious, 
humanist and cultural influences, which is itself an aspect of what is thought to 
be a shared European inheritance and identity, means that there will be forms 
of religious identity which cannot readily be accommodated within this 
broader balance-focused approach. Religious identities which are inconsistent 
with the notion of balance, characterised by the features outlined above, may 
be seen as threats to the Union's public order and may be restricted on this 
basis. In particular, approaches to religion which cannot reconcile themselves 
to accommodation of humanism inherent in this idea of balance, which are 
unable to make their political contributions on the basis of the implicit 
acceptance of multiple truth claims inherent in a religiously pluralist public 
sphere, or whose beliefs and practices are not rooted in, or even clash with, 
predominant national or European cultural norms, may struggle to achieve 
influence or even acceptance within such a framework.16 Conversely, religious 
identities which are established elements of national identities are not seen as 
threats to the overall notion of balance and therefore, to the public order, even 
when they retain political ambitions which may be inconsistent with principles, 
such as respect for personal autonomy, which the Union has identified as a key 
element of balance and therefore of its public order.17 Furthermore, the thesis 
shows how, in its attempts to protect the public order from forms of religion 
seen as hostile to the notion of balance, the Union has, at times been willing to 
curtail principles such as individual autonomy in matters of belief which are 
themselves regarded as key elements of such balance.18
4. The Chapters
These features are sketched and analysed in five substantive chapters and a 
conclusion. As noted above, this thesis argues that the EU approaches religion 
on the basis of Europe’s ethical tradition which it sees as being characterised 
by balance between what are sometimes competing religious, humanist and
16 See Chapter V and Chapter VI.
17 See Chapter V.
18 See Chapter VI.
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cultural influences. Chapter II sets out the factual background to this enquiry 
by setting out the fundamental elements of contemporary European approaches 
to the relationship between religion, politics, the law and the state. It notes how 
European identity originally arose out of a shared commitment to Christianity 
but how this identity has also been moulded by a strong humanist tradition 
which owed much to Christianity but which nevertheless played a significant 
role in the experience of secularisation undergone by most Member States 
since the 15th century. The Chapter demonstrates that although Europe is 
relatively a-religious in world terms, religion remains an element of both 
personal and national identities. Indeed, the chapter shows that strict separation 
of church and state is rare in Europe and that religion has an important 
institutional role in many Member States, particularly in relation to healthcare 
and education. Despite its continued role in individual and collective identities, 
religion’s political influence has waned and, although it retains some influence 
over law in relation to “moral issues” such as the beginning and end of life, 
family structures and sexuality, this influence is declining and has given way to 
humanist notions of individual autonomy to a significant degree. The chapter 
therefore demonstrates that religion in Europe retains an important role as an 
element of individual and collective identity. In particular, individual 
denominations continue to function as parts of the national identity and 
institutional structures of many European states. Despite this continuing role in 
identity, religion in Europe is required to compete for influence over law with 
strong secular and humanist traditions which have resulted in significant 
restriction of its political role and influence.
Chapter III shows how the tradition outlined in Chapter II has been reflected in 
the Union’s approach to the influence of religion over lawmaking. It reveals 
how religion is recognised by the Union as an element of its constitutional 
values but how, at the same time, this role is balanced by the recognition of 
potentially competing humanist and cultural influences. The limited role 
played by religion in the political arena shown in Chapter II, is reflected in the 
Union’s approach to the role of religion in law and policy making. Although it 
recognises the “particular contribution” of religious bodies in this area, EU law 
requires that this contribution be made in the context of civil society thereby
18
requiring religious bodies to engage in structures which implicitly recognise 
the legitimacy of other beliefs and the authority of secular political institutions. 
Accordingly, the notion of balance between the various elements of the 
Union’s ethical inheritance is preserved by recognising a role for religion in 
relation to lawmaking while simultaneously making such a role contingent on 
the limitation of claims on the part of religion to a monopoly on truth or to 
substantive political power in its own right.
The chapter also shows how religion’s role in national identity and culture and 
its role as a source of communal moral norms, have been accommodated by 
EU law through the pluralist nature of the Union’s public order which enables 
Member States to reflect particular national and religiously specific visions of 
public morality in EU law, provided that such states respect the notion of 
balance between religious, humanist and cultural influences inherent in EU 
fundamental rights commitments (most notably respect for individual 
autonomy) as well as the moral pluralism involved in principles such as 
freedom of movement. This approach has been justified on grounds of cultural 
autonomy. The EU level of this pluralist public order lacks a strong cultural 
identity and is therefore marked by a strict adherence to formal neutrality in 
religious matters and notions of public morality derived from its fundamental 
rights commitments. Although formally neutral, such commitments have been 
heavily influenced by the historical and cultural role of particular religious 
traditions in Europe, most notably that of Christian humanism and can be more 
restrictive of religions which struggle to accept the limitations on their 
influence inherent in a balance between religious and humanist values and in 
respect for Europe’s strong cultural tradition of individual autonomy and 
popular sovereignty.
Chapter IV demonstrates how this same framework fits in with the Union’s 
fundamental rights obligations which also envisage religion exercising 
influence over law on the basis of its status as an element of individual and 
collective identities. It analyses the various justifications for religious freedom 
and notes how respect for individual and collective religious rights can often 
come into conflict. The chapter shows how, in line with both the pluralist and
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humanist elements of its public order, and with its fundamental rights 
obligations, seen primarily in the requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”), EU law has recognised individual and collective 
religious freedom as largely private rights linked to notions of personal 
autonomy in matters of identity. However, both sets of rights have also been 
seen as being required to give way to certain public interests in non-private 
contexts. In particular, the right to develop and adhere to a religious identity 
has been seen as being legitimately required to yield to the general public 
interest in the maintenance of a non-theocratic, democratic system, a 
requirement which can be seen as reflecting the limitations on assertion of 
religious claims to truth in the public sphere in Chapter III. Furthermore, the 
ECHR caselaw indicates that respect for religious freedom does not require the 
accommodation of individual or collective religious choices in non-private 
contexts such as the labour market when such choices clash with prevailing 
cultural norms. The chapter therefore suggests that the basic framework 
provided by the Union’s fundamental rights obligations in relation to religious 
freedom is one which requires that individual and collective religious identities 
receive a significant degree of protection in private but which enables Member 
States to curtail such identity rights in non-private contexts in order to promote 
either their communal cultural identity or the democratic nature of the public 
order.
Chapter V addresses the application of the identity-based framework set out in 
Chapter IV within the context of EU single market law and how the potentially 
clashing collective and individual identity rights have been reconciled in this 
area. It notes how the view of religion as an element of personal identity 
entitled to protection on the basis of respect for individual autonomy, can be 
seen in the characterisation of religion as an economic choice within Single 
Market law. The chapter shows how EU law has taken a broader view of the 
need to protect individual religious identity in non-private contexts than that 
contained in the minimum standard prescribed by the Court of Human Rights 
and has legislated in order to require accommodation of individual religious 
identity in the workplace. The chapter demonstrates how, by embracing the 
principle of indirect discrimination, EU law not only protects individual
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religious identity outside purely private contexts, but also ensures the formal 
neutrality of the market place, thereby pluralising the workplace in religious 
terms. On the other hand, such facilitation of religious and individual identity 
is still required to give way to certain public interests such as the commercial 
nature of the market economy, the need to protect the non-theocratic nature of 
the public order and pre-existing religious privileges in the market. The Union 
has, in fact, shown considerable deference towards existing structures and 
privileges held by particular denominations in the market place and has 
exempted such structures from the duty to comply with anti-discrimination 
measures in order to enable the preservation of the institutional role played by 
particular religions in individual Member States. Such deference facilitates 
collective religious identity by enabling religious employers to promote their 
“ethos” in the workplace. It also, however, restricts individual religious 
identity rights by permitting discrimination against employees on religious 
grounds. This facilitation of the collective role of religion is also seen in the 
Union’s direct recognition of religion as an element of culture. Respect for 
cultural influences is explicitly recognised as an element of the respect for 
inheritance and the balance between the religious, humanist and cultural 
elements underlying its public order which the Union pursues. Chapter V 
shows how the Union has, in line with its approach in relation to pre-existing 
religious privilege in the marketplace, recognised particular approaches to 
individual denominations and institutional arrangements linking such 
denominations to particular Member States, as parts of national culture. This 
cultural approach reinforces some of the features of the “balance” pursued by 
the Union outlined in previous chapters. For instance, given that culture relates 
to a state of affairs which is not necessarily normative, characterising religion 
as an element of culture reinforces its status as a human choice or element of 
identity rather than a claim to truth or ideological matter. Such a view of 
religion reinforces the limits on the role of explicitly religious claims in the 
political arena set out in Chapter m . However, the chapter also demonstrates 
how recognition of particular religions as elements of national culture enables 
such faiths to access a degree of influence over law which is denied to other 
faiths. Such status also enables these insider faiths to promote their worldview, 
or protect their elevated status, through EU law by means of exemptions from
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free market rules and public morality clauses which Member States see as 
necessary to preserve religiously influenced elements of their culture. 
Furthermore, the chapter shows how such a culturally centred view of 
religion’s relationship to law causes the Union to view as "cultural" and 
therefore acceptable, demands which, coming from “outsider” religions would 
be seen as unduly political and threatening to notions such as the pluralism of 
the public sphere or respect for individual autonomy, which underpin the 
balance between religious and humanist influences to which the public order of 
the Union is committed. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates how religions 
which are regarded as contrary to European culture have received scant 
recognition of their rights under EU law and have, in some cases, been 
characterised as contrary to the public order and liable to restriction on that 
basis.
The Union’s regulation of religion in the Single Market therefore demonstrates 
that while it is committed to facilitating religion as an element of individual, 
collective and national cultural identity, there are also kinds of identity which, 
within a framework dedicated to maintenance of the balance between the 
religious, humanist and cultural influences which forms Europe’s ideological 
inheritance, are considered unacceptable. Chapter V notes how religions falling 
outside of the protection of national cultural identity and which fail to respect 
the limitations on religion’s political role seen as inherent in this inheritance, 
are considered to be identities which will not merit protection under the EU 
law. Chapter VI further investigates this notion of unacceptable religious 
identities. It analyses how the limitations on the political influence of religion 
inherent in the vision of balance pursued by the Union have been highlighted 
in its dealings with outsiders whose religions cannot as readily be 
accommodated under the rubric of national cultural identity. The chapter 
assesses the EU’s approach to enlargement and the integration of immigrants 
to demonstrate how religions which attempt to dominate the public sphere have 
been seen as violating the duty to respect the principle of pluralism while 
attempts to interfere with private autonomy to impose religious morality 
similarly breach the requirement that the role of religion respect the notion of 
balance between religious and humanist influences. Failures on the part of
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religion to respect public and private autonomy are therefore viewed as 
inconsistent with a European identity which the Union regards as 
encompassing not only a strong (predominantly Christian) religious tradition 
but also the equally strong traditions of questioning religion, of imposing a 
degree of separation between the religious and political realms and of 
respecting individual autonomy. The chapter goes on to show however, that in 
defending this identity, the Union has been willing to interfere with individual 
autonomy itself by seeking to regulate private religious identity and that in 
doing so the Union has implicitly regarded some forms of religion, most 
notably Islam, as inherently less compatible with Europe's religious inheritance 
and identity than others. Furthermore, it demonstrates that while the Union has 
accommodated the reflection in law of norms of religions which are part of 
national cultures and identities, as elements of "public morality" or national 
cultural norms, attempts on the part of outsider religions to mould the law to 
reflect their religious beliefs are seen as political rather than cultural and as 
representing, on that basis, a threat to the limitations on religious political 
influence inherent in the Union's interpretation of the requirements of balance 
between religious, humanist and cultural influences.
The thesis concludes by tying these themes together in Chapter VII which 
argues that the Union's approach to religion is characterised by a commitment 
to reconciling the two dominant and partially conflicting approaches to religion 
which have emerged from European history, namely the tradition of Christian 
religiosity and the humanist tradition, which partly grew out of Christianity but 
which also fostered a strong tradition of secularism and of questioning and 
challenging of religion. These traditions are reconciled by the Union through a 
commitment to balancing the religious, humanist and cultural influences it sees 
as marking its religious inheritance. This commitment to balancing a strong 
religious tradition, which has included promotion of religious goals and norms 
through law, with a strong humanist tradition stressing individual autonomy, 
equality and separation between the religious and political realms, is effected 
by the recognition of religion as an element of identity, both individual and 
collective. The framework of identity enables religions to pursue their goals in 
relation to the promotion of communal moral norms through recognition of
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religion's status as an element of collective identity and as a contributor to the 
definition of shared norms. At the same time, viewing religion as a form of 
identity defines it as an element of human choice, thus pluralising it and 
limiting its ability to assert a monopoly on truth in the public sphere while also 
strengthening claims for autonomy in relation to individual identity formation, 
all of which place limits on religion's ability to dominate the legal and political 
arenas. The features, sketched out in the chapters discussed above, give the 
Union a public order which is unambiguously linked to a Christian humanist 
tradition and which facilitates the, predominantly Christian, cultural role of 
religion in influencing the law. On the other hand, while not secular, such a 
public order is avowedly non-theocratic and while recognising religion and 
privileging certain culturally entrenched forms thereof, the Union also 
recognises the importance of non-religious perspectives.
The problem of the apparent unequal treatment of insider and outsider religions 
nevertheless remains. However, in the light of the continuing importance of 
particular religions in the cultural identity of Member States, the Union’s 
limited powers, its legal pluralism and its commitment to respecting Member 
State cultural autonomy all mean that a degree of unequal treatment is 
inevitable. However, although it is not capable of radically reshaping the 
relationship between religion and law within Member States, the Union does 
not merely reflect Member State preferences but places limits, albeit limited 
ones, on such relationships. By treating the influence exercised by insider 
religions over law as a result of their role in the identities of particular Member 
State as cultural rather than political or ideological, the Union does exempt the 
claims made by such religions on this basis from requirements of rational 
justification and reciprocal respect for other identity claims, despite the 
political and ideological elements of these cultural demands. The recognition 
of such claims as cultural is therefore undoubtedly an important source of 
privilege and influence over law. However, the conclusion argues that, by 
exempting such cultural claims from requirements of rational justification and 
reciprocal recognition on the grounds of their ostensibly non-political nature, 
the Union can impose these very requirements of insider religions when they 
make demands which are explicitly political in nature or which cannot be
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cannot be characterised as a claim for protection of cultural identity. The EU’s 
public order therefore establishes its political sphere as a formally neutral 
environment in religious terms to which all religious viewpoints may 
contribute and within which claims to exclusive possession of the truth and a 
refusal to recognise the validity of other religious identities are not possible. 
Furthermore, the combination of this protection of the autonomy of the 
political sphere from religious domination with the Union’s requirement that 
Member States respect the fundamental elements of the Union’s own public 
morality such as respect for the principle of proportionality and fundamental 
rights including individual private autonomy, non-discrimination and free 
movement rights, provide an impediment to attempts to expand the influence 
of particular faiths over law and political life and to the subjugation of 
individual autonomy to the promotion of collective religious and cultural goals 
at Member State level,19 thereby promoting the degree of pluralism necessary 
for cultural evolution to remain sufficiently open and reflexive to enable 
groups which are currently outsiders to contribute to the process of cultural 
evolution.
Accordingly, the thesis will suggest that, while the EU is not secular, if 
predictions of the return of religion to the political arena20 prove correct, the 
Union may well provide limitations on the impact of such a return in the 
coming decades and may play an important role in the evolution of the 
relationship between the law, politics, the state and religion in Europe. While 
recognising the serious nature of the issues of equal treatment of differing 
religions caused by the linking of religion’s public role to its cultural status 
which an identity-focused approach involves, the thesis concludes by 
suggesting that the Union’s attempts to distinguish between this cultural role 
and explicitly religious claims within the public sphere represent a justifiable 
balance between ensuring respect for the its cultural and legal pluralism while 
constructing a distinctive public order with identifiable fundamental norms.
19 See Chapter III, Section 5.
20 P. Berger and G. Weigel (eds.) The Decsecularization of the M odem World: Resurgent 
Religion and Modem Politics (Grand Rapids Michigan, Erdemans Publishing Company and 
Public Policy Center, 1999).
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1. Introduction
This thesis suggests that EU law deals with religion largely as a matter of 
identity and on the basis of what the Union sees as Europe’s ethical tradition 
of a balance between religious, humanist and cultural influences. This chapter 
sets out the factual background to this analysis by setting out the fundamental 
elements of contemporary European approaches to the relationship between 
religion the law and the state. The Union regulates religion in a context in 
which the majority of political power and religious practice remains within 
national contexts1 and through a public order which is committed to respecting 
pluralism and national cultural autonomy. The approaches of Member States 
to religion are characterised by Europe’s common heritage of Christianity and 
by humanist and secular influences which have emerged from European
1 Although international religions such as the Catholic Church are by definition not national 
bodies, their hierarchies and clergy are nevertheless organised along national lines to a 
significant extent.
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history and which have limited religious influence over law and politics in 
Europe to a greater degree than elsewhere. However, the balance between 
these influences is struck differently in differing Member States and 
arrangements in relation to the official status of religion or religions, the 
political and legal influence of religion and the cultural and institutional role 
of religious bodies, vary significantly from state to state. Despite such 
diversity, this chapter demonstrates how certain common themes and patterns 
can be identified. All current EU Member States share a Christian past but 
have also been exposed to humanist and secular influences which have 
reduced religious influence over law and politics. However, religion has 
retained a role in both personal and collective identities. Religious institutions 
retain important roles in areas such as healthcare and education in almost all 
Member States while many States retain official links to particular Christian 
denominations which remain an important element of national identity. No EU 
Member State is a fully-fledged theocracy and limitations on religious 
influence are a key element of the shared European ethical tradition. On the 
other hand, religious groups have retained some influence over law and policy 
in certain areas, albeit to a declining degree. The chapter therefore provides a 
broad outline of the approach of EU Member States to religion which is 
characterised by a significant degree of diversity but also by a common view 
of religion as an important aspect of national, collective and individual 
identities which has both an particular institutional position and a degree of 
influence (albeit one which is limited and declining) over law and politics.
The chapter begins by sketching the role played by Christianity in European 
history and identity before moving on to analyse the theoretical explanations 
of the secularisation process which has led to the establishment of significant 
limitations on religious influence over law, politics and society in Europe. It 
notes how these developments have given rise to competing versions of 
European identity centred on Christianity and secularism. Section three notes 
that the degree of secularisation undergone by European societies is rather 
exceptional in international terms. However, it also demonstrates how recent 
theories of secularisation accept that, even in secularised societies, religion has 
not disappeared and continues to exercise influence in certain areas, most
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notably issues relating to sexual morality and the beginning and end of life 
(“lifeworld” issues) as well as questions of communal identity. Section four 
applies these theoretical findings to contemporary Europe. It notes how 
religion’s continuing role in individual identity is shown by the high levels of 
nominal adherence to religion as well as by the widely divergent levels of 
religious practice shown by the populations of European states. It describes 
how religious influence over law and politics has declined, even in relation to 
“lifeworld” issues, but that religious bodies nevertheless retain a degree of 
influence in these matters. This section also considers the role played by 
religion in national identity and the constitutional and institutional position of 
religion in the Member States. It shows how there is a wide degree of 
divergence between states with options from official embrace of a single 
religion to official secularism being found amongst EU members. 
Nevertheless, almost all states provide some degree of recognition or support 
to religion and religious bodies retain significant roles in the provision of 
healthcare and education.
The chapter therefore establishes that, while religion exercises a comparatively 
low level of influence over European societies, attachment to a particular form 
of religion, or way of dealing with religion, is a key element in the both 
personal identity and the national identity of many Member States. 
Furthermore, while religious influence over law and politics has declined, it is 
not entirely a thing of the past. However, the role played by religion in these 
areas is counterbalanced by strong humanist and secular influences which 
have marked European history and the overall picture is therefore one of 
balance between religious and secular influences which is struck in differing 
ways in the various Member States. It is in this context that the Union’s 
regulation of religion and development of its own constitutional approach to 
religious issues takes place.
2. A Legacy of Christianity and Secularisation
Religion and Western Christianity in particular, have played a foundational 
role in the establishment of the very ideas of Europe and European identity. Le 
Goff suggests that “it was Christianisation above all that brought uniformity
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to the West in the Early Middle Ages.”2 He notes how the first time medieval 
chroniclers described an event as “European” was the victory of Christian 
Frankish forces over a Muslim army at Poitiers in 7323and how with the 
crusades of the 11th century, Western Christianity became synonymous with a 
European identity which defined itself against the Islamic and Byzantine 
Orthodox Christian civilizations to its South and East, a process which was 
reinforced with the fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Turks and the military 
threat posed by Ottoman Empire until the 17th century.4 Le Goff also 
describes how certain features of Western Christianity gave rise to key ideas 
and distinctions which were to have a profound effect on the political 
development of Europe. In particular he suggests that the separation of the 
laity and the clergy by Pope Gregory VII helped to bring about a degree of 
separation between Caesar and God which distinguished European civilisation 
from the Caesaro-Papism of the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Islamic 
approach which did not differentiate between the religious and political 
domains.5 Furthermore, he notes how the emergence during the 11th and 12th 
centuries of a strong emphasis on the belief that man was made in the image of 
God gave rise to a strong strain of humanism which was to have important 
consequences in terms of the importance accorded to the individual in 
European society in future centuries.
Although Le Goff suggests that these features “involved the rejection of 
theocracy [....] and a balance between faith and reason,”6 both he and other 
authors such as Taylor and Casanova agree that up to the 15th century all areas 
of European life were dominated by religion and by Western Christianity in 
particular.7 However, beginning in the late 15th century, Europe embarked on 
a long process of secularisation or what Taylor calls “disenchantment” which 
led to a decline in religious influence over political and ultimately, personal, 
life that has few parallels elsewhere in the world. Various explanations have
2 J. Le Goff The Birth of Europe (Malden MA and Oxford UK, Blackwell 2005) 22.
3 Ibid. 26.
4 Ibid. 10.
5 Ibid. 60.
6 Ibid. 196.
7 n. 2 above 200. See also J. Casanova Public Religions in the M odem World (Chicago and 
London, University of Chicago Press, 1994) 20.
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been provided for this development. Casanova argues that this reduction in 
religious influence was caused by four main factors. The Protestant 
Reformation undermined the universalist claims of the Catholic Church, the 
rise of the modern state with its monopolisation of force undermined the 
compulsory nature of religion, the rise of capitalism and markets removed 
economic life from the control of religious bodies and ideas and finally, early 
modem science brought about new and autonomous methods of verifying
O
truth. This combination of factors eventually brought about a situation in 
modem Europe where “the quest for subjective meaning is a strictly personal 
affair [and] the primary “public” institutions (state, economy) no longer need 
or are interested in maintaining a sacred cosmos or public religious 
worldview.”9
Similarly Bruce10 argues that it was the increase in both individualism and 
rationality engendered by the Reformation which began the process which was 
to result in the secularisation of modem Europe. He submitted that 
“individualism threatened the communal basis o f religious belief and 
behaviour, while rationality removed many o f the purposes o f religion and 
made many o f its beliefs implausible”.n The decline of religious influence was 
strengthened by the rise of the nation state in the post Reformation period. In 
particular, he suggests that the adoption of a policy based on a degree of 
mutual tolerance following the Treaty of Westphalia as enabling a “live and let 
live” attitude towards religion which came to predominate over the unbending 
convictions of previous generations. This acceptance of a degree of pluralism 
eventually brought about a situation where religion (and eventually, even the 
idea of God) became part of a world of choices and preferences. Previously 
dominant churches therefore lost the central role they once had in society as an 
increasingly rational citizenry exercised their choice in religious matters to 
follow individualistic and subjective forms of religion with a consequent 
decline in the role and influence of traditional religious denominations.
8 J. Casanova Public Religions in the M odem World (Chicago and London, University of 
Chicago Press, 1994) 21-24.
9 Ibid. 37.
10 S. Bruce, From Cathedrals to Cults: Religion in the Modern World (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1996).
11 Ibid. 230.
30
Weber and Durkheim both attributed major importance to the emergence of 
capitalism and saw religious decline as an inevitable by-product of modernity. 
Weber saw the Industrial Revolution as having encouraged a process of 
“capitalist secularisation” where “irrational compulsion” was replaced by 
“sober economic virtue” and utilitarianism.12 Durkheim, on the other hand, 
stressed the role of modern industrial society in promoting “functional 
differentiation” under which specialised autonomous professions rather than 
ecclesiastical institutions became the providers of goods such as healthcare, 
education and welfare.13
Other theorists have focused on internal developments within religion. Stark 
and Iannaccone put forward what has been called a “supply side” theory, 
arguing that the dominance of single denominations and state subsidy brought 
about a complacent clergy and unadaptive ecclesiastical environment which 
depressed levels of belief and practice.14 Taylor on the other hand emphasises 
political and moral changes which, he suggests, arose from within 
Christianity. He suggests that religions reformers such as Luther and Calvin 
built on the humanistic elements of Christianity and gave new importance and 
dignity to ordinary human flourishing by abolishing the distinction between 
sacred and profane activities. Christian humanism, also facilitated the growth 
of Deism which centred religious belief around personal experience and 
reason rather than revelation. Such an approach, he suggests, empowered 
individuals to determine their own relationship to the divine and led to the 
modem “age of authenticity” where individuals are encouraged to develop 
their own identities and approaches to life.15
Whatever its origins, the process of secularisation was vigorously resisted by 
many religious bodies, particularly, the Catholic Church but has nevertheless
12 M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism (New York, Scribner’s, 1930 
[1904]).
13 E. Durkheim The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (Oxford and New York, Oxford 
World’s Classics, Oxford University Press, 2001).
14 R. Stark and L.R. Iannaccone “A supply-side reinterpretation of the “secularization” of 
Europe”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 33(3) (1994), 230-252 at 231.
15 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2007).
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led to a situation where the levels of religious practice, belief and influence 
over the legal and political domains are weaker in Europe than in any other 
continent.16 However, both Taylor and Casanova agree that this process has 
not resulted in the removal of religious influence from European life. As is 
shown below, religion continues to seek to influence law and public policy, 
particularly in relation to “lifeworld’ issues such as family, sexuality and the 
beginning and end of life.17 Furthermore, Taylor argues that, even in 
secularised societies such as Europe, there is an “irrepressible desire for the 
transcendent”18 which has been seen in recent centuries in the romantic and 
nationalist movements as well as in the success of evangelical religious 
movements and the anti-humanist movements such as fascism, which saw a 
purely rationally based worldview and the cooperative demands made by such 
an approach as suffocating the human spirit.19 Moreover as Davie points out,20 
levels of nominal adherence to religion remain high in Europe while Christian 
religious institutions and symbols remain important elements of national life 
and identity of most EU member states. This dualism has been highlighted by 
Olivier Roy who, while agreeing that “Western secularism actually has a 
Christian origin”,21 nevertheless notes that secularism and Christianity 
provide two potentially competing poles around which Western identity can be 
defined. In this vein he suggests that the West (and therefore also Europe) is 
defined either:
“m Christian terms or [...] in reference to the philosophy of the
Enlightenment, human rights, and democracy that developed against the
Catholic Church through first the Protestant Reformation , then the
22Enlightenment, and finally the secular and democratic ideal”.
16 P. Norris and R. Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).
17 See sections 3.2 and 4.2 below.
18 n. 15 above.
19 Ibid.
20 G. Davie Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modem World 
London, Darton, Longman Todd, 2002).
21 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007) Preface, ix.
22 Ibid. vii.
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3. The Post-Secularisation Role of Religion in Contemporary Europe
3.1 Europe as a Secular Exception
Despite the near-universal acceptance of secularisation theory in academic 
circles up until the 1960s, religion in the outside world stubbornly refused to 
wither away as predicted. Furthermore, the persistence of religion was limited 
to pre-industrial countries in the less developed world. Berger, previously a 
committed advocate of secularisation theory, recanted and conceded that the 
non-Westem world was “as furiously religious as ever” and that evidence of 
religious decline in the United States was largely absent. The continuing 
religious vitality of the United States (with its highly developed religious 
pluralism) called into question the link between pluralism, relativism and 
secularity.23
However, although religion remained strong in many areas of the world, in 
Europe, it was undeniable that a significant degree of secularisation had taken 
place. In this context, Europe, as a progressively secularising continent, 
eventually came to be seen as the exception the rule of a persistently religious 
world rather than the trail blazer to a secular future. Although, as is discussed 
below, most Europeans retained at least an nominal affiliation to Christianity, 
as Cox pointed out: “an unwillingness by most Europeans to declare 
themselves entirely atheistic, or to abandon irrevocably all hope o f life after 
death, is not persuasive evidence that Berlin and Amsterdam are throbbing 
with a hidden Durkheimian numinosity”, 2 4  Furthermore he notes that the fact 
that “in large areas of modem Europe, religious men and women who attempt 
to create new religious institutions run into a brick wall o f resistance and 
indifference”.25 Attempts to introduce televangelism to Europe for example, 
have found that that kind of religion simply does not find an appreciative 
audience in amongst Europeans in the way it clearly does elsewhere.
23 P. Berger A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age o f Credulity, (New York, Free Press, 
1992) at 32.
24 J. Cox “Master Narratives of Long-Term Religious Change” in H. Me Leod and W. Ustof 
(eds.) The Decline o f Christendom in Western Europe, 175-2000 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003) 203-204.
25 Ibid.
26 G. Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the M odem World 
London, Darton, Longman Todd, 2002) at 32.
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Whatever the merits of their arguments in relation to secularisation theory as it 
applies to the world in general, attempts to deny Europe’s progressive 
secularisation, like those who used confidently to predict the eventual 
disappearance of religion altogether, run into what Cox describes as the
97“triumphant empirical rebuttal” of a welter of statistics showing a 
continuing decline in levels of religious practice and belief amongst Europeans 
in general.
3.2 The Post Secularisation Political and Legal Role of Religion
Nevertheless it was also clear that, although secularisation had occurred, it had
not meant that religion had disappeared altogether from European life.
28Casanova has adapted secularization theory to take account of the continuing 
influence exercised by religious organizations and worldviews over certain 
areas of law and politics. He agrees that this process has brought about a 
fundamental change in the role of religion in society but departs more 
radically from traditional secularisation theories in rejecting the idea that the 
emancipation of the secular spheres meant that religion would inevitably 
decline and disappear. He rejects the idea that religion in the modem world 
has been relegated to the private sphere arguing that religion and politics have 
a symbiotic relationship and that “the walls separating church and state
9Qcontinually develop cracks through which they penetrate each other” 
Religions, he asserts, have refused to accept the marginal role allocated to 
them under the liberal state model of separation. The Catholic Church in 
particular has refused to accept that separation of church and state means the 
privatization of morality.30 While he agrees that the Churches neither can nor 
should seek to control the state, Casanova rejects the secularist idea of a 
neutral public square as damaging to both religion and politics31 and as biased 
against those who have religious faith.32 Accordingly he sees three
27 n. 24 above, 205.
28 n. 8 above.
29 Ibid. 41.
30 Ibid. 57.
31 Ibid. 61.
32 Ibid. 64.
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circumstances under which modem religions should and in fact do intervene in 
the public square. These are:
1. To protect modem freedoms and rights against an absolutist 
authoritarian state (such as the ecclesiastical opposition to dictatorship in 
Brazil and Spain).
2. To contest the absolute lawful autonomy of secular spheres and their 
claim to be organised according to principles of functional differentiation 
without regard to extraneous moral/ethical considerations. (Casanova gives the 
example of the opposition to arms race in the US by the Catholic church in 
the 1980s, but, in the EU context, a more relevant example may be the 
consistent warnings of the Catholic hierarchy and clerics of other religions 
against the absolute primacy of the market in modem society).
3. To protect the what he terms the “traditional life-world” (ie. questions 
relating to the beginning and end of life (such as euthanasia, bio-ethics and 
abortion), family policy and sexuality) from administrative or juridical state 
penetration and in the process to open up issues of norm and will formation to 
the public and collective self-reflection of modem discursive ethics. Casanova 
gives the example of the public mobilization of the so-called Moral Majority 
and the Catholic public stand on abortion in support of “the right to life” in the 
United States as examples of this third instance.33 In the European context, the 
Catholic Church has been equally active in relation to EU policies related to 
these lifeworld issues.
In summary, Casanova accepts that modernisation has played a key role in 
bringing about a significant decline in religious influence in modem society. 
The emancipation of the secular spheres from ecclesiastical control is, he 
believes “incontestable and a modem structural trend” ?A However, he rejects 
the idea that this process of secularisation will inevitably bring about the 
disappearance and privatisation of religion, asserting that where churches have 
avoided excessive entanglement with the state, religion can retain vitality and
33 Ibid. 228-229.
34 Ibid. 212.
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that in the modern democratic state, religions continue to play a public role in 
certain areas.
Casanova’s adaptation of secularisation theory would appear to account 
successfully for many (though not all) of the features of the role of religion in 
contemporary Europe. It is clear that, in European terms at least, processes 
such as the rise of the nation-state and the capitalist economy, coupled with 
scientific and educational advances, have brought about a decline in the 
influence of religion on society. Indeed, even the Catholic Church, having 
fought the emergence of the secular state for centuries, began in the mid 1960s 
a tortuous process o f official aggiomamento to secular modernity [in which 
it] accepted the legitimacy o f the modern age”. However this has not meant 
that religion has disappeared from European life in either its private or public 
forms.
More importantly, the churches themselves have not abandoned their public, 
political role. As Casanova pointed out, the Catholic Church in particular, 
despite its acceptance of the legitimacy of the secular state, has explicitly 
rejected the notion of religion as a purely private matter and continues to 
challenge the absolute autonomy of the key secular spheres of the market and 
the state and to intervene in public affairs on a wide range of issues, 
particularly those connected to the “lifeworld”. In its “Doctrinal Note on Some
36Questions Regarding the Participation o f Catholics in Political Life” the 
Vatican authorities stated bluntly that legislators had “a grave and clear 
obligation to oppose” any law that attacks human life and that it was 
“impossible” for any Catholic to vote for such laws.37 More broadly, the same 
document states that “a well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one 
to vote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the
38fundamental contents o f faith and morals”.
35 Ibid. 9.
36 “Doctrinal Note on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of Catholics in Political 
Life 16 January 2003, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Quoted in D. 
Yamane, The Catholic Church in State Politics: Negotiating Prophetic Demands and Political 
Realities (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 151.
Ibid.37
38Ibid..
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Support for the argument that the churches do retain an influential public role 
is provided by Halman and Riis who argue that what they term “modem 
people” are “less prone to accept the churches as moral authorities though
39they may still accept them as advisors on a limited range of moral issues.” 
Thus while religious bodies express views on a wide range of matters, their 
influence is concentrated on certain issues. This hypothesis is further 
supported by Procter and Homsby-Smith’s work which showed that while 
political values on socio-economic issues could not be predicted on the basis 
of levels of religious practice and identification, a significant relationship 
could be shown between the latter and attitudes to questions of ‘family 
values”40 Thus, even in highly secularised societies such as Europe, churches 
act most strongly and have most influence in relation to state attempts to 
regulate the private sphere (namely those areas of policy impinging on the 
“lifeworld’ of family policy, the beginning and ending of life, sexuality and 
bio-ethics). Indeed in a 2006 address to the European People’s Party, Pope 
Benedict XVI stated that:
"As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the principal focus o f her 
interventions in the public arena is the protection and promotion of the dignity 
of the person, and she is thereby consciously drawing particular attention to 
principles which are not negotiable "Al
As to the specific areas of policy related to the dignity of the person, the Pope 
mentioned three areas upon which the church had focused:
39 L. Halman and O. Riis (eds) Religion in Secularizing Society: The Europeans’ Religion at 
the End of the 20th Centrury (Brill, Leiden, Boston 2003) 5.
40 M. Procter and M. Hornsby-Smith “Individual Context Religiosity, Religious [sic.] and 
Values in Europe and North America” in L. Halman and O. Riis (eds) Religion in Secularizing 
Society: The Europeans’ Religion at the End of the 20th Centrury (Brill, Leiden, Boston 2003) 
at 110-111. Norris and Inglehart also note a weakening in the relationship between a general 
right political orientation and religiosity over the last twenty years in most industrial and post­
industrial societies apart from the United States and Austria (n.16 above, 228). While several 
commentators note that there continues to be a link between religiosity and support of right 
wing political parties, the significance of Procter and Hornsby-Smith’s work is that this 
orientation is influenced to a greater degree by the attitudes of right wing parties to 
“lifeworld” issues rather than their stances on socio-economic matters.
41 Address of Pope Benedict XVI to the European People’s Party of 30 March 2006 full text 
at: http://www.vatican.va/holy father/benedict xvi/speeches/2006/march/documents/hf ben- 
xvi spe 20060330 eu-parliamentarians en.html (last visited 20 June 2008).
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protection o f life in all its stages, from the first moment o f conception until 
natural death;
- recognition and promotion of the natural structure o f the family - as a union 
between a man and a woman based on marriage - and its defence from  
attempts to make it juridically equivalent to radically different forms o f union 
which in reality harm it and contribute to its destabilization, obscuring its 
particular character and its irreplaceable social role;
- the protection o f the right o f parents to educate their children”42
These issues both are at the forefront of contemporary political debate within 
Europe43 and at the crux of the value differences separating values of the West 
from those of less economically developed regions.44 Large scale immigration 
into Europe, particularly from Muslim countries, has given these issues a new 
lease of life45 and has reopened conflicts which the proponents of traditional 
Christian morality had thought lost for many years. In late 2004 an expert 
group appointed by the EU issued a report entitled Islam and Fundamental 
Rights in Europe which concluded that:
“the major area o f conflict between Islam and Human Rights is not politics but 
on Civil Law and culture as demonstrated in the debate over secularism and 
Islam. The highest divergence between Muslims and non-Muslims seem to 
concern the questions o f morality and sexuality as shown in the debate over 
the headscarf but also on the question o f sexual orientation”46
42 Ibid.
43 See for example, B. Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West 
from Within, (New York, Doubleday, 2006).
44 n. 16 above.
45 J. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe,
(Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2005, 1 5 ,1 6  and 92.
6 See J. Cesari, A. Caeiro and D. Hussain Islam and Fundamental Rights in Europe Final 
Report, October 2004, European Commission, DG Justice and Home Affairs Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifique, Ecole Practique de Hautes Etudes, Groupe de Sociologie des 
Religions et de la Laicite, paragraph 3 of the Executive Summary.
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This conclusion was underlined by joint statement condemning homosexuality 
on the part of leading figures from a range of Islamic organisations in early 
2006 which was published in the London Times newspaper.47
Thus, although significant secularisation has taken place, and although most 
mainstream European religions have come to accept the legitimacy of secular 
political authority, this has not meant that religion has been removed from law 
or political life, Instead, in certain areas, religion continues to seek to play a 
role in relation to, and to varying degrees, succeeds in influencing, law and 
politics in the Member States of the European Union.
3.3 Religion and Identity
In addition to its continuing role in the legal and political arenas, theorists 
have noted the continuing importance of religion in matters of identity in 
Europe. Davie acknowledges that there has been a striking decline in religious 
belief and practice in Europe. She argues however, that large numbers of 
Europeans who do not themselves practice their religion actively, nevertheless 
retain a religious sensitivity, approve of religion in a general way and are 
pleased that the smaller number of active religious participants do practice 
their faith.48 This, Davie terms, “vicarious religion” and she sees it as 
representing a uniquely European frame of mind in which the actively 
religious are seen as carrying out religious activities “on behalf o f  the non- 
actively religious. In an approach reminiscent of supply-side theories, she 
regards such an attitude as springing partly from European attitudes to public 
utilities which they may never use themselves but whose existence they 
nevertheless approve of. Churches, Davie argues, have become de facto 
influential voluntary organisations capable of operating in a variety of ways. 
As members of civil society, churches are “central to the structures o f a 
modem democracy and attract more members than almost all o f their 
organisational equivalents”.49 She therefore concludes the Europeans have not 
become less religious but differently so. They are content for a minority of the
47 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,59- 1984362.00.html (accessed 6 October 2006).
48 G. Davie, Religion in Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000).
49 Ibid. 18.
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population to enact their “religious memory”50 on their behalf with a level of 
awareness that they may need to draw on such religious facilities at certain 
times in their lives. In this regard, Davie noted the almost universal take up of 
religious ceremonies at the time of death, the prominent role accorded to 
churches in times of national crisis such as the sinking of the ferry Estonia in 
the Baltic Sea in 1994 or after the death of Princess Diana in 1997 and the 
growth in “New Age” spirituality amongst Europeans in recent times.51
Hervieu-Leger also focuses on religion’s role in terms of collective identity. 
She views religion as an aspect of a shared memory, awareness of which is an 
essential feature of both individual and social identity.52 Furthermore it is also 
an important element of the chain which links past, current and future 
members of a community. The tradition of collective memory of that 
community becomes the basis of that community’s existence. Modem 
societies, by their nature, are less capable of maintaining the communal 
memory which is central to their religious existence and it is the resultant 
amnesia rather than increased rationalism that causes the decline in religion. 
Although she believes that modem societies are corrosive of traditional 
religion,53 Hervieu-Leger believes that such societies through their emphasis 
on progress which can only ever be partially attained, also produce “utopian” 
spaces which can only be filled by religion. This analysis supports Davie’s 
view of a Europe that has become differently religious rather than secular.
4. Religious Practice, Belief and Influence in Europe: The Current 
Situation
4.1 Practice and Belief
This theoretical picture of a decline in religious belief, practice and influence 
over society but the persistence of a religious element to collective and 
individual identity is borne out by the statistics on religious identity and 
practice in Europe. According to the World Values Survey some 49% of those 
in agrarian societies reported attendance a religious service at least once a
50 n.26 above, 46.
51 Ibid. 19.
52 D. Hervieu-Leger, La Religion pour memoire (Paris, Le Cerf, 1993).
53 D. Hervieu-Leger, Vers un nouveau christianisme (Paris, Le Cerf, 1993).
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week.54 In the developed United States, the figure is almost as high at 46%.55 
The European Values Survey by contrast found that in 1999/2000 only 20.5% 
of Western Europeans reported similar levels of church attendance.56 
Similarly, in relation to core religious beliefs, only 53.3% of Western 
Europeans said they believed in life after death,57 a figure some 23% lower
CO
than that given by respondents in the United States. Europeans also 
significantly lower levels of belief in notions such as heaven, hell, sin, and in 
the existence of a deity than either less developed societies or developed 
countries such as Canada and the United States.59 Furthermore, according to 
the 2006 Eurobarometer survey, religion is an important source of values for a 
mere 7% of Europeans. Values such as peace (52%), respect for human life 
(43%), human rights (41%) democracy (24%) and individual freedom (22%) 
were viewed as significantly more important in this regard.60
The picture across Europe is, however, far from uniform. In Scandinavia for 
example, levels of weekly church attendance are extremely low with both 
Denmark and Sweden coming in at under 4% and Finland barely exceeding 
5%. In Ireland, by contrast some 56.9% of respondents were weekly 
churchgoers.61 Several commentators62 argue that, in terms of religion, Europe 
can be divided into a traditionally Protestant North characterised by low levels 
of practice and belief, a traditionally Catholic South with higher (though 
declining) levels and a denominationally mixed zone which is between the
54 n. 16 above, 70.
55 Ibid. 74. The figure in relation to the United States is the figure from the 2001 survey while 
the figure for agrarian societies represents a composite of the figures for all surveys between 
1981 and 2001.
56 n.26 above, 6.
57 Ibid. 7.
58 Ibid..
59 Ibid. 6,1. See also data from the Gallup Opinion Index and World Values Survey quoted at 
page 90 of Norris and Inglehart (n.16 above).
60 Eurobarometer 66 (2006) Standard Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf (last 
visited 30May 2007).
61 n. 26 above, 6-7.
62 Ibid. 11 and L. Halman and T. Pettersson “Differential Patterns of Secularization in Europe: 
Exploring the Impact of Religion on Social Values” in L. Halman and O. Riis (eds) Religion 
in Secularizing Society, (Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2003) 54.
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two. Even within these groups there is considerable diversity (traditionally 
Catholic France for example manifests patterns of belief and practice which 
are closer to those of the Protestant North) and countries which simply fail to 
fit the pattern (Ireland which is geographically and culturally part of the North 
shows a greater resemblance to the its fellow Catholic countries in the South 
in relation to levels of belief and practice).
The situation is further complicated by the growth of immigrant populations 
who not only adhere to religions not traditionally present in Europe, but who 
come from societies where religion and religiously influenced values continue 
to play a dominant role.64 Both France and Germany for instance now have 
Muslim populations several million strong, while Britain plays host to large 
numbers of evangelical Christians from its African and Caribbean ex-colonies 
as well as significant populations of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus from the 
Indian sub-continent. In several countries, most notably the Netherlands, 
Germany and France the persistence and strength of traditional religious 
values amongst immigrant communities has come to be seen as a problem by a 
significant section of society and has increased tensions between migrant 
groups and host populations. Indeed, some of those opposed to further 
immigration and others who favour immigration but oppose multiculturalism 
have stressed secularity rather than Christianity as a non-negotiable feature of 
European identity to which incomers must conform.65
Furthermore, despite the sustained secularisation, religion in general and 
Christianity in particular does continue to exercise an influence over European 
society. A large (though declining) number of Europeans (77.4%) continue to
63 Ibid. 11.
64 n. 26 above, 38-39.
65 See Chapters IV and V. The rise of the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands was closely 
connected to a desire to require Muslim immigrants to adopt “European Values”, particularly 
the separation of religious norms from questions of gender equality and sexuality. These 
arguments have since been incorporated into immigration policy in several countries including 
the Netherlands. Grace Davie has argued that the difference in attitude to religion of native 
Europeans and immigrant communities “has led to persistent and damaging 
misunderstandings, not least amongst groups whose religious commitments form the very core 
of their existence and fo r whom a pick-and-mix, live-and-let-live attitude simply will not do.” 
G. Davie, “Religion in Britain: Changing sociological assumptions” Sociology, 34/1:113-128. 
Quoted at n. 26 above, 40.
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profess a belief in God66 while a significant number continue to use religious 
services to mark key life events such as marriage or death. Indeed, even in 
highly secularised Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden, 
where levels of belief in key elements of Christian theology such as the 
existence of a life after death are under 50%, the vast majority of the 
population continue to belong to the Lutheran state churches (a step which 
requires them to pay a proportion of their income to those churches). 
Questions may well be asked as to whether the use of familiar ceremonies to 
mark life events represents any meaningful level of religious engagement or 
belief or whether high church membership in Scandinavia is in fact merely an 
instance of cultural nationalism rather than cultural religiosity, but the fact 
remains that, despite unprecedented declines in religious belief and practice, 
European life continues to be marked by certain features which are, at the very 
least, arguably religious. Furthermore, “alternative” or “new age” spirituality 
has been growing steadily as mainstream religion has declined enabling some 
to argue that it is merely the form and not the level of religiosity that has 
changed.67
The overall picture however, particularly in international terms, remains one 
of a Europe whose people are more secular than either their contemporaries in 
other continents or their ancestors at any time during the past two millennia. 
The inhabitants of Europe are, as a whole, less likely than any other people in 
the world to believe in God, sin, heaven, hell, or life after death than those of 
any other continent and are even less likely to attend any kind of religious 
ceremony on a frequent basis. Having dominated the social, political, legal and 
economic life of Europe for centuries, mainstream Christian denominations 
now find themselves in a position of weakness that has no parallel either in 
history or in the rest of the modem world. They have found themselves in this 
situation precisely at the time when the nation states of Europe have been 
attempting to create a new and common political community based on 
common values of which Christianity would once have been the primary 
source. Indeed, Martin once argued that “Europe is a unity by virtue o f having
66 n.26 above, 7.
67 Ibid. 19.
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one God and one Caesar”.68 An argument which is given credence by the fact 
that, historically Catholic and Protestant countries of the former Soviet bloc 
have found it significantly easier to achieve membership of the Union than 
their Orthodox equivalents. As the debates around the preamble to the 
proposed Constitutional Treaty showed69 however, the applicability of 
Martin’s assertion to the present day, highly controversial.
4.2 Declining Influence over Law and Politics
Furthermore, while Casanova is correct that religious bodies retain a degree of 
influence in relation to “lifeworld” issues, this influence is comparatively 
weak and declining. Not only has the increasing de-ideologisation of politics 
since the end of the Cold War, with its emphasis on economics as a 
technocratic sphere subject more to its internal laws than those of any 
overarching ideology, made it increasingly difficult for organisations such as 
churches which retain such comprehensive worldviews, to remain relevant in 
relation to issues of socio-economic policy. Even in relation to lifeworld 
issues, European religious groups have had far less success than their 
American counterparts in opposing the liberalization of policy in relation to 
family structures and sexuality.
The post war period in Europe has been characterised by a steady decline in 
religious influence in this area. For instance, in 1940, homosexuality was 
illegal in 17 of the 25 states which were members of the EU in 2004.70 Only 
two of states had decriminalised homosexuality since 1822 with Portugal 
having reintroduced its ban in 1912. However, beginning with Sweden in 1944 
states began to remove the criminal law from this area. The process was quite 
gradual at first with Portugal (1945) and Greece (1951) being the only 
countries to change their policy between the end of the war and the beginning 
of the 1960s. The next two decades saw this trend increase with 9 states
68 D. Martin, A General Theory of Secularisation, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1978) 100.
69 See Chapter II.
70See: The International Lesbian and Gay Association, World Legal Survey, available at: 
http://www.ilga.info/Information/Legal survev/europe/world legal survey europe.htm (last 
visited 9 November 2006).
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71wholly or partially decriminalising homosexual conduct by 1980. By 1993, 
Ireland found itself to be the only then member of the Union to maintain a 
policy of complete criminalisation and reformed its laws later that year. The 
countries of central and Eastern Europe which sought to join the Union 
following the fall of the Iron Curtain all decriminalised before accession 
(though, in the case of Romania and Cyprus, only as a result of pressure from 
European institutions).72 The Catholic and Orthodox churches in particular 
were opposed to this process.73
The law in relation to abortion was subject to a similar process.74 By the end 
of the Second World War only Sweden had legalised the practice. During the 
1950s Hungary (1956), Poland (1956), the USSR (which contained the Baltic 
Republics at the time)(1955) and Denmark (1956) all decriminalised abortion 
in certain circumstances. During this time, the Netherlands also introduced a 
policy of de facto toleration although the relevant legislation was not passed 
until 1981. The United Kingdom (apart from Northern Ireland where religious 
feelings ran much more strongly) passed legislation providing for a liberal 
abortion regime in 1967. During the 1970s and despite the fervent opposition 
of religious figures in general (and the Catholic Church in particular), bans on 
abortion were relaxed or abolished in Finland (1970), East Germany (1972), 
France (1975) and West Germany (1976). This trend continued thoughout the 
1980s with Portugal (1984), Spain (1985) and Greece (1986) liberalising their 
legislation in this area. A notable exception to this trend was Ireland where 
following a campaign which in which the Catholic Church was heavily 
involved, the constitution was amended in 1983 to grant the unborn an equal
71 Decriminalisation occurred in the following order: Hungary (1961), Czechoslovakia (1961), 
England and Wales (1967 though the law was not changed in Scotland until 1980 and 
Northern Ireland until 1982)) and Germany (1968 in the East and 1969 in the West), Austria 
(1971), Finland (1971), Malta 1973, Slovenia (1977).
72 The Baltic states decriminalized in 1992 (Latvia and Estonia) and 1993 (Lithuania) with 
Romania and Cyprus doing so in the year 2000).
73 For an account of the opposition of the Irish Catholic Church to reform of the Irish law see 
K. Rose in “Equality for Lesbians and Gay Men, A Report of ILGA Europe” June 1998 
available at: http://www.steff.suite.dk/report.htm (last visited 8 November 2006). It is perhaps 
noteworthy that this document was financially supported by the European Commission. For an 
account of the opposition of the Cypriot and Romanian Orthodox Churches and the attitude of 
the EU to this process see Chapter IV.
74 See the Childbirth by Choice Trust Report “Abortion Law, History and Religion” available 
at: http://www.cbctrust.com/historv law religion,php#7 (last visited 8 November 2006).
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right to life to that of the mother. Similarly, following the removal of 
restrictions on religious influence on public life which resulted from the 
overthrow of communism in Poland, the previously liberal abortion law was 
significantly tightened in 1993.
The law in relation to other “lifeworld” issues such as adultery and divorce has 
also been subject to a decreasing degree of religious influence. Adultery, for 
instance, was considered a crime in several European countries until the 1970s 
all of which subsequently decriminalised the practice while divorce was
1 r
finally legalised in Ireland in 1997. On the other hand, traditional attitudes 
towards lifeworld issues persist in many Member States, particularly those
1f\which have joined since 2004. Furthermore, laws in relation to issues such as 
euthanasia and same-sex marriage continue to be influenced, at least partially, 
by religious teachings and in all Member States religious figures are 
prominent participants in debate on such matters. Therefore, although the 
ability of religious organisations to influence law in this area has steeply 
declined since the end of the Second World War, there is considerable 
diversity between Member States and a degree of religious influence remains. 
Nevertheless, in world terms, the balance struck in Europe between the 
promotion of traditional religious morality and humanist notions of individual 
autonomy favours the latter to a notable degree.
4.3 Continuing Role in National identity
The religious history and background of Member States continues to exercise 
an influence, even following intensive secularisation. As Norris and Inglehart 
put it:
75 Irish law criminalised adultery until 1981, French law until 1975 and Austrian law until 
1997. See K. Gajendra Singh, “EU-Turkish Engagement: A Must for Stability of the Region”, 
South Asia Analysis Group Papers http://www.saag.org/papersl2/paperll27.html (last visited 
19 June 2006).
76 Eurobarometer 66 (2006) Standard Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union 
available
at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf (last visited 
30 May 2007).
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“the distinctive world views that were originally linked with religious 
traditions have shaped the cultures o f each nation in an enduring fashion;
today, these distinctive values are transmitted to the citizens even if they never
11
set foot in a church, temple or mosque.”
They argue that Sweden, for example, continues to manifest a distinctive 
Protestant value system although less than 5% of the population attends 
church on a weekly basis.78 To a degree therefore, religions continue to 
influence the values of very secularized societies with Norris and Inglehart 
noting the particular relevance of orientations towards work ethic, sexual 
liberalization and democracy in Catholic and Protestant societies. There are, it 
is therefore argued, “Lutheran atheists” and “Catholic atheists” with religious 
influence on values continuing after actual belief and practice have fallen 
away.79 Of course, the secularization of European society has had a significant 
impact on the potency of these religious values. This is something which is 
recognized by Norris and Inglehart who argue that:
“Today, these values are not transmitted primarily by the church, but by the
educational system and the mass media, with the result that although the value
systems of historically Protestant countries differ markedly and consistently
form those of historically Catholic countries -  the values o f Dutch Catholics
are much more similar to those o f Dutch Protestants than to those o f French,
80Italian or Spanish Catholics''’
Even amongst the secular therefore, religion continues to play a values- 
forming role. However, as the level of contact with purely religious 
institutions falls, this role is, increasing mediated through state institutions and 
national cultures.
Furthermore, state identity and state institutions continue to maintain links to 
particular religious traditions in many Member States. Davie has pointed out
77 n.16 above, 17.
78 Ibid. 17-18.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid..
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that the “vicarious” European approach to religion means that the attitude of 
Europeans towards traditional churches is akin to their attitude to public 
services in general in that they have a benign attitude towards their existence 
and activities but are not actively involved with them, other than at times of 
particular personal or communal significance or crisis (such as birth, death, 
state occasions).81 In fact this idea of publicized religion (or even the 
“socialized religion” of the supply side theorists) does fit with the legal and 
institutional reality of European church-state relations. True separation of 
church and state is in fact, extremely rare in Europe. European religions retain 
a prominent role in both member state constitutions and as key elements of 
national education and (to a lesser extent) healthcare provision.82 Indeed 
Norris and Inglehart’s attribution of a key role to national educational systems 
in the propagation of religious values in secular society is mirrored by the 
strenuous efforts made by traditional churches to retain and enhance their role 
in educational systems and to defend this role from any interference from EU 
institutions. The same churches have been equally keen to ensure that the 
prominent role of religion as a source of underlying constitutional values in 
several member states has been similarly insulated from challenges at 
European level.83
4.4 Constitutional and Institutional Position
Given that the idea of state neutrality in relation to religion has been “a central
84plank of liberal thinking about the state and its ethical dimensions” the most 
striking feature of church-state relations in Europe is the almost total absence 
of such neutrality. While many commentators such as Jones have seen 
religious neutrality as a defining characteristic of the liberal state arguing that 
“ <2 liberal state is a state which imposes no conception o f the good upon its
81 G. Davie Religion in Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 
44.
82 J.T.S. Madeley, “European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious 
Neutrality” in J.T.S. Madeley and Z. Enyedi (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary 
Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 2003).
83 See for instance protocol 11 of the Amsterdam Treaty guaranteeing the status of national 
churches in national law and the watering down of the Employment Discrimination directive 
to allow discrimination in order to maintain the ethos of religious institutions discussed in 
Chapter V.
84 n.82 above.
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citizens but which allows individuals to pursue their own good in their own
QC
way”, other commentators have suggested that “arrangements based on 
Enlightenment liberal assumptions actually offend against the principle o f
governmental religious neutrality because they privilege secular liberal beliefs
86over religious ones and consign religion to the margins o f social life” The 
latter group argue that true freedom of religion requires active facilitation by 
the state of religion and religious practice.
Ironically, in the highly religious United States, the constitutional prohibition 
on the establishment of any religion has lead to the imposition of far more 
strictly secular standards of state neutrality than in secular Europe with state 
funding and endorsement of religion strictly prohibited under the 
jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court.87 In Europe, by contrast, although the 
legislative imposition of religious views of the good life on individuals has 
been significantly curtailed by secularisation, church and state are, in general, 
both financially and legally intertwined. In his 1982 survey of church-state 
relations in the world, Barrett found that of the 35 sovereign territories in 
Europe, only five could be termed secular in the sense that the State neither 
promoted neither religion nor irreligion. Nine communist countries were 
Atheistic, fourteen were associate with a single confessional tradition while 
Finland supported two (state Russian orthodox and Lutheran). Six states were 
committed to the support of a plurality of religious organisations with Belgium 
for example paying salaries the clergy of six different denominations.88 
Furthermore, as Madeley points out, even the five states classified as secular 
had arrangements which would fall foul of the version of non-establishment 
developed by the United States Supreme Court (with even famously secular 
France falling short of the ideal of strict neutrality in several respects). Indeed,
85 P. Jones, “The Ideal of the Neutral State” in R. Goodin and A. Reeve (eds.) Liberal 
Neutrality (London: Routledge 1989) quoted in Madeley, n.82 above, 5.
86 S. Monsma and C. Soper, The Challenges o f Pluralism; Church and State in Five 
Democracies (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997) quoted in Madeley, n.82 above, 5.
87 See for example Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 509 US 1 (1997) where the 
Supreme Court held that governmental action which supported religion must have a secular 
purpose and avoid “an excessive governmental entanglement with religion” to pass 
constitutional muster.
88 D. Barrett (ed.), World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study o f Churches and 
Religions in the Modem World AD 1900-2000 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1982). 
Quoted in Madeley, above n. 82, 13.
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when de facto circumstances were taken into account, no European state could 
be said to have a fully neutral approach by the state towards religion with most 
states offering large-scale subsidies to certain denominations.89 A review of 
the situation in the year 2000 showed that there had been no large scale shift 
towards state neutrality. Despite the large increase in the number of cases 
(there were 47 independent states, some 12 more than in 1980), only Sweden 
and newly reunified Germany had moved towards a greater degree of 
neutrality (though both still provided large subsidies to religious 
organizations). By far the largest trend was towards the removal of previous 
restrictions on religious life (a relic of the communist era) and their 
replacement with state support for recognized denominations (either through 
the taxation system or through direct state funding of church buildings and 
facilities).90
A second striking feature of European church-state relations is the sheer 
diversity of arrangements amongst member states. Indeed, Massignon argues 
that within Europe, “attachment to a specific model o f church-state relations is 
one of the elements o f identity and national political culture” 91 while Meny 
and Knapp suggest that there is a European tradition of a dominant church or 
religion which continues to mark the political systems of Italy and the UK.92 
Both this specificity and the close relationship between the church and state, 
are reinforced by the fact very few countries are divided anywhere close to 
equally along religious lines. In fact most countries are either overwhelmingly 
of one denomination.93 Furthermore, adherence to particular religions has been 
a central feature of the identity of states such as Ireland, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom while relationships to particular religions were key elements 
in the foundation of the modem French, Spanish, Italian and German States.
89 n.82 above, 15.
90 Ibid. 17.
91 See B. Massignon, “Les relations des organismes Europeens religieux et humanistes avec 
les institutions de 1’Union Europeene: Logiques nationals et confessionnelles et dynamiques 
d’europeanisation” in Croyances religieuses, morales et ethiques dans le processus de 
construction europeenne, Commissariat General du Plan, (Institut Universitaire de Florence, 
Chaire Jean Monnet d’etudes Europeennes, 2002), my own translation.
92 Y. Meny and A. Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 26.
93 n.82 above, 15.
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Thus, particularly where a single denomination has traditionally made up a 
large majority of the population (a situation which applies to 23 of 27 EU 
member states), it was natural that the welfare of the relevant church (which 
would have been an important part of the communal identity of a the dominant 
ethnic group in that nation state), came to be seen as a proper task for organs 
of that state. Therefore, despite the great diversity and national particularity of 
church-state arrangements in Europe, an amount of state aid for recognized 
denominations, either direct or indirect, is a common thread in almost all 
countries.
Almost all member states of the EU have a constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of religion and all are, in any event, required to uphold the freedom to 
practice one’s religion by the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.94 Beyond this minimum, diversity reigns. However, despite 
this diversity of constitutional arrangements, relatively similar approaches are 
adopted by several groups of Member States. The Nordic countries for 
instance were, until very recently, characterized by officially established 
Lutheran state churches. Part I §4 of the Danish Constitution states “The 
Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, 
and as such shall be supported by the State”95. Part II §6 of the Constitution 
also lays down a requirement that the monarch “be a member o f the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church” 96 In Finland, the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
is also established by law (the Finnish Orthodox Church is also established).97 
In both countries the vast majority of citizens are members of the established 
(Lutheran) churches with 83.1% of Finns and 84.3% of Danes being members
94 This has not prevented the suppression of several new religions such as Scientology in 
many member states. The Greek State has made efforts to restrict the ability of religions other 
than Greek Orthodoxy to recruit new members and has found itself before the Strasbourg 
Court on this basis. These questions will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter III.
95 See: The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5 1953, English Translation, Fact 
Sheet/Denmark (010279/7) of the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://www.folketinget.dk/pdf/constitution.pdf accessed 16 April 2008.
96 Ibid.
97 Section 76 of the Finnish Constitution provides that “Provisions on the organisation and 
administration of the Evangelical Lutheran Church are laid down in the Church Act.” See: The 
Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999 (731/1999)
http://evl.fi/EVLUutiset.nsf/Documents/F322C5D68B64DB62C22572870Q4547927OpenDoc 
ument&lang=FI accessed 16 April 2008.
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despite low and falling rates of belief and practice.98 In 2000, Sweden formally 
disestablished the Church of Sweden motivated by a feeling that the existence 
of a state church was no longer appropriate in a pluralist society. However, in 
all three countries, the State continues to collect a religious tax from those who 
are members of the established (and formerly established) churches. The funds 
from these taxes are passed on to the denominations in question which are 
therefore amongst the richest and best funded churches in Europe despite the 
tiny and shrinking nature of their active congregations.
The Greek model represents a very different version of establishment. Article 
3 of the Greek Constitution recognizes the Greek Orthodox Church as “the 
prevailing religion in Greece”. The same article states that “The text o f the 
Holy Scripture shall be maintained unaltered’ and prohibits “Official 
translation o f the text into any other form o f language, without prior sanction 
by the Autocephalous Church o f Greece and the Great Church o f Christ in 
C o n s ta n tin o p le Article 14.3 also permits an exception to the prohibition on 
the seizure of newspapers and other publications in cases of “an offence 
against the Christian or any other known religion”. Indeed, membership of the 
Orthodox Church is seen as being inseparable from Greek identity (97% of 
Greeks are members of the Orthodox Church) and during the most recent 
revision of the Constitution completed in April 2001, the main parties of left 
and right agreed that the issue of the amending the status of the Orthodox 
Church would not even be raised.100 The constitutional primacy of the 
Orthodox Church in Greece is an entirely different phenomenon from that of 
established Scandinavian churches, having a much more concrete impact on 
religious life. The Constitution lays down that church administration is to be 
regulated by state law. Orthodox clergy are paid by the State and the 
Archbishop of Athens receives the same honours as a Head of State. More
98 Source: Danish Ministry for Church Affairs
http://www.kirkeministeriet.dk/kirkestatistik.html and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Finland.
http://evl.fi/EVLUutiset.nsf/Documents/F322C5D68B64DB62C2257287004547927OpenDoc 
ument&lang=FI accessed 16 April 2008.
99 The Constitution of Greece, Articles 3.1 and 3.3.
100 See G.Th. Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case” in J.T.S. 
Madeley and Z. Enyedi (eds.) Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of 
Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 2003) 120.
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importantly, the construction of any religious buildings requires the 
permission of the local Orthodox bishop, a rule which has severely restricted 
the provision of mosques outside of Thrace (home to an indigenous Muslim 
minority). Both proselytism and blasphemy are criminal offences (though 
rarely invoked) and in 1998 the Council of State ruled unconstitutional a 
reduction in the hours of religious instruction (which relates exclusively to 
Greek Orthodoxy) in schools. An earlier decision of the same court required 
parents who wished their children to withdraw from such classes to make a 
formal request citing specifically different religious beliefs for them to do 
so.101 The Greek State does recognize other religions, namely the Muslims of 
Thrace and the Jews whose clergy are employed by the state and who are 
regulated by state law. However, as Mavrogordatos points out “to speak of 
“plural establishment” (...) would be misleading, since no equal treatment is 
implied.”102 Other faiths are generally treated as private associations (though 
the status of the Catholic Church as a legal person was subject to dispute until 
relatively recently).103 The Greek model of church-state relations is therefore, 
somewhat removed from the European mainstream and aspects of these 
arrangements have been challenged several times before the European Court 
of Human Rights.104
Although it is the major Christian denomination in Europe, full establishment 
of the Catholic Church is rare. In fact, tiny Malta, provides the sole example 
amongst all 27 member states of full establishment of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Article 2(1) of the Maltese Constitution declares that “The religion of 
Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion”.105 The Constitution 
explicitly envisages a prominent role for the Catholic Church in the public life 
of the country in Article 2(2) which states “The authorities o f the Roman 
Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right to teach which
101 Ibid. 121.
102 Ibid. 123.
103 Ibid.
104 See for example: Kokkinakis v Greece Judgment of 25.5.1993 Case 14307/88.
105 Constitution of Malta, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Malta, 
http://docs.iustice.gov.mt/lom/legislation/english/leg/vol 1/chaptO.pdf (last visiteed 16 April 
2008).
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principles are right and which principles are wrong.'”106 Article 2(3) provides 
constitutional status for compulsory religious education stating “Religious 
teaching o f the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State 
schools as part o f compulsory education”.101 This rather uncompromising 
approach does not however, typify the approach of most largely Catholic 
member states. The Slovenian and Lithuanian constitutions both declare that 
there is to be no state church108 while 41(4) of the Portuguese Constitution 
states that “The churches and religious communities are separate from the 
State”.109 The Slovenian document also includes a guarantee of equal 
treatment of religious denominations. Other countries such as Luxembourg, 
Austria and Slovakia make no reference to any specific denomination (in 
contrast to his Danish counterpart, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg appears to 
be free to belong to the religion of his choice). Several traditionally Catholic 
states do make limited special provision for the Catholic religion in their 
constitutions. Article 16.3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution for example, states 
that “The public authorities shall take the religious beliefs o f Spanish society 
into account and shall in consequence maintain appropriate co-operation with 
the Catholic Church and the other confessions.”110 However, the same article 
also states in unequivocal terms that “There shall be no State religion”. The 
Irish Constitution accords religion in general a more prominent role. Although 
it guarantees not to endow any religion and despite the removal of an article 
referring to the “special position ” o f the Catholic Church” by referendum in 
1972, the Constitution as a whole retains a strikingly religious air. The 
Preamble to the Constitution begins “In the Name o f the Most Holy Trinity, 
from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both o f 
men and States must be referred, We, the people o f Eire, Humbly
acknowledging our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ ”.1H The
religious influence is not restricted to mere declarations. The oaths of office 
for the President and Judiciary are couched in religious terms with no secular
106 Constitution of Malta, Article 2.
107 Ibid.
108 Article 7(1) of the Constitution of Slovenia and 43(7) of the Constitution of Lithuania.
109 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, Article 41.
n0 Constitution of Spain, Article 16.3.
111 Bunreacht na h-Eireann, Preamble.
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alternatives provided.112 More importantly, such religious rhetoric has had 
concrete effects on the interpretation of the constitution with the Supreme 
Court invoking the terms of the preamble as a ground for its refusal to strike 
down as unconstitutional a ban on homosexual intercourse.113 Blasphemy is 
declared by Article 40.6.l.i to be a criminal offence and Catholic teaching in 
relation to abortion, divorce and the authority of the family in matters of 
education were all given constitutional status.114 While this constitutional 
model may appear to be closer to that contained in the Greek Constitution 
(with the enshrining of privilege for a single denomination), the Irish 
Constitution does contain provisions which moderate the heavily Catholic 
influence on much of the document. For instance, discrimination on religious 
grounds is forbidden by Article 44.2.3 while Article 44.2.2 contains a 
prohibition on state endowment of any religion. In a similar vein, the Italian 
Constitution states that “State and Catholic Church are, each within their own 
reign, independent and sovereign'^Article 7(1)).115 Article 8(1) provides that 
“Religious denominations are equally free before the law”.116 In practice 
however, Italy recognizes only certain denominations such as the Jews and the 
Waldensians with many other religious groups, including Muslims being
117excluded from significant privileges. Like the Irish Constitution, the 
preamble to the Polish Constitution speaks of a “culture rooted in the 
Christian heritage o f the nation” but also contains some concessions towards 
secularists in that it is enacted in the name of “those who believe in God as the
112 Ibid. Articles 12.8 and 34.5.1.
113 Norris v AG  [1984] IR 36 where O’Higgins CJ for a majority of the court stated: ‘'The 
preamble to the Constitution proudly asserts the existence o f God in the Most Holy Trinity and 
recites that the people of Ireland humbly acknowledge their obligation to “our Divine Lord, 
Jesus Christ. ” It cannot be doubted that the people, so asserting and acknowledging their 
obligations to our Divine Lord Jesus Christ, were proclaiming a deep religious conviction and 
faith and an intention to adopt a Constitution consistent with that conviction and faith and 
with Christian beliefs. Yet it is suggested that, in the very act of so doing, the people rendered 
inoperative laws which had existed for hundreds of years prohibiting unnatural sexual 
conduct which Christian teaching held to be gravely sinful. It would require very clear and 
express provisions in the Constitution itself to convince me that such took place. When one 
considers that the conduct in question had been condemned consistently in the name o f Christ 
for almost two thousand [...], the suggestion becomes more incomprehensible and difficult o f  
acceptance”.
114 See Articles 40.3.3 (abortion), 41.3.2 (previously prohibited divorce, this was repealed by a 
wafer-thin majority in a referendum in 1995) and 41.1.1, 41.1.2, 42.1, 42.3.1 (family authority 
in education).
115 Constitution of the Italian Republic, Article 7(1).
116 Ibid. Article 8.
117 n. 48 above, 17-21.
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source o f truth, justice good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such a
118faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources”
and of “recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences”.119
It also states in Article 25.2 that the public authorities “shall be impartial in
120matters o f public conviction, whether religious or philosophical”. 
Significantly, both the Italian and Polish constitutions make provision for 
relations with the Catholic Church to be regulated by means of a concordat.121 
These concordats have been a source of fierce controversy in many countries 
including Poland, Hungary and Slovakia where critics charged that they 
institutionalized preferential treatment for the Catholic Church in key areas 
such as healthcare and education with negative consequences for non- 
Catholics using such services.
Catholic countries have adopted equally diverse approaches to state-financing. 
Spain and Italy operate a church tax system where taxpayers can opt to 
contribute a proportion of their income to the religious bodies. In both cases 
existing arrangements favour the Catholic Church although the Socialist 
government elected in Spain in 2004 has begun a process of removing such 
privileges.122 It is perhaps notable that, though levels of belief and practice are 
much higher than in Scandinavian countries, levels of payment of the 
voluntary church tax is much lower in both Spain and Italy. In Portugal no 
direct subsidies are provided but indirect aid is generous. The concordat 
arrangements agreed between the Vatican and several Eastern European 
countries have also tended to provide a degree of state funding of religious 
institutions, either directly or indirectly. In Ireland, by contrast, under­
provision of social services by the State led, until relatively recently, to the 
provision of such services by the Churches. As the ability of the State to fund 
such services increased it took over the financing of these activities but 
allowed the churches to retain control meaning that a degree of indirect 
financial support was given. There extent of direct financial help is however,
118 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Preamble.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. Article 25.2.
121 Article 7(2) of the Constitution of the Italian Republic and Article 25.4 Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland.
122 n. 48 above, 39-41.
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extremely limited. Catholic Belgium on the other hand, while eschewing the 
idea of a state church, does play the salaries of Catholic priests along with the 
ministers of other religions.
Religiously mixed countries such as Germany and the Netherlands do not have 
state churches. In the Netherlands the constitution is largely silent on the 
question of religion other than brief provisions providing freedom from 
discrimination and for respect for religious preferences in education. Direct 
subvention of religion is not a feature of the Dutch system though some 
indirect aid is provided. In Germany the constitution embodies the model of 
“positive neutrality” towards religion where the state does not establish or 
privilege any denomination but nevertheless actively facilitates institutional 
religion. The Basic Law carries over the provisions relating to religion from 
the Weimar Constitution which provide for “a constitutionally structured 
form of cooperation between the state and churches structured around the
1 j o
principles o f neutrality, tolerance and parity.” Article 137(1) provides that
there is to be no state church but Articles 137(6) and 138(1) establish the right 
of churches to levy religious taxes on their members and the right to public 
subsidies from the Lander. In Germany, the major religions denominations are 
considered to be public corporations and taxes are levied on their behalf by the 
State and the churches are heavily involved in the provision of state-funded 
social services. Other religiously mixed countries such as Hungary have also 
established a degree of state funding for religious denominations (with funding 
of the Catholic Church regulated by a concordat). The level of financial 
support has however fluctuated with changes in government (the left being 
more parsimonious in relation to religious funding). A voluntary church tax 
system has also failed to attract more than 20% of taxpayers.124
Finally, France is unique in that its constitution does not merely fail to 
establish a state church, instead it establishes the secular (“lai'que”) nature of 
the Republic under which the state is meant to have a strictly neutral public
123 Ibid. 17-21.
124 Z. Enyedi, “The Contested Politics of Positive Neutrality in Hungary” In: John Madeley 
and Zsolt Enyedi (eds.) Church and State in Contemporary Europe. The Chimera of 
Neutrality. (London: Frank Cass, 2003) 157-176.
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sphere from which religion is excluded altogether. However, even famously 
secular France does not achieve total separation. The province of Alsace was 
not part of France at the time of the separation of church and state in 1905 and, 
to this day church state relations in the region are governed by the concordat in 
force prior to that date under which Catholicism was officially recognized. 
This proved controversial when in 1997 gay rights protesters were fined for 
protesting against the Archbishop of Strasbourg outside Strasbourg Cathedral 
as under the relevant legislation (Article 167 of the Prussian Penal Code of 
1871!) any offence against the church under canon law was punishable as a 
breach of the criminal law.125 Furthermore, even beyond Alsace, the French 
State remains responsible for the upkeep of all pre-1905 church buildings. It 
also pays the salaries of chaplains in military and penal institutions as well as 
limited financial support for religious schools. The requirement of secularity is 
however, rigorously enforced in other arenas, most notably and controversially 
in relation to the wearing of religious clothing such as headscarves or turbans 
in public schools. This robust secularity is by no means typical of the 
educational systems of member states in general. However, education is a key 
arena within which the battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation is 
being fought and which, insofar as religious educational institutions act as 
employers and providers of services, may fall within EU law. It is for these 
reasons, that it deserves separate consideration.
4.5 Service Provision: Religion and Education
As both Davie and Casanova point out, education, like healthcare and welfare
was part of the domain of the churches for centuries. However, as Davie also
says “the emergence o f a discrete and autonomous educational sector is an
almost universal characteristic o f modernization; it is part o f the undisputed
126structural differentiation of modem societies” which Casanova sees at the
still valid core of secularization theory.127 In modern day Europe, the state has 
assumed a responsibility for ensuring that citizens have access to adequate 
educational facilities. However, in the context of falling levels of belief and
125 See the newspaper report in Demieres Nouvelles d ’Alsace, 20 October 1996.
126 48 above, 84.
127 n. 8 above, 84.
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practice, church involvement in education represents perhaps the best 
opportunity for religions to pass on the “religious memory” identified as vital 
by Davie and Hervieu-Leger. Indeed Davie argues that, in France the 
exclusion of religion from the state school system along with the decline in 
religious practice means that the younger generation are experiencing 
“religious illiteracy’ with negative consequences for their ability to 
understand European culture and history. Accordingly, religious 
denominations have fought particularly hard to maintain their role within 
education systems. Almost all member state constitutions as well as the 
European Convention on Human Rights protect the right to some form of 
denominational education or, at least, to a degree of respect for parental 
preferences in the carrying out of education by the state.129
In all member states therefore, the religion plays a role in education, either 
where religious denominations own and manage schools or through the 
provision of religious education in state schools. The precise nature of the role 
played varies greatly between states. In Greece and Italy the religious 
instruction that is provided in state schools is almost entirely specific to Greek 
Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism respectively with a prominent role being 
given to the clerical authorities in the selection of textbooks and design of 
curricula.130 In France by contrast, religion is entirely excluded from the 
public school system. Somewhere in the middle are found pluralist countries 
such as the Netherlands however, where the state system provides a form of 
religious instruction which consists of what Davie calls the “conscious 
preparation o f children for a world where a variety o f religious ideas forms a
1 -7 1
significant part o f cultural exchange”. While the overall trend across 
Europe appears to be one of growing pluralism, Davie is concerned that “A so-
128 n.48 above, 93. The phrase “religious illiteracy” is a translation of the phrase 
“analphabetisme religieux” popularised by Henri Tincq, the religious correspondent of the Le 
Monde newspaper.
129 Article 2 of Protocol I of the ECHR states that “7n the exercise of any functions which it 
assumes in relation to education and teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
c o n v ic tio n sSee also for example Article 23(3) of the Dutch Constitution, Article 24(1) of 
the Belgian Constitution, Article 42 of the Irish Constitution, Article 27(3) of the Spanish 
Constitution.
130 n.48 above, 91.
131 Ibid. 95.
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called multi-faith education can end up respecting the faith o f no-one and 
devaluing the concept o f religion altogether.” Individual denominations 
have therefore been keen to retain control of their own schools in which their 
individual ethos can be imparted to pupils. The extent to which they have been 
able to do so while retaining state funding varies across Europe.
The role of religious education in schools can be seen as a reflection of its 
wider constitutional status. In Finland for example, where the Lutheran 
religion is the established faith, religious instruction remains central to 
primary and secondary curricula. There is some provision for minorities 
(notably the Orthodox Community which also has official status) but in 1992 
(despite very low levels of practice and belief in the main tenets of the 
Lutheran faith) 97% of Pupils followed the courses related to the Lutheran 
Church.133 This underlines not only the dominance of the state church but the 
significant social aspect of its nature as well as its formative influence in 
national identity. Although alternative courses can be provided at parental 
request, the Lutheran Church course is seen as such a non-threatening, 
national-identity-related phenomenon that parents who are not church 
members, are happy for their children to take part. In religiously plural 
countries like Germany and the Netherlands, separate types of education are 
provided for the respective denominations. In Germany, though the individual 
Lander have a great deal of power over education, the system reflects the 
historically bi-confessional nature of the country and the Basic Law lays down 
that religious education must be a regular subject in the public school 
system.134 In general two types of religious education are provided, one 
Lutheran and one Catholic. The curriculum and textbooks used are formally 
scrutinized by the state and churches and include a mixture of confessional 
teaching alongside more general philosophical themes such as social issues, 
church history and world religions. The state of Brandenburg which is 
particularly secular given its history as part of the formerly Communist East,
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid. 90-91.
134 M. Minkenberg, “The Policy Impact of Church-State Relations: Family Policy and 
Abortion in Britain, France and Germany” in J.T.S. Madeley and Z. Enyedi (eds.) Church and 
State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 
2003) 202.
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considered the introduction of a non-confessional ethics course to replace 
religious instruction.135 This move was strongly resisted by the historic 
churches. Overall the German system reflects the tension (inherent in the 
approach of the Basic Law to the question of religion in general) between 
religious tolerance and pluralism and a wish to inculcate Christian moral 
values which were seen by the founders of the Federal Republic as a bulwark 
against fascism and communism. The system does permit pupils to withdraw 
from religious education with the written permission of their parents. Regional 
differences have also placed this system under strain with the more secular 
East manifesting discontent with the overtly religious nature of the system and 
Catholic Bavaria resenting prohibitions on the placing of crucifixes in the
■I l iT
classroom imposed by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the essentially 
bi-confessional nature of the system does not adequately accommodate the 
needs of the large Turkish minority.137
Similarly in France, despite the denominationally-neutral secular state school 
system the large Muslim minority find that their needs are catered for to a 
significantly lesser degree than Christians. A relatively large network of 
private Catholic schools continues to exist alongside the state system. Though 
the status of these schools has been a source of friction, the Loi Debre of 1959 
which regulates their status provides them with a degree of state funding. 
There is no similar network of Muslim schools leaving Muslim parents 
without the same choice extended to their Catholic fellow citizens. This 
disparity in treatment became more controversial when the French government 
decided to ban the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols including the 
hijab in state schools in 2004. The British system has grappled with similar 
issues. It contains a network of denominational but state-funded schools which 
make up approximately 25% of the state system. These schools have 
traditionally been exclusively Christian but other denominations are now 
seeking to open their own schools. In recent years, both Muslims and Seventh 
Day Adventists have received permission to open state funded schools. This
135 n.48 above, 90-91.
136 BverfGE 93, 1 (1995).
137 n.48 above, 90-91.
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has proved controversial despite the fact that the state retains the power to 
supervise the teaching and curricula offered in such institutions.138
Education remains a key issue for the churches. The Vatican has made it a key 
priority in its negotiations of concordats with Eastern European countries such 
as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia (where the issue of the concordat brought
I  O Q
down the government in early 2006). Indeed Crouch notes that the issue of 
education has been one of the few issues in relation to which European 
churches have retained a capacity to act as rallying points for political and 
moral claims, with attempts to undermine the place of church schools in 
France and Spain having generated mass protests in recent times.140 At 
member state level, the churches have been extremely successful in acquiring 
and protecting a state-funded role for religion in national educational systems, 
even in supposedly robustly secular France. The churches have been keen to 
protect this role from challenge at European level lobbying to have their status 
under national law recognized under the Amsterdam Treaty as well as to 
protect their right to discriminate in order to maintain the ethos of their 
educational and healthcare institutions.141 This activity is not restricted to the 
Catholic Church with Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany having 
described this “public mandate” of religion as “indispensable” in 1997.142 This 
role is often very specific to the individual member state and can be closely 
linked to an individual denomination’s role as part of the national identity of 
the state in question. It is therefore an area which is particularly sensitive for a 
supranational organism such as the EU.
139 See: “Slovak Government Falls over Concordat with Vatican” Conscience, June 2006, 
http://findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi hb064 (last visited 18 April 2008).
140 C. Crouch “The Quiet Continent: Religion and Politics in Europe” in D. Marquand and R. 
L. Nettler (eds.) Religion and Democracy (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
141 The churches are also involved in healthcare provision in many member states. Their 
profile in this are is however much lower than in education. It is also of less significance in 
sociological and constitutional terms than education and will not therefore be addressed in 
detail. The right of the Catholic Church to fire employees of its medical facilities who publicly 
dissent from its core teachings was upheld by the European Commission on Human Rights in 
Rommelfanger v. Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 6.9.1989.
142 n. 134 above, 202.
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5. Conclusion
The relationship between religion, politics, the law and the state in EU 
Member States is therefore characterised by a significant degree of diversity. 
Europe as a whole is marked by a common heritage of Christianity which 
formed the basis for the emergence of a common European identity. However, 
full scale theocracy is entirely absent from the European scene and this 
Christian-influenced common identity has been moulded by other shared 
experiences such as the Reformation and the Enlightenment which have 
brought about a reduction in the influence of religion over the law and the 
state. These experiences and the secularisation they brought about, do owe 
much to Christianity and in particular to its strong humanist tradition. 
Nevertheless, they have served to limit the public ambitions of Christian 
religions as well as those of other faiths whose presence in Europe has 
increased in recent years. This is particularly notable in relation to “lifeworld” 
issues where the large scale enforcement of traditional Christian morality in 
relation to matters of sexuality and family has been replaced by an approach 
which places much greater emphasis on individual autonomy and equality. 
Nevertheless, the approach of Member States in this area is by no means 
uniform. Religious ideas continue to influence the law in relation to issues 
such as marriage, abortion and euthanasia in many Member States. 
Furthermore, religion remains a strong element of communal identity and 
culture and maintains a strong institutional presence in many Member States, 
particularly in the area of healthcare and education. Thus, despite its 
continuing role, religion must compete for influence with strong secular and 
humanist traditions. The relationship between religion, the state and the law in 
contemporary Europe is therefore characterised by a balance between religious 
(largely Christian) and secular influences albeit a balance that has shifted 
notably in a secularist direction and which varies from state to state.
These features of the European approach to religion are all potentially relevant 
to EU law. Given that the balance between religious and secular/humanist 
influences is struck differently in each Member State, the balance stuck by the 
Union in its own public order may conflict with the approaches of individual 
states. Furthermore, in developing a common European identity, it must take
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account of both the formative influence of Christianity on European identity as 
well as the difficult relationship that has existed between Christianity and the 
humanist notions which have led to the reduction of Christian influence over 
law and politics. Furthermore, while freedom of religion is recognized by all 
Member States, the contours of such a right, particularly in its collective and 
institutional forms, are the subject of dispute. The Union’s embrace of the 
principles of equal treatment and gender equality can impinge on the role 
played by religious bodies in the provision of healthcare and educational 
services. In particular EU legal norms in relation to anti-discrimination in 
employment may impede the ability of religious bodies to promote their 
religious beliefs and identity through their employment practices. The Union 
must also decide whether, in exercising its regulatory functions (most notably 
in relation to the Single Market) its duties to respect religious freedom require 
it merely to adopt a neutral approach or whether active facilitation of religious 
practice is needed. Overhanging all of these issues is the question of the 
relative powers of the Union and its Member States. As the EU’s competences 
expand, the potential for EU law and policy to interfere with the ability of 
individual Member States to uphold the religiously specific element of their 
communal identities increases. Thus, the approach adopted by Community law 
to these issues may also have to take account of the need to avoid interfering 
with sensitive issues of identity, particularly in the light of the rather weak 
democratic legitimacy of the Union itself. On the other hand, the status of EU 
law as the autonomous constitutional order of a “Community o f Values” may 
also impel it towards interfering with the religious particularities of Member 
States in so far as such particularities are inconsistent with the values to which 
the Union has declared itself to be committed.
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Chapter III: Balance, Inheritance and Religion as a Basis of Law in the 
Public Order of the European Union 
1. Introduction
2. Religion as a Source of the Union’s Constitutional Values
3. Recognition of the Role of Religion in Lawmaking
4. The Pluralist Public Morality of EU Law
5. Limitations on Public Morality within EU Law
5.1 Consistency with a Common Ethical Template
5.2 The Importance of Balance
5.3 “Fair Balance” and the Autonomy and Equality o f the Individual
5.4 Public Morality and Perspectives Contrary to Common European Norms
6. Conclusion
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the use of religion as a basis of law within the public 
order of the EU. Religion plays this role by virtue of its recognition as part of 
the Union’s ethical inheritance, as a phenomenon which has a particular 
contribution to make to lawmaking and as part of a wider public morality 
which the Union and its Member States are entitled to legislate to uphold. 
However, although religion is recognised as part of the Union’s constitutional 
order, this order is characterised by a balance between religious, humanist and 
cultural elements all of which can both reinforce or restrict each other’s 
influence. The Union has attached significant importance both to this notion of 
balance of conflicting influences and to that of respect for the ethical 
“inheritance” of Europe. This approach has permitted those religions with 
significant cultural roots in Europe and which are capable of reconciling 
themselves to humanist influences, to exercise greater influence over EU law 
than those faiths which lack such characteristics.
Religion’s role as a basis of law in the EU legal order operates at three levels. 
The first section of the Chapter analyses how the notion of an ethical 
inheritance characterised by a balance between religious, cultural and
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humanist influences has been recognised as a source of the Union’s 
constitutional values. The next section examines how religious institutions 
have been recognised as playing a particularly important and privileged role in 
the lawmaking process. However, it also shows how this role has conformed 
to the notions of balance and inheritance by showing how the recognition of 
religions as part of Civil Society has been linked to their role at national level 
and has required them to relativise, and therefore partly secularise, their 
perspectives.
Finally, the Chapter addresses the role played by religion in the substantive 
law of the Union. It demonstrates how religious perspectives have been 
recognised as a valid basis for EU legislation and for derogation by Member 
States from EU law duties, on the basis of the status of such perspectives as 
part of a broader public morality which Member States and the Union may use 
to promote particular communal norms and visions of the nature of a 
community. Under the EU’s public order, this public morality is pluralist and 
accommodates religion’s role in national cultural identities in that it 
encompasses divergent Member State moralities as well as a common 
European element. The common European element both restricts and reflects 
the pluralism of EU public morality in that, in addition to facilitating Member 
State moral decisions, it requires that such decisions respect certain values 
such as pluralism, the rule of law and the fundamental rights commitments of 
the Union. These fundamental rights principles provide a broad ethical 
framework which is marked by Europe’s ethical inheritance and 
accommodates only those moral goals which are compatible with the notion of 
balance between religion and humanism and with certain common European 
cultural norms which have emerged from the balance between Christian and 
humanist influences which has characterised European history. Perspectives 
which are contrary to these norms are not recognised as valid elements of EU 
public morality. Thus, EU law protects, through its promotion of a particular 
public morality, the broad outlines of the settlement between religious and 
secular influences in Europe and the “way of life” it represents. Therefore, 
although the Union has adhered to strict formal neutrality in religious matters, 
faiths which lack cultural roots in Europe or which are incapable of
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reconciling themselves to the limitations on religious influence inherent in the 
notion of balance between religion and humanism will have a more limited 
influence over EU law and are implicitly characterised as contrary to the 
public morality of the Union.
2. Religion as a Source of the Union’s Constitutional Values
As noted in Chapter II, European identity has been notably marked by both 
Christianity and humanism and there is no consensus in relation to the 
relationship between religion and the state at Member State level.1 Indeed, as 
Roy has stated, secularism and Christianity each provide a competing pole 
around which European identity can be defined.2 The tensions in this dual 
approach to religion and European identity became a major feature of the 
negotiations relating to the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2003 and 
focused on the issue of whether the preamble to the Treaty would contain a 
specific reference to either God or Christianity as a source of the Union’s 
constitutional values. The Catholic Church was particularly vocal on this 
issue. Pope John Paul II repeatedly called for the inclusion of “a reference to 
the religious and in particular the Christian heritage o f Europe.” These 
requests were forcefully pursued by COMECE,4 the organisation representing 
the Catholic Bishops to the European Union. The Bishops argued that the 
Union’s values and its Charter of Fundamental Rights in particular were:
“inspired by the Judaeo-Christian image of mankind'1
and that:
1 See Chapter II
2 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007).
3 Paragraph 114, “Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Europa of His Holiness 
Pope John Paul II to the Bishops, Men and Women in the Consecrated Life and All the Lay 
Faithful on Jesus Christ Alive in His Church the Source of Hope for Europe”, 28 June 2003 
quoted in The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, 
COMECE, 11 March 2005,
http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub const treaty 050311 EN.pdf (last visited 2 March 
2008).
4 COMECE stands for ‘Commission des Episcopats de la Communaute Europeenne’.
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“m order therefore to facilitate citizens ’ identification with the values o f the 
European Union, and to acknowledge that public power is not absolute, the 
COMECE secretariat recommends that a future Constitutional Treaty o f the 
European Union should recognise the openness and ultimate otherness 
associated with the name of God. An inclusive reference to the transcendent 
provides a guarantee for the freedom of the human person”5
The making of such a reference was actively opposed by secularist groups and 
states such as France with its strong separation of church and state.6 The initial 
draft proposed by the Constitutional Convention President Valery Giscard- 
d’Estaing suggested the following formulation:
“Conscious that Europe is a continent that has brought forth civilisation; that 
its inhabitants, arriving in successive waves since the first ages o f mankind, 
have gradually developed the values underlying humanism: equality of 
persons, freedom, respect for reason,
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, which, nourished first by the civilisations of Greece and Rome, 
characterised by spiritual impulse always present in its heritage and later by
n
the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment
This reference to a “spiritual impulse” and the failure to refer explicitly to 
religion in general or to Christianity in particular was heavily criticised by 
religious groups and significant sections of the Convention which was tasked 
with drawing up the Treaty. The Catholic Church and several Member States 
argued that it was historically inaccurate to refer to the Enlightenment but not 
Christianity as a source of European values while a slew of amendments 
referring to either the Christian or Judaeo-Christian roots of such values were
5 The Future of Europe, Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the 
COMECE Secretariat to the Debate on the Future of the European Union in the European 
Convention, COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002.
6 See “God Missing from EU Constitution” BBC News, 6 February 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2734345.stm (last visited 2 April 2008).
7 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169, 18.7.2003, p. 1-150
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Oput down by Convention members. The representative of the Polish 
Government to the Convention argued that “Religions and Christianity among 
them have been part and parcel o f our continent’s history”9 while a Hungarian 
representative argued that “We Europeans know it very well that the Judeo- 
Christian culture is at the very foundation o f our idea of a common Europe”.10 
On the other hand those whose views fell on the opposite side of Roy’s dual 
characterisation of the role of religion in European identity argued as Socialist 
MEP Josep Borrell argued that:
“a lot o f our values have been forged against the Church or the churches. I f  
we are to celebrate historical heritages we should remember the whole story: 
with its religious wars, the massacres o f the Crusades; the nights o f Saint 
Bartholomew and the Inquisition’s autos-da-fe; Galileo and the forced 
evangelisations; the pogroms and the turning o f a blind eye to fascism.[...] 
when it comes to democracy, human rights and equality, God is a recent 
convert. ”n
The final version of the Constitutional Treaty agreed by the Member States, 
amended the relevant section of the Preamble so that it read as follows:
"Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which have developed the universal values o f the inviolable and
8 See for example Suggestion for amendment of title by Mr Brok on behalf of the EPP 
Convention Group co signed by Antonio Tajani, member, and Mr Martikonis, member, 
available at: http://european-
convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/1000/1000 Pre%20Brok%20EN.pdf (accessed 2 April 
2008). Other similar amendments are available at: http://european- 
convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=1000&lang=EN (last visited 2 April 2008).
9 See “Personal Remarks by Professor Danuta Hubner, Representative of the Government of 
Poland to the European Convention Plenary Session, 27-28 February 2003” available at: 
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/7171 .pdf (last visited 5 April 2008).
10 See “Speech Delivered by Jozsef Szajer, Hungary, at the European Convention, 27 February 
2007, available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/9468.pdf (last visited 5 
April 2008).
11 See “Contribution submitted by Mr Joseph Borrell Fontelles, member of the 
Convention: "Let’s Leave God Out of This" Brussels, 22 January 2003, CONV 501/03 
available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00501en03.pdf (last visited 
5 April 2008).
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inalienable rights o f the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the 
rule o f law."12
This formula was retained in the Lisbon Treaty13 and, irrespective of whether 
it is ultimately ratified, represents that consensus view of the Member States in 
relation to the role of religion in the Union’s constitutional order. The 
Preamble characterises the constitutional values of the Union as deriving from 
a balance of religious, humanist and cultural influences. These three influences 
both reinforce, and are inconsistent with, each other. For instance, humanist 
influences can compliment religious influences due to the strong humanist 
tradition within Christianity which has also been reflected in European culture. 
On the other hand, the secularist elements of the humanist tradition, with its 
emphasis on human self-government, can also be restrictive of the influence 
which religious organisations, including Christian ones, may seek to assert 
over law and politics.
This approach involves, in contrast to strictly secular public orders, the 
recognition of a religious element to the Union’s constitutional values and 
public morality. On the other hand, the reference to religion is balanced by 
references to cultural and humanist influences, the latter of which have, as 
Taylor has argued,14 functioned so as to reduce the influence of religion over 
public life in Europe. Furthermore, these religious and humanist influences are 
recognised in their instrumental capacity as contributors to the emergence of 
values such as respect for individual rights, democracy, equality etc. Thus, the 
balance struck by the Union in this area grants humanist ideas significant 
influence by defining the various influences on the Union’s public morality as 
valuable by virtue of their contribution to certain forms of human government. 
In contrast to religiously based constitutions such as the Irish Constitution 
which defines its ultimate notion of the good in explicitly religious terms,15 the 
Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty portrays democracy and respect for individual
12 Council of the European Union, Brussels, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 15 April 2008, 6655/08
13 Ibid. Preamble.
14 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2007).
15 See Bunreacht na h-Eireann, Preamble.
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rights as the ultimate good to which Europe’s cultural, religious and humanist 
influences have contributed. Thus, the role accorded to Europe’s religious 
inheritance is substantially counterbalanced by ideas which owe much to 
humanist notions of human self-government.
As the text of the Preamble makes clear, this balance between religious and 
humanist influences is also influenced by cultural factors. The predominant 
contemporary view of culture is of a broad ethnographic or anthropological 
state of affairs which represents a broad “way of life” encompassing 
established patterns in relation to both values and beliefs and matters such as 
food, clothing or leisure activities. 16 The invocation of cultural influences 
themselves and the notion of the importance of Europe’s “cultural, religious 
and humanist inheritance” (emphasis added) imply that the fundamental 
constitutional norms of the Union are influenced by and therefore reinforce, a 
shared European way of life. Such an approach entails greater recognition of 
those forms of religion which have been historically predominant in Europe, 
which have left a greater mark on national cultures and which are therefore 
compatible with established European cultural norms. Indeed, as is shown in 
Chapters III and V, the Union has been at pains to ensure that EU law does not 
undermine the cultural or institutional role of particular religions at Member 
State level, including, for instance the arrangement of leisure periods around 
particular religious patterns or the role of particular religions as sources of 
national identity.17 This approach achieved explicit recognition in Article 
17(1) which states that:
“The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of
18churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States”.
16 See F. Inglis, Culture (Cambridge UK and Malden MA, USA Polity Press, 2004), 28-29 
also C. Barker, “Culture” in The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies, (London, Thousand 
Oaks, New Delhi Sage 2004) 45.
17 See Chapters III and V.
18 Article 17(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, OJ C 115/47 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:Q047:0199:EN:PDF
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The importance attached to culture and to the notion of inheritance can 
therefore be seen as granting certain forms of religion greater influence over 
the Union’s public morality than others. In particular, as Europe’s “religious 
inheritance” is overwhelmingly Christian, Christianity is likely to exercise a 
greater influence than other faiths over a public morality which draws on a 
mixture of Europe’s “cultural, humanist and religious in h er ita n ceThis was 
the view of the Catholic Bishops who regarded the Preamble as “implicitly 
referring to the centre o f this [religious] tradition, which is Christianity,”19 
Indeed, the importance of balancing religious influences with those of the 
humanist tradition and cultural norms can be seen as implicitly categorising 
forms of religion which are anti-humanist or which contravene other European 
cultural values are contrary to European public morality.
This balancing of religious, humanist and cultural elements was criticised 
from both religious and secular perspectives. Although, as noted above, the 
Catholic Bishops welcomed what they regarded as an implicit reference to 
Christianity, they nevertheless stated that:
explicit mentioning of God or Christianity would have been a strong 
signal supporting the identity o f Europe. It is therefore regrettable that neither 
the European Convention nor the Intergovernmental Conference agreed to the 
inclusion of such a reference. As a matter o f historical fact, it is Christianity 
and the Christian message that have built the ‘inheritance o f Europe ’ from
which have developed the universal values o f the inviolable and inalienable
20rights of the human person, democracy, equality and the rule o f law.”
On the other hand, a group of secularist Convention members argued that:
19 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, COMECE, 
11 March 2005, http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub const treaty 050311 EN.pdf (last 
visited 5 May 2008).
20 Ibid.
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“the wording o f the Preamble was already stretching the tolerance o f non- 
Christians to the limit [and that]religion has not always been an unqualified 
blessing for Europe.”21
The balance struck by the Preamble is, indeed, in some ways intellectually
unsatisfying in that it is neither clearly secularist nor fully endorses the theory
of the religious basis of European public morality. The academic debate has
reflected this lack of clarity. On the one hand, some have argued that the
Preamble’s failure to grant specific recognition to Christianity as the source of
Europe’s common moral and political norms is unduly secularist and
misleading. Weigel for instance argues that the Preamble presents a “false and
distorting” view on the basis that “Christianity is the story that has arguably
22had more to do with constituting Europe than anything else.” The Treaty, he 
suggests, embodies a secular view of Europe which “cannot identify with 
precision and accuracy, the sources of Europe’s commitments to human
• jo
rights, democracy and the rule o f law.” Weigel’s critique draws heavily on 
Weiler’s Un’Europa Cristiana24 which is equally critical. Weiler argues that 
the failure to mention God or Christianity in the Preamble represented,
25according to Weiler, an “EU-enforced laicite on European public life.” The 
approach embodied in the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, he suggests, 
endorses the right to freedom from religion which he sees as partisan and less 
desirable than freedom of religion.
This approach has rightly been criticised for failing to take account of the full 
picture of the relationship between Christianity and liberalism which has often 
been characterised by conflict. As Cvijic and Zucca note, Weiler’s
21 Convention Meeting of 5-6 June 2003, Reform of Institutions and Revisions of Parts I and 
IV of the Draft. Comments of members Borrell, Duhamel and Abitol.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+B1-20030606- 
1+0+DQC+XML+V0//EN (last visited 2 April 2008).
22 G. Weigel The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America and Politics without God (New  
York, Basic Books, 2005) 70.
23 Ibid. 85.
24 J.H.H. Weiler, Un'Europa Cristiana: Un saggio esplorativo, (Milan, BUR Saggi, 2003).
25 See discussion in A.J. Menendez, “Review of A Christian Europe”, European Law Review, 
30, No. 1, February 2005, 133.
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“claim that the liberal ideal derives directly from Christian philosophy and 
that it is accordingly illogical that the Preamble o f the European Constitution 
invokes humanist values but refuses to make a direct allusion to Christian
values, fails to give due recognition to the full picture of the relationship
26between humanism and Christianity. ”
Indeed, although Christian thought and Christian humanism in particular, 
played an influential and perhaps indispensable role in the development of 
principles such as individual autonomy and equality, such principles have also 
on occasion come into conflict with Christian teachings and in particular, the 
desire of many Christian Churches to have religious teachings in areas such as 
the family and sexuality, reflected in the law of the land. The Catholic Church 
has, in the past, explicitly rejected notions such as freedom of religion27 and 
even today has endorsed the use of the criminal law to promote and enforce 
adherence to biblical standards of sexual behaviour. Although it has come to 
accept the legitimacy of the secular state and to actively embrace liberal 
democracy, such acceptance has, as Roy points out,28 on occasion, been 
prompted by considerations of realpolitik rather than theological reform. 
Furthermore, Weigel’s complaint that the Preamble does not identify the 
source of Europe’s commitments to democracy and human rights not only 
appears to assume a congruent relationship between these principles and 
Christianity but also fails to take into account that such commitments can arise 
from multiple sources, or as Dershowitz suggests, from historical experience
29of injustice and oppression rather than from religious worldviews.
On the other hand, secularist critiques have failed to note the degree to which 
religion (and, implicitly Christianity), is in fact recognised as part of European
26 S. Cvijic and L. Zucca, “Does the European Constitution need Christian Values?” OJLS 
Vol. 24, No. 4 (2004), 744.
27 Propositions 15 and 78, The Syllabus of Errors, The Holy See, 8 December 1864 (H. 
Dezinger (ed.) The Sources o f Catholic Dogma, (B. Herder Book Company 1957). See also 
the Papal Encyclical Quanta Curat 1864 in Carlen (ed.), The Papal Encyclicals, Vol. 1 1740- 
1878 at 382.
28 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 21-22.
29 A. Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory o f the Origins of Rights (New York, 
Basic Books, 2004).
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public morality and is accorded special treatment by EU law in other areas.30 
Thus, Menendez’s defence of the Preamble on the basis that:
“defining constitutional ethics in Christian terms may obstruct the integration 
o f those with other or no religious beliefs who face other barriers to full
31membership o f our society”
fails to give adequate recognition to the fact that by recognising Europe’s 
religious and cultural “inheritance” as part of European public morality, the 
Treaty does in fact, recognise that Christian perspectives partly constitute the 
Union’s constitutional ethics, albeit that such recognition is implicit and 
balanced by the simultaneous recognition of humanist influences.
The fact that neither those who see European identity as secular nor those who 
see it as Christian were satisfied by the approach adopted in Lisbon Treaty, 
underlines the fact that the Union has identified as balance between these two 
influences rather an outright preference for one or the other as characteristic of 
its public morality. The Preamble recognises religion and religious values as a 
part of the mix of influences which constitute the values which underpin the 
Union’s constitutional order. In this way the EU’s constitutional values reflect 
what MacCormick calls “value pluralism” under which conflicts between 
differing rights or approaches are seen as the norm and are resolved through 
balancing conflicting elements rather than through according priority to one 
over another in a hierarchical fashion.32 Thus, religion is not entirely excluded 
from a public role and the Union does not follow a strictly secular approach 
under which religious norms and ideas are by definition excluded from 
influence over public life. However, it is true that the recognition of religion is 
limited and, at least formally, denomination-neutral. Although the notion of 
inheritance and the influence of cultural matters do mean that forms of religion 
which were historically dominant in Europe are likely to exercise greater
30 See Chapter V and in particular the discussion of the Framework Directive.
31 See Menendez, above n. 25.
32 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.)
The European Court o f Justice, (The Academy of European Law, European University 
Institute, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), 64-65.
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influence over the EU’s public morality, the Union has pointedly refused to 
associate explicitly itself with a particular religion. Indeed the EU has 
repeatedly indicated its rhetorical commitment to the equality of religious and 
other forms of belief or philosophy, for example in relation to the privileges of 
religious bodies in the Framework Directive33 or in the Declaration on the 
Status of Churches34 both of which conferred equal recognition on other forms 
of belief or philosophy. It is this formal neutrality which religious groups, 
most notably the Catholic Church, have found objectionable.
Beyond the formal neutrality of its provisions, what is notable about the 
approach reflected in the Preamble to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties is 
that while religion is recognised and may therefore play some role in the 
determination of public policy, recognition is also granted to other influences 
such as humanism which may limit the realisation of the ambitions of religions 
in the political and legal arenas. Furthermore, both religious and humanist 
values are seen in the Preamble as instruments leading to the recognition of 
values such as equality and respect for individual rights which have, as some 
contributors to the debate surrounding the Preamble pointed out, had complex 
and sometimes antagonistic relationships to certain forms of religion, 
including Christianity. Thus, while recognition is granted to religion, such 
recognition is counterbalanced by humanist values which emphasis notions of 
human autonomy and self-government independent of any appeal to the 
divine.
This notion of a public morality characterised by a partly-contested balance 
between religious, humanist and cultural influences is repeated in other areas 
of EU law. Religions which lack deep cultural roots in Europe or which are
33 Article 4(2) of the Directive states: “churches and other public or private organisations the 
ethos of which is based on religion or belief” (Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation Article 2(5) OJ L 303, 
2 .12 .2000 ).
34 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration 
N o.l 1 to the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133 
provides that:
“The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of 
churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.
The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations”
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incapable of reconciling themselves to the accommodation of humanist 
influences, will struggle to achieve influence under such a public morality. 
Indeed, such religions can even be seen as contrary to the public morality 
espoused by the Union. Thus, the EU has a preference for those forms of 
religion which are compatible with the accommodation of the humanist and 
secular elements of European culture. Such compatibility is not an easy matter 
for all religions as the accommodation of humanist influences can require 
significant limitation of the influence of religion over law and political life. 
Such approaches have been criticised as a violation of the duty of neutrality 
towards religion. Modood argues that it is “a contradiction to require both 
that the state be neutral about religion and that the state should require 
religions with public ambitions to give them up. ” However, it is unclear how 
a polity which is committed to values such as individual autonomy and gender 
equality could possibly uphold such values while simultaneously refusing to 
limit the realisation of the desires of forms of religion which, for instance, 
desire to mould law and policy in line with patriarchal religious teachings in 
relation to sexuality and gender. Certain limitations on the political and legal 
ambitions of religion are an indispensable element of liberal democracy. The 
fact that they impinge to a greater degree on forms of religion which reject 
aspects of key liberal values does not mean that such limitations violate the 
religious neutrality of the polity in question. It is true that, had the EU chosen 
merely to affirm its commitment to democracy and individual rights and had 
remained silent on the sources of its commitments to such principles, the issue 
of religious neutrality need not have arisen. However, by choosing to open up 
the contentious issue of the source of its ethical commitments and recognising 
an instrumental role for religion in the determination of their content, the 
Union does implicitly associate itself with certain religious traditions.
This approach underlines that importance attached to the notion of balance 
between religious and humanist influences within the public morality of the 
Union. Preserving such balance means that approaches which involve a 
negation of any of the elements will be contrary to the Union’s notions of
35 T. Modood, ‘Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the ‘Recognition’ of Religious 
Groups’ Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, (1998), 378 at 393.
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public morality. This principle, which will be discussed in more detail below, 
can cut both ways. Just as an attempt to introduce Sharia as the basis of a legal 
system has been identified as unacceptable on grounds of its failure to respect 
the autonomy of the public sphere and individual autonomy in the private 
sphere, approaches which are particularly restrictive of religion, such as 
France’s approach to religious clothing in public places, have also been seen 
as potentially problematic in the light of the Union’s commitments to religious 
freedom.37
3. Recognition of the Role of Religion in Lawmaking
Religious influence over EU law is not restricted to acting a source of 
constitutional values. Religious perspectives have also been recognised as 
having a special and privileged role to play in lawmaking. This section 
analyses the approach adopted by the Union in this field and suggests that, in 
common with the role of religion in the constitutional values of the Union 
outlined above, the role granted to religious bodies in lawmaking is 
characterised by a balance between religious, humanist and cultural 
influences. It begins with an analysis of the informal links between religious 
bodies and EU institutions before considering the status granted to such bodies 
by the Treaty. It notes how religious perspectives have been recognised as a 
necessary and uniquely important element of lawmaking but concludes by 
showing how, on the other hand, the Union’s recognition of the religious 
contribution to lawmaking in the context of Civil Society has the effect of 
relativising and, thereby partly secularising, religious perspectives.
Recognition that churches and religious organisations are, by virtue of their 
religious nature and perspective, valid contributors to policy formation and 
law-making implies, at least in theory, that religious perspectives may form 
part of law and public policy. This is an approach which deviates from secular 
notions of the state. For instance, theorists such as Rawls and Habermas have 
argued that the justification of law or policy on religious grounds is 
inconsistent with a liberal constitutional order. Rawls suggests that
36 See the discussion of Refah Partisi v. Turkey in Chapter VI.
37 See section 5.2 below.
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“the self-understanding o f the constitutional state has developed within the 
framework o f a contractualist tradition that relies on ‘natural’ reason, in 
other words solely public arguments to which supposedly all persons have 
equal access. The assumption o f a common human reason forms the basis of 
justification for a secular state that no longer depends on religious
-50
legitimation.”
Similarly, Habermas advocates that state officials (including politicians) must 
“justify their political statements independently o f their religious convictions 
or world views”39 and that
“Majority rule turns into oppression if the majority deploys religious 
arguments in the process o f political opinion and will formation and refuses to 
offer those publicly accessible justifications which the losing minority be it 
secular or o f a different faith, is able to follow. ”40
However, in line with its rejection of purely secular notions of Europe’s 
constitutional ethics, the EU does recognise the validity, importance and 
particular nature of the contribution of religious bodies to lawmaking and 
would therefore seem, at least in theory, to accept the notion that the law may, 
at least in part, be based on religious arguments. Religious bodies have had 
informal links to European Institutions for many years.41 The Catholic Church 
(COMECE), the Protestant Churches (KEK-CEC) and Jewish, Muslim,
42Orthodox and Humanist groups all have full time representation in Brussels. 
These informal links to European institutions were largely developed at the 
behest of religious groups themselves,43 however, the European Commission
38 J. Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 1-25 
(2006), 4 referring to J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993.
39 Ibid. 9.
40 Ibid. 12.
41 See T. Jansen, “Europe and Religions: the Dialogue between the European Commission and 
Churches or Religious Communities”, Social Compass 47(1), 2000, 103-112.
42 M. Rynkowski “Remarks on Art. 1-52 of the Constitutional Treaty: new Aspects of the 
European Ecclesiastical Law? German Law Journal Vol. 6 No. 11,1 November 2005.
43 n.41 above.
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in particular has come to see such links as potential contributors to the 
attainment of its broader political goals. Links between religious bodies and 
the Union were placed on a more formal basis in 1992 when Commission 
President Jacques Delors established a programme called “A Soul fo r  Europe” 
whose aim was described by the Commission as “giving a spiritual and ethical 
dimension to the European Union”.44 The facilitation of religious 
contributions to policy making was not merely a result of a desire to 
accommodate religious perspectives within EU law and policy but was also 
seen as an opportunity to use religious organisations to develop the European 
Civil Society which was regarded as necessary to sustain European 
integration. Commission President Delors made this point explicitly in an 
address to the “Soul for Europe” initiative in which he stated that:
“We won't succeed with Europe solely on the basis o f legal expertise or 
economic know-how. [...] I f  in the next ten years we have not managed to give 
a soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning, the game will be up ”45
thus explicitly linking the participation of religious bodies in European public 
life and the accommodation of religious perspectives in the EU’s activities, to 
the sustainability of the Union as a political project. Subsequently, the Bureau 
of European Policy Advisors (BEPA),46 which reported to the Commission 
President, became responsible for what was described at “Dialogue with 
Religions, Churches, Humanisms.”41 This process of dialogue consisted 
mainly of a series of seminars and discussion groups on the role of religious
44 See European Commission, Archives of GOPA, Dialogue with Religions, Churches and 
Humanisms -Issues: A Soul for Europe.
http://www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/policv advisers/archives/activities/dialogue religions humanis 
ms/index en.htm (last visited 6 May 2008).
45 Quoted in H. Alfeyev ‘Christian Witness to Uniting Europe: A View from a Representative 
of the Russian Orthodox Church’ The Ecumenical Review, January 2003. See also European 
Commission, Archives of GOPA, Dialogue with Religions, Churches and Humanisms -  
Issues: A Soul for Europe.
http://www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/policv advisers/archives/activities/dialogue religions humanis 
ms/index en.htm (last visited 7 May 2008).
46 This organisation was previously known as the Forward Studies Unit and the Group of 
Policy Advisors.
47 Rynkowski, n. 42 above.
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bodies in the Union.48 The fact the EU institutions reached out to religious 
bodies in this way underlines the degree to which the Union has recognised 
religious bodies as playing a particularly important role in policy making. The 
contributions of other elements of Civil Society have not been sought out or 
recognised in this way.
The specific recognition of “churches ” in the context of this “Dialogue with 
Religions, Churches, Humanisms” also provides some indication of the 
influence of cultural and historical factors. Although the term has been applied 
to certain newer religious movements such as Scientology, churches are a 
Christian concept which is generally still taken to refer to the organisational 
structure or branches of the Christian religion. Christian religious structures 
also fall within the term “religions” so the singling out of churches can be seen 
as indicative of the prominent role European institutions expected the religious 
institutions of traditionally dominant Christian churches to play in this 
dialogue. Indeed, the importance of cultural matters in the Union’s approach 
to religion and in particular its desire to respect the public role of traditionally 
dominant Christian denominations at Member State level is seen elsewhere in 
EU law. The 1998 Declaration on the Status o f Churches49 appended to the 
Amsterdam Treaty also signified a formalisation of the Union’s relationship to 
religious bodies in that it stated that the Union “respects and does not 
prejudice the status under national law o f churches and religious associations 
or communities in the Member States” thus recognising the status of such 
bodies at national level in a formal way. Indeed, as is shown in Chapter Three, 
this deference towards the cultural role of religion in Member States has also 
been reflected in the Union’s substantive legislation, most notably in relation 
to employment law and religiously managed healthcare and educational 
institutions.50
The Commission White Paper on Governance of 2001 also indicated the 
openness of the Union to the recognition of the role of religious perspectives
48 See Bureau of European Policy Advisers,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policv advisers/index en.htm (last visited 18 May 2008).
49 n.34 above.
50 See Chapter V.
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in policy making by recognising the “particular contribution ” of “churches 
and religious communities” to policy making.51 Thus, not only did the 
Commission recognise religious bodies as particularly important elements of 
Civil Society, it also recognised the particular nature of their contribution. 
Such recognition indicates a view that religious bodies have particular 
qualifications or that they bring perspectives to lawmaking which are other 
institutions are not capable of providing to the same degree. The combination 
of the recognition of both the importance and the particular nature of religious 
contributions by the Commission underlines the notion of religious bodies as 
particularly important and privileged players in the articulation of Europe’s 
public morality by Civil Society. Thus, the Union appears to recognise to 
some degree the historic role of churches and religions as moral guardians 
with a special authority on moral matters. Of course, morality is not the sole 
preserve of religious bodies, however the Union’s explicit references to 
churches along with its identification of the “particular contribution” of 
religious bodies in this regard would appear to defer to the historic role played 
by religions in relation to notions of morality, a role which, as noted in 
Chapter II, is consistent with the continuing public role of religion in Western
52society identified by theorists such as Casanova.
This identification of religious perspectives as necessary and particularly 
important elements of lawmaking was reflected in the Constitutional and 
Lisbon Treaties which explicitly recognised this “particular contribution” by 
according (following a strenuous campaign on the part of the Catholic 
Church)53 a privileged consultative status to religious groups. While Article 
11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty commits the Union to maintaining an “an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and Civil 
Society”54 Article 17 singles out religious bodies and specifically undertakes to
51 European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels 25.7.2001.
52 J. Casanova Public Religions in the M odem World (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1994).
53 See “The Future of Europe: Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the 
COMECE Secretariat to the Debate on the Future of the European Union in the European 
Convention” COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002.
54 n. 18 above, Article 11(2).
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maintain a dialogue with them. The Article, which also incorporates the 1998 
Declaration on the Status of Churches, reads:
“1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law 
of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States.
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical 
and
non-confessional organisations.
3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall 
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and 
organisations. "55
The granting of this special status was strenuously opposed by secularist 
organisations which characterised the Article as “incompatible with 
secularism”56 as challenging “the principle o f separation o f church and
57state” and as granting religion “a privileged status in European public policy
CQ
making”. Although the dialogue is open to all religions, the combination in 
the same Article of the recognition of the national status of churches with the 
recognition of the special importance of religious contributions to policy 
making, links the recognition accorded to and role played by, religious bodies 
at EU level with the national status of such bodies as the identity and 
contribution of such bodies will be influenced by their role in the lives of 
particular Member States.
The Union does therefore seem to accord religious perspectives a particular 
degree of recognition and facilitation in policymaking. Religious bodies are 
recognised as elements of Civil Society with which the Union will maintain a 
dialogue. However, such bodies are seen as making a “specific contribution” 
and as representing a particularly important part of Civil Society which is
55 Ibid. Article 17.
56 See “Catholics Join European NGOs in Coalition in Appeal to Convention Not to Give 
Religion Unfair Influence in Constitutional Treaty” U.S. Newswire, 22 May 2003, 
http://www.forf.org/news/20Q3/cie.html (last visited 15 March 2008).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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accorded specific and explicit recognition. By recognising the specificity of 
the contribution of religious bodies to law making, the Union implicitly 
identifies religious perspectives as a legitimate and necessary element of 
policy formation. Furthermore, the recognition of the right of religious bodies 
to be consulted by lawmaking institutions in a separate article from that 
dedicated to Civil Society in general, characterises this religious contribution 
to lawmaking as particularly important.
Nevertheless, in line with the Union’s approach in other areas, this facilitation 
of religious influence in lawmaking is balanced by other influences which 
draw on the humanist and secular influences within the EU public order. First, 
Article 17 itself also recognises the equal status of “philosophical and non­
confessional organisations”. One of the most prominent of these is the 
International Humanist and Ethical Union which has been part of the dialogue 
with European institutions and which has a vigorously secular outlook. 
Furthermore the fact that, even in an article dedicated to the facilitation of 
religions, the Union felt constrained to provide equal recognition to non­
confessional groups, indicates that, although religion is recognised within the 
legal and political arenas, such perspectives will not necessarily be 
predominant. Indeed, the importance of religious bodies is seen in line with 
humanist approaches, as deriving, to a significant degree, from their human 
dimensions and the attachment of individuals to religious organisations. This 
approach is echoed in the Commission’s documents in relation to the dialogue 
with “Religions Churches and Humanisms” which stresses the status of 
religious bodies as part of Civil Society and which justifies dialogue with such 
bodies on the grounds that:
“They are representatives o f European citizens. In this respect, Community 
law protects the churches and religious communities, as they would any other 
partner in Civil Society”.59
59 See: “Commission Document on Dialogue with Religions, Churches and Humanisms: 
Introduction to the legal aspects of the relations between the European Union and the 
communities of faith and conviction.” Group of Policy Advisers, available at: 
http://ec.europe.dgs/policv advisers/archives/activities/dialogue religions humanisms/legal e 
n.htm (accessed 5 April 2008).
84
Thus, while the historical and cultural role of religions in Europe as moral 
guardians means that the “specific contribution” of churches and religious 
communities is recognised by the Union, and while this contribution is seen as 
representing a particularly important perspective, the right of such bodies to 
play a part in the lawmaking process is seen as deriving from their historic role 
as moral guardians and from their status as representative organisations, rather 
than from the inherent truth of their message or the importance of ensuring 
compliance with divine mandates. Indeed it is simply inconceivable that EU 
legislation would explicitly base itself on revelation or seek to justify itself on 
the basis of its compatibility with a religious text. EU legislation is not 
justified in theological terms and one does not, for example find biblical 
justifications in the preambles of Directives and Regulations which instead 
rely on what might be termed generally accessible justifications. Even 
legislation such as the Preamble to the Framework Directive, a piece of 
legislation which touches on religious issues to a significant degree, justifies 
the measures contained therein on the basis of non-religious goals such as their 
contribution to the “attainment o f a high level o f employment and social 
protection, raising the standard o f living and quality o f life, economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity. ”60 Indeed, as is shown in Chapter VI, the 
statements of the Commission, the rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights and EU Enlargement policy have all indicated that the a failure to 
maintain limits on religious influence over the political and legal domains is 
incompatible with membership of the Union.61 In fact, the Union’s approach 
in relation to the role of religion in lawmaking can be seen as reflecting the 
notion of balance between religious worldviews and humanist perspectives 
which stress human autonomy and reject use of the idea of law as subordinate 
to, or merely a means to promote, divine authority on earth.
Furthermore, the Union also balances this religious influence and relativises 
religious perspectives by providing such recognition in the context of Civil
60 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303/16 2.12.2000, Paragraph 11.
61 See Chapter VI.
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Society. The manner in which the dialogue with religious bodies has operated 
demonstrates that the Union has refused to associate itself explicitly with 
particular religious viewpoints and has instead operated a process in which 
differing religious, and even non-religious, perspectives have been accorded 
equal recognition. As noted above, Article 17 specifically recognises the equal 
status of “philosophical and non-confessional organisations”, thus 
recognising the legitimacy of non-religious world views. Not only have 
avowedly secularist and atheist groups taken part in the dialogue, new 
religious movements, which have received little protection in other areas of 
EU law, have also been permitted to participate. Rynkowski notes that 
members of what he calls “sects”: “are present during meetings, even those 
concerning combating the illegal activities o f sects” He argues that their 
presence is “inappropriate” and that the Commission “is a hostage o f political 
correctness”. Whatever the merits of these arguments (and neither reasons 
supporting the inappropriateness of their presence nor indeed a method of 
distinguishing “sects” from bona fide religions, are provided), the 
denomination-neutral approach adopted by the Commission highlights both 
the conspicuous reluctance of the Union to grant recognition to, or associate 
itself officially with, any individual religious denomination and the 
commitment to balancing religious and humanist perspectives seen in the 
Union’s public morality.
Thus, the Union does recognise and privilege religious bodies as particularly 
important articulators of, and contributors to, European public morality and on 
this basis, acknowledges them as important contributors to law and policy 
making. However, the fact that such recognition is provided within the context 
of Civil Society (albeit with privileged status therein), requires that religious 
bodies exercise the rights attached to such recognition in the context of a 
process which relativises their claims. Furthermore, by participating in a 
process in which religious bodies are required to persuade lawmakers and to 
articulate their religious contribution in a forum which equally recognises 
different religious, or anti-religious perspectives, religious bodies implicitly
62 n. 42 above.
63 Ibid.
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accept that legitimacy of secular political institutions along with the reality 
that the ultimate decision in relation to matters of law lies with such 
institutions. Indeed, as the justifications provided by Commission President 
Delors for the original dialogue with religious groups made clear, the Union’s 
engagement with religious groups has been partly related to efforts to create a 
European public sphere and to enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of the 
political institutions of the Union.64 Thus, the Union’s approach to the 
facilitation of religious contributions to lawmaking can be seen as balancing 
religious and humanist influences by recognising religion as one influence 
amongst many in the process of law making. Engagement in such a process 
requires religious groups to acknowledge the legitimacy of other religious and 
non-religious worldviews. Such acceptance is not an easy matter for all 
religions. As Habermas points out:
“missionary doctrines such as Christianity or Islam are intrinsically intolerant 
of other beliefs. Love of your neighbour includes active care for his or her 
salvation. And because, -as Thomas Aquinas, among others, argued -eternal 
salvation has absolute priority over all goods, care for the salvation o f others 
does not per se exclude the application o f force to convert someone to the 
right faith or to protect them against heresy.”65
The recognition of such groups within the context of Civil Society is therefore 
based on certain prerequisites, thus:
“The liberal state expects that the religious consciousness o f the faithful will 
become modernised by way o f cognitive adaptation to the individualistic and 
egalitarian nature o f the laws o f the secular community”66
64 See “The New Crusade; Fighting for God in a Secular Europe, Conservative Christians, the 
Vatican and Islamic Militants”, Newsweek, 1 November 2004.
http://www.relisiousconsultation.ore/News Tracker/the new crusade fiehtine for God in 
a secular Europe.htm (last visited 18 June 2008).
65 J. Habermas “Intolerance and Discrimination” I.CON, Volume 1, Number 1, 2003, pp2-12,
7.
66 Ibid. 6.
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Thus recognition of religious communities in this way can be seen as 
encouraging a process where each religious body “locks the moral and legal
f i l  •principles o f secular society onto its own ethos” and where religious bodies
68in general “have to make the civic principle o f equal inclusion their own. ” 
As Habermas acknowledges, such a process means “accepting mutually 
exclusive validity claims”69 which requires a neutralisation of the “practical
70impact o f the cognitive dissonance” this produces.
Indeed, it is notable how recognition of religion in the context of a pluralist 
Civil Society linked to secular political institutions has pushed religious bodies 
to phrase their contributions in precisely the kind of generally accessible 
reasons required by theorists such as Rawls and which appeal to views of “the 
good life” which are not necessarily religious. For instance COMECE justified 
its calls for the recognition of the specific contribution of Churches and 
religious organisations on the basis that churches:
“are committed to serve society -inter alia, in the fields o f education, culture,
media and social work — and they play an important role in promoting mutual
respect, participation, citizenship, dialogue and reconciliation between the
71peoples o f Europe, East and West”
Their campaign in favour of the making of a reference to Christianity in the 
Preamble was justified on similarly generally accessible grounds, with the 
Bishops stressing Christianity’s role in developing human rights and 
democracy and suggesting that such a reference “would have been a strong
72signal supporting the identity of Europe”. Similarly, Pope John II also 
declared that the Church was committed to “fully respecting the secular nature
67 Ibid. 8.
68 Ibid. 10.
69 Ibid. 12.
70 Ibid.
71 The Future of Europe, Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the 
COMECE Secretariat to the Debate on the Future o f the European Union in the European 
Convention, COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002.
http://www.comece.org/upload/pdl7secr convl 020521 en.pdf (last visited 18 June 2008).
72 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, COMECE,
11 March 2005, http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub const treaty 050311 EN.pdf (last
visited 18 June 2008).
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of the institutions’,73 of the Union thus acknowledging the legitimacy and 
contribution of secular political institutions.
The Church’s invocation of European identity not only underlines the 
instrumental polity building aspects of the process, it also demonstrates, along 
with the reliance on the facilitative role of religion in relation to religiously 
neutral civic activities and values, how in engaging in the lawmaking process 
at EU level, religious bodies have internalised what Habermas termed “civic 
principles” and “the moral and legal principles o f secular society. ” Thus, 
while religion is recognised by the Union, this recognition of religious 
influence is balanced by the nature of the forum in which such recognition is 
granted which requires religions to relativise their claims and accept the 
legitimacy of other worldviews.
The Union’s Treaty commitment to engagement with Civil Society show that 
it recognises that its law and policy making must be informed by diverse 
perspectives and views of the good life from across Europe. Thus, Civil 
Society plays a role in forming a European public morality which informs the 
Union’s lawmaking. Religion, as noted above, has been recognised by the 
Union as a particularly important contributor to this public morality. This 
public morality enables certain religious traditions to exercise greater 
influence than others. The explicit recognition of the status and role of 
national churches in Article 17 encourages the according of greater weight to 
the contributions of religions which are culturally and institutionally 
entrenched at national level. Furthermore, as was the case in relation to the 
influence of religion in relation to the constitutional values of the Union set 
out in the Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty, the recognition of religion’s role in 
lawmaking in the context of Civil Society renders those forms of religion 
which can reconcile themselves to the notion of balance between humanist and 
religious influences and to the European cultural norms, more capable of 
exercising influence than religions which lack such characteristics and which
73 Paragraph 114, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia In Europa Of His Holiness 
Pope John Paul II To The Bishops Men And Women In The Consecrated Life And All The 
Lay Faithful On Jesus Christ Alive In His Church The Source Of Hope For Europe, 28 June 
2003.
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are, for instance, anti-humanist in nature or which cannot acknowledge the 
legitimacy of secular political institutions. Thus, the cultural influence and 
long (though still contested) tradition of humanism within the historically 
dominant Christian churches render them more able to exert influence within 
the structures established by the Union to engage with religious perspectives 
than outsider religions such as Islam which have had less cultural impact on 
Europe or which may have more antagonistic attitudes to humanist principles.
4. The Pluralist Public Morality of EU Law
The recognition of religious perspectives within EU law is not restricted to 
institutional and symbolic roles. In contrast to libertarian views of the 
relationship between law and morality which stress the idea of morality as a 
largely private matter and see the promotion of communal moral standards by 
the law as legitimate only when necessary to prevent harm to others,74 EU law 
does permit the promotion of certain communal, moral or cultural norms 
through law, provided that such promotion can be reconciled with the balance 
between religious, humanist and cultural elements that underpin the Union’s 
public morality and, in particular, its commitments to individual autonomy and 
equality which are reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, the 
right of Member States to promote a particular way of life or view of the good 
life through law is, within certain boundaries, recognised by EU law. Indeed, 
as is shown below, the Union has repeatedly and explicitly recognised that 
notions of “mura/ify”, “ordre public” and “public policy’ as valid grounds for 
legislation.75 Given its explicit recognition as part of the Union’s 
constitutional values in the Lisbon Treaty and in the light of its heavy 
influence over national cultures and views of morality, religion plays an 
important part of these notions of public policy and morality. Thus, while the 
public morality is not explicitly or exclusively religious, as Davies notes, in 
relation to issues such as sexual morality, bio-ethics, gambling, or alcohol 
consumption, people’s views:
74 E. P. Foley, Liberty fo r All: Reclaiming Individual Privacy in a New Era of Public Morality, 
(New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2006).
75 See below.
90
“do derive directly or indirectly -via modem secular philosophies that have
nfbeen influenced by religion -  from religious values that pervade societies.”
Thus, he argues that morality clauses in trade law both “have a clear and
11traditional link with conventional interpretations o f major religions” and
facilitate the recognition of such religious perspectives in trade agreements. 
The same is true of the of morality clauses in EU law which enable Member 
States, notwithstanding their EU law duties, to promote particular communal 
cultural or religious norms. For instance, in assessing the compatibility with 
EU law of Member State restrictions on gambling in the Schindler case, the 
Court of Justice stated that it was “not possible to disregard the moral, 
religious or cultural aspects o f lotteries, like other types o f gambling in 
Member States”78 which were held to grant the Member State in question a 
“degree o f latitude” entitling it to restrict gambling notwithstanding the EU
7Qlaw duty to respect the freedom to provide services. The Treaty also makes 
room for Member States to derogate from EU legal duties in order to promote 
certain communal cultural, religious or moral norms. Articles 30 and 55 
recognise “public morality”80 and “public policy”81 as legitimate grounds for 
the derogation from the duty of Member States to permit the free movement of 
goods and services.
Not only is religion recognised, as a basis for derogation from EU law duties, 
it is also a valid element of EU legislation itself. Community legislation
76 G. Davies “Morality Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty: 
the Case of GMOs”, World Trade Review (2007), 6:2, 249-263.
77 Ibid.
78 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Schindler Case C-275/92 ECR [1994] 1-01039. 
paragraph 60.
79 Ibid. para. 61.
80 Article 30 provides that: “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection o f health and life of humans, 
animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member S ta tes”, Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community OJ C321, Article 30.
81 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community OJ C321, Article 
55.
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repeatedly refers to notions of ordre public or morality. In Netherlands v 
Council Advocate General Jacobs cited several examples of the recognition 
of notions of morality in EU legislation noting that:
83 84“The Community Trade Mark Regulation and the Trade Marks Directive 
both provide for the refusal o f registration or invalidity o f a mark which is 
contrary to public policy or to accepted principles o f morality (contraire a
85l'ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs). The Community Plant Variety Rights
Regulation86 provides that there is an impediment to the designation of a 
variety denomination where it is liable to give offence in one o f the Member 
States or is contrary to public policy (est susceptible de contrevenir aux
A O J
bonnes moeurs dans un des Etats membres ou est contraire a I'ordre public).
o p
Directive 98/71 on the legal protection o f designs provides that a design 
right shall not subsist in a design which is contrary to public policy or to
accepted principles o f morality (contraire a Vordre public ou a la moralite
89publique). The amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive approximating the legal arrangements for the protection o f 
inventions by utility model90 provides that utility models shall not be granted 
in respect o f inventions the exploitation o f which would be contrary to public 
policy or morality (contraire a I'ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs). ”91
Thus, “public morality” and therefore religion, is well recognised as a 
permissible basis for legal and policy choices in Community law and as a
82 Netherlands v Council Case C-377/98 [2001] ECR 1-7079.
83 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 
1994 L 11, p. 1.
84 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1.
85 Article 7(l)(f) of the Regulation and Article 3(l)(f) of the Directive. It may be noted that in 
his Opinion delivered on 23 January 2001 in Case C-299/99 Philips Electronics, at paragraph 
18, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer gave as an example of a trade mark registration of 
which would be barred because it was contrary to public policy the mark Babykiller for a 
pharmaceutical abortifacient.
86 OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1
87 Article 63(3)(e).
88 Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998, OJ 
1998 L 289, p. 28.
89 Article 8.
90 OJ 2000 C 248E, p. 56.
91 Article 4(a).
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permissible basis for Member States to derogate from the EU law duties. 
Individual autonomy is an important principle in the EU legal order and, as is 
shown in Chapter VI, the Union requires that the accommodation of religious 
influence over law, and the promotion of communal moral standards which 
this may involve, not be such as to unduly curtail such autonomy. 
Nevertheless, as the acceptance of restrictions on gambling in Schindler on the 
basis of its particular “moral, religious or cultural aspects” shows, the Court 
accepts that EU law does, in certain circumstances, permit such moral notions 
to be invoked to restrict the autonomy of individuals to engage in activities 
regarded as damaging or sinful for cultural or religious reasons in order to 
allow Member States to promote their own collective vision of the good life 
and morality. Thus, although the Union has consistently required that the
autonomy of public sphere institutions to legislate for that which contravenes
02religious morality be respected, it does permit some restriction of individual 
autonomy in the private sphere on religious grounds.
EU public morality is also inherently pluralist in that it encompasses both a 
shared European, and differing national, ethical frameworks. This pluralism is 
further reflected in the Union’s acceptance that most ethical choices are to be 
taken at national level and upheld as part of EU law, provided they are 
compatible within the broad parameters of an independent European public 
morality. These aspects of EU public morality were seen in the Schindler 
case where the Court of Justice recognised that particular national religious 
and cultural notions of morality in relation to gambling were a valid basis for 
the restriction of the freedom to provide gambling services.94 This focus on the 
recognition within EU law of the individual public moralities of the Member 
States and the consequent prioritisation of Member State ethical choices is 
shown even more markedly in cases such as Grogan95 and Jany.96 In these
92 See Chapter VI.
93 For a discussion of constitutional pluralism and the development of heterarchic rather than 
hierarchical interaction of legal orders see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” 
EUI Working Papers, Law 2002/1 http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/179/l/law02- 
l.pdf (last visited 31 July 2008).
94 n. 78 above.
95 Case C-159/90 SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR1-4685.
96 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR 1-8615.
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cases the Court of Justice was faced with differing Member State regulation of 
the morally and religiously sensitive issues of abortion and prostitution. In 
Grogan the Court was faced with a situation where the combination of the 
differing moral judgments of Ireland and other Member States in relation to 
abortion and the EU law principle of free movement of services, threatened to 
undermine the ability of the Irish authorities to give effect to that moral 
judgment in a domestic context. In this case student groups facing prosecution 
for distributing information in relation to abortion services abroad in violation 
of the Irish Constitution’s protection of the life of the unborn, argued that such 
restrictions violated the freedom to provide services under EU law. The Court 
found that the lack of commercial links between the student organisations and 
the abortion providers in question precluded the invocation of Community 
law. Nevertheless, its judgment threw significant light on the pluralistic nature 
of public morality within EU law. The Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children (“SPUC”) had argued that abortion should not be recognised as a 
service under EU law on grounds of what they saw as its grossly immoral 
nature. The Court’s decision on this point was as follows:
“ Whatever the merits o f those arguments on the moral plane, they cannot 
influence the answer to the national court's first question. It is not for the 
Court to substitute its assessment for that o f the legislature in those Member
f>97States where the activities in question are practised legally. ”
The Court therefore explicitly refused to come to a “one size fits all” 
conclusion in relation to the morality of abortion in EU law and stated that it 
would not second guess the decision of the legislatures of Member State which 
had decided that abortion was legally acceptable. On the other hand, although 
its decision in relation to the lack of commercial links meant that the Court did 
not address the issue of the curtailment of the freedom to provide services on 
the basis of the differing moral choice of the Irish authorities, this issue was 
dealt with by Advocate General Van Gerven in his opinion. Having concluded 
that the provision of information in relation to abortion services in other
97 n. 95 above, paragraphs 19 and 20.
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Member States was covered by the principle of free movement of services, he 
held that restriction of such information was permissible on the basis that 
Ireland’s anti-abortion laws represented “a  policy choice of a moral and 
philosophical nature the assessment o f which is a matter for the Member 
States and in respect o f which they are entitled to invoke the ground o f public 
policy. ”98 As this moral choice in relation to abortion was, in the view of the 
Member State, “a  genuinely and sufficiently serious threat public policy 
affecting one o f the fundamental interests o f society”99 and in the light of “the 
area o f discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty”100 which 
Community law provided the national authorities, Advocate General Van 
Gerven was prepared to uphold the restriction in question as a proportionate 
derogation from the free movement of services on grounds of public policy.101
Thus, in deciding what would qualify as a service for the purposes of EU law, 
the Court indicated that it would respect the moral pluralism of the Union by 
refusing to second guess the decision of those Member States for whom 
abortion was acceptable. On the other hand, in relation to the impact the 
decision of certain Member States to tolerate abortion and its consequent 
recognition as a service under Community law, could have on the enforcement 
within Ireland of anti-abortion laws, EU law, according to Advocate General 
Van Gerven, was equally willing to recognise a public morality derogation by 
the Irish authorities from freedom of movement of services in order to uphold 
Ireland’s different moral conclusions in relation to this issue.
A similar commitment to the value of pluralism and a consequent desire to 
enable the notion of public morality within Community law to accommodate 
differing moral perspectives of Member States, was seen in Jany where the 
Court assessed whether prostitution could be categorised as a service under 
Community law and again based its affirmative decision on the basis that:
98 n. 95 above, Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, para. 26.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.para. 29.
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“So far as concerns [sic] the question o f the immorality o f that activity, raised 
by the referring court, it must be borne in mind that, as the Court has already 
held, it is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment for that o f the
legislatures o f the Member States where an allegedly immoral activity is
102practised legally”.
The approach of the Court in Grogan and Jany underlines the importance of 
pluralism in the public morality of the EU. In both cases the Court stressed 
that the primary forum within which the ethical choices which influence the 
content of the public morality recognised and operationalised within EU law, 
is the individual Member States which are permitted to come to differing 
moral conclusions in relation to issues and to have these differing conclusions 
reflected in EU law. The deference to Member State ethical and cultural
choices inherent in this endorsement of pluralism was further noted by the
French Conseil constitutionnel in its 2004 decision in relation to the
constitutionality of the Constitutional Treaty where, in discussing the
compatibility of the French approach to secularism with EU human rights 
norms, in it noted the “considerable leeway” granted to Member States “to 
define the most appropriate measures, taking into account their national 
traditions”.103
However, the commitment to pluralism cuts both ways. Just as EU law is 
required to respect the principle of pluralism by accommodating divergent 
Member State moral choices, the moral choices of Member States themselves 
must respect the moral pluralism inherent in the notion of free movement 
guaranteed by Community law. Free movement rights enable individuals to 
place themselves under differing ethical regimes and therefore permit them to 
carry out activities which may be prohibited for reasons of public morality in 
their home country. EU law requires that Member State laws which reflect 
particular moral choices must be compatible with the right of individuals to 
choose, by means of free movement rights, to be bound by the moral choices
102 n. 96 above, para. 56.
103 Decision n° 2004-505 DC of November 19th 2004, The Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.ff/decision/2004/2004505/eng.htm, paragraph 
18.
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of other Member States. Such a right can contribute significantly to individual 
autonomy by enabling, for example, those who wish to provide or use the 
services of prostitutes, to do so in another Member State despite the 
prohibition on doing so in their own country. The right to move across 
European borders is a fundamental right under EU law whose violation is 
particularly likely to be characterised as disproportionate. The requirement of 
respect for the moral pluralism engendered by free movement rights can 
therefore be said to be a feature of the European element of the EU’s public 
morality. Thus, the plural nature of EU public morality which finds its 
expression in the reflection of Member State moral choices in EU law is itself 
restricted by the requirement of respect for the moral pluralism inherent in the 
free movement rights guaranteed by the Union.
This requirement that Member State public morality take account of this right 
of individuals to access different ethical regimes in other Member States was 
seen in Advocate General Van Gerven’s opinion in Grogan where, as noted 
above, he suggested that, while measures restricting abortion information were 
acceptable within EU law:
“a ban on pregnant women going abroad or a rule under which they would be 
subjected to unsolicited examinations upon their return from abroad” (...) 
would be disproportionate [and] would excessively impede the freedom to 
provide services. ”104
Similarly, in R. v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte 
Blood,105 the UK Court of Appeal found, in a judgment which explicitly 
referred to the opinion in Grogan, that, in principle, EU law gives the right to 
receive medical treatment in another Member State and that moral choices in 
national law must take account of this right. In this case, a widow who was 
prevented from using her husband’s sperm for the purposes of artificial 
insemination due to a requirement in British legislation that he have given his 
written consent for its use, sought the right to bring the sperm to Belgium
104 n. 98 above, para. 29.
105 [1997] 2 All ER 687.
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which had no such requirement. The Court of Appeal held that the medical 
treatment in question was insemination with her husband’s sperm rather than 
insemination in general and consequently a refusal to permit the export of his 
sperm amounted to an interference with her EU law rights.106 The judgment 
noted that, as the Court of Justice had held in Schindler, Member States had 
“a sufficient degree of latitude to determine the moral or religious or ethical
107values which it regards as appropriate in its t e r r i t o r y Thus, provided that 
the interference in question was proportionate and justified by “some 
imperative requirement in the public interest” EU law could “not be relied 
upon as preventing [the British authorities] from imposing any restriction on 
the export o f sperm”.108 However, the UK’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, which had taken the decision to refuse had a degree of 
discretion under the relevant legislation and, in coming to its decision, it was 
obliged to “balance Mrs Blood’s cross border rights as a Community citizen” 
against the United Kingdom’s ethical decision to “attach great importance to 
consent, the quality o f that consent and the certainty o f it”} 09 Although the 
Court of Appeal was clear that it was “not possible to say, even taking into 
account E. C. law that the authority are bound to come to a decision in Mrs 
Blood’s favour” the failure to take her Community law rights into account and 
to “provide reasons which meet the standards set by European law”110 led to 
the quashing of the decision to prevent export.111 Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeal recognised that the right of EU citizens to travel between Member 
States in order to be bound by the differing ethical choices of another Member 
State must be taken into account in relation to the implementation of British 
public morality based policies. The United Kingdom authorities were therefore 
required to respect the pluralism inherent in the Single Market by 
countenancing the removal of sperm from the UK in order that it be used 
according to Belgian norms for purposes which the British authorities had held 
to be illegal on moral grounds.
1Ub Ibid. 698-700.
107 Ibid. 700.
108 Ibid. 701.
109 Ibid. 702.
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This notion of respect for the moral pluralism inherent in the notion of free 
movement and access for individuals to the differing ethical regimes of the 
Member States is also seen in cases such as Jany where, as noted above, the 
Court held that the status of prostitution as legal under Dutch law prevented 
the invocation of public morality as a reason to refuse the registration of 
Polish prostitutes as “self-employed!” for the purposes of the Pre-Accession 
Agreement. Issues of discrimination on grounds of nationality were obviously 
also an important factor in the decision, nevertheless, by ensuring that non­
nationals could not be subjected to more rigorous standards than those 
imposed on nationals, the ruling also underlines the right of individuals under 
EU law to access, by means of free movement, the opportunity to be bound by 
the ethical decisions of another Member State.
The judgment in Blood, where the issue of moving between ethical 
frameworks was complicated by the impact on domestic moral choices of the 
issue of the export of sperm, made it clear that the right to access services in 
another Member State may not always override the right of individual 
Member States to enforce collective moral preferences. Nevertheless, 
Advocate General Van Gerven’s statement in Grogan that attempts to prevent 
pregnant women from travelling to other Member States to have abortions 
would be unacceptable under EU law despite what he recognised as the grave 
importance of the moral principle which such a ban would be seeking to 
uphold,112 indicates that the right to move between Member States is taken 
extremely seriously by EU law and represents a real limitation on the ability of 
Member States to legislate so as to enforce particular moral, religious or 
cultural norms. Thus, the reflection by a particular Member State of communal 
religious norms in its legislation is required by EU law to take account of the 
overall pluralism inherent in the European project which has opened up ethical 
horizons beyond the nation state to individual Europeans, thereby limiting the 
degree to which the such communal moral norms can be imposed on
112 n. 98 above.
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individuals who, in Hirschman’s terms113 have the right of exit in addition to 
the voice with which domestic democratic structures provide them.
5. Limitations on Public Morality within EU Law
However, to suggest that this pluralism is such as to exclude any independent 
moral judgment of the substance of Member State public morality derogations 
at the European level is mistaken. EU public morality is both national and 
European, and the requirements of this independent, European element of EU 
public morality can be such as to provide limitations on the reflection of 
Member State moral choices. Becoming and remaining a Member State of the 
European Union involves moral commitments to certain notions of the good 
beyond respect for pluralism. These notions have been linked by the Union to 
respect for fundamental rights and democracy. At least as a matter of politics, 
this duty applies to Member States even when they act outside of the Union’s 
areas of competence. The 1993 Copenhagen Criteria explicitly established 
respect for fundamental rights as an explicit criterion for membership of the 
Union.114 The Nice and Lisbon Treaties also reiterated the Member States’ :
“attachment to the principles o f liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and o f the rule o f law”115
and laid down respect for such principles as an ongoing duty of membership 
through Article 7 which envisaged the removal of voting rights from Member 
States which is in “serious and persistent breach” of this obligation.116 
Furthermore, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has 
committed both the Union and the Member States to upholding, within the 
sphere of operation of EU law, a certain view of the good, albeit one which 
preserves a significant degree of latitude for Member States. This view does,
1,3 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
114 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1. Available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921 .pdf (last visited 20 June 2008).
115 n.12 above, Preamble to the Consolidated Treaty on European Union. See also the 
Preamble to the Treaty on the functioning on the European Union, (also n.12 above).
116 Article 7 TEU as amended (see n. 12 above).
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however, encompass certain principles such as privacy and equality which 
embody notions of the good which would preclude attempts to enshrine in law 
certain moral or religious notions inconsistent with such principles.
These duties have been used as a basis to restrict the ability of Applicant 
States and Member States to use their legal systems to reflect religious and 
moral perspectives in a way which is inconsistent with notions of equality and 
individual autonomy, even in areas which lie outside of the scope of the 
Treaties. As is shown in Chapter VI, Romania and Turkey were required by 
the Union not to criminalise homosexuality and adultery respectively as 
conditions of membership,117 while in 2005 Poland’s newly elected 
conservative government was warned by the Commission that it risked losing 
voting rights in EU institutions if it failed to respect gay rights.118
These obligations are not merely political and the European element of EU 
public morality can act as a legal limitation on the accommodation of Member 
State moral choices in EU law. Contrary to some readings of the judgments in 
Grogan and Jany}19 the Court’s conclusion that “arguments on the moral 
plane cannot influence the answer” in relation to the status of abortion of 
prostitution as a service does not mean that EU law is merely a passive 
reflector of Member State public moralities. In addition to the political and 
legal commitments to fundamental rights, EU legislation includes numerous 
morality clauses such as those noted by Advocate General Jacobs above in 
Netherlands v Council. Not all of these clauses deal with the issue of Member 
State derogations on morality grounds but also refer to the notion of public 
morality within EU law, independent of the status of such notions at Member 
State level. Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer gave an example of the 
operation of the notion of morality within Community law in the Phillips 
Electronics120 case where he suggested by way of example that the registration
1,7 See Chapter VI.
118 Ibid..
119 D.R. Phelan 'The Right to Life of the Unborn v the Promotion of Trade in Services', (1992) 
55 MLR 670.
120 Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd. 
ECR [2002] 1-05475.
Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer.
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of an abortifacient under the trade mark “Babykiller” would be barred under 
Community law on the grounds that to do so would be contrary to public 
policy.121
In relation to derogations from EU law on the basis of Member State moral
choices, the Court has repeatedly made it clear that “concept o f public policy
cannot be unilaterally decided by each Member State without being subject to
122control by the institutions o f the Community” Thus, rather than 
demonstrating that EU law merely reflects and does not independently assess 
the moral nature of such derogations, cases such as Grogan merely show that 
such assessments take very seriously the need to respect the inherent pluralism 
of the EU’s public morality and also therefore, the autonomy of Member 
States in moral matters. This reading of Grogan is supported by the fact that 
the jurisprudence of the Court has made it clear that it will assess Member 
State moral choices for compliance with the Community moral norms which 
make up a European element of the Union’s public morality and may 
intervene when such moral choices are divergent to too great a degree from 
these Community moral norms. This Community morality, as will be shown 
below, is rather thin but does, in addition to the principle of pluralism 
discussed above, encompass to the notion of balance between religious, 
cultural and humanist elements reflected in requirements of respect for the 
idea of the individual as an autonomous and equal actor and for certain 
communal European norms, all of which are assessed in relation to the broad 
notion of the good reflected in the Union’s commitments to fundamental 
rights.
5.1 Consistency with a Common Ethical Template
The caselaw of the Court of Justice has also appeared to suggest that Member 
State derogations from EU norms on grounds of public morality will be 
accepted only where they in some way echo, or are congruent with, an 
independent set of EU moral norms. The limitation on Member State moral 
choices imposed in this regard requires that the moral choice in question fall
121 Ibid. para. 18
122 See Bouchereau [1977] ECR [1999] paragraphs 33 and 34.
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within the broad definition of the good seen in the fundamental principles of 
EU law (most notably in relation to fundamental rights).
In Omega Spielhallen123 the Court explicitly looked to find echoes in the 
Union’s legal order for the moral value which the German authorities relied 
upon in order to prohibit a game which was alleged to contravene public 
morality. Here, the provider of a game which was alleged to allow players to 
simulate killing by shooting lasers at one another challenged the action of the 
German authorities who had prohibited the game on the grounds that it “was 
contrary to fundamental values prevailing in public opinion”,124 in particular 
the respect for human dignity required by the German Constitution. The 
Applicant alleged that the prohibition in question violated the freedom to 
provide services guaranteed by the EC Treaty. The German authorities argued 
that their actions were protected by the public policy and public morality 
exceptions recognised by EU law.
In assessing the German derogation, the Court recognised that Member States 
had a margin of discretion in relation to the concept of public policy and that 
the restrictive measures in question did not need “to correspond to a 
conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in which
125the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected 
Nevertheless, the Court explicitly assessed whether the fundamental value 
invoked by the Member State was also reflected in the autonomous values of 
the Community legal order. In paragraphs 34 and 35 it held that:
“the Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for human 
dignity as a general principle o f law. There can therefore be no doubt that the 
objective o f protecting human dignity is compatible with Community law, it 
being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, the principle o f respect for  
human dignity has a particular status as an independent fundamental right.
123 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR1-9609.
124 Ibid. para. 7.
125 Ibid. para. 37.
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Since both the Community and its Member-States are required to respect
fundamental rights, the protection o f those rights is a legitimate interest
which, in principle, justifies a restriction o f the obligations imposed by 
126Community la w f
The conclusion that human dignity was a general principle of EU law was 
based on the analysis of Advocate General Stix-Hackl who noted in her 
opinion that “a variety o f religious, philosophical and ideological reasoning
1 97could be given as the basis o f this analysis” before noting the recognition of 
the right in various international Human Rights treaties,128 Member State 
constitutions,129 Directives and Regulations130 and decisions of the Court of 
Justice.131 In other words, the accommodation within EU law of the German 
public morality exception in respect of the dignity of the human being, was 
dependent on the recognition of a similar moral value by the Community legal 
order, which, as the Court noted in paragraph 33 and in cases such as Hauer132 
draws on, but is independent of, the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States. This is in line with Advocate General Stix-Hackl’s conclusion 
that the assessment of Member State derogations on grounds of public 
morality includes review of “appropriateness” in addition to
proportionality.133
The notion of assessing the “appropriateness” of such derogations would 
seem to imply that national moral judgments are to be assessed for their 
compatibility with an independent set of standards within EU law. Indeed in 
the case of Netherlands v Council134 which involved a challenge, inter alia, on 
public morality grounds, to the 1998 Biotechnology Directive, Advocate 
General Jacobs implied that the scope of common EU morality may evolve
126 Ibid. para. 34 and 35
127 Ibid. Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, paragraph 78.
128 Ibid. para. 82.
129 Ibid. para. 83.
130 Ibid. para. 87.
131 Ibid. paras. 88, 89 and 90.
132 Judgment of 13/12/1979, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Rec. 1979,p.3727).
133 n. 127 above, para. 103.
134 Netherlands v Council Case C-377/98 ]2001] ECR1-7079.
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and come to cover an increasingly broad range of areas, arguing, in relation to 
Member State morality derogations in the area of biotechnology that:
“the discretion o f a Member State to determine the scope of the concept o f 
public morality in accordance with its own scale o f values, so defined by the 
Court more that 20 years ago, should perhaps now be read with some caution. 
In this area, as in many others, common standards evolve over the years. It 
may be that the ethical dimension o f some o f the basic issues within the scope 
o f the Directive is now more appropriately regarded as governed by common 
standards. ”135
The progressive embrace by the Union of shared fundamental values as an 
element of its identity and legal order may therefore be increasing the degree 
to which the that legal order reflects and upholds an independent framework of 
moral values. This potentially limits the pluralism of the EU’s public morality 
in that the emergence of common standards, on Advocate General Jacobs’ 
analysis, results in the restriction of the discretion of Member States to pursue 
approaches which differ from such standards.
The development of the fundamental rights obligations of the Union have had
1a notable impact in this regard. In the ERT case it was held that all Member 
State derogations from EU law duties (therefore including those based on 
public morality) are subject to compliance with the common commitment of 
all Members States of the Union to comply with fundamental rights 
obligations. Furthermore, given their fundamental status in the ethical and 
legal order of the Union, the fundamental rights recognised by EU law must 
have a major impact on the content of EU public morality as well as on the 
limitations imposed on the reflection of the particular public moralities of 
individual states within the Union’s legal order. This analysis is further 
underlined by the fact that in Omega, the inquiry into the legitimacy of a 
derogation from the freedom to provide services on the basis of the need to 
protect human dignity was regarded by both the Court and Advocate General
135 Ibid. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para. 102.
136 ERT Case C-260/89 ECR [1991] 1-02925.
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as conclusively resolved (although issues of proportionality remained
outstanding) by the identification of this principle as one of the general
1principles of law protected by the Community legal order. In other words, 
once the protection of human dignity had been categorised as part of the 
general principles of law through which fundamental rights are protected 
within EU law, a derogation based thereon was in principle acceptable and no 
further identification of the source or broader significance of the relevant 
principle was required.
The reflection of Member State moral choices in the public morality of the EU 
is therefore dependent on the compatibility of such moral choices with the 
Union’s fundamental rights obligations and general principles of law, which 
are now given expression in the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights which 
acts to “reaffirm” the fundamental rights resulting from the common 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. As Foley has suggested, all 
constitutions depend on a failure to definitively resolve certain fraught issues 
and contain unwritten, tacit “abeyances” which enable such constitutions to 
survive by fulfilling the need for “protective obscurity” around certain 
issues. In line with this approach and in common with the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not explicitly identify itself with any 
particular religious worldview. Neither does it claim that the rights it contains 
derive from any particular religious tradition or divine authority. This, as 
Weiler notes,139 is in contrast to the constitutions of several EU Member States 
which, as shown in Chapter II, specifically invoke either God or the Christian 
Trinity or which recognise a particular religion as underpinning their 
constitutional order.140 However, the Charter does invoke Europe’s “spiritual 
and moral heritage”141 and undertakes to respect:
137 n. 126 above.
138 M. Foley, The Silence of Constitutions, (London, Routledge, 1989) 81.
139 n. 24 above.
140 See Chapter II.
141 n. 12 above, Preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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“the diversity o f the cultures and traditions of the peoples o f Europe as well as 
the national identities o f the Member States”142
Thus, the rights contained in the Charter are seen as emerging from a 
particular religious and moral heritage which, as noted above, has been 
heavily marked by Christian and humanist influences. The interpretation of 
these rights is, therefore, likely to reflect and accommodate established 
European ways of life and to prove less challenging to the ambitions and 
public role of culturally entrenched religions or religions which can reconcile 
themselves to humanist influences than to religions which lack such 
characteristics. Indeed, the influence of humanist principles is clearly seen in 
the Preamble to the Charter which speaks of “universal values o f human 
dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity” 143 and of the Union’s commitment 
to place “the individual at the heart o f its activities”. 144 The importance of 
individual human as an equal and autonomous agent is also recognised in 
Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 21 which protect the rights to bodily integrity, 
liberty of the person, freedom from slavery, privacy, freedom of expression 
and equality.145 On the other hand, the Charter also recognises religion and 
religious freedom as another “good” while the Preamble and Article 17 of the 
Lisbon Treaty specifically endorse the notion of at least some religious 
influence over law. Furthermore, the national cultures and identities which the 
Charter undertakes to respect may themselves involve the promotion of 
religiously influenced communal moral standards. Thus, the notion of the 
good with which Member State moral choices must be compatible is rather 
broad and offers significant scope for the maintenance of the pluralism of EU 
public morality. The Court of Justice has not identified any overarching 
worldview within which its general principles and defence of human rights are 
based and thus has not required the Member State public moralities fall in line 
with any such worldview. The ethical template which is laid down in the 
Charter does reflect the influence of the Christian and humanist traditions in
142 Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01,
14.12.2007.
143 Ibid.
144 t u : j
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Europe to some degree but is at the same time is relatively broad and flexible 
and therefore gives Member States significant leeway to pursue their particular 
collective moral goals.
5.2 The Importance of Balance
Despite the relatively broad and flexible nature of the ethical template set out 
in the Charter, there are aspects of the Union’s approach, which can 
potentially restrict Member State autonomy in moral and religious matters to 
significant degree. Indeed, the very pluralism that is the source of Member 
State autonomy in moral matters itself operates so as to restrict this autonomy. 
EU public morality is characterised by a commitment to balancing what are 
seen as the potentially conflicting “goods” of Europe’s religious, humanist and 
cultural inheritance. EU law requires that Member States respect this element 
of European public morality and that, in seeking to promote their own versions 
of public morality, they respect this notion of balance and do not accord 
absolute priority to any single element. The notion of balance between 
conflicting good has been a central concern of the jurisprudence of the Court 
of Justice. In contrast to the almost absolutist approach adopted by US 
constitutional law, for example in relation to freedom of speech, EU law has 
tended to seek to balance conflicting rights. As noted above, MacCormick and 
others have noted how when faced with clashes of two “goods”146 the Court 
has not sought to establish a “hierarchical structure among these values''’ but 
has instead its decisions “are a matter o f weighing and balancing” ,U1
The Court has followed the same approach in relation to fundamental rights. 
In Promusciae the Court of Justice assessed the implementation of EU 
copyright legislation by Spain in the light of a request by an organisation 
representing the owners of intellectual property rights to an internet provider 
to disclose the identities of internet users who had violated such rights using 
filesharing software. It held that:
146 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.)
The European Court o f Justice, The Academy of European Law, European University 
Institute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. In this instance the authours were discussing 
the clash between the goals of market freedoms and environmental protection.
147 Ibid. 65.
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“the Member States must, when transposing the directives mentioned above. 
take care to rely on an interpretation o f the directives which allows fair 
balance to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community lesal order. Further, when implementing the measures 
transposing those directives, the authorities and courts o f the Member States 
must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those 
directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation o f them 
which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with other general
j j  o
principles o f Community law such as the principle o f proportionality. ” 
(emphasis added).
Thus, faced with a clash between the “goods” of privacy and property rights, 
the Court did not assign priority to one over the other but required that that the 
Member State in question strike a “fair balance” between them.
MacCormick et al. note that an approach centred on balancing reflects a 
“value pluralism” where “values and principles cannot be reduced to a single 
value or coherent set o f values, nor should conflicts between reasons be 
interpreted as a sign o f imperfection, but rather as the normal state for human 
beings.”149 The Court’s focus on notions of balance reflects the value 
pluralism of EU public morality in that it does not require uniform moral 
outcomes in each Member State but permits differing national conclusions in 
relation to moral issues provided that such conclusions respect the concept of 
“fair balance”. This concept grants Member States a considerable degree of 
latitude and thereby may grant a degree of what Foley would term “protective 
obscurity” to the EU legal order. On this view, EU law does not seek 
perfection or pursue a single outcome of the reconciliation of conflicting rights 
but embraces the notion of pragmatic reconciliation of rights rather than more 
doctrinaire according of priority to one set of rights over another. On the other 
hand this balance-centred approach does not give Member States an entirely
148 Case C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefonica de Espaha SAU, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 29 January 2008, para. 68.
149 n. 146 above, 64.
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free hand in that it also implies that certain approaches which, for example fail 
to give any or adequate weight to principles identified as “goods” by the 
Community legal order will fall foul of EU law.
Given that, religion, the protection of national culture and identity and the 
rights to individual autonomy and equality (which can be threatened by the 
imposition of communal religious or cultural standards) have been identified 
as “goods” by Community law, Member States must ensure that the moral 
choices they make which impinge on these goods do not fail to respect the 
duty of maintaining balance between them. This commitment to a balance 
between religious, cultural and humanist influences is seen in EU anti- 
discrimination legislation which, as discussed in Chapter V, attempts to 
balance the institutional rights of religious bodies and the cultural role of 
religious institutions in many Member States with the right of individuals to 
privacy and equal treatment.150 A concern that a failure to maintain such a 
balance between these elements could invite the intervention of EU law was 
seen in relation to the concerns in France that the incorporation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights into the Constitutional Treaty might, due to its 
commitments to religious freedom, compromise the France’s strictly secular 
approach to the wearing of religious clothing in schools. This was referred to 
by the Conseil constitutionnel in its decision on the Constitutional Treaty151 in 
which it held that the French approach to this issue was not imperilled by the 
Treaty. It came to this conclusion on the basis that the French approach was in 
fact characterised by a degree of balance between the competing goods of 
religion, the secular identity of the French state and the protection of 
individual rights inherent in this secularist approach. The Conseil held that the 
relevant French laws had “reconcile[d] the principle o f freedom o f religion
1 M
and that o f secularism” and that given that the Court of Human Rights had 
given individual states “considerable leeway to define the most appropriate
150 See Chapter V, in particular sections 2 and 3.
151 Decision n° 2004-505 DC of November 19th 2004, The Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe available at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004505/eng.htm 
(last visited 20 June 2008).
152 Ibid. para.h 18.
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153measures, taking into account their national traditions”, the French 
approach was not endangered by the Constitutional Treaty’s recognition of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, the Conseil did not simply conclude that 
Member States had the sufficient cultural autonomy to define an approach to 
these issues without European interference but rather held that the French 
approach, in the light of both the considerable autonomy retained by Member 
States in this area and the fact that it balanced the relevant rights, would not 
trigger European intervention.
5.3 Fair Balance and the Autonomy and Equality of the Individual
Although an approach which leaves it to Member States to strike a fair balance 
between rights does grant significant leeway to national authorities, the notion 
of what is “fair” is influenced by certain fundamental shared European norms 
which restrict Member State autonomy in this area. Legislation, on the part of 
either the Union or it Member States, which seeks to promote notions of 
public morality, is required to respect certain key principles such as coherence, 
proportionality and non-discrimination which is centred on the strong tradition 
of individual liberty within Western liberal thought. Thus, while a margin of 
discretion in relation to public policy is provided by the willingness of the 
Courts to permit public policy derogations to be assessed “in accordance with 
[a Member State's] own scale o f values and in the form selected by if,”154 the 
Court has repeatedly affirmed that, as Advocate General Van Gerven stated in 
Grogan this margin of discretion is subject to “the limits set by Community 
law” which includes a proportionality test requiring that the derogation:
“be justified by some imperative requirement in the general interest, (...) be 
suitable for securing the attainment o f the objects which it pursues and (...) 
must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.”155
Member State morality based derogations which are held by the Court to 
interfere in a disproportionate way with Community law rights will, therefore,
1531bid.
154 Case 121/85 Cone gate Limited v. HM Customs and Excise ECR [1986] 01007.
155 As summarised in Blood, n. 105 above, 700.
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not be accepted in EU law. Advocate General Van Gerven, for example, 
suggested in Grogan that a ban on pregnant women travelling or mandatory 
pregnancy tests on women on departure from or return to Ireland was would 
fail this test.156
The Court has also been clear that derogations on grounds of the need to 
promote public morality must also respect the principle of non-discrimination 
between nationals and citizens of other Member States. In both Jany157 and 
Adoui and Comouaille158 the Court refused to accept attempts to curtail, on 
grounds of public morality, the Community law rights of non-national 
prostitutes to work in Member States on the basis that:
“Although Community law does not impose on Member States a uniform scale 
of values as regards the assessment o f conduct which may be considered to be 
contrary to public policy, conduct may not be considered to be o f a sufficiently 
serious nature to justify restrictions on entry to, or residence within, the 
territory o f a Member State o f a national o f another Member State where the 
former Member State does not adopt, with respect to the same conduct on the 
part of its own nationals, repressive measures or other genuine and effective 
measures intended to combat such conduct”159
As discussed above, this principle is also linked to the moral pluralism 
inherent in the European project which confers on those individuals with the 
abilities, resources and skills to do so, the right to choose, by exercising 
freedom of movement, to be bound by the ethical choices of different Member 
States. In addition, it is connected to the broader requirement that Member 
State derogations be coherent and internally consistent in order to achieve 
acceptance within EU law. This was seen most notably in the Conegate160 case 
where a challenge was brought to the refusal of the British authorities to 
permit the import of certain pornographic items on the basis that domestic law
156 n. 98 above, para. 29.
157 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR1-8615.
158 Joined Cases 115 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornouaille v. Belgian State ECR [1982] 01665.
159 Ibid. para. 60.
160 n. 154 above.
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permitted their domestic manufacture and sale (subject to a ban on sending 
them through the post). The Court upheld the challenge on the basis that:
“A Member State may not rely on grounds o f public morality in order to 
prohibit the importation of goods from other Member States when its 
legislation contains no prohibition on the manufacture or marketing o f the 
same goods on its territory”161
It further stated that:
“It must at least be possible to conclude from the applicable rules, taken as a
whole that their purpose is, in substance, to prohibit the manufacture and
] 62marketing o f those products”
The decision in Conegate clearly has much in common with the approach 
adopted in Jany and Adoui and Comouaille which precluded the imposition of 
stricter moral standards on outsiders than a Member State’s own nationals. 
However, as the above paragraph shows, it also underlines a second aspect of 
the approach of EU law to public morality in that the Court also made it clear 
that Member State derogations on grounds of public morality would also be 
assessed for their internal coherence and that measures which fail to indicate 
the requisite degree of coherence would not be accepted in EU law. The 
importance attached by the Court to the coherence of Member State morality 
derogations reflects Fuller’s notion of the “internal morality” of law which 
requires that laws be sufficiently general, intelligible and free of 
contradictions. As MacCormick and others have pointed out, the notion of 
coherence has been an important element in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice and derives from “the idea crucial to the rule o f law that the different 
parts o f the whole legal order should hang together and make sense as a 
whole,”164 or, at the very least, should not actively contradict each other. Such
161 Ibid. para. 16.
162 Ibid. para. 17.
163 L. Fuller The Morality o f Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969).
164 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the 
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.)
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ideas are central to the principle of the rule of law which the Union has 
explicitly embraced as part of the Copenhagen Criteria setting out the 
prerequisites of membership165 and as one of the EU’s fundamental 
constitutional values which finds expression in general terms in the Preamble 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights166 as well as more concrete expression in
1 fnthe prohibition of retroactive or extra legal punishment in Article 49.1.
These requirements establish a broad framework which is centred on 
individual liberty. The Union’s approach implicitly distinguishes between law 
and morality, regards individual freedom to act as the default position and 
requires that all curtailments of such freedom be coherent and as narrowly 
tailored as possible. These notions of the centrality of individual autonomy 
and the view of morality as a largely private matter whose enforcement by law 
must be limited and specifically justified are have a long history in Western
liberal thought but have been less influential in other contexts, most notably in
168largely Muslim societies. Combined with the emphasis placed on non­
discrimination in Jany, Conegate and Adoui, the requirements of coherence 
and proportionality underline the importance placed by the EU legal order of 
the individual as an equal and autonomous actor whose ability to take 
decisions and plan his or her own life must be respected. Thus, the promotion 
of public morality by law takes place in a context which places significant 
emphasis on individual liberty against which the promotion of communal 
moral standards must be balanced and which may therefore prove less
The European Court o f Justice, The Academy of European Law, European University 
Institute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, 47.
165 The Copenhagen Criteria provide that: "Membership requires that candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 
“See: European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1. Available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921 .pdf (last visited 20 June 2008).
166 Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01,
14.12.2007.
167 Article 49.1, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01,
14.12.2007.
168 See T. Gabriel “Is Islam against the West?” in R. Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. 
Idleman Smith (eds.) Islam and the West Post 9/11 (Aldershot, Hants, England, Ashgate, 
2004) at 15). See also See also P. Norris and R. Inglehart Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Politics Worldwide Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
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challenging for religions which have reconciled themselves to the emphasis 
placed on human autonomy within Western societies.
5.4 Public Morality and Perspectives Contrary to Common European 
Norms
The importance attached to individual autonomy by EU law can be seen as 
merely indicative of a wider point, namely, that certain norms, which for 
cultural and historical reasons have come to be widely shared in Europe 
influence the kind of moral goals which can validly be pursued by legislative 
means under EU law. As both Advocate General Jacobs’ point in relation to 
the restriction of Member State autonomy in moral matters through the 
emergence of common European standards,169 and the notion of assessing the 
“appropriateness” of the moral goal pursued by the Member State in question
170in Omega, suggest, certain moral goals which run counter to the notion of 
the good reflected in the Charter which, as noted above, is broad but 
nevertheless influenced by common European inheritance of Christian, 
humanist and cultural influences, are seen as illegitimate and unacceptable 
within EU law, even if balanced against other countervailing influences.
To take an example, the emergence of a common European norm of gender 
equality may operate so as to reduce the ability of Member States to make 
differing moral choices in this area. For instance, Article 41.2 of the Irish 
constitution provides that:
“7. In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman 
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be 
achieved.
2. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect o f their
1 7 1duties in the home. ”
lby n. 135 above.
170 n. 127 above.
171 Bunreacht na h-Eireann, Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2.
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This article could be seen as representing a deeply held religiously-influenced 
moral notion in relation to the upholding of differences between the sexes and 
the role of women and mothers in family life. Should the Irish authorities 
introduce, legislation which discouraged mothers of young children from 
taking paid employment, such measures would fall foul of the principle of 
gender equality in the workplace enshrined in EU law. Even if the Irish 
government were to demonstrate that the measure in question was very limited 
and attempted to balance the rights of individuals to equal treatment against 
the religious and moral imperative to maintain traditional gender roles, it is 
difficult to imagine that such a choice could be categorised as, to use the 
language of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Omega, “appropriate” by the 
Court in the light of the emphasis placed by Community law on gender 
equality in the workplace and the principle of equal treatment in general. 
Indeed, in Kreil the Court was willing to interfere with an explicit 
constitutional mandate in the extremely sensitive area of military policy when 
the policy in question violated the norm of gender equality.172 On the other 
hand, where common standards have not yet emerged to the same degree, as 
for example is the case in relation to sexual orientation discrimination, 
compromises on the principle of equal treatment on the basis of respect for 
religious and cultural norms have been accepted by EU law, most notably in 
relation to the Framework Directive which has explicitly permitted 
discrimination in employment on grounds of sexual orientation in 
organisations which have a religious ethos on the ground that the limited 
exemptions achieved a balance between the rights of religious bodies and 
those of individuals.173
Notions of religious morality which deviate from established European 
cultural norms are, of course, more likely to come into conflict with “common 
standards.” Thus, notions of European public morality are, to a degree linked 
to the promotion of a common European way of life or ways of life which are 
respectful of the balance between largely Christian religious influences and
172 Case C-285/98 Kreil v. Germany [2000] ECR 1-69.
173 R. (Amicus and others) v. The Secretary of State fo r Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 
860.
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humanist influences which characterise European history, in addition to 
cultural norms, in relation, for instance, to gender equality which have 
emerged from this history. Therefore, common European norms around the 
mixing of the genders may prevent the recognition on public morality grounds 
of a Member State law which sought to enforce in the workplace Islamic 
notions of the separation of the genders. Similarly, it is interesting to consider 
how the Court of Justice would react to notions of morality deriving from 
religions such as Scientology which have little cultural purchase in Europe. A 
law passed by a Member State at the instigation of Scientologists which for 
instance, banned the practice of psychiatry (towards which the Church of 
Scientology is very hostile) and placed the kind of restrictions on the 
advertising of psychiatric services which Ireland had placed on abortion 
services in Grogan would present the Court of Justice with the prospect of 
recognising as part of European public morality a moral stance rejected by the 
overwhelming majority of Europeans.
Were such laws passed by the Union’s own legislature there is, I would 
suggest, little likelihood that they would survive review by the Court. 
However, the pluralism of the EU’s public morality means that when Member 
States seek to make such choices, difficulties arise. The Union’s commitment 
to certain values means that it must place some limits on what can be accepted 
as part of the public morality recognised by EU law. Notions of 
proportionality, coherence and a duty to respect rights to move between 
countries do provide some such limits. However, the judgment in Omega and 
the importance placed by the Union on compliance with fundamental rights, 
particularly in the ERT judgment, means that certain religious and moral 
viewpoints which contradict the balance between religion and humanism 
inherent in the Union’s public morality (seen particularly in its fundamental 
rights instruments) may simply not be capable of being accommodated by 
European public morality or, therefore, EU law. Indeed, such an approach is 
arguably implicit in Articles 6 and 7 TEU which require Member States to 
uphold human rights and democracy on pain of loss of voting rights in the 
Council and thereby stress the notion of EU membership as involving a 
commitment to a certain shared European notion of the good.
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Therefore, if the Union is to be a “Community of Values” and it commitments 
to fundamental rights and shared norms are to have any meaning, certain 
moral or religious goals which deviate from established European cultural 
norms or common standards will not be capable of being accommodated 
within EU public morality and will be held to be contrary to European public 
morality even before issues of balance or coherence arise. On this view, 
particular historical and cultural experiences such as Europe’s collective guilt 
in relation to the holocaust or its long experience of Christianity and 
humanism will influence the Union’s view of what can “count” as valid 
religious or cultural aims in the striking of a balance between religious cultural 
and humanist influences. From such a viewpoint, when the Court of Justice, as 
it did in Omega, investigates the appropriateness of a moral choice which a 
Member State is seeking to have recognised within EU law, or when the 
special contribution of religious bodies to policy formation is being sought by 
EU institutions, all forms of religious morality may for cultural, historic, moral 
or other reasons, not “count” in striking a fair balance between religious 
influences and humanist influenced notions of individual autonomy. Rather, as 
in Promusicae , the Court will assess the balance, only in relation to forms of 
religion whose influence can be balanced against humanist influences or 
established European cultural norms. Approaches which, like radical Islam, 
are radically opposed to key influences such as humanism or which by, 
promoting racist ideas, clash with the legacy of key cultural and historical 
experiences such as the holocaust simply will not be recognised for the 
purposes of such balancing exercises.
Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, the reflection of religion in EU law by 
means of the recognition of public morality, is likely to favour those forms of 
religion which can reconcile themselves to the balance between religious and 
humanist influences which has emerged from European history and which 
characterises much of European culture. As Taylor and LeGoff have pointed 
out, humanism’s success in Europe occurred partly because of the humanistic 
elements of Europe’s historically dominant religion, Christian religions. As 
noted in Chapter I, many have suggested that many of the fundamental values
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of the Union such as democracy equality and individual autonomy have roots 
in Christianity. Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude that given its 
enormous cultural influence and its links to humanism, Christianity may 
exercise a greater influence over European public morality (and thereby EU 
law) than other faiths. Nevertheless, the humanist influences over European 
culture which gave rise to the secularisation of Europe, have, despite the 
religious roots they may have had, have served to limit religious influence 
over law and politics. This has been particularly true in relation to what 
Casanova termed “lifeworld” issues of family, sexuality and the beginning and 
end of life in relation to which mainstream Christian denominations have 
continued to attempt to influence law so that it conforms to their moral 
teachings. Thus, even if liberal notions such as autonomy and equality can be 
seen as the offspring of Christianity, they represent rather rebellious offspring 
which, as adults, have come to clash with their “parents” in the legal and 
political arenas. The Union’s commitment to balancing religious and humanist 
influences therefore restricts all religions, including those with deep roots in 
national and European culture.
6. Conclusion
The notions of pluralism, balance and inheritance are key features of the 
recognition of religion as a basis of law in the EU public order. The legitimacy 
of religious input into law is recognised at a symbolic level through the 
recognition of religion as an element of the Union’s constitutional values, at 
an institutional level in the recognition of religious bodies in the lawmaking 
process and in substantive law through the recognition of religion as part of a 
public morality which the Union and Member States may legislate to protect.
However, in all three areas in which religion is recognised it must share its 
role as an element of public morality with cultural and humanist influences 
which are similarly recognised. Although these elements can reinforce each 
other (as in the case of the Christian influence on Member State cultures) they 
can also be in conflict (as when humanism’s stress on individual autonomy 
clashes with religious desires to promote communal morality). Thus, the 
overall public morality through which religion influences EU law is
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characterised by a balance between these religious, cultural and humanist 
elements. These features are seen in relation to religion’s institutional position 
where the recognition of the special importance and contribution of religious 
institutions to lawmaking is balanced by the secularising effect of providing 
such recognition in the context of a pluralist civil society.
In relation to substantive EU law, religion exercises influence by means of 
morality clauses which allow both the Union and its Member States to 
promote communal moral standards by means of law. This EU public morality 
is pluralist in that it recognises that the primary forum within which ethical 
choices are made is still the individual Member State and therefore permits the 
recognition of differing national religious, cultural and moral viewpoints 
within EU law. However, membership of the Union also involves certain 
moral commitments and a degree of common agreement around fundamental 
political and legal values. Thus, an autonomous EU public morality also 
restricts the degree to which the particular moral choices of individual 
Member States can be reflected in EU law. These restrictions require that the 
ethical choices of Member States do not deviate from a common European 
element of EU public morality containing commitments to proportionality, 
coherence, free movement rights and the notion of fair balance between 
competing values, all of which reflect, inter alia, a degree of respect for 
individual autonomy which is inherent in the Union’s commitment to balance 
between the religious, cultural and humanist influences underlying its public 
order.
Such an approach to public morality has much in common with 
MacCormick’s notion of the Union as characterised by a legal pluralism 
characterised by the interaction of legal systems.174 Indeed, the analogy can 
extend to other areas of EU law such as freedom of movement where one 
could argue that, just as EU law requires that national regulatory decisions 
take into account the principle of free movement of goods, similarly it requires 
that national ethical choices take into account the moral commitments of EU
174 N. MacCormick, “The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now” (1995) 1 European Law 
Journal 259, 264-5.
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membership embodied by the Union’s public morality and fundamental rights 
commitments. This is seen in the judgments in Promusicae and Omega which 
indicated that what is required is that Member States take account of the 
various “goods” and elements of public morality recognised by EU law in 
coming to their ethical decisions.
Although the Union has adhered to a relatively strict formal neutrality in its 
dealings with religions, these “goods” and the notion of what constitutes a fair 
balance between competing rights are both, of course, influenced by European 
culture and history. Indeed, the importance of Europe’s ethical and religious 
“inheritance” in the determination of the content of the public morality of the 
EU has been explicitly acknowledged in the Treaties. Combined with 
deference towards Member State cultural and moral autonomy and the 
promotion of the notion of balance between religious and humanist influences, 
the notion of respect for an ethical inheritance permits culturally entrenched 
Christian religions and those faiths which can reconcile themselves to 
limitation on religious influence which respect for Europe’s humanist tradition 
entails, to exercise greater influence over EU law. Nevertheless, the Union 
recognises the complexity of the relationship between liberal democracy and 
religion in general and provides limits to the public ambitions of all faiths, 
even those with strong humanist traditions and deep cultural roots in Europe. 
Thus, the notion of balance can be seen as attempting to reconcile religion’s 
important role in communal identity with protection of individual identity 
rights, including the right not to be forced to adhere to particular religiously- 
inspired communal moral norms, which derive in part from the humanist 
elements of the Union’s public order.
The Union’s public morality therefore upholds the broad outlines of the 
balance between religion and secular/humanist balance in Europe and the 
cultural values and way of life to which this balance gives rise. Its approach is 
not religiously neutral and exhibits a preference for culturally-entrenched 
faiths which play strong roles in communal cultural identities in Europe and 
which can reconcile themselves to the notion of balance between humanist and 
religious influences. Those religions that do not exercise significant cultural
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influence in a Member State, which are opposed to certain shared European 
cultural norms or which are anti-humanist, are largely excluded from influence 
and are, at least implicitly, identified as in some ways contrary to the Union’s 
public morality and notion of the good. On the other hand, religions such as 
mainstream Christian churches which have deep cultural roots and which have 
a strong humanist tradition, may find that they exercise a far greater influence 
over European public morality than other faiths. Nevertheless, although the 
strong humanist elements of European public morality, and the secular 
influences which they gave rise to, may owe something to Christian 
humanism, they also provide powerful limitations on the influence which all 
religions, including Christianity, can exercise over the law. Thus, the Union’s 
approach is characterised by a complex and shifting balance between 
religious, cultural and humanist influences. This balance is struck in a pluralist 
context which attempts to reconcile the differing balances between such 
influences in individual Member States with the need to maintain the open and 
sufficiently religiously neutral common European ethical framework 
necessary for the functioning of the Union as a polity.
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Chapter IV: Religion as Identity and the Fundamental Rights Obligations 
of the Union 
1. Introduction
2. Rationales for Protecting Religious Freedom in Contemporary Europe
3. The Scope of Freedom of Religion in EU Law as Part of the Union’s 
Fundamental Rights Commitments
4. Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Relating to 
Religious Freedom
4.1 The Text o f the Article
4.2 Individual Religion Freedom as a Private Right
4.3 Institutional Religious Freedom
4.4 Religion as Part o f the State
5. Conclusion
1. Introduction
Chapter III showed how the Union, though limiting the role of religions in the 
political and lawmaking arena in important respects, also permits religion to 
exercise influence over law as an element of civil society and, perhaps more 
importantly, as an element of a public morality which, provided that individual 
autonomy is respected, is promoted out of respect for national cultural 
autonomy. Chapter IV shows the importance of religion’s status as an element 
of identity within such a framework and how such an approach fits in with the 
Union’s fundamental rights obligations in respect of religious freedom. The 
constraints imposed on the Union in this regard are determined, largely, but 
not entirely, by the European Convention on Human Rights which provides 
the basis for the protection of religious freedom in EU law. This chapter 
considers how the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has had to 
reconcile principles such as equality and individual autonomy in religious 
matters which underpin liberal rationales for religious freedom, with more 
communal rationales which recognise religion’s communal nature and the 
right of Member States to promote a communal identity, which may be 
religiously-specific, through their public institutions.
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The chapter demonstrates how the ECtHR has seen individual religious 
freedom as a right which is principally private in nature and focuses on an 
individual right to develop and adhere to a religious identity. The Court has 
generally refused to require states to provide special accommodation for 
religion in non-private contexts such as the labour market. The chapter notes 
how, at times, the Strasbourg Court has seen the relationship between religion 
in the public arena and the liberal democratic state in essentially competitive 
terms and has empowered states to limit religious expression in the public 
contexts in order to defend the principles and interests such as state neutrality, 
equal treatment or public order. Such an approach would seem to be consistent 
with notions of the neutral state and with the defence of religious freedom, 
albeit to a degree which is limited by the needs of the state in the public sphere 
and on the principle of respect for individual autonomy, both of which are 
linked to the Union’s humanist heritage. However, the chapter also 
demonstrates how such individually-based protection has nevertheless been 
influenced by broader cultural factors and how the protection provided by the 
Strasbourg Court has slanted towards forms of religion which are culturally 
established in Europe to the detriment of religious practices which are less 
familiar and culturally entrenched.
Having considered the protection of religion as an individual right, the chapter 
then examines the Court’s approach to the institutional element of religious 
freedom. It demonstrates that, while the Court has endorsed the right of states 
to confine religion to the private sphere in order to ensure the neutrality of the 
public contexts, it has not always seen the relationship between non-private 
religion and the state in competitive terms. It contends that, in an approach 
which is reflective of communal notions of religion and the protection of 
religion’s broader role in communal identity, the ECtHR’s judgments have 
shown a willingness to uphold the conferral of significant public sector 
privileges by Member States on certain denominations, even when such 
privileges interfere with individual rights such as the right to equal treatment 
and personal autonomy. The chapter demonstrates how the confining of 
individual religious freedom to the private sphere, coupled with the right of 
the state to protect the institutional role and social status of certain religions,
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reveals an approach to the relationship between the state and religion which by 
and large respects the right of states to define their own relationship to 
religion, including relationships which involve the close identification of 
certain states with individual denominations. It shows how the ECHR has been 
interpreted so as to permit the use of coercive state power to promote the 
interests of certain religions and how liberal principles such as equal treatment 
and freedom of expression have, at times, been required to give way to the 
right of states to promote a religiously specific communal identity. The 
chapter therefore concludes that there are two sets of rights relevant to the 
Union’s duties in respect of religious freedom. The first is consists of a duty to 
respect the right of individuals to develop and adhere to a religious identity of 
their choosing in the private sphere while the second rights is more permissive 
than mandatory in nature focus on the right of the state to define religion’s role 
in collective identity. Therefore, the constraints imposed by the ECHR on the 
choices of both the EU and its Member States in this area are in fact relatively 
limited and consist mainly of a duty to respect religion in the private sphere 
and to ensure that the identification of the state with a particular religion is not 
such as to imperil the level of pluralism inherent in the liberal democratic 
nature of the Convention system. The fundamental rights obligations of the 
Union in relation to religious freedom therefore leave it free to grant priority 
to the right of Member States to define their own relationship to religion, to 
defend their public spheres and state institutions from religion or, conversely, 
to promote certain denominations through state institutions and do not require 
it to ensure adherence on the part of such Member States to principles such as 
state neutrality and equal treatment of religions.
The first section of the chapter analyses the major rationales for the protection 
of religious freedom in contemporary Europe and how such rationales 
accommodate the diverse nature of religion. The second section traces the 
emergence of the Union’s fundamental rights obligations in EU law and the 
role of religion and the ECHR in those obligations. The chapter then considers 
the protection of religious freedom in its individual and collective forms by the 
ECtHR before concluding with an assessment of the implications of the
125
Court’s approach for the relationship of religion to both the EU and its 
Member States.
2. Rationales for Protecting Religious Freedom in Contemporary Europe
The complex, and at times contradictory, nature of religion makes the issues 
arising out of its legal protection particularly complex. Religion is both a 
matter of individual choice and a type of communal action which may impinge 
on individual choice. It is also an ideological matter of beliefs and opinions 
which nevertheless also involves significant elements of cultural identity 
which set it apart from purely political beliefs. This section analyses the major 
rationales advanced for the protection of religious freedom in contemporary 
Europe and the degree to which each can accommodate religion’s complex 
nature as well as the further complications relating to the balance of power 
between the Union and Member States which arise in the context of the EU.
Four such rationales are generally advanced in the modem European context, 
for the protection of religious freedom. 1 The first two focus on religious 
conflict as a source of suffering and disorder, the third relies on religious 
justifications for religious tolerance and the fourth emphasises the role of 
religious freedom as part of a wider commitment to liberalism and personal 
autonomy.2 The first two rationales are closely related and emphasise the 
historical strife caused by religious conflict. The first approach sees religious 
freedom as an instrument to avoid the suffering brought about by religious 
intolerance. It recognises religious diversity as inevitable and protects 
religious freedom as a means to avoid the conflict which a failure to tolerate 
such diversity would inevitably bring. This argument has found favour in 
some international human rights instruments such as the United Nations 
Declaration on the Elimination o f All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief The preamble to the declaration
1 C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
and New York, Oxford University Press, 2001) 22-33.
2 Ibid.
3 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms o f Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
36/55 of 25 November 1981. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/religion.htm 
accessed, 30 April 2007.
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specifically refers to the suffering caused by a failure to respect religious 
freedom arguing for religious tolerance on the basis that:
“the disregard and infringement o f human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in particular o f the right to freedom o f thought conscience, religion or 
whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering 
to mankind ’4
The second and related approach focuses on the fact that historically, religion 
has often been the ground for persecution. Respect for religious freedom is 
therefore seen as a means to avoid the recurrence of such persecution. The 
highlighting of the fact that, as in the case of race and ethnicity, persecution 
has often been focused on religion, provides a rationale for the inclusion of 
specific guarantees of religious freedom in addition to more general 
commitments to freedom of opinion and expression.5 This historical and 
pragmatic approach has certainly had some influence on the emergence of the 
principle of freedom of religion in Europe. Indeed, it was the destruction and 
suffering occasioned by the religiously-fuelled conflicts that convulsed post- 
Reformation Europe that prompted the recognition of the degree (albeit a 
rather limited one) of religious diversity embodied in the cuius regio eius 
religio principle that was enshrined in the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the 
Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Such principles retain relevance today; the 
European Union, as will be shown below,6 has been markedly reluctant to 
interfere with the relationships developed between some of its Member States 
and certain religions. However, on the other hand, the wording of the relevant 
articles of both the European Convention on Human Rights and EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights focus on a concrete personal right to choose and practice 
one’s religion,7 not on the need to avoid persecution or discrimination on 
religious grounds. Although discrimination on religious grounds is addressed
4 Ibid., Preamble.
5 Above n. 1 at 24-25.
6 See sections 4.3 and 4.4 and n. 38 below.
7 See sections 3 and 4.1 below.
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Qby the EU Charter, this is done in a general anti-discrimination article which 
covers grounds such as racial, gender and sexual orientation discrimination 
which, unlike religious freedom are not addressed by a separate and specific 
article. Indeed, when the issue of the avoidance of conflict has arisen in the 
ECHR caselaw the Strasbourg Court has generally invoked the possibility of 
conflict as a reason to restrict religious freedom9 or has framed the issue as 
one of hurt personal feelings rather than persecution or disorder.10
The third justification relies on religious grounds. A policy of toleration of 
religious difference can serve as a means by which adherents of the majority 
faith can ensure that their faith will be tolerated in places where other faiths 
predominate. John Stuart Mill, for instance, argued from a Christian 
perspective that religious truth will most easily be established in an 
environment free of religious coercion11 while Locke felt that religious 
coercion merely bred hypocrisy and deceit and that forcing Christianity was 
futile as insincere Christians would not, in any event, be “saved”.12 However, 
Evans also notes that while:
“religious tolerance may be part o f the teachings o f some religions, (...) it is 
not common to all religions and even religious groups that contain some 
commitment to the notion of freedom o f religion may disagree fundamentally
13as to the meaning o f and limits to that freedom".
The Catholic Church for instance vigorously opposed the idea of religious 
freedom for many years and only finally reconciled itself to the principle after 
the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. For example, the “Syllabus of 
Errors” issued by Pope Pius IX explicitly condemned the idea that “Every 
man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light o f
8 See Article 21(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 14.12.2007 OJ 
2007/C 303/01.
9 See for instance Sahin v Turkey 44774/98 [2004] ECHR 299 (29 June 2004) at paras. 97 and 
98
10 Otto Preminger Institut v Austria -13470/87 [1994] ECHR 26, paras. 48 and 56.
11 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, (Wordsworth Classic edition, 1996) in Evans, n. 1 above, at page 25.
12 J. Locke, “Letters on Toleration” in the Works of John Locke, Vol. VI, at 28 (1823) quoted 
at page 25 of Evans.
13 Above, n. 1 at 26.
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reason, he shall consider true”14 or that people in Catholic countries should be 
free to “enjoy the public exercise o f their own peculiar form o f worship”.15
While the modem Catholic Church has embraced the notion of religious
freedom,16 this is not true of all major religions. Although the Koran does state
11“let there be no coercion in religion” it also mandates the death penalty for 
apostasy which remains a crime in several Muslim states. Saudi Arabia argued 
strongly against the inclusion of a right to change one’s religion in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights18 and more recently, the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam19 agreed by the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers in 1990, demonstrates a notably ambivalent attitude towards 
religious freedom. Article 10 of the Declaration states:
“Islam is the religion o f unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form  
of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to 
convert him to another religion or to atheism “.
The Declaration makes no mention of a corresponding right not to be 
compelled to remain within Islam. Therefore, while some faiths do provide 
reasons to protect freedom of religion others have not done so in the past or do 
not do so in the present. In contrast to approaches which see religious freedom 
as part of respect for individual rights or as part of communal cultural rights, 
this religiously based view sees religious freedom as something comes from 
beyond and which transcends the state. How such a right would be 
operationalised within a legal system such as the European Union in which
14 Proposition 15, The Syllabus of Errors, The Holy See, 8 December 1864. (H. Dezinger (ed.) 
The Sources of Catholic Dogma, (B. Herder Book Company, 1957). See also the Papal 
Encyclical Quanta Curat 1864 in Carlen (ed.), The Papal Encyclicals, Vol. 1 1740-1878 at 
382.
15 Ibid., Syllabus of Errors, Proposition 78.
16 Vatican II, “Declaration on Religious Freedom”, in W. M. Abbott (ed.) The Documents of 
Vatican II, (Piscataway, American Press, 1966) 677.
17 The Koran, Surah al-Baqarah: 256
18 M. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) 187.
19 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted and issued at the Nineteenth 
Islamic Conference, of Foreign Ministers in Cairo, 5 August 1990 available at 
http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislaml990.htm accessed 22 April 2007.
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nation states are extremely powerful, which is not a theocracy and which has 
never sought to justify its laws in explicitly theological terms, remains 
problematic.
The final rationale sees freedom of religion as an important part of a liberal
society. Raz argues that ‘‘freedom o f religion or belief is an essential and
independent component o f treating human beings as autonomous persons
deserving o f dignity and respect” and that “if society does so treat people it
20will allow for choice between a variety o f religious beliefs”. Similarly, Rawls
01views religions as “a fundamental aspect o f human life and self-definition”, 
while Dworkin argues that states must treat citizens “as human beings who are 
capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives 
should be lived”.22 These views are echoed in the UN Declaration on religious 
intolerance which states that:
“Religion or belief for anyone who professes either, is one o f the fundamental 
elements in his conception o f life and that freedom o f religion should be fully
23respected and guaranteed”.
According to Evans, these arguments are based on the ideas that “individuals 
are in the best position to determine their own concept o f the good life and 
should, within certain constraints, be free to pursue their ideal without 
governmental interference” 24 This justification of religious freedom on the 
basis of liberal respect for individual autonomy and the right to form one’s 
own identity, fits in with the overall thrust of European human rights 
protection in the post war period which, in common with many modem human 
rights instruments, protects freedom of thought and conscience as well as 
providing specific protection for religious freedom. Such instruments also 
generally guarantee other rights such as the right to privacy and freedom of
20 J. Raz, The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988) 396.
21 J. Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1971) 17-22. 
Quoted in Evans above, n. 1 at page 31.
22 R. Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977) 
272-3.
23 n. 3 above.
24 n. 1 above, 30.
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expression as part of a wider, more general commitment to the protection of 
individual autonomy. The protection of freedom of religion at international 
level has, as Malcolm Evans suggests, “been bound up with the development
25of the concept o f individual human rights”. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the European Union has identified the humanist tradition with its 
strong streak of individual autonomy as a major influence on its constitutional
values which have also been declared to include the “rights o f the human
26person, freedom, equality and the rule o f law" all of which would seem to be 
consistent with this view of religious freedom.
However such an approach raises certain difficulties. It embodies a very 
secular view of religion, seeing it as a phenomenon worthy of protection only 
in so far our commitment to human choice and autonomy compels us to ensure 
that all items are on the menu in the cultural and philosophical restaurant. This 
raises the question of why specific protection for religious freedom should be 
provided rather than a more general commitment to respect personal 
autonomy. Furthermore, this approach fails to take account of religion’s 
broader social role and ideological nature. Religion is not a phenomenon that 
can be neatly contained within the private and individual realm within which 
liberal states are content to grant the decisions of individuals the maximum of 
respect, but has communal aspects and wider social and political ramifications. 
Thus an approach to religious freedom based solely on a respect for individual 
choice is, to some extent, inconsistent with the communal and social nature of 
many aspects of mainstream European religions many of which play important 
public roles both institutionally and as sources of identity in several Member 
States. As Dalacoura points out, a purely individualistic approach to religion 
undermines the ability of religion to retain social relevance. Religion, she 
argues:
“is a social affair, as well as a matter o f personal belief Its strength rests on 
socialisation, worship and the existence of taboos. Religion confined to the
25 n. 18 above, 172-3.
26 See Preamble, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007/C 
306/01.
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private sphere eventually loses its hold on the individual conscience, as the 
history o f the Western world after the nineteenth century clearly demonstrates. 
I f  religion is not to guide us in our relationships with one another, it loses its
27relevance to our existence and therefore withers away. ”
For many religions therefore, to protect only religion’s individual aspects is to 
undermine its ability to maintain the taboos and social presence necessary to 
avoid its decline as a relevant force in society. The maintenance of such taboos 
requires interference with individual choice and autonomy and is therefore 
somewhat inconsistent with the liberal rationale for religious liberty. Most 
European religions reject the notion of religion as a purely individual and 
private matter.28 Although it is true that, in the period since the Enlightenment 
and Reformation, the influence of religions over the public sphere in Europe 
has declined significantly, the major Christian denominations all continue to 
engage in the public sphere and to attempt to influence law and public policy 
in certain areas.29 For many religions whose presence on the European scene is 
more recent and whose relationship to the public arena and to post- 
Enlightenment values has not been as influenced by the key experiences of 
European history, the notion of religion as a private individual matter is even 
more problematic. Cantwell-Smith argues that most religions, apart from the 
traditional European faiths, view religion more as a matter of a way of life and 
behaviour than as a series of beliefs and opinions30 while Esposito suggests 
that the idea of religion as a primarily personal private matter of individual
27 K. Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International 
Relations, (London and New York, I B Tauris ,1998) 11.
28 See for instance the statements of the leader of the Anglican Communion Archbishop of 
Canterbury in “Down with Godless Government” The Sunday Times, 22 April 2007, available 
at:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/articlel687465.ece 
(accessed 30 April 2007) and the Address of Pope Benedict XVI to the European People’s 
Party of 30 March 2006 full text at:
http://www.vatican.va/holv father/benedict xvi/speeches/2006/march/documents/hf ben- 
xvi spe 20060330 eu-parliamentarians en.html, both of which call for active religious 
involvement in the political process.
29 Ibid.
30 W. Cantwell Smith, “The Meaning and the End of Religion” (New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1963), at chapters 2 and 3 which states that the notion of religion, let alone the 
primacy of particular beliefs as opposed to a religious way of life is alien outside traditional 
European religions (quoted in C. Evans above, n. 1 at 75).
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belief is largely a Western one.31 For such religions, an approach to religious 
freedom based solely on protection of individual autonomy would appear 
gravely deficient.
The fact that religion remains involved in public and political life reveals a 
further limitation in an approach based purely on respect for individual 
autonomy. Liberal theorists speak of religious freedom as an element of 
individual choice to be asserted by individuals against the state.32 However 
given its communal, social and political roles, religion itself can be a threat to 
individual autonomy. Religiously motivated actions can for instance have 
political consequences including the undermining of liberal democratic system 
and the principle of individual choice and autonomy itself. The difficulties 
posed by the need to respect religious choices while defending liberal 
democratic values from theocratic forces can be seen in the Union’s pursuit of 
“balance” in the previous chapter and in the limitations on the political role of 
religion which such balance is seen as requiring. It is also seen in the approach 
of certain European bodies to the impact of religious freedom on the public 
sphere. Some such bodies have sought to place limits on the degree to which 
such freedom can be used to protect actions inconsistent with liberal 
democratic principles. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
for example, has stated that: “The recourse to religion [as a source of values] 
has, however, to be reconciled with the principles o f democracy and human 
rights”33 while decisions of the European Court of Human such as that in 
Ref ah Partisi v Turkey34 indicate clearly that freedom of religion is subject to a 
requirement that religious ideas or practices must not, particularly in the public 
sphere, threaten the wider liberal democratic values which underlie the 
European public order.
Indeed, the broader role of the state and national identity is an element which 
is not adequately addressed by an exclusive focus on personal autonomy as the
31 J. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, (Oxford and New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2002) at 199.
32 ns. 20-22 above.
33 Pari Ass of C of E, Recommendation 1202 of 2 February 1993 on religious tolerance in a 
democratic society, para. 9.
34 Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/88 and 41344/98 (2003) 37 EHRR 1.
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rationale for the protection of religious freedom. This autonomy-centred 
approach is very much part of the broader liberal project of the generally 
neutral state which does not embody any particular vision of “the good life.”35 
However, several human rights instruments place strong emphasis on the 
rights of parents to pass on their religion to their offspring (for example by 
ensuring that the right to religious education is protected) which would seem 
to stress religion’s role as an element of communal culture rather than solely a 
matter of individual choice. Furthermore, religion has been repeatedly defined 
as a partly cultural matter by EU institutions.37 In more general terms, the 
emphasis on religion’s cultural role would seem to contradict an entirely 
individualistic and autonomy-based view of religion given that one’s cultural 
identity, at least partly arises out of involuntary factors such as race and 
upbringing. Most European states are not religiously neutral and have strong 
cultural, historical and institutional links to certain religions which are a key 
element of the collective national identity which such states embody. To give 
a few examples, questions of religious identity were fundamental elements of 
the nationalist revolts which saw Belgium secede from the Netherlands and 
Ireland secede from the United Kingdom. Orthodox Christian identity was 
also fundamental to the Greek struggle for independence while Protestantism 
was a key element in the formation of the British state. Relations between 
religious communities were hugely important internally in Germany and the 
Netherlands while conflict around the role of the Catholic Church represented 
the major cleavage in France, Spain and Italy for much of the 19th century. 
Indeed these struggles were fundamental elements in the creation of the 
modem French, Spanish and Italian states. Even today, a primary element of 
the identity of many Member States is provided by their relationship to 
religion or a particular denomination. France’s status as a secular republic is 
fundamental to its identity, the Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches remain 
key elements of Greek and Polish identity while the changed relationship of 
countries like Ireland and Spain to the Catholic Church is seen by their 
citizens as representing a major change in their national identities.
35 See for example Rawls n. 21 above.
36 See for example Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
37 See Chapter V.
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This national and cultural role is at the centre of a further complication in the 
analysis of the protection of religious freedom under EU law. While EU 
fundamental rights law is very much part of the worldwide and regional post­
war developments in human rights, the Union itself is an organisation of 
multi-level governance in which issues of subsidiarity and the relative powers 
of its constituent parts are particularly important. The Union’s status as a 
functional organisation of restricted competence and limited democratic 
legitimacy means that the extent to which it is capable of articulating and 
imposing a distinctive approach to the issue of religious freedom is restricted 
by its duty to respect the autonomy and identity of its Member States. Indeed 
its founders deliberately sought to avoid entangling the Community with 
sensitive questions such as religion and identity on the grounds that it was 
only through functional integration that European unification could advance. 
Accordingly, the Union has had to be particularly sensitive not to appear to 
interfere with Member State choices in this area. Indeed, in a contemporary 
variation on the cuius regio eius religio theme, a Declaration appended to the 
Amsterdam Treaty and more recently a substantive article of the Reform 
Treaty state that “The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law o f churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States” 38 thus deliberately attempting to limit the degree which EU 
law will interfere with the religius established by modem day regii (Member 
State governments).
Apart from purely religious rationales which struggle to achieve recognition 
within the European context, the protection of freedom of religion in the 
contemporary European context is underpinned by a mix of potentially 
mutually inconsistent rationales which focus on religion as an element of 
identity but which emphasise different elements of religion and view its 
relationship to the state in very different ways. These differing approaches see
38 See Declaration 11, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340 ,
10/11/1997 P. 0308. See also Article 16 C of the Treaty of Lisbon which states "The Union 
respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious 
associations or communities in the Member States.” (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 
December 2007, OJ 2007/C 306/01).
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religion as an element of individual identity to be protected from state power 
and as part of the culture which constitutes the state. The EU’s attempts to 
define a distinctive relationship to religion and religious freedom in its public 
order is likely to be influenced by liberal ideas of individual autonomy which 
are at the heart of its identity as a “Community of Values”. However, such 
ideas potentially clash with several other factors notably, religion’s claim to 
transcendence, the problematic relationship between some religions and 
individual autonomy and the immense historical and cultural role of certain 
denominations in many Member States with which, as an institution of limited 
democratic legitimacy, the Union is ill-equipped to interfere.
3. The Scope of Freedom of Religion in EU Law as Part of the Union’s 
Fundamental Rights Commitments
We have seen how the competing rationales for the protection of religious 
freedom offer very different visions of the role of religion within the modem 
state. The Union’s balancing of these competing visions takes place within 
certain constraints, most notably its commitment to uphold certain 
fundamental rights. Over the course of its history the Union’s fundamental 
rights obligations have broadened and deepened steadily. Undertakings by the 
Union and its Member States to respect certain fundamental principles have 
been increasingly explicit and have been turned into key elements of both the 
EU’s legal and political orders.39 This commitment to the upholding of certain 
fundamental rights informs the assessment of what can be considered to be a 
proper balance between religious, humanist and cultural influences over the 
law and can therefore potentially influence the Union’s approach to the 
relationship between religion and state and the ability of Member States to 
pursue relationships to religion which violate such undertakings. Thus the 
Union’s commitment to upholding freedom of religion can affect not merely 
the role of religion in the Union’s own public order, but can also call into 
question the established structures and relationships which constitute the role 
of religion in the public orders of individual Member States.
39 A. Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2004).
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The evolution of the Union’s legal obligations in relation to human rights 
began in the late 1960s when the Court of Justice started to develop the idea of 
“general principles” of Community law which included fundamental rights 
obligations and whose observance the Court declared it would ensure. In 
1969,in Stauder v City o f Ulm° the Court examined the implementation by the 
German authorities of a Commission decision enabling the sale of surplus 
butter. It found that the arrangements in question were compatible with 
Community law but at the same time held that fundamental rights were 
“enshrined in the general principles o f law and protected by the Court” 41 A 
year later in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft42 case it established that acts 
by the Community which violated such fundamental rights would be held to 
be illegal.
The decisions in Stauder and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft effectively 
created what was to become an unenumerated bill of rights in Community law. 
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the Court attempted to give some 
indication as to the content of these rights by invoking the “constitutional 
traditions” of the Member States as their source. In Nold v Commission43 the 
Court recognised that international treaties to which Member States were part 
could also act as a source of fundamental rights. Such an approach obviously 
created great scope for the European Convention on Human Rights, as a treaty 
which all Member States had ratified, to play a role in the determination of the 
content of rights resulting from the “common constitutional traditions” of the 
Member States. The ECJ’s judgment in Rutlili v Ministre de VInterieur44 
explicitly recognised the ECHR as such a source.45 By the time of its 1989
40 [1969] ECR 419.
41 Ibid. para. 7
42 Case 11/70 [1970] ECR 1125.
43 [1974] ECR 491.
44 Case 36/75 [1975] ECR 1219.
45 The Court has also mentioned other treaties as sources of fundamental rights in Community 
law. The ICCPR for example was mentioned in Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, 
while the European Social Charter was mentioned in Blaziot v Beligum Case 24/86 [1988] 
ECR 379.
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decision in Wachauf v Bundesamt fur Emahrung und Fortwirtschaft46 the 
Court could summarise the situation as follows:
“The Court has consistently held [...] that fundamental rights form an integral 
part o f the law, the observance o f which is ensured by the Court In 
safeguarding those rights, the Court has to look to the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with 
the fundamental rights recognised by the Community may not find acceptance 
in the Community. International treaties concerning the protection o f human 
rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they have 
acceded can also supply guidelines to which regard should be had in the 
context o f Community law.”41
This obligation to respect human rights principles has been held to apply not 
merely to EU legislation itself but to all measures implementing or derogating 
from EU law. In the ERT case the Court was faced with a challenge to the 
award of a monopoly to a Greek broadcasting service by the Greek 
government. The award amounted to a derogation from the market freedoms 
protected by EU law. While such derogations are not in themselves necessarily 
incompatible with community law48 the derogation in this case was challenged 
on the basis that, inter alia, it interfered with the right to freedom of expression 
protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The Court therefore had to decide 
whether a national law measure, derogating from EU law was itself subject to 
compliance with Community fundamental rights norms. It held that:
“the national rules in question can fall under the exceptions provided [...] 
only if they are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of 
which is ensured by the Court. ”49
This extensive view of the reach of EU fundamental rights norms means that 
the duty to respect the principle of religious freedom applies not only to EU
46 Case 5/88 ECR [1989] 02609.
47 Ibid. para. 17.
48 Ibid. para. 1.
49 Ibid .para. 43.
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law itself but also to measures implementing or derogating from EU law. In 
Segi v Council50 the Court addressed the issue of the status of anti-terrorism 
measures adopted under the Third Pillar and held that all acts of the Union 
which created legal effects in relation to third parties, including those taken 
under the third pillar could be the subject of a reference to the Court of Justice 
for the purposes of obtaining a preliminary ruling on, inter alia, the 
compatibility of such measures with fundamental rights norms. In the light of 
these judgments, it is clear that the Union’s duty to respect fundamental rights 
applies across a wide range of areas of EU activity including all areas of the 
Single Market (including employment, regulation of advertising and 
commercial activities) as well as politically sensitive areas such as justice and 
home affairs and anti-terrorism policy.51
The ECJ’s development of a fundamental rights jurisprudence has been part of 
a broader deepening of the Union’s political commitment to fundamental 
rights. In 1977, the Parliament, Council and Commission adopted a Joint 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights in which they undertook to respect the 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.52 In 1992, Article 6 
of the Maastricht Treaty made a similar commitment to:
“respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention for  
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
50 Segi et al v Council Case C-355/04 P Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 27 
February 2007, paras. 53 to 56.
51 For an example of the relevance of religious freedom to Union law in this area seethe 
Council Decision implementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 
which provides that Member States will not be required by the Convention to extradite an 
individual if there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the request for extradition was 
made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person in question on grounds, inter alia, 
of religion or if extradition would “cause prejudice” to that person on that basis (Article 
16(14), Council Decision of 29 April 2005 on the conclusion on behalf of the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. OJ 
L261/69 2004/579/EC). Similarly, the decision on the mutual recognition of financial 
penalties allows Member States not to execute the relevant penalty if there are “reasons to 
believe, based on objective elements that the financial penalty has the purpose of punishing a 
person on the grounds of his or her [...] religion.” (Para. 5, Preamble, Council Framework 
Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to financial penalties, L76/16 22.3.2005). Respect for freedom of religion is also 
regularly required by the Union in its external relations (see for example Article 3(a), Council 
Common Position on Nigeria of 27 May 2002, 2002/401/CFSP.
52 OJ 1977 C l03/1.
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on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles o f law”.
The Constitutional Treaty and its successor, the Lisbon Treaty both viewed the 
Union as a “Community of Values” and defined the upholding of fundamental 
rights as a key element of EU membership. This reflected the approach 
adopted by the Union in the Enlargement process with the Copenhagen 
Criteria of 1993 which govern the accession of new members to the Union 
specifically requiring applicant states to ensure respect for human rights as 
part of the accession process.54 In 2000 the Union went further and adopted its 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights although differences amongst Member 
States meant that it was stated that it operated only as a political declaration. 
The Lisbon Treaty envisages that the Charter will become a part of EU law.
A commitment to the protection of fundamental rights is therefore a key 
element of the EU’s legal and political orders. It is also clear that protection of 
religious freedom is one such fundamental right. As far back as 1976 the Court 
of Justice recognised in Prais v Council55 that freedom of religion was part of 
the “general principles” of law which it was committed to upholding. In doing 
so the Court invoked Article 9 of the ECHR thereby indicating the 
Convention’s special status in EU law fundamental rights jurisprudence. The 
influence of the ECHR can be seen in Article 10 of the Charter which states:
“Freedom o f thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and religion. 
This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public and private, to manifest 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised in accordance with 
the national laws governing the exercise o f this right.”
53 Article F, Treaty on European Union, OJ C l 91 29 July 1992.
54 These fundamental rights have included the right to religious freedom, see for instance the 
Commission’s Turkey 2005 Progress Report SEC (2005) 1426) {ECOM (2005) 561 final} at 
page 29 which highlighted respect for religious freedom as one of the requirements of 
accession.
55 Prais v Council Case 130/75 Judgment of 27 October 1976.
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Apart from the specific reference to conscientious objection in the second 
section, the text of Article 10 is almost identical to that of Article 9 of the 
ECHR.56 The fact that its text very largely reproduces the wording of Article 
9 of the ECHR indicates that the Union envisages that, although the Charter 
was not in itself legally binding, the level and scope of the protection of 
religious freedom in EU law were intended overlap significantly with the 
protection provided under the ECHR. This approach has been further 
strengthened by the rulings of the ECJ in the cases of Akrich v Secretary o f
57 58State for the Home Department and Parliament v Council both of which 
accorded a dominant role to the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights in 
the determination of the requirements of the Union’s commitment to 
fundamental rights. In Parliament v Council for instance, the Parliament 
requested that the Court annul certain provisions of the directive on the basis 
that they constituted a violation of the right to family life. In reaching its 
decision to uphold the directive, the Court based its analysis of the 
requirements of the EU’s fundamental rights norms (including the Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights) 59 on the interpretation of Article 8 of the 
ECHR by the European Court of Human Rights noting the “special 
significance” of its jurisprudence in this regard.60 It cited several judgments of 
the Strasbourg Court61 before upholding the impugned provisions on the basis 
that they:
“[did] not run counter to the right to respect for family rights set out in
particular in Article 8 o f the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court o f
62Human Rights.”
56 See section 4.1 below.
57 Case C-109/01 ECR [2003] 1-09607
58 Parliament v Council, Case C-540/03 judgment 27th June 2006.
59 Para. 38 where the Court acknowledged the Charter’s importance in the determination of 
the content of the Union’s fundamental rights norms. This was reaffirmed in Advocaten voor 
de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad Case C-303/05 see the Opinon of Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo at para. 78.
60 Ibid. para. 35.
61 Ibid. para. 54.
62 Ibid. para. 98.
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Apart from noting that that the relevant provisions appeared to be consistent 
with the Strasbourg Court’s view of the requirements of Article 8, the ECJ 
offered no other reasons for its conclusion that the directive was consistent 
with EU fundamental rights norms. This would seem to indicate that the Court 
of Justice regards the Charter as having acted merely to confirm the rights 
which were already protected by EU law as a result of national constitutional 
traditions, of which the ECHR is a primary element.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will therefore have 
a significant impact on the relationship between religion and the public order 
of the EU. The ECHR provides the framework within which the Union can 
construct its relationship to religion. Politically, the Union has repeatedly 
committed itself to respecting the requirements of the ECHR while legally, the 
Court of Justice has made it clear that not only is the Convention a key source 
of fundamental rights obligations within EU law itself but that measures in 
violation of such rights will be struck down. Therefore, whatever balance the 
Union strikes between the rights of individuals, religious organisations and 
member states, must respect the fundamental norms laid down by the 
Strasbourg Court in its interpretation of the Convention.
4. Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Relating to 
Religious Freedom
This section analyses the approach of the Court of Human Right to the 
regulation of religious freedom and the relationship between religion and the 
state in contemporary Europe. The Strasbourg Court (“ECtHR”) has had to 
reconcile principles such as equality and individual autonomy in religious 
matters which underpin liberal rationales for religious freedom and which 
reinforce notions of state neutrality vis a vis religion, with more communal 
rationales which recognise religion’s communal nature and the right of 
Member States to promote a communal identity, which may be religiously- 
specific, through its public institutions. It argues that the constraints imposed 
by the ECHR on state-choice in this area are largely limited to a duty to 
respect religion in the private sphere and demonstrates how the ECtHR, 
through an approach which has granted priority to the right of states to define
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their own relationship to religion, to defend the public sphere and state 
institutions from religion or, conversely, to promote certain denominations 
through state institutions, over approaches which stress ideas such as state 
neutrality and equal treatment, has reflected the continuing intertwining of the 
state and certain forms of religion in Europe.
4.1 The Text o f the Article
The ECHR specifically identifies religious freedom as one of the key rights 
protected by the Convention system, Article 9 provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests o f public safety, for the protection of public order,
63health or morals, or the protection o f the rights and freedoms of others.
The wording of the article highlights the major issues arising in its 
interpretation by showing the tension between the potentially competing 
communal and individual elements of religious freedom. The first phrase 
defines religion as an individual right and as a matter of thought rather than 
culture or identity ( “everyone has the right to freedom of thought conscience 
or religion”). However, it goes on to acknowledge its public and communal 
aspects (the right “either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance”). The second section deals with limitations on religious freedom. 
Although the use of the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” would 
seem to indicate that only weighty considerations would justify interference 
with Article 9 rights, the relatively extensive grounds mentioned (“the 
protection o f public order”, “health or morals” and “the protection o f the
63 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Article 9.
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rights and freedoms o f others”) indicate that broader interference may be 
permitted. Thus, the text of the article itself provides no simple answers to the 
complex issues of individual, communal and state rights and duties brought up 
by religious freedom and as will be shown below, the balance struck by the 
Strasbourg institutions between these rights and interests has appeared to 
differ in different circumstances.
4.2 Individual Religious Freedom as a Private Right
The Strasbourg Court has, despite Article 9’s protection of the right to 
“manifest” one’s religion, seen protection of individual religious freedom as 
being largely confined to the private sphere. In particular it has failed to 
require member states to provide religious individuals with special 
accommodations in order to allow them to adhere to their religious identities 
in public contexts. In Arrowsmith v UK64 the European Commission of Human 
Rights65 (“ECommHR”) stated that Article 9 did:
“not give individuals the right to behave in the public sphere in compliance 
with all the demands o f their religion or belieff66
fna statement which it has repeated on several occasions. The Court has shown 
a concern to protect the State’s ability to regulate public space and public 
matters from demands to accommodate religious belief and practice. It has 
therefore adopted a relatively restrictive interpretation of the notion of 
“manifestation” of religion, refusing, for example, to acknowledge 
“commercial activities” on the part of a church (the selling of “e-meters” by
64 Arrowsmith v. UK (Application 7050/75), Comm. Rep 1978, 19 DR 5
65 Until 1998 the admissibility of applications under the Convention was decided by a separate 
European Commission of Human Rights which referred on successful applications to the 
Court for a final decision.
66 Ibid. Here the term “public sphere” seems to be used in a broader sense meaning non­
private contexts as opposed what Asen calls the “realm of social life in which public opinion 
can be formed” (R. Asen “Toward a Normative Conception of Difference in Public 
Deliberation” Argumentation and Advocacy 25 (Winter) 115-129 (1999).
67 See for instance cases relating to cattle vaccination X v Netherlands Application 1068/61 (in 
relation to cattle vaccination) C v UK Application 10358/83 (taxation) and X  v Austria 
Application 1718/62 (mandatory voting) (all quoted at page 180 of Evans, n. 1 above.).
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scientologists)68 or the contracting of a religious marriage69 as falling within 
the meaning of this term. Furthermore, it has refused to acknowledge indirect 
discrimination on religious grounds as a violation of Article 9. The Court has 
repeatedly upheld laws challenged under Article 9 on the basis that they were 
“generally applicable and neutral”.10 In C. v UK71 for example, the applicant 
who was a Quaker, objected to being required to pay income tax which might 
be used for purposes incompatible with his pacifist beliefs. The Commission 
in rejecting his claim noted that “Article 9 primarily protects the sphere o f
79personal beliefs and creeds” and that it “does not always guarantee the right
73to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by such a belief ’ 
before concluding that there was no violation of the Convention on the basis, 
inter alia, that the legislation in question “applies neutrally and generally in 
the public sphere”1* Challenges to taxation arrangements, the compulsory
nc nf.
vaccination of farm animals and mandatory voting have been upheld on a 
similar basis. These cases all involved consideration of a clash between the 
needs of the state in public matters such as regulation of the market, taxation 
and the political sphere, with the religious beliefs and practices of individuals 
who enter into such areas as consumers, producers or citizens. In each case the 
ECtHR upheld the right of the state to interfere with individual religious 
identities in order to ensure that the attainment of government goals in these 
areas would not be compromised and refused to require states to provide to 
religious beliefs, protections not given to other beliefs or opinions. The 
subjugation of religious freedom in public contexts to the needs of the State is 
seen equally clearly in cases where the presence of religion in public spaces 
such as educational institutions or the military is seen as a potential threat to 
the identity of the state or even to the state itself. The Turkish authorities were 
permitted to maintain strict limitations on the wearing of Islamic dress in
68 Church of Scientology v Sweden Application 7895/77 16 Dec and Rep (1979) (quoted at 
108-9 of Evans)
69 Khan v UK Application 11579/85.
70 Chappell v UK Application 12587/86.
71 C. v UK Application 10358/83 DR 37, 142.
72 Ibid. at 147.
73 Ibid. See n. 66 above.
74 Ibid.
75 X v Netherlands Application 1068/61
76 X v Austria Application 1718/62
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77  78educational institutions in Karaduman v Turkey and in Kalag v Turkey to 
purge the army of those with connections to Islamic fundamentalist 
movements as part of their attempts to defend the secular nature of the Turkish 
State.79 In both cases the ECtHR and ECommHR argued that the state’s need 
to defend its secular identity rendered legitimate restrictions on the individual 
religious identity of those who chose to study in or work for public bodies 
such as universities and the military. Similarly in Dahlab v Switzerland  the 
Court upheld the right of the Swiss authorities to prevent state primary school 
teachers from wearing the Islamic headscarf on the basis that it was legitimate 
for the state to attempt to ensure the neutrality of the educational system. The 
Court’s decision in Sahin v Turkey81 in which restrictions on the headscarf in 
universities were again upheld, also invoked notions of public order and the 
possible impact on the rights of the less religious of an assertive religious 
presence in public institutions. It should be pointed out that not all “generally 
applicable and neutral” laws have been upheld by the Court. In Thlimmenos v
87Greece it held that Greek laws which did not provide for exemptions for 
those who objected to national service on religious grounds violated Article 9. 
This however was very much an exception with the Court, as Evans states, 
viewing “the fact that a law is general and neutral [as] at least a powerful
83indicator that it cannot interfere with freedom o f religion or belief’.
The Court’s view of individual religious freedom as a right that is largely 
restricted to the private sphere and which does not generally provide an 
entitlement to special accommodation beyond this sphere, is also seen in its 
characterisation of religion as a purely voluntary matter whose adherents can 
be taken to have waived their right to adhere fully to their religion when they 
enter the public arena. In Ahmad v UKM for example, the case of a Muslim 
teacher who was refused time off by his employer to attend the Mosque on
77 Karaduman v Turkey, Application 16278/90, Commission, decision of 3 May 1993, DR 74.
78 41 Eur Ct HR (Ser A) 1199 at 1203 (1997-IV)
79 In 1998 the Commission (which had decided on the admissibility of cases) was merged with 
the Court under a series of reforms of the operation of the Court of Human Rights.
80 Dahlab v Switzerland, Application 42393/98 ECHR V.
81 (2005) 41 EHRR 8.
82 Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 15.
83 Ahmad v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 126.
84 Ibid. at 130
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Fridays, failed partly on the basis that he had agreed to such limitations on his 
freedom of religion when he had accepted a contract of employment which did 
not provide for time off on Fridays. In Stedman v UK*5 no violation of the 
Article 9 was found in the case of an applicant who refused to work on 
Sundays on the basis that she was free to leave her employment while in the
or
case of Karaduman v Turkey, as noted above, the applicant’s decision to 
attend a university whose regulations forbade the wearing of headscarves was 
seen by the court as having constituted agreement to waive her right to wear 
the garment while being photographed for her university ID card.
The Court’s failure to require member states to provide protection for the right 
to have one’s religious practices accommodated in areas such as employment 
does bring the risk that the religious practices of adherents of majority 
religions will receive greater protection given that social and economic life is, 
for historical reasons, likely to be arranged around their practices (with for 
example holidays covering the Christmas period and the weekly rest period 
covering Sundays in mainly Christian countries). Indeed the cultural partiality 
of the protection provided by the ECHR is seen more directly in its approach 
to the notion of “manifestation” of one religious belief. It has held that only 
acts “required’ by a particular religion will be covered by the right to manifest 
ones religion and, in contrast to the approach of the US Supreme Court87 the 
Strasbourg Court has taken upon itself to determine “objectively” what 
constitutes manifestation for these purposes rather than relying on the 
subjective views of applicants. Thus in Ahmad v UK it held that Mosque 
attendance was not a requirement of the religion of the Muslim teacher refused 
permission to take time off school to attend Friday Prayers88 while in 
Karaduman v Turkey it decided that the right of a female applicant to wear an 
Islamic headscarf was not “manifestation” for the purposes of Article 9.89 
Similarly, in Valsamis v Greece90 the Court simply substituted its view for that 
of the Jehovah’s Witness applicants who felt that being required to take part in
85 Stedman v UK, Application 29107/95.
86 n. 77 above.
87 Thomas v Review Board of Indiana Social Security Division, 450 US 707, 714 (1981).
88 Ahmad v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 126
89 Karaduman v Turkey Application 16278/90, Commission, decision of 3 May 1993, DR 74
90 Valsamis v Greece 2 ECt HR Ser A 2312 (1996-VI) Evans at 121.
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a Greek national day parade violated their pacifist beliefs, deciding that the 
parade was not military in character. Although the Court has been relatively 
liberal in its definition of religion,91 its insistence that its views, rather than 
those of the applicants, should decide what is required by the relevant religion 
has meant that, as Evans notes, there is a risk that the Court “will single out for  
protection religious rites and practices with which the members o f the Court
92are familiar and feel comfortable”. Cumper notes that “the Commission and 
Court have, at times, been accused o f being unsympathetic to the claims of 
those from non-Christian traditions or religions without a long history in 
Europe”P  The low priority accorded by the Court to rights such as the right to 
wear a headscarf or other items of religious apparel94 compared to its 
willingness to uphold more typically Christian practices such as proselytism95 
and worship96 means that states are under even less obligation to modify 
norms of their public sphere which are culturally or religiously specific in 
order to accommodate minority religious needs.
91 The Strasbourg institutions have not engaged in detailed analysis of the issue of what 
qualifies as a “religion or belief’ for Article 9 purposes and have instead tended not to dispute 
that the belief systems at the centre of claims fall within the definition of “religion or belief’. 
Thus the claims of movements such as Scientology (see X. and Church o f Scientology v 
Sweden Application No. 7805/77. 16 DR 68) and the “Divine Light Zentrum” (Omkaranda 
and the Divine Light Zentrum v Switzerland Application No 8118/77, 25 Eur Comm’n HR 
Dec & Rep 105 (1981) both discussed in Evans above, n. 1 at 55) have been analysed on the 
basis that they fall within Article 9 as have the claims of certain non-religious movements 
such as pacifism (Arrowsmith v UK).
92 n. 1 above, 125.
93 P. Cumper, “The Rights of Religious Minorities: The Legal Regulation of New Religious 
Movements” in P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds.), Minority Rights in the “New” Europe,
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), 174-175 (1999). And T. J. Gunn 
Adjudicating Rights o f Conscience under the European Convention on Human Rights in J. D. 
Van Der Vyver and J. Witte J (eds) Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal 
Perspectives (Hague, Boston, London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 305, 322.
94 The Court has never found in favour of an applicant seeking the right to wear an item of 
religious apparel (see Evans above, n. 1 at page 125) who states that “[The judges of the 
CourtJ have never held in favour of an applicant in cases dealing with the wearing of 
religious apparel or having particular appearance, for example, which can be important to 
people from some religious traditions despite having little relevance in Christianity. On the 
other hand they have been quick to hold that there is a right to proselytize or “bear Christian 
witness” ”
95 Kokkinakis v Greece (Application No. 260-A) Judgment of 25 May 1993, Ser. A.; 17 EHRR 
397.
96 Manoussakis and Others v Greece (18748/91) [1996] ECHR 41 (26 September 1996).
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There are however, limits to the degree to which individuals can be required to 
modify their behaviour in order to maintain their religious freedom. In Darby 
v Sweden97 the ECommHR rejected the argument that an applicant’s decision 
to reside chiefly in another state meant that he had voluntarily waived his right 
to avoid the compulsory church taxes imposed by the Swedish government on 
temporary residents. Notably however, the law to which the Commission took 
exception in Darby imposed the duty on the applicant to pay the relevant 
church tax merely as a result of his living in Sweden rather than as a result of 
his having engaged in public activities. Accordingly this decision can be seen 
more as a vindication of a private right to individual religious freedom rather 
than a right to have one’s faith accommodated by public authorities.
The ECtHR’s general approach has therefore been to uphold the right of states 
to restrict religion to the private sphere. It has consistently characterised 
individual religious freedom as a right which does not necessarily include an 
entitlement to have one’s religious identity accommodated contexts such as 
employment or education which are not purely private. The Strasbourg Court 
has seen the relationship between religiosity in public contexts and the needs 
of the state in competitive terms and has resolved this perceived conflict in 
favour of the right of the state to regulate public space and activities. This 
approach is largely consistent with the secular idea of the public sphere as a 
religiously neutral place in which religious concerns deserve no special 
consideration and with the idea of religious freedom as a primarily a matter of 
individual freedom of thought rather than a way of life or source of identity. 
The ECtHR’s emphasis on the neutrality and general applicability of laws as a 
reason for their compatibility with the Convention would seem to draw 
heavily on liberal and secular conceptions of the neutral state while its 
emphasis on voluntarism and choice seem to place it firmly in line with the 
notion of religious freedom as an element of a wider respect for individual 
autonomy rather than approaches which stress the need to protect religion’s 
communal and social role. Indeed the Court has referred approvingly to 
secularism as a notion which is in harmony with the values of the Convention
97 Darby v Sweden (1990) 13 EHRR 774 (discussed at Evans, above, n. 1 at 127).
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on more than one occasion.98 Furthermore, by regarding religion as a rival to 
the state and by focusing on the need to restrict religious freedom in the public 
arena in order to protect “the rights and freedoms of others”, the court’s 
approach appears to recognise that despite its status as an important part of 
individual identity, religion can itself pose a threat to individual autonomy.
However, while the Court’s reluctance to require accommodation of religion 
public contexts may be consistent with notions of neutrality and individual 
autonomy, it does not necessarily imply that the Court has embraced these 
ideas as the foundation of its approach to the regulation of the relationship 
between religion, the individual and the state. First, as noted above, the Court 
has faced allegations that its approach to the issue of the right to manifest 
one’s religion has been tainted with bias towards traditionally European forms 
of religion. Perhaps more importantly, the Court’s decisions are heavily 
focused on protection of the rights of the state rather than those of individuals. 
Particularly in areas such as the education system or the military which are 
linked to the formation of citizens or the protection of the public order, the 
Court has been willing to protect the right of states to restrict religious 
expression or activity in public contexts even when efforts to do so impinge on 
individual autonomy in arguably personal and private matters such as the 
wearing of religious apparel. However, as will be shown below, the Court has 
never required states to ensure the neutrality of state institutions in order to 
protect individual autonomy from the communal aspects of religion. Indeed 
the Court has repeatedly upheld the public role of individual denominations in 
states which maintain particular ties to certain religions. Seen in this way, the 
restriction of the requirement to respect religious freedom to the private sphere 
can be seen more as an empowerment of the state to define its own 
relationship to religion (which may include significant public and communal 
privileges for certain religions) rather than as an embrace of liberal ideas of 
the religious neutrality of the state. This approach is also seen in the Court’s
98 See Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1 at para. 93 and Sahin v Turkey 
4411419% [2004] ECHR 299 (29 June 2004) para. 99.
150
decisions relating to the institutional aspect of religious freedom to which I 
now turn
4.3 Institutional Religious Freedom
The Strasbourg Court’s approach to the regulation of the institutional aspect of 
religious freedom and the relationship of religious institutions to the state also, 
in general, reflects the prioritisation of the right of the state to choose to define 
a particular communal religious identity. While the Court has been 
unsympathetic to attempts to require states to accord special accommodation 
for individual religiosity in the public arena, it has upheld the granting by 
Member States of significant public privileges to state-favoured religious 
institutions. The Court has placed boundaries on the rights of states in this 
area. In Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria," it was faced with a situation where in 
reaction to internal disputes, the Bulgarian Government had dismissed the 
leadership of the Bulgarian Muslim community in order to ensure that each 
religious community would have a unified leadership. In ruling on a complaint 
by those dismissed, the Court recognised the importance of the institutional 
element of religious freedom stating that ” Were the organisational life o f the 
community not protected by Article 9 o f the Convention, all other aspects o f 
the individual's freedom o f religion would become vulnerable”100 It went on 
to find that attempts by the state to interfere in the internal affairs of religious 
communities constituted a violation of Article 9101 and could not, in a 
democratic society, be justified by the need to ensure unified religious 
leadership.102
Indeed the Court has gone further and has recognised that the internal 
autonomy of religious institutions can also legitimately be recognised as 
extending to cover situations where religious organisations engage in 
otherwise regulated activities such as employment, in order to carry out
99 (2002) 34 EHRR 1339.
100 Ibid. para. 62.
101 Ibid. para. 82.
102 Ibid. para. 78. See also Church of Scientology Moscow v Russia (Application no. 18147/02) 
Judgment of 5 April 2007 where the deregistration of the Church of Scientology was held to 
violate article 11 in conjunction with Article 9.
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religious activities. In Knudsen v Norway103 the Norwegian State Church had 
dismissed one of its ministers who disagreed with recent abortion legislation 
and refused to perform certain tasks which he felt required him to act in 
violation of his conscience. The minister’s application under Article 9 was 
dismissed on the grounds that the church was entitled to require its ministers 
to behave in a certain way or to resign. Although the church in question was a 
state church, the central holding in the case applies equally to religions which 
are not similarly connected to individual state. It would seem therefore that 
religious freedom under the ECHR involves a degree of internal autonomy for 
religious institutions that may not be provided for other institutions. Religions, 
by virtue of their religious nature are seen as being exempt from certain 
otherwise generally applicable norms. The Catholic Church, for example, is 
not required to obey gender equality laws in its recruitment of priests. To hold 
otherwise would have serious implications for the ability of religious 
institutions to organise themselves in accordance with their beliefs. This 
willingness to uphold the autonomy of religious institutions does in effect 
permit states to enable religious organisations to claim exemptions from 
generally applicable laws on grounds of religious freedom.
In relation to tasks such as that as acting as a member of the clergy or as a 
political campaigner where the job in question has a clear ideological element, 
it can be appreciated why respect for freedom of conscience can be invoked to 
justify some discrimination. However, in relation to religion, the Court and, 
prior to its abolition, the Commission of Human Rights, have gone further and 
have upheld such privileges even when such institutions are engaging in 
regulated activities such as employment in jobs which are not directly related 
to religious activities but which instead relate to a religion’s broader public 
role. In Rommelfanger v Federal Republic o f Germany104 the Strasbourg 
institutions upheld the dismissal of a doctor in a Catholic hospital who was 
fired after he criticised the Catholic Church’s attitude to abortion in a letter to 
a newspaper. The German Constitutional Court upheld the decision to dismiss
103 Knudsen v Norway (1986) 8 EHRR 45.
104 Rommelfanger v Federal Republic of Germany 1989 62 DR 151 ECommHR Decision of 
6.9.1989. German Constitutional Court Decision: BNr 12242/86.
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the Applicant on the basis that his letter had constituted a breach of his 
contractual duty of loyalty to his employer. The Commission of Human Rights 
dismissed his application under the Convention on the basis that the 
enforcement of the employer’s contractual rights did not violate an 
interference with his ECHR rights. In doing so the Commission was 
supporting the right of a religious institution to terminate the employment of 
an employee of a partly state-funded body (the Catholic hospital) whose 
functions were largely secular, on the basis of his disagreement with the 
religious teachings of the owner of that institution. Robbers sees this decision 
as representing acknowledgment “to a great degree” of the “right o f self- 
determination o f the religious communities in its sub stance’'’105 by the 
Convention institutions. In this case the relevant “right to self-determination” 
involves the exemption of such religious institutions from norms generally 
applied to bodies engaged in the public sphere activity of employment in 
institutions which are not exclusively religious in nature. Moreover these 
privileges were held to comply with Article 9 despite their impact on the rights 
of individual employees of such organisations. As has been noted above, the 
Court has repeatedly held that individuals cannot rely on claims of religious 
freedom to demand exemptions form generally applicable government 
regulations in areas such as employment. However, the rulings in Knudsen and 
Rommelfanger seem to indicate that the Strasbourg institutions are 
sympathetic to the granting of precisely such exemptions by member states to 
certain religious institutions.
Such an approach could be interpreted as the Court embracing a version of 
collective religious freedom which recognises religions cultural and communal 
aspects and which enables religious institutions to make demands of the state 
in public contexts. However, it would be a mistake to view this conferral of 
public privilege on religious institutions as an instance of the Convention 
institutions requiring the state to subjugate its interests to those of religious 
freedom. First, in both cases the Court was upholding the choice made by the
105 G. Robbers, “State and Church in the European Union” in G. Robbers (ed.) State and 
Church in the European Union, (Baden Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1996).
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state to grant such privilege rather than laying down rights enforceable against 
the state. Second, the wider Convention caselaw shows very little support for 
the prioritisation of religious freedom to such an extent. Not only would this 
be inconsistent, as noted above, with the Court’s approach to individual 
religious freedom; the Strasbourg institutions have repeatedly accorded 
priority to the rights of States to define the religious nature of public contexts 
over those of individual religious freedom. This has occurred not only in 
relation to its upholding of “neutral and generally applicable” laws but in 
cases such as Sahin, Kalag and Dahlab where the efforts of the Turkish and 
Swiss states to control the wearing of religious apparel in educational and 
military establishments in order to uphold the secularity of public institutions 
were upheld by the Court. The primacy of the needs of the state and the 
particular public orders of individual states is also seen in the analysis of the 
Article 9 jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights undertaken by the 
French conseil constitutionnel as part of its 2004 decision in relation to the 
proposed EU Constitutional Treaty.106 The conseil analysed the Treaty’s 
protection of religious freedom in order to assess its compatibility with 
France’s constitutional principle of secularism. It noted that the protection 
afforded to freedom of religion under the proposed Treaty was substantially 
similar to that provided by Article 9 of the ECHR. Having reviewed the 
relevant caselaw, the conseil noted that Convention rights were to be 
interpreted in harmony with the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states and concluded that Article 9 had been interpreted by the 
Strasbourg institutions in such a way as to confer on member states a wide 
margin of appreciation. This margin of appreciation was considered by the 
conseil as being sufficiently broad to prevent the protection provided to 
religious freedom by the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (which it 
viewed as the having the same substance as that provided by Article 9) from 
undermining the constitutional principle of strict secularism laid down in the 
French constitution notwithstanding any impact the application of this
106 See Decision of 19 November 2004, 2005-505 available at www.constitutionnel.fr. See 
also Guy Carcassonne, “France: Conseil Constitutionnel on the European Constitutional 
Treaty” European Constitutional law Review, 1: 293-301, 2005.
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principle may have on religious freedom.107 In other words, the religious 
freedom protected by Article 9 would, under the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court, give way to the right of the state to defend its public order 
and to structure and regulate the public sphere in accordance with its particular 
religious (or a-religious) communal identity. The conseiV s assessment of the 
limited impact of Article 9 on the ability of individual states to define their 
own relationship to religion would appear to be largely correct. In
70Scircumstances such as those in Kalag, Karaduman and Sahin where states 
have seen public expressions of religiosity as a threat to the identity of the 
state, or even in cases like Dahlab where the objection was to certain forms of 
religious expression as opposed to religion in general,109 the Court has been 
willing to see the relationship between religion and the state in the public 
arena in essentially competitive terms. Furthermore, it has been clear that 
conflict between the right to religious freedom and that of the state to control 
and define the nature of public spaces and institutions will generally be 
resolved in favour of the latter. However, unlike France, most member states 
of both the Council of Europe and the EU have official links to certain 
religious traditions with religion underpinning of the constitutional order,110 
undertaking state functions in areas such as education and healthcare111 or
119acting as a major source of national identity. When, as in cases such as 
Rommelfanger, states have chosen to confer important public roles on certain 
favoured denominations, the Court has not seen the religion as a rival to the 
state in the public arena. Indeed, in upholding such arrangements it has, in 
contrast to its approach in cases such as Sahin or Dahlab, downplayed the 
impact of the impact of the presence of religion in the public sphere on those 
of different or no religion. It is therefore arguable that the recognition by the 
Court of Human Rights of the rights of religious institutions in the public 
sphere is not a matter of the assertion of religious rights against the authority 
of the state in the public sphere but rather a matter of a recognition of the right 
of states to define their own identity and relationship to religion, including the
107 Ibid.
108 See ns. 78, 81 and 86 above.
109 See n. 80 above.
110 See Chapter I.
111 Ibid.
n2Ibid.
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right to treat certain denominations as, by virtue of history, constitutional 
status and institutional reality, in some way part of the state and broader public 
order.
It must be noted that the Court has indicated that the Convention imposes 
limitations on the degree to which states can seek to impose a single religious 
identity or legislate for the religious law of a single faith. For instance its 
judgment in Refah Partisi v. Turkey stated that a political programme aimed at 
introducing Islamic religious law would be “incompatible with the
113fundamental principles o f democracy, as set fourth in the Convention”, 
noting particularly how “the way [Islamic religious law] intervenes in all 
spheres o f private and public life in accordance with religious precepts” 
meant that it “clearly diverges from Convention values”.114 Although these 
comments were, strictly speaking, obiter, they represent a clear indication that 
there is a point at which promotion of certain forms of religion through state 
institutions or religious influence over the state would be incompatible with 
the respect for pluralism and individual autonomy inherent in the Convention 
system. Nevertheless the Court’s upholding of the status of state churches 
together with the decision in Rommelfanger show a recognition of the cultural 
role of religion in certain Member States and an unwillingness to interfere 
with the promotion of a religiously particular communal identity by such 
states. Thus the Court has not seen the identification of the state with a 
particular denomination, the promotion of a religiously specific communal 
identity or the involvement of religious institutions in the exercise of state 
functions as violating Convention values despite the impact of such policies 
on the equal treatment of religions or on individual freedom from religion. On 
the other hand, apart from the rather limited internal rights recognised in cases 
such as Knudsen and Hasan and Chaush, states have not been required by the 
Court to provide religious institutions with the public role Dalacoura would 
see as necessary to the maintenance of their public role. Thus, the failure of 
the Convention institutions in cases such as Rommelfanger to interfere with 
the granting of public sphere privileges to certain religions can be see as
113 Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1, para. 123
114 Ibid.
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empowering the state to define its relationship to religion in the manner of its 
choosing rather than as a requirement that such a relationship encompass 
certain collective privileges for religious institutions.
4.4 Religion as Part o f the State
Taken together, the Strasbourg Court’s characterisation of the relationship 
between religion and the state in the public arena in competitive terms, its 
prioritisation of the rights of the state over those of religions in the public 
contexts and its upholding of the right of states to allow religious institutions 
to exercise significant public sector activities point to a recognition of certain 
religions as in some way part of the state.
Despite the evolution of real and substantial limits on the influence of religion 
over both public and private spheres in Europe, many European states have 
not fully renounced the use of state power to promote religious interests or to 
uphold the taboos necessary for the maintenance of religious influence over 
society. The use of state power in this way has a potentially serious impact on 
individual autonomy and runs counter to the liberal rationale for the protection 
of religious freedom. As noted above, the Court has shown a degree of 
nervousness at the impact on Convention values of governmental involvement 
in this area by repeatedly emphasising the state’s role as “neutral and 
impartial organiser o f the exercise o f various religions.”115 Nevertheless, the 
ECHR has not mandated the separation of church and state been interpreted so 
as to facilitate the use, albeit to a limited degree, of coercive power to promote 
the interests of certain religions and which identifies the interests of certain 
religions with those of the state.
In Darby v Sweden116 the ECtHR explicitly stated that the establishment of a 
single faith as a state religion did not breach Article 9 (although it did say that 
the terms of establishment must include safeguards for individual religious 
freedom).117 The direct collection of taxes by churches and the use of the
115 Ibid. para. 91.
116 Darby v Sweden 13 E.H.R.R. 774 (1991)
117 Ibid.
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judicial apparatus of the state to enforce payment of religious taxes have also 
been upheld despite the danger that such an approach may force individuals to 
reveal their religious beliefs to the state.118 The Strasbourg institutions have 
also upheld the outright favouring of certain denominations under the taxation 
system provided that there are “objective and reasonable justifications” for 
such discrimination119 and have refused to find a right to recognition by the
state even when such recognition brought significantly more favourable
120treatment from state institutions.
1 9 1Even more strikingly, in Kokkinakis v Greece the ECtHR was faced with a 
Greek law banning proselytism. Although a process of constitutional 
amendment had removed the sections which explicitly favoured Greek 
Orthodoxy, the law had originally been introduced and continued to function 
so as to maintain the dominant position of the Greek Orthodox Church. The 
Court found in favour of the applicant (a Jehovah’s Witness convicted of 
seeking to convert a Greek Orthodox woman) but did so on the basis that the 
Greek Courts had failed to indicate with sufficient precision what element of 
the applicant’s actions had constituted the relevant offence. It explicitly 
refused to condemn anti-proselytism laws in general and specifically upheld 
the compatibility of laws banning “improper proselytism”. In doing so the 
Court upheld what was in effect, the use of coercive legal measures to restrict 
the ability of minority religions to undermine the dominance of what, as the 
Court noted, was in the Greek context the “religion o f the state”122 It was left 
to the dissenting judgment of Judge Martens to make the case for viewing 
religious freedom as essentially an individual matter and to argue that:
“ Whether or not someone intends to change religion is no concern o f the 
State’s and, consequently, neither in principle should it be the State’s concern
123if  someone attempts to induce the another to change his religion. ”
m  E & GR v Austria App No 9781/82 37 Eur Comm’n HR Dec & Rep 42 (1984).
119 Iglesia Bautista “el Salvador” and Ortega Moratilla v Spain 1992 Application 17522/90
120 X  v Austria Application 8652/79 26 Dec and Rep 89 (1981)
121 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397
122 Ibid. para. 14.
123 Ibid. Dissent of Judge Martens at para. 14.
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Indeed despite its statement that Article 9 is “also a precious asset for atheists, 
sceptics and the unconcerned’'124 the ECtHR has gone as far as using it and the 
notion of religious freedom in general, as justification for laws under which 
the state can restrict expression deemed hostile or insulting towards religion. 
In Otto Preminger Institut v Austria125 the Court upheld a ban on the (private) 
showing in the predominantly Catholic Tyrolean region of a film which the 
Austrian authorities felt would be insulting to Catholics stating that:
“in extreme cases the effect o f particular methods o f opposing or denying 
religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from
11 f\exercising their freedom to hold and express them”.
It went on to use Article 9 as a justification for restricting freedom of 
expression under Article 10 on the basis that:
“The respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 
can legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals o f 
objects o f religious veneration; and such portrayals can be regarded as 
malicious violation o f the spirit o f tolerance, which must also be a feature of
i  r y n
democratic society.”
1 OQ
The Court repeated this line of argument in Wingrove v UK where it based 
its decision to uphold restrictions on the distribution of an allegedly 
blasphemous film on the “right o f citizens not to be insulted in their religious 
feelings”.129 There is, however, no such right apparent in the text of Article 9. 
Moreover, there was no suggestion in either case that the films in question 
incited violence or hatred against any religious group. In 2005 the Court again 
upheld the compatibility of blasphemy laws with in I.A. v Turkey.130 Three of 
the seven judges argued strongly that:
124 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397, para 31.
125 Otto Preminger Institut v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34
126 Ibid, para. 47
127 Ibid.
128 Wingrove v UK (1996) 24 EHRR 1.
129 Ibid.
130 I.A. v Turkey (Application no. 42571/98) Judgment of 13 September 2005.
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“the time has perhaps come to “revisit” [the approach in Otto Preminger 
Institut and Wingrove], which in our view seems to place too much emphasis 
on conformism or uniformity o f thought and to reflect an overcautious and 
timid conception o f freedom o f the press”131
However, the majority relied on the precedents set in Otto Preminger Institut 
and Wingrove to hold that the conviction of a publisher for publishing a book 
which was harshly critical of the Koran met the legitimate aim of intending “to 
provide protection against offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by 
Muslims“m  and, as the book had not been seized, the measure was 
proportionate.133 Such a view of Article 9 grants to the state significant 
latitude to use its coercive powers to maintain the taboos Dalacoura has argued 
are necessary for the maintenance of the social position and influence of 
individual denominations and would appear to be at odds with the liberal 
notion of religious freedom as predominantly a means to ensure respect for 
individual choice within the framework of a neutral and secular state.
As noted above, European society is notably a-religious in international terms 
and both EU and ECHR institutions have evidenced a strong concern that 
unfettered religious influence over the public sphere may be incompatible with 
Europe’s shared commitment to liberal democracy. The expansive and 
communalist view of religious freedom seen in Wingrove, Otto Preminger and
I.A. has the potential to impact on liberal democratic values and freedom from 
religion to a significant degree and the Court has not held to it in all 
circumstances. The Court has been willing to countenance relatively clear 
disparities in treatment in relation to the rights of different denominations in 
the public sphere. In Wingrove, when dealing with insults towards the UK’s 
established Christian religion the Court had invoked the “right o f citizens not 
to be insulted in their religious feelings, ”134 in contrast in The Church of
131 Ibid. para. 8, dissenting judgment of Judges Costa, Cabral-Barreto and Jungwiert.
132 Ibid. para. 30.
133 Ibid. para. 32.
134 Ibid.
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Scientology and 128 of its Members v Sweden the Commission dismissed a 
complaint against the failure of the Swedish State to punish a man who had 
been critical of the religion on the basis that “a right to be free from criticism”
136 137was not part of freedom of religion. Similarly Choudhury v UK when 
faced with a UK law that criminalised blasphemy of the Christian religion but 
not Islam, the Commission refused to find a violation of the Convention and 
held that the failure to make out a claim under Article 9 also defeated 
arguments under Article 14 which prohibits discrimination in respect of rights 
protected by the Convention.138 Thus states have been permitted to provide 
protection for selected religions and to use coercive legal powers to protect 
those religions which form part of their communal identity.
Obviously, the liberal and egalitarian values of the Convention, and in 
particular the duty to respect individual religious identity, do provide 
significant limitations on the degree to which states can use their coercive 
powers to favour certain chosen religions. The Court, for instance, recently 
ruled that a failure to provide exemptions from compulsory religion classes to 
pupils whose parents objected to the content of the lessons was a violation of 
the Convention.139 Furthermore, as noted above, the Court’s judgment in 
Refah Partisi v Turkey140 gave strong indications that attempts to introduce a 
theocratic system or to legislate for religious law in such a way as to interfere 
significantly with rights to privacy and self-determination would be 
inconsistent would breach the ECHR.141 Nevertheless, these values have not 
been interpreted so as to require separation of the interests of the state and 
individual religions. Despite its attachment to liberal values the Court’s 
approach to the relationship between religion and the state in Europe owes as 
much to visions of religion as a collective and cultural matter as to liberal 
notions of religious freedom as an element of individual autonomy. The Court
135 The Church of Scientology and 128 of Its Members v Sweden App. No. 8282/78 (1980) 21 
D&R 109, 100
136 See Evans above, n. 1, 69-70.
137 Choudhury v UK App No 17439/90 12 Hum Rts LJ 172 (1991)
138 Ibid.
139 Zengin v Turkey App No 1448/04, Judgment of 9 October 2007.
140 (2003) 37 EHRR 1.
141 Ibid. at para. 123.
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has permitted Member States to use state institutions to offer privileged 
treatment to certain denominations, to use coercive powers to uphold the 
dominant position of certain religions and to insulate chosen faiths from the 
full rigours of democratic debate thus enabling such states to maintain and 
promote certain religions as elements of their collective identity.
5. Conclusion
The fundamental rights obligations of the EU in respect of religious freedom 
are therefore unlikely to require it to call into question the continued 
intertwining of religion and the state in many of its Member States. The Union 
is committed to the protection of religious freedom and this obligation applies 
across all areas of EU law. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which largely 
determines the content of the Union’s fundamental rights obligations, does 
reflect humanist ideas to a significant degree. The Court’s view of individual 
religious freedom as largely a private matter of identity is consistent with 
notions of the religiously neutral state. Decisions such as Refah Partisi and 
those relating to the wearing of Islamic dress in public institutions, reflect a 
fear of the consequences for individual autonomy of significant religious 
presence in the public arena. However, overall, the Court has shown a 
pragmatic acceptance of the continued importance of religion to Member State 
identity and has been unwilling to interpret guarantees of religious freedom in 
such a way as to interfere with the ability of Member States to define a 
relationship to religion which reflects their cultural norms. While not requiring 
them to do so, the ECtHR’s judgments have permitted states to grant 
significant institutional privileges to religious bodies and have enabled them to 
play key roles in relation to important state functions such as the provision of 
healthcare and education, despite the impact that such an approach may have 
on individual freedom from religion and equal treatment of religions. 
Furthermore, it has upheld not only the recognition of official state religions 
thus recognising the pragmatic virtue of the old cuius regio eius religio 
principle, but has also endorsed the use of coercive state powers to maintain 
the taboos necessary for the continuance of religion’s social role by upholding 
laws which are designed to maintain the dominance of certain
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denominations142 or which provide selective protection to certain faiths from 
ridicule or blasphemy.
In summary, the fundamental rights framework provided by the ECHR 
provides significant latitude for states to maintain close relationships to certain 
denominations. Given religion’s dual nature as an individual and collective 
phenomenon, it is not surprising that conflicts between protection of 
individual and collective religious identities have arisen. The approach of the 
ECtHR has been to protect individual religious identity in private but to do so 
in a manner which grants greater protection to practices common to culturally- 
entrenched traditionally European religions than to practices of religions 
whose large scale presence in Europe is more recent and whose practices are 
more likely to conflict with established structures. Furthermore, in non-private 
contexts, the ECHR jurisprudence has, by granting to individual states the 
right to define and protect a denomination-specific communal religious 
identity, required individual religious identity to give way to particular 
communal religious, political or cultural norms. Thus, religious identity is 
protected in a framework within which, provided that it respects the pluralism 
and respect for individual autonomy inherent in the liberal democratic values 
which underpin the Convention, the right of the state to maintain a religiously 
specific element to its identity and to promote such an identity through public 
institutions is largely upheld. Nevertheless, although the ECHR largely 
determines the content of EU fundamental rights norms, the admittedly limited 
EU jurisprudence in this area indicates a slightly broader view of the 
protection to be given to individual religious identities in non-private contexts 
and appears to grant greater scope to individuals to require equal treatment of 
their particular religious identity in contexts such as employment where doing 
so may impinge on the ability of states to promote particular communal 
cultural and religious practices. Such an approach has also been seen in EU 
legislation in this area, which is the subject of the next chapter.
142 See for example Kokkinakis v Greece above, n. 95.
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Chapter V: The Regulation of Religion in the Single Market
1. Introduction
2. Dual Approach to Religion in the Market
2.1 Religion as a Market Choice
2.2 Protection of Religion from the Market
2.3 Limitations
2.3.1 Limitation on Grounds of Needs of the Market
2.3.2 Reconciliation with the Structures and Norms of the Liberal Democratic 
Polity
2.3.2.a Religion as Part of the Public Order of the EU
2.3.2.b Limitations on Religion as Part of the Public Order of the EU
2.3.3 Accommodation of Existing Religious Privilege in the Market
3. Cultural Autonomy, Single Market Law and Religion
3.1 Definition of Culture in EU Law
3.1.1 Institutional Arrangements as Culture
3.2 Culture and Discrimination between Religions
3.2.1 Culture, Insider Religions and Compatibility with the Public Order
3.2.2 Culture and Religions Viewed as Contrary to the Public Order
4. Conclusion
1. Introduction
In line with the approach outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter shows 
how EU law has largely viewed religion as a matter of identity. In regulating 
this form of identity in the context of the Single Market, the Union has 
adopted a dualist approach which sees religion both as an economic choice 
within the market and as a phenomenon requiring protection from the 
economic and commercial processes of the market. As religious identity is 
both individual and collective in nature, the Union is therefore required to 
mediate conflicts between individual and collective religious identities. This 
chapter shows how EU law has actively facilitated individual religious identity 
within the Single Market on a basis which promotes the equal treatment of all 
religions and potentially destabilises denomination specific communal market 
practices and structures, most notably through its prohibition of direct and
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indirect discrimination in employment on grounds of religion. On the other 
hand, the actual impact of this facilitation is limited by the need to respect the 
overall structures of the competitive market and by the Union’s recognition of 
collective religious identity. EU law has recognised religion, including 
religiously influenced market structures and institutional arrangements, as 
elements of national culture which Member States are entitled to uphold. It has 
also granted religious institutions exemptions from anti-discrimination 
legislation, thus according priority to their collective identity over that of the 
individual identity of the employees of such institutions.
However, in line with the notion of balance discussed in Chapter III, the 
facilitation of both individual and collective religious identities is also limited. 
Exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation have been narrowly drawn 
and regarded as exceptional. Furthermore, the limitations on religion’s 
political influence which the Union sees as intrinsic to the notion of balance 
which underpins its public order have also been recognised through the 
explicit subjugation of religious rights to those of the state to defend 
fundamental state interests and the liberal democratic order.
The chapter shows that this approach to religion, and in particular, the 
characterisation of religion’s public role as part of national culture, has 
allowed “insider” religions which have strong cultural roots in Member States 
to access significantly greater privileges within the marketplace. Furthermore 
such privileges are limited by the needs of the market and state to a 
significantly lesser degree than the individual religious rights recognised in 
other areas of Single Market law. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the 
cultural prism through which “insider” faiths are seen causes their ideological 
demands to be viewed as cultural, and therefore less liable to restriction on the 
basis of the need to respect restrictions on religion’s political influence than 
the demands of “outsider” religions. Accordingly, the Union allows religious 
elements of national culture, and therefore denominationally-specific practices 
and ideas of the good life, to exercise significant influence within the 
marketplace. The regulation of religion within the Single Market reflects the 
wider culturally-conditioned dialectic in EU law between the accommodation
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of religion’s role in individual and collective identity and the need to limit the 
public role of religion required by the balance between the religious, cultural 
and humanist elements which characterises the Union’s public order.
2. Dual Approach to Religion in the Market
2.1 Religion as a Market Choice
The law of the Single Market views religion in the market place in two distinct 
ways, recognising it as both an economic choice which can be facilitated by 
the economic liberties of the Single Market and as an intimate, non-economic 
phenomenon which requires protection from those same liberties. In relation 
to the former, the Court of Justice has, on occasion, been willing to stretch the 
notion of economic activities in order to protect religiously motivated choices 
by individuals even when the actions in question lacked features such as 
exchange and commercial value which normally characterise market 
transactions. For instance, in Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie,1 the 
Court assessed the right of a German national to live in a religious commune 
in the Netherlands solely in terms of his rights to freedom of movement and 
the economic aspects of his activities. In this case the Applicant challenged the 
refusal of the Dutch authorities to grant him the residence permit to which 
EEC nationals employed in the Netherlands were entitled. Mr Steymann was a 
member of a religious commune known as the Bhagwan Community for 
whom he performed household chores and helped with the Community’s 
commercial activities. In return the Community provided for Mr Steymann’s 
material needs. However, the Community provided for the needs of all of its 
members whether they performed such duties or not. The Dutch authorities 
ruled that Mr Steymann was not pursuing an activity as an employed person 
and refused him a residence permit on that basis. The Dutch Raad van Staat 
referred the following question to the ECJ:
“Can activities which consist in, and are entirely centred around, 
participating in a community based on religion or on another form o f 
philosophy and in following the rules o f life o f that community, whose
1 Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie Case 196/87 ECR [1988] 06159.
2 Ibid. para. 4.
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members provide each other with benefits, be regarded as an economic 
activity or as a service for the purposes o f the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community?”
It appeared to take a very minimalist view the competence then held by the EC 
in relation to religious matters stating:
“in view o f the objectives o f the European Economic Community, participation 
in a community based on religion or another form o f philosophy falls within 
the field o f application of Community law only in so far as it can be regarded 
as an economic activity within the meaning o f Article 2 o f the Treaty”.4
The Court went on to hold that the work carried out by members of the 
Bhagwan Community constituted an “essential part o f participation in that 
community”5 and that the support given to members could be regarded as “an 
indirect quid pro quo for their work“6
Accordingly the Court found in favour of the Applicant holding that:
“Article 2 of the EEC Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that activities 
performed by members o f a community based on religion or another form o f 
philosophy as part of the commercial activities o f that community constitute 
economic activities in so far as the services which the community provides to 
its members may be regarded as the indirect quid pro quo for genuine and 
effective work. ”
Thus the Court regarded religion as relevant to EU law rights only in so far as 
it could be subsumed into the broad economic framework of the issue of free 
movement of workers. Therefore, while the judgment certainly approached the 
issue from an individual rights perspective, the right in question was seen as
3 Ibid. para. 6.
4 Ibid. para. 9.
5 Ibid. para. 12.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. para. 14.
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that of freedom of movement rather than freedom of religion. Indeed, the most 
notable aspect of the decision is Court’s concern to bring activities which were 
not economically motivated, within the framework of commercial norms such 
as “quid pro quo for genuine and effective work ” and its refusal to allow the 
religious nature of the activity to impinge on its purely economic and 
individualistic analysis of the issues involved. Religious choices were 
therefore seen as economic choices and as falling within the ambit of EU law 
for that reason.
o
In van Rosmaalen v. Bestuir van de Betrijfsvereinigingen the Court showed a 
similar willingness to emphasise the commercial aspects of religious conduct, 
even in contexts where they did not provide the primary motivation for the 
relevant activities. In this case the Court of Justice was required to interpret 
the definition of “self-employed” in relation to the pension entitlements of a 
priest who had worked for several decades as a missionary in what was then 
called Zaire. The Court ruled that:
“The term ‘self-employed person’ [...] applies to persons who are pursuing or 
have pursued, otherwise than under a contract o f employment or by way of 
self-employment in a trade or profession, an occupation in respect o f which 
they receive an income permitting them to meet all or some of their needs, 
even in the income is supplied by third parties benefiting from the services o f a 
missionary priest”9
In other words, the fact that during the course of the Applicant’s ministry, he 
had been maintained by the local community rather than the order of priests to 
which he belonged was sufficient to bring him within the definition of “self- 
employed” for the purposes of EU law.
The Court offered no definition of religion in either case. Indeed the repeated 
references in the Steymann judgment to “religion or other form o f
8 Case 300/84 [1986] ECR 3097.
9 Ibid. para. 23
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philosophy”10 could be seen as consistent with a view of religion as simply a 
form of philosophy which is not entitled to any greater consideration or role in 
public life than other beliefs. Although the Steymann decision could be seen as 
showing a willingness to facilitate individual freedom of religion and the 
ability of individuals to construct their own identity, by supporting the right of 
an individual to use his or her European right to freedom of movement to take 
part in the life of a religious community in another Member State, the failure 
of the Court to attribute any special significance to the religious aspects of the 
case and its implicit acquiescence in the Dutch Court’s characterisation of 
religion as a form of philosophy might be less welcome from a religious 
perspective in other circumstances. Therefore although the strong emphasis 
placed by markets on respect for individual autonomy and choice11 does draw 
on some of the same principles which form the basis for liberal theories of 
freedom of religion, a purely economic approach can lead to 
mischaracterisation of individual religious behaviour to a significant degree 
and ignores vital elements of religion such as its collective, institutional and 
cultural elements.
2.2 Protection o f Religion from the Market
However, as shown in the previous chapter, the Union is required to protect 
religious freedom as part of its commitment to fundamental rights. EU law has 
therefore also recognised religion as a fundamental right which requires 
protection within the Single Market. The upholding of religious freedom not 
only involves the balancing of religious rights against the interests of broader 
structures such as the market and the rights of the non religious, it also 
requires the reconciliation of potentially conflicting institutional, collective 
and individual religious rights. The protection of religious freedom within the 
Single Market has led Community law to recognise various individual rights 
such as an individual right not to be discriminated against on the basis of one’s 
religious identity when engaging in market activities and a right to have one’s 
religious identity facilitated in the workplace. At the same time it also
10 Ibid. para. 9.
11 See for example E. Petersmann “Constitutional Economics, Human Rights and the WTO” 
(2003) 58 Aussenwirtschaft 49, 56-8.
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acknowledged collective interests and has sought to balance the right to 
protect institutional religious ethos and the religious elements of national 
culture against such individual entitlements.
The notion that respect for religion required a degree of active protection 
within the Market was seen from relatively early on in the history of the 
Community. The preamble to the European Social Charter of 1961 for 
example, states that:
“the enjoyment o f social rights should be secured without discrimination on
grounds o f race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or 
12social origin...”
In its dealings with its own employees the Community has forbidden religious 
discrimination for some time. For instance, the 1962 Regulations governing 
the recruitment and employment of Council staff13 and the 1976 Council 
Regulations regulating the conditions of employment of the staff of the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions14 and the European Centre for the Development of Vocational 
Training15 all prohibited discrimination on religious grounds. On the other 
hand however, none specified whether applying generally applicable rules 
which did not make special allowances for religious beliefs or practice would 
constitute such discrimination. The ruling of the Court of Justice in the mid 
1970s in Prais v Council,16 indicated that a duty to take such active steps and 
to protect individual choice and identity in relation to religion may be part of 
the general principles of EU law. In this case the applicant had been unable to
12 European Social Charter (18.10.1961), c.f. e.g. art. 136(1) EC.
13 EEC/EAEC Council: Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff 
Regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Official Journal B 045, 
14/06/1962 P. 1385-1460, Article 27(2).
14 Council Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) No 1860/76 of 29 June 1976 laying down the 
Conditions of Employment of Staff of the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, Official Journal L 214, 06/08/1976 P. 0024-0046, Chapter 3, 
Article 23.
15 Council Regulation (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) No 1859/76 of 29 June 1976 laying down the 
Conditions of Employment for Staff of the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training, Official Journal L214, 06/08/1976 P 001-0023, Chapter 3, Article 23.
16 Prais v Council Case 130/75 Judgment of 27 October 1976.
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complete examinations for the recruitment of officials as they had been 
scheduled for a Jewish holy day on which she felt unable to write or travel for 
religious reasons. The Council refused her request to change the day on which 
the exam was to take place. The applicant argued that that in the light of 
Article 9 of the ECHR, the regulations governing the recruitment of 
Community officials should be interpreted so as to enable every candidate to 
complete the examinations irrespective of his or her religious background. The 
Defendant did not dispute that freedom of religion as guaranteed by Article 9 
of the ECHR was part of the general principles of Community law or that the 
Staff Regulations required the Council to recruit without reference to the 
religion of applicants, but argued that to oblige it to take account of the 
religious requirements of all candidates would involve an excessive 
administrative burden. The Court ruled that the if the Council were to be 
informed within good time by a candidate that a particular date presented 
religious difficulties, then it:
1 7“should take this into account (...) and endeavour to avoid such dates” 
but that:
“neither the Staff Regulations nor the fundamental rights already referred to 
can be considered as imposing on the appointing authority a duty to avoid a 
conflict with the a religious requirement o f which the Authority has not been 
informed.”
The judgment concludes rather cryptically stating:
“/« so far as the Defendant, if informed o f the difficulty in good time would 
have been obliged to take reasonable steps to avoid fixing fo r  a test a date 
which would make it impossible for a person o f a particular religious faith to 
undergo the test, it can be said that the Defendant in the present case was not 
informed o f the unsuitability o f certain days until the date for the test had been
17 Ibid. para. 16.
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fixed, and the Defendant was in its discretion entitled to refuse to fix  a 
different date”.18
This statement left as an open question the issue of whether the Council would 
have been obliged to set a new date had it been informed in good time or 
whether such an approach was merely desirable. The decision does however 
indicate both support for the idea of religious freedom as part of the general 
principles of EU law and a degree of openness on the part of the Court to the 
idea that individual religious freedom included a right to adhere to one’s 
religious identity in market contexts such as the workplace, with a 
corresponding duty on the part of Community institutions actively to facilitate 
such religious identities. Such a view of individual religious freedom would 
seem to go beyond the requirements of Article 9 as it has been interpreted by 
the Strasbourg Court.19
This dual approach of recognising religion both as a choice which could be 
facilitated as part of the commercial processes of the Single Market and as a 
reason to circumscribe such processes, is also seen in more recent Community 
legislation in relation to employment. Directive 2003/88, which regulates 
aspects of working time, shows a willingness to defend religious choices even 
when they potentially impinge on the pursuit of market imperatives such as 
maximum efficiency, permitting Member States to allow derogations from 
working time legislation for “workers officiating at ceremonies in churches 
and religious communities”.20 In doing so the Union permits Member States to 
go beyond their minimum ECHR duties and to facilitate individual religious 
identities in market contexts by disapplying the rules otherwise applicable to 
workers which could interfere with religious practices despite the impact that 
such facilitation may have on the organisation of the working day. More 
significantly, the Union’s anti-discrimination legislation has conferred
18 Ibid. para. 19.
19 See Chapter II.
20 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L299/9 18.11.2003 (this 
amended Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of 
the organisation of working time OJ L307 13.12.1993 which had a similar provision). See 
Dellas v Premier Ministre Case C-14/04 1 December 2005.
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significant more general protection on the religiously motivated choices of 
individuals in the area of employment.
Despite the commitments in relation to discrimination in documents such as 
the European Social Charter of 1961, a treaty basis for EU legislation in 
relation to religious discrimination was lacking until the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. The situation changed significantly with
Article 6a of the Treaty which granted the Community the authority to make
21laws prohibiting discrimination on various grounds, including religion. In 
late 2000 the Council used these new powers to enact Directive 2000/78/EC 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation (“the Framework Directive”).22 This directive was intended to 
combat discrimination on the grounds listed in Article 6a. In line with EU anti- 
discrimination law as it had applied in relation to gender discrimination, the 
directive prohibited both direct and indirect discrimination on religious 
grounds. Article 2.2 of the directive defined these concepts in the following 
terms:
“2.2(a): Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is 
treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation, on any o f the grounds referred to in Article 1 [these 
grounds are: religion or belief, age, disability or sexual orientation].
2.2(b): indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a particular 
religion or belief, a particular disability , a particular age, or a particular 
sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared to other persons 
unless:
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and the means o f achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”
The duality of the Union’s approach to religion in the marketplace is seen here 
in relation to the differing approach to direct and indirect discrimination. The
21 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 6a OJ C340, 10 November 1997.
22 OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16-22
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prohibition in Article 2.2(a) on direct discrimination prevents an individual’s 
religious identity being used to prevent them from engaging in market 
activities. Religious individuals are not to be prevented from engaging in the 
activity of employment or to be paid less than their market worth of their 
labour on the basis of their religion. Thus, the freedom of religious individuals 
to enter into the free market is protected. This can be seen as in some ways 
comparable to the judgment in Steymann where the religious nature of the 
applicant’s motivation was not seen as a reason to deny him the market 
freedoms granted by EU law. Indeed Article 2.2(a) goes further and enshrines 
the formal religious neutrality of the Single Market. Market actors are required 
by the Directive to be “religion blind” and not to hold the fact of an 
individual’s religious identity against them. Such an approach reflects the 
formal equality of all religious individual identities in EU law and establishes 
the market as an arena within which individuals of all religious backgrounds 
have an equal opportunity to take part. Thus, notwithstanding the 
predominance of a single religious tradition in a Member State, outright 
favouring of adherents to particular religions in the area of employment is 
prohibited by the Union which thereby enforces and upholds the notion of the 
formal equality of individuals as market actors.
The prohibition of indirect discrimination in Article 2.2(b) on the other hand, 
takes a different approach. By providing that “apparently neutral” provisions 
or practices which place individuals of a particular religion at a disadvantage 
are to be considered discriminatory unless objectively justified, the Directive 
goes beyond formal equality and requires that the religious choices of 
individuals be actively facilitated thus providing the possibility of protecting 
such choices from standard market practices. Thus, workplace dress codes 
which preclude the wearing of headscarves for female Muslim employees or 
arrangements in respect of working time which interfere with the ability of 
workers to respect religious feast days, are potentially covered by the notion of 
indirect discrimination. This is an approach which goes significantly beyond 
the requirements of Article 9, which, as interpreted by the Court of Human 
Rights does “not give individuals the right to behave in the public sphere in
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23compliance with all the demands o f their religion or belief ” and which 
involves the active facilitation of religious behaviour even when such 
behaviour impinges on pre-established workplace practices.
It is noteworthy that the privileges granted by the directive are applicable to 
religion in general and make no distinction between culturally entrenched and 
newer or minority faiths. Indeed, the approach of the directive provides 
significant scope for undermining denomination-specific privilege in the 
workplace in that it enables adherents of minority religions to characterise 
workplace structures built around the traditions and practices of the dominant 
religion as measures placing adherents of minority faiths “at a particular 
disadvantage compared to other persons”. Thus, by bringing workplace 
practices which give reflect a particular religious tradition within the notion of 
discrimination, EU Single Market law not only requires that such practices be 
objectively justified but also seems to categorise as discrimination, and 
therefore implicitly to deprecate, the maintenance of communal structures 
which accord preferential treatment to certain religions. This approach has the 
potential to undermine, in the name of the rights of religious individuals, not 
merely the rights of employers but also the ability of in individual Member 
States to structure the workplace, and thereby the communal life of the state, 
in such a way as to reflect their predominant religious tradition.
2.3 Reconciliation o f Religious Rights with Established Norms and Structures 
The prohibition of indirectly discriminatory measures, as Fredman notes, can 
be seen as an attempt to reduce the costs to individuals of adhering to certain 
identities.24 Taken together Articles l 25 and 2.2 of the Directive place religion 
together with characteristics such as age, disability or sexual orientation which
23 See Arrow smith v. UK, (Application No.7050/75), Comm. Rep 1978, 19 DR 5. Here the 
term “public sphere” seems to be used in a broader sense meaning non-private contexts as 
opposed what Asen calls the “realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed” (R. 
Asen (see n. 66 of Chapter IV).
24 See S. Fredman “Combating Racism with Human Rights: The Right to Equality” in S. 
Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and Human Rights The Case of Racism (Academy of European 
Law, European University Institute, OUP, 2001).
25 Article 1 reads “The purpose of this directive is to lay down a general framework for 
combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the 
Member States the principle of equal treatment.”
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are seen as either immutable or as so fundamental to personal identity that 
people should not be asked to change or disavow them. They would therefore 
appear to grant priority to the protection of individual religious identity and 
the notion of equal treatment of adherents to different religions, over the right 
of states or employers to reflect a particular religious heritage in their 
workplace practices. Being centred on ideas of respect for and facilitation of 
individual autonomy, such an approach can be seen as being broadly in line 
with liberal rationales for the protection of religious freedom. However such 
facilitation must be reconciled with other factors. Rights, of course, do not 
exist in a vacuum and their exercise must take account of countervailing rights 
and interests. Unsurprisingly the Directive provides that the rights it provides 
may be restricted in order to protect “the rights and freedoms of others. ” 
Thus, religiously motivated harassment of colleagues or refusals to work with 
people of a particular gender or religion will not be protected.
Nevertheless, religious rights are in certain circumstances accorded clear 
priority over other countervailing norms. In relation to animal cruelty for 
example, EU law has provided exemptions from laws requiring humane 
slaughtering methods in order to facilitate religious practices in relation to 
meat preparation. Directive 93/119/EC on the protection of animals at the time
97of slaughter of killing confers authority on religious institutions in relation to 
animal slaughter in Article 2(8) which provides that:
“religious authority on whose behalf the slaughter is carried out shall be
competent for the application and monitoring o f the special provisions which
28apply to the slaughter according to religious rites ”.
The Directive’s preamble notes that it is “necessary (...) to take account o f the 
particular requirements o f certain religious rites. ” It goes on to provide in 
Article 5(2) that the requirement that animals be stunned before slaughter does
26 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation Article 2(5) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000
27 Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of 
slaughter of killing.
28 Ibid. Article 2(8). Para. 1 of the Preamble to Directive 2001/88/EC of 23 October 2001 
amending Directive 91/630/EEC laying down minimum standards for the protection of pigs 
OJ L 316 1.12.2001, has a similar provision.
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not apply “m the case o f animals subject to particular methods o f slaughter 
required by certain religious rites” thus subjugating the prevention of cruelty 
to animals to the religious rights of those who only wish to consume ritually 
killed meat.
Perhaps more significantly for the purposes of this chapter, the rights to active 
facilitation of religion in the marketplace conferred by EU law and the 
Framework Directive in particular, also have to be reconciled with the 
interests of the two pillars of the European public order, the market and the 
humanist elements of the liberal democratic state.
2.3.1 Reconciliation with the Structures o f the Market
Although in legislation such as the Framework Directive, EU law has provided 
significant protection to the right of individuals to adhere to and retain a 
religious identity, this facilitation and must adapt itself to the overall structures 
of the market. A competitive market economy such as that envisaged by the 
EU treaty, is characterised by certain features such as the commercial 
exchange and the pursuit of profit, efficiency and self-interest. The protection 
provided by EU law of the rights of religious individuals in areas such as 
employment can impact on the pursuit of these objectives and a balance must 
therefore be struck found between them.
Although in Steymann, the Court of Justice, in characterising the relationship 
between the Applicant and the religious community to which he belonged as 
one of employment, was willing to overlook the absence of genuine economic 
exchange or profit seeking between them, EU law in this area has been clear 
that the facilitation of religion must adapt to the profit motive and the need for 
efficiency in the market. Article 2.2(b)(i) of the Framework Directive makes 
this point explicitly, stating that an apparently neutral provision which 
disadvantages an individual will not be discriminatory if:
29 Ibid. Article 5(2).
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(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate
If)aim and the means o f achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”
Therefore workplace practices which place individuals of a particular religion 
at a disadvantage compared to other individuals will not be considered 
discriminatory if they are “objectively justified by a legitimate aim” and the 
means chosen to achieve the aim are “appropriate and necessary”. The 
Directive’s provisions make it clear that the pursuit of market goals such as 
efficiency and competitiveness are to be considered to be legitimate aims in 
this regard. Paragraph 17 of the Directive’s preamble states that:
“This Directive does not require the recruitment, promotion, maintenance in 
employment or training o f an individual who is not competent, capable and 
available to perform the essential functions o f the post concerned or to
31undergo relevant training (...)”
Thus, where the beliefs or practices of a particular religious identity are 
incompatible with fundamental commercial demands such as the need to 
perform the “essential functions” of a post, the duty to facilitate religion will 
give way to the need to maintain business efficiency and the duty of the 
employee to provide effective work in return for employment. Indeed, the 
concern to temper the protection of the rights of religious individuals in order 
to avoid unduly burdening business and administration was already to be seen 
in the Court of Justice’s judgment in Prais which stressed that the duty to 
schedule recruitment exams so as to avoid clashing with religiously mandated 
days of rest would only apply when the defendant had been: “informed o f the 
difficulty in good time ” and only extended to a duty:
“to take reasonable steps to avoid fixing for a test a date which would make it 
impossible for a person o f a particular religious faith to undergo the test”
30 n.26 above Article 2.2(b)(i)
31 Ibid. Preamble, para. 17
32 n. 16 above
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thus allowing the duty to facilitate an individual’s religious choices to be 
circumscribed by the need to avoid unduly burdening the process of 
recruitment.
Judgments in other areas of discrimination law have shown similar concerns. 
Thus, the need to avoid placing “an intolerable burden on employers” was 
relied on to limit the duty of employers to justify differences in pay between
■30 t
employees while “justifiable operational reasons” were invoked to limit the 
duty to facilitate employees on parental leave.34 The needs of the broader 
economy have also been seen as justifying a difference in treatment in respect 
of employees of small firms35 and differences in treatment in respect of older 
workers.36 The common thread in these cases is the willingness of the Court to 
circumscribe rights to equal treatment and the facilitation of individual 
identities in order to protect the ability of enterprises to operate efficiently 
within a competitive economy or to protect the ability of the state to regulate 
the economy. While the Court has on occasion found interferences with the 
principle of equal treatment to have been disproportionate, in general it has 
shown considerable deference to the needs of employers and the regulatory 
state. In relation to discrimination on grounds of religion therefore, the rights 
provided by EU law to employees are likely to be required to accommodate 
the needs of the competitive market to a significant degree. In relation to 
indirect discrimination on religious grounds in particular it must therefore be 
thought likely that certain religiously motivated behaviour such as a refusal on 
the part of Muslim supermarket workers to handle pork or alcohol may well be 
held to relate to an availability to perform essential functions of the job and to 
fall outside of the protection of the Framework Directive on this basis. Writing 
in relation to the EU Race Directive37 (which contains similar provisions
33 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 18 May 2006. B. F. Cadman 
v Health & Safety Executive Case C-17/05 ECR [2006] 1-09583.
34 Para. 47 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 15 March 2007. Sari Kiiski v 
Tampereen kaupunki Case C-l 16/06.
35 Case C -l89/91 Kirsammer-Hack v Sidal [1993] ECR 1-6185.
36 See Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) 16 October 2007, [2007] All ER (D) 207 (Oct) and C -l44/04 Werner 
Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2005] ECR 1-9981.
37 Council Directive 2000/43/EC on 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin OJ LI 80/22 19.7.2000.
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relating to indirect discrimination), Chalmers has suggested that minority 
identities are recognised:
“only on the basis that they transform themselves so that they be judged 
according to the “rules o f the game” o f the existing model o f political
38economy, whatever hidden structures or biases it contain”.
Given that matters such as the range of products sold in shops is likely to have 
been influenced by wider cultural norms which are themselves partly the 
product of particular, (and in Europe mainly Christian), religious traditions, it 
is inevitable that the subordination of the right to maintain a religious identity 
in the workplace to the need to ensure that employees carry out the essential 
functions of their jobs will impinge more on followers of minority religions. It 
is clear however, both from the caselaw of the Court and the provisions of the 
Framework Directive, that EU anti-discrimination law is not intended to 
displace the influence of the commercial elements of the market economy and 
that indirectly discriminatory measures which seek to safeguard the ability of 
an enterprise to compete in the market place will, be seen as having the 
legitimate aim necessary to withstand challenge on grounds of religious 
discrimination.
The accommodation of economic interests is not absolute and directly 
discriminatory measures which prevent individuals from entering the 
marketplace on the basis of the mere fact of their religious identity will not be 
upheld on this basis, even if the employer’s commercial interests are at stake, 
as for example in cases where for example a large number of customers dislike 
being served by a Jewish staff member. Neither would measures which were 
disproportionate, as for instance an unwillingness, on grounds of efficiency, to 
allow an employee to respect his or her religious day of rest in a context where 
the relevant tasks could be performed on other days, be upheld. However, 
while economic interests will not be accorded priority in every occasion, the 
protection of religion within the Single Market, at least in so far as it involves
38 D. Chalmers, “The Mistakes of the Good European?” in S. Fredman (ed.) Discrimination 
and Human Rights The Case of Racism (Academy of European Law, European University 
Institute, Oxford University Press, 2001) 220.
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active facilitation of religious behaviour as opposed to protecting the mere fact 
of religious identity, will have to accommodate itself to a significant degree, to 
the centrality of commercial norms such as the pursuit of profit and efficiency 
in EU law.
2.3.2 Reconciliation with the Structures and Norms o f the Liberal Democratic 
Polity
2.3.2.a Religion as Part of the Public Order of the EU
However, the interests that EU law recognises as being capable of justifying 
the restrictions on religious rights are not solely economic. The 
accommodation of religion within the Single Market also has to take account 
of the desire of EU law to maintain certain restrictions on the public role of 
religion (particularly in the political arena) in order to maintain the balance 
between religious, humanist and cultural influences which underpin its public 
order and which is seen as having given rise to the Union’s liberal democratic 
ethos.
While certain limitations are imposed on this basis, the EU is not a strictly 
secular policy and does recognise both the promotion of a particular public 
status for religion, including a degree of protection from liberal principles such 
as freedom of expression, as part of its public order. Indeed the EU’s own 
public order has notably un-secular elements with Single Market legislation 
both accommodating religious perspectives and seeing the promotion of an 
elevated cultural and social status for religion as an element of the public 
good. For example, the law of the Single Market has characterised the 
enforcement of respect for religious taboos, the prevention of the denigration 
of religion and the promotion of an elevated public status for religion as part 
of the public good as well as providing recognition of religious perspectives 
within its regulatory law.
Union law on trade marks for instance has contemplated restrictions motivated 
by a desire to protect religious taboos around certain symbols by providing 
that Member States may:
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“provide that a trade mark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be 
liable to be declared invalid where and to the extent that: (...) (b) the trade
39mark covers a sign of high symbolic value, in particular a religious symboV\
Similarly the 2007 Broadcasting Directive requires that:
“Member States shall ensure by appropriate means that audiovisual media 
services provided by media service providers under their jurisdiction do not 
contain any incitement to hatred based on race, sex, religion or nationality 40
thus protecting those who hold religious but not other kinds of beliefs. More 
significantly, the Directive also provides that “No television advertising or 
teleshopping shall be inserted during religious services” 41thereby attempting 
to ensure by means of the law the a degree of reverence for religious services. 
Furthermore, as was demonstrated in Chapter III,42 in addition to promoting a 
particular status for religion, the Union has, in certain circumstances, 
recognised the validity of the promotion of religious morality by means of 
“public morality” clauses in legislation as a valid element of EU law. 
Restrictions on cloning and bio-technology43 and on gambling44 have, as 
discussed in Chapter III, been recognised on this basis. Therefore, in contrast 
to strictly secular polities,45 EU law does recognise religious perspectives as a
39 Directive 89/104/EC Art 3(2)(b).
40 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities, Chapter A, Article 3b..
41 Ibid. Chapter IIC section 14.
42 See sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III.
43 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions. OJ L 213, 30.7.1998, p.13-21.
44 Case C-275/92, Her M ajesty’s Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jorg Schindler 
[1994] E.C.R. 1-1039; [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 4. See also Placanica Joined Cases C-338/04, C- 
359/04 and C-360/04 para. 47, judgment of 6 March 2007. See discussion in Chapter IV, 
Section Four.
45 The Preamble to the Turkish constitution for example requires that “there shall be no 
interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics’’and in 
Article 24 prohibits “even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and 
legal order of the state on religious tenets." See the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 
English translation available from the Office of the Prime Minister at 
http://www.bvegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anavasa/anavasa-ing.htm (last accessed 2 March 2008).
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valid element of law making and appears to regard the promotion of an 
elevated public status for religion in general as part of the public good.
2.3.2.b Limitations on Religion as Part o f the Public Order o f the EU 
Such accommodation is however, part of a broader context in which 
significant limitations on the degree of public influence which can be 
exercised by religion are seen as a key element of a the balance between 
religious, cultural and humanist influences inherent in the liberal democratic 
nature of the Union’s public order. As is shown in Chapter VI, the Union’s 
approach to migration and Enlargement show that it regards the limitation of 
religious influence over law and politics as perquisites for the respect of 
principles such as privacy and equal treatment.46 Furthermore, the duty to 
accept these limitations has been seen both as a duty of states wishing to join 
the Union47 and as an individual duty of individuals seeking to reside there.48 
The European Court of Human Rights has also been explicit that preponderant 
religious influence over law and politics is repugnant to the democratic values 
underlying the European Convention of Human Rights which the EU has 
undertaken to respect.49
Such limitations are also seen in EU Single Market legislation. Article 2.5 of 
the Framework Directive provides that:
“This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by national 
law which in a democratic society, are necessary for the public security, for  
the maintenance o f public order and the prevention o f criminal offences, for  
the protection of health and for the protection o f the rights and freedoms o f 
others. ,,5°
A similar limiting clause was not included in any of the other anti- 
discrimination directives to date so it can be assumed that it was feature or 
features of the grounds protected in Directive 2000/78 (sexual orientation,
46 See Chapter VI.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1.
50 n. 26 above
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religion or belief, disability and age) that were thought to render such a clause 
necessary. The fact that the grounds given in Article 2(5) are strikingly similar 
to those given in Article 9.2 of the ECHR (“such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f public 
safety, for the protection o f public order, health or morals, or the protection o f 
the rights and freedoms o f others”) would seem to indicate that it was the 
inclusion of religion in the directive caused the inclusion of this limitation 
clause.
The notion that religious rights, like all other rights, are to be limited by the 
need to respect the rights of others is not remarkable. However, Article 2.5 
goes further and limits the protection of religion in the market in order to 
safeguard the principle of balance between religious and humanist influences 
and the fundamental interests of the liberal democratic state. The Union’s 
overall approach to religion is characterised by both a respect for religion’s 
role in individual and communal identity and an awareness that a high level of 
religious influence over public institutions can pose a threat to the state, to 
democracy and to the humanist elements of the balance between religious and 
humanist influences required by the EU’s public order.51 Just as Article 2.2’s 
prohibition on discrimination on religious grounds represents this respect for 
religious identity, Article 2.5 can be seen as reflecting the Union’s desire to 
maintain certain limitations on religion’s public role in the interests of the 
state, liberal democracy and the principle of balance which underpins its 
approach to religion. The provisions of Article 2.5 subordinate the prohibition 
on discrimination in the Directive is specifically to “the interests o f public 
safety” and “the protection o f public order” in so far as such subordination is 
“necessary in a democratic society.” The invocation of ideas such as “public 
order” and “public security” would seem to indicate reflect a view that there 
are core elements related to the authority and security of the modern state 
which cannot be expected to accommodate individual or collective identities 
in general and religion in particular, without undermining the stability of the 
public order as whole. Such an approach has much in common with the 
restrictions on the assertion of religious claims to truth in the political arena
51 See Chapter VI.
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outlined in Chapter III. Thus, the need of a democratic society to maintain 
public order, or indeed, to promote “morals” or personal freedom (“the rights 
and freedoms of others”), trumps the need to respect religious freedom in the 
marketplace. Notably, unlike the “objective justification” exemption in Article 
2.2(b)(i), the exemption provided by Article 2.5, covers both the both direct 
and indirect discrimination. Accordingly, adherents to religions which are 
seen as contrary to the public order, or which are hostile to the notion of 
balance and the accommodation of humanist and cultural influences which it 
entails, may be excluded from employment in, for example the security 
services or the army, simply on the basis of their religious identity.
2.3.3 Accommodation of Existing Religious Privilege in the Market 
However, as has be noted in Chapter IV, in addition to its personal aspects, 
religion is also a communal phenomenon and most mainstream European 
faiths regard an approach to religious freedom based solely on protection of 
individual autonomy as gravely deficient. The right of individual employees 
to equal treatment on grounds including religion can be inconsistent with the 
rights of such institutions to organise themselves in accordance with their 
religious beliefs. Indeed the relevant ECHR caselaw,53 and therefore in all 
likelihood the general principles of EU law,54 suggest that the protection of the 
collective religious identity of religious organisations requires that exemptions 
from anti-discrimination laws be provided to religious bodies, at least in 
relation to those employed to carry out religious tasks such as preaching. 
However, the role of religious bodies in the market place is not restricted to 
the employment of clergy.
Certain religions have achieved privileged status in many Member States. 
More importantly in terms of Single Market law, religious institutions 
continue play a key role in the provision of public services such as health and 
education in several EU Member States.55 The EU has specifically undertaken 
not to interfere with this institutional role for religion at Member state level. In
52 See Chapter IV.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 See Chapter II.
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1998 the Member States agreed to append a Declaration on the Status o f 
Churches to the Amsterdam Treaty.56 This Declaration has also been included 
in the Lisbon Treaty57 and provides that:
“The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law o f churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States ”.58
The Union has therefore undertaken to avoid interfering with the status which 
Member States choose to grant, or not to grant, under national law to 
individual denominations or to religious organisations as a whole. Thus, EU 
law recognises that it cannot be used to force a state to reconsider, in general 
terms, its decision to promote, to some degree, a religiously specific collective 
identity in public contexts and could not be used, for example, to require a 
member state to disestablish a state church, or potentially, to restrict the public 
role exercised by religious institutions in individual Member States. The 
centrality of the role of the Member States in relation to the demarcation of the 
public role of religious bodies is underlined by the fact that no definition of 
“religion”, “religious”, “association” or “church” is provided by EU law 
which, under the terms of the Declaration, would appear to be bound to defer 
to the definitions of national law in these matters.
This commitment to respecting the pre-existing Market privileges granted to 
religions by Member States is given concrete form in the Framework Directive 
which significantly limits the applicability of the prohibitions on direct and 
indirect discrimination on grounds of religion on this basis. Indeed paragraph 
24 of the Directive specifically invoked the Declaration stating:
56 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration 
No.l 1 to the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133.
57 Article 16C, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, OJ C 306/42 17.12.2007.
58 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration 
N o.l 1 to the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133. 
The declaration also states “The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical 
and non-confessional organisations” however, such organisations do not have the institutional 
and legal status held by various denominations under Member States’ laws meaning that the 
inclusion of this rider could be seen as something of a meaningless gesture designed to lessen 
the degree to which the Union appeared to be granted special treatment to religious bodies.
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“The European Union in its Declaration No. 11 on the status o f churches and 
o f non-confessional organisations, annexed to the Final Act o f the Amsterdam 
Treaty, has explicitly recognised that it respects and does not prejudice the 
status under national law o f churches and religious associations or 
communities in the Member States and that it equally respects the status o f 
philosophical and non-confessional organisations. With this in view, Member 
States may lay maintain or lay down specific provisions on genuine legitimate 
and justified occupational requirements which might be required for carrying 
out an occupational activity”59
The substantive provisions of the Directive reflect this accommodation of 
collective institutional religious privilege. In Article 4.2 which deals with 
“occupational requirements”, the Directive provides that Member States may 
provide that acts which would otherwise be considered discriminatory:
“shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason o f the nature of the 
particular occupational activities concerned or o f the context within which 
they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and 
determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.”60
This article provides protection for the internal autonomy of religious 
organisations by exempting them from the duty not to discriminate, religious 
practices such as restriction of membership of the clergy to believers or, for 
those religions for which it is necessary, to members of one gender. 
Importantly, these privileges are granted not directly to the relevant 
institutions but instead provide Member States with the right to grant such 
privileges if they so desire.
However, the exemption granted to Member States by the directive goes 
beyond the accommodation of genuine occupational requirements. Article 4.2
59 n. 26 above.
60 Ibid.
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substantially curtails the application of the key EU law of principle non­
discrimination to religious institutions while leaving it to apply with full rigour 
to other kinds of institutions. The Article states:
“Member States may maintain national legislation in force at the date o f 
adoption of this Directive or provide for future legislation incorporating 
national practices existing at the date o f adoption o f this Directive pursuant to 
which, in the case o f occupational activities within churches and other public 
or private organisations the ethos o f which is based on religion or belief, a 
difference o f treatment based on a person’s religion or belief shall not 
constitute discrimination where, by reason o f the nature o f these activities or 
o f the context in which they are carried out, a person’s religion or belief 
constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement, having 
regard to the organisation’s ethos. This difference o f treatment shall be 
implemented taking account o f Member States ’ constitutional provisions and 
principles, as well as the general principles o f Community law, and should not 
justify discrimination on another ground.
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall 
thus not prejudice the right o f churches and other public or private 
organisations. the ethos o f which is based on religion or belief, acting in 
conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals 
working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation’s 
ethos. ”61 (emphasis added).
There are a number of noteworthy features of this article. First, it covers 
religious bodies alone. However, its scope goes beyond that of mere internal 
autonomy for churches and extends to “other public or private organisations 
the ethos o f which is based on religion or belief ’. Thus, the notion of 
“occupational requirement” is deliberately extended in order to ensure that 
religious bodies exercising public functions can protect the religiously specific 
nature of the public services they provide by providing scope within EU law to
61 Ibid.
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exempt them from otherwise applicable non-discrimination norms. Indeed the 
directive goes even further in the second paragraph of Article 4.2 which 
contemplates the extension of the rights of religious institutions as employers 
to require individual employees to act “in good faith and loyalty to the 
organisation’s ethos.” This approach involves significant curtailment of 
principles such as the prohibition on discrimination against individuals on 
grounds of religion and individual freedom from religion in favour of the 
collective rights of religious bodies. Moreover, it allows religious institutions 
to exercise these rights in relation to functions that are not specifically 
religious. Actions which result from a particular ethos are exempt from the 
normal standard of “genuine and determining occupational requirement” 
applied by Article 4.1 to other kinds of employers. Instead, religious 
employers are permitted to bring their beliefs into the calculation of what 
constitutes a “genuine legitimate and justified occupational requirement”. 
Thus, a religious organisation which operates a publicly funded hospital or 
school is permitted to import its religious rules relating, for example, to 
appropriate sexual behaviour, into the law by gaining exemptions from 
prohibitions on discrimination on this ground in order to defend its “ethos”. 
Such an approach supports the protection of a broad collective institutional 
religious identity in public contexts such as the provision of healthcare of 
educational services, even when such protection impacts on the rights of 
individual employees in the private arena (insofar as the conduct of an 
employee of an organisation with a religious ethos in his or her private life 
could be seen as failing to act “in loyalty to organisation’s ethos”). The fact 
that a decision to discriminate is religiously motivated is therefore seen as a 
reason to curtail the applicability of the otherwise generally applicable 
principle of non-discrimination.
Moreover, the term “ethos” is not defined meaning that it could be extended to 
cover almost any form of otherwise-prohibited discrimination, provided that 
the discriminatory intent is religious in nature. In addition, while under Article 
2.2(b)(i) of the Directive indirect discrimination against an individual on the 
grounds of his or her religion (or on any of the other prohibited grounds) is 
permitted only when it can be “justified by a legitimate aim, and the means o f
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f \0achieving that aim appropriate and n e c e s s a r y No such limitation is placed 
on discrimination necessitated by ethos which is based on religion or 
belief ’. Thus, religiously motivated discrimination alone is not required to 
justify itself in terms of legitimacy of it aims, its necessity or appropriateness. 
This appears to place religion outside of the norms governing the public 
behaviour of institutions in modem liberal societies and to characterise 
religion as a kind of non-rational, non-modem phenomenon whose actions 
cannot be regulated or assessed according to generally applicable modem 
norms without impinging on its essence. In other words, by exempting acts 
which result from the religious ethos of an organisation from generally 
applicable principles of non-discrimination while refusing to define what such 
an ethos may or may not encompass, EU law seems to suggest that religion 
cannot be expected to account for itself in the rationally structured norms 
which apply to other organisations in modem liberal democratic societies.
This approach would seem to suggest that EU law recognises religion as an 
exceptional phenomenon whose communal rights and public role are entitled 
to broad recognition not accorded to other kinds of bodies. However, although 
many of the rights provided by the Directive are wide-ranging and specifically 
religion-related, they do not indicate a broad prioritisation of the rights of 
religious institutions at the expense of principles such as equal treatment or the 
protection of individual identity. Instead the provisions of Article 4.2 can be 
seen as an attempt on the part of the Union to ensure that its embrace of norms 
such as equal treatment on grounds of religion does not interfere with the 
established institutional privileges and public role of certain religions in the 
market in several Member States.
This deference towards pre-existing (and therefore largely Christian) religious 
structures in the market is seen by the fact that the exemptions provided by EU 
law in respect of religious employers take the form of a right, but not a duty, 
of Member States to impose a standstill clause maintaining such privileges. 
Furthermore, although EU law, as noted above, does recognise the promotion
62 Ibid.
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of a particular public status for religion as part of the public good and 
accommodates religious perspectives in its regulatory framework, it also 
implicitly characterises such exemptions from the principle of equal treatment 
as anachronistic and anomalous.
This view of such privileges as anachronistic is shown by the fact that only 
those national practices which predated the Directive are protected by the 
exceptions provided by Article 4.2 (“Member States may maintain national 
legislation in force at the date o f adoption o f this Directive or provide for  
future legislation incorporating national practices existing at the date o f 
adoption o f this Directive”). Thus, while EU law is willing to provide 
recognition to established Member State practices, it is not willing to require 
the rolling modification principle of equal treatment in to the future in order to 
facilitate religious privilege. The status of these privileges as anomalies is seen 
in several ways. First, the structure of the Directive establishes non­
discrimination as a general principle from which religious bodies are then 
granted an exception. The norm to which the religious privileges are 
exceptions is therefore that of the liberal principle of equal treatment. Second, 
although non-religious bodies do not have the public role which would enable 
them to benefit from the exemptions in Article 4.2 (one does not find for 
example publicly funded socialist, environmentalist or fascist hospitals or 
schools at Member State level), nevertheless those who agreed on terms the 
Directive felt constrained to indicate, at least rhetorically, a commitment to the 
equality of religious and non-religious beliefs by including in the terms of 
Article 4.2 “churches and other public or private organisations the ethos o f 
which is based on religion or belief” (emphasis added). Although the 
practical impact of this inclusion is limited, it does represent an implicit denial 
that religion is by its nature entitled to privileged status to which other belief 
systems are not.
Furthermore, even the accommodation of pre-existing religious structures is 
constrained by the religion-limiting elements of the broader dialectic within
63 Ibid.
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EU law between recognition of religion and a desire to limit the public role of 
religion in the interests of the balance between religious, cultural and humanist 
influences which is seen as underlying liberal democratic values. Thus the 
public role accorded to religion by Article 4.2 is one which is exceptional and 
which must be reconciled with the wider hegemony of liberal values. 
Therefore although discriminatory actions motivated by an institution’s 
religious ethos are exempt from the otherwise applicable standards of 
legitimacy, necessity and appropriateness, the limited and non-hegemonic 
public role assigned to religion by the Directive is nevertheless underlined by 
the fact that it specifically requires that the communal rights provided under 
Article 4.2 be implemented “taking account o f Member States’ constitutional 
provisions and principles, as well as general principles o f Community law” 
and that they “should not justify discrimination on another ground.” This 
reference to the principles of Member State constitutional law and the general 
principles of EU law, coupled with the provisions of Article 2.564 subjugating 
the rights conferred by the Directive to public security, the rights and 
freedoms of others (which apply equally to the provisions dealing with 
religious institutions), make it clear that the privileges granted to religion are 
viewed as exceptions which fall to be justified against the overall 
constitutional principles (and therefore, to an extent, collective identity) of 
both the Member States and the Union and can therefore be seen as an element 
of an overall public order which embodies contrary elements and which is, in 
the final instance, defined by the secular institutions of the polity. Indeed in 
the United Kingdom litigation relating to the implementation of the 
exemptions provided in Article 4.2, the Courts have stressed that, as 
departures from the principle of equal treatment, they need to be narrowly 
interpreted.65
64 Article 2.5 provides: "This Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by 
national law which in a democratic society, are necessary fo r the public security, fo r  the 
maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, fo r the protection of 
health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ” (see n. 39 above.)
65 R. (Amicus and others) v. The Secretary of State fo r Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 860. 
See also the narrow interpretation given to the exemption in a case where the Bishop of 
Hereford was found to have breached the rights of a gay applicant for a diocesan social work 
job when he questioned him about his sexual life in a way in which a heterosexual employee 
would not have been questioned. See “Bishop Urged to Resign after Diocese Loses Gay Bias
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Of course, these principles of national constitutional law are themselves not 
entirely secular and are likely, particularly in countries where religious 
institutions are granted a major public role, to reflect the religious identity of 
the very institutions whose public role they may be invoked to limit. For 
example Irish legislation implementing Article 4(2) takes a broad approach 
providing exemptions from the duty not to discriminate to:
“A religious, educational or medical institution which is under the direction 
or control o f a body established for religious purposes or whose objectives 
include the provision o f services in an environment which promotes certain 
religious values shall not be taken to discriminate against a person [in 
contravention of the Act7 if—
(a) it gives more favourable treatment, on the religion ground, to an employee 
or a prospective employee over that person where it is reasonable to do so in 
order to maintain the religious ethos o f the institution, or
(b) it takes action which is reasonably necessary to prevent an employee or a 
prospective employee from undermining the religious ethos o f the 
institution. ”66
Furthermore, in the Irish case, the country’s heavily Catholic constitution may 
well prove unlikely to provide significant grounds for restriction of the 
exemptions in the Directive given that Irish Courts have in the past upheld the 
dismissal of a teacher in a Catholic school on the grounds that she was 
unmarried and pregnant.
Thus, the institutional privileges granted by Article 4.2 are subject to certain 
limitations in the name of respect for balance, liberal democracy and the 
restrictions on the public role of religion which they entail. However, these 
limitations are provided by such humanist and secular elements as there may 
be in the public orders of both the Member States and the EU which may
Case” The Guardian Newspaper, 19 July 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/gavrights/storv/Q..2129741.00.html (last visited 6 February 2008).
66 Employment Equality Act 1998, section 37(1).
67 Flynn v Power [1985] IR 648.
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themselves bear the influence of particular religious traditions or regard the 
promotion of an elevated (albeit limited) public status for religion in general as 
part of the public good.
Accordingly, EU law in this area engages in a rather complex balancing of 
individual and collective identity rights in relation to religion which is 
informed and limited by its commitment to an overall balance between 
religious, cultural and humanist influences over law. While the Union 
recognises both a right to engage in religion as a market activity and a right to 
protection for religious and identity and activities within the market, these 
rights must adapt to established structures, norms and institutional 
arrangements. While the right not to be penalised for being a believer in a 
particular faith (and therefore individual religious identity), is protected to a 
very significant degree, the right to act in accordance with the beliefs in the 
marketplace can be limited when such actions clash with fundamental market 
norms such as the pursuit of profit or efficiency. Both the right to hold a 
religious identity and to act in accordance with such an identity in the market 
are also limited not only by the requirement that it be balanced with other 
rights but also by the fundamental interests of the state and the liberal 
democratic public order. Furthermore, the facilitation of individual religiosity 
and the attempt by EU law to restrict discrimination on religious grounds is 
also required to accommodate the pre-existing religious structures in the 
marketplace thus enabling significant departure from key principles such as 
equal treatment in order to facilitate the maintenance of the public role of 
certain religions in individual Member States.
3. Cultural Autonomy, Single Market Law and Religion
There is however a further means through which religion is recognised within 
the Single Market which also reflects the desire of EU law not to interfere with 
the established structures underpinning the role of certain religions in the 
public life of Member States. Not only does the role played by religion in 
national culture enable it to achieve a degree of recognition in the 
marketplace, this role is not subject the same degree to the limitations imposed
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by the market, the state and liberal values which constrain the rights accorded 
to religion in other areas of Single Market law.
As discussed in Chapter III, the EU is a pluralist public order committed to 
respecting the cultural autonomy of its Member States (including the right of 
each state to define its own notions of public morality). Indeed, as an 
institution of limited democratic legitimacy, attempts on the part of the EU to 
interfere with cultural autonomy could have very serious consequences for the 
stability of the Union. On the other hand as Taylor points out, sustainable
political communities are not made up of “a scratch team of history with
68nothing more in common that the passenger list o f some international fl ig h t  
but require some kind of common identity.69 Seen in this light, it is hardly 
surprising therefore that the Union has repeatedly referred to itself as a 
“community o f values” and has attempted to promote the “common cultural 
heritage ”70 of Europe.
This dual approach of respecting Member State cultural autonomy while 
promoting a common cultural identity derived from these various national 
cultures is reflected in Article 151 of the EC Treaty which provides that:
1. “ The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures o f the
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at 
the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
[ - I
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions o f this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to 
promote the diversity of its cultures. ”
3.1 The Definition o f Culture in EU Law
68 C. Taylor, “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, Discussion Paper 15, (The Centre for 
the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, 1995) 19.
69 Ibid.
70 Article 151, Treaty Establishing the European Community OJ c 325/33 24.12.2002.
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According to predominant contemporary perceptions, culture is seen as an 
ethnographic or anthropological state of affairs covering matters of values and 
beliefs and the generation of meaning as well as practices relating to matters 
such as food, leisure rituals or clothing.71 Such a view of culture is not readily 
understandable in terms of rational argument or teleology.72 Indeed, the 
existence of a national culture in particular, is seen as requiring no justification 
in rational terms or in terms of the attainment of greater goals.73
Neither does culture, as a phenomenon which is not goal oriented, fit readily 
in to the competitive structures of the free market and has in general been 
protected from the impact of the market in significant ways. As Sassoon noted 
in relation to postwar Europe:
“Even after the boost in the ideological strength of the free market following 
the post-war boom, hardly any political party(...) was willing to support the 
strict application of the market mechanism in the field o f culture. ”74
The distinctiveness of individual cultures has also often been seen as a good in
7 Sitself. This placing of a high value placed on distinctiveness for its own sake 
underlines culture’s specific and particularist nature. As a culture is 
constituted by certain habits, ideas and practices shared by a certain group it 
defines itself in relation to existing practices and structures which are linked in 
some way to past practices and structures of the same group. Furthermore, as 
it is constituted by certain shared distinctive features, culture is inherently 
particularist as it by definition excludes those who do not share such 
commonalities.
71 See F. Inglis, Culture (Cambridge UK and Malden MA, USA Polity Press, 2004)
28-29. See also C. Barker “Culture” in The SAGE Dictionary o f Cultural Studies Sage. 
(London, New Dehli, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2004) 45.
72 Ibid. 12.
73 D. Sassoon The Culture of the Europeans: From 1800 to the Present, (Harper Collins, 
London, 2006) 861. This exemption from standards of rationality is also seen, as noted above, 
in relation to Article 4(2) of the Framework Directive which notably fails to require that 
discriminatory decisions justified on the grounds of religious ethos, be justified in terms of 
rationality or reasonableness.
74 Ibid. 867.
75 See arguments of Von Herder Quoted in Inglis above note 71, 14.
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The law of the Single Market has repeatedly adapted to and facilitated these 
features. The Court of Justice has demonstrated an anthropological and 
ethnographic understanding of culture. In Eman v College van Burgenmeester 
en Wethaiders van den Haaq, it was faced with a challenge to Dutch law 
which required citizens of Dutch overseas territories to reside in the 
Netherlands for ten years before they could vote in European elections. In 
reaching its decision the Court was required to consider the attributes of 
nationhood in relation to Member States. The Court listed the elements of such 
national identity stating that a nation was “the totality o f individuals linked by
77the fact o f sharing traditions, culture, ethnicity, religion, and so on The 
valuing of cultural distinctiveness is also seen in EU law, most notably in 
Article 151 ’s commitment to respect “national and regional diversity” in 
cultural matters.
Single Market legislation has repeatedly recognised culture’s non-economic 
nature and the need to protect a shared cultural heritage from the impact of the 
free market. The preamble to the 2007 Broadcasting Directive stated that the 
status of audio visual services as “cultural services'’ and their “growing 
importance [...] for education and culture justifies the applications o f special 
rules to these services”.78 It also noted that Article 151(4):
“requires the Community to take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions o f the Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to
79promote the diversity o f its cultures. ”
and that the European Parliament had resolved that:
76 Eman v College van Burgenmeester en Wethaiders van den Haaq, Case C-300/04, [2006] 
ECR 1-08055, para  79.
77 Ibid.
78 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States, OJ L 332/27 18.12.2007, Preamble, 
para. 3.
79 Ibid. para. 4.
197
"cultural activities, goods and services have both an economic and a cultural
nature, because they convey identities, values and meanings, and must
80therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value, ”
thus acknowledging both culture’s role in generating meaning and identities as 
well recognising that this important role could be threatened by the regulation 
of cultural matters in accordance with purely commercial and economic 
principles.
Religion is, of course a key element of many national cultures and has 
accordingly been explicitly recognised by EU law as forming part cultural 
identity not only in the caselaw of the Court of Justice which, as noted above
in Eman defined culture as “the totality o f individuals linked by the fact o f
81sharing traditions, culture, ethnicity, religion, and so on”, but also in 
legislation. For instance, Council Regulation 3911/92 on the export o f cultural 
goods, includes “elements forming an integral part o f artistic, historical or 
religious monuments” and the “inventories o f ecclesiastical institutions” in its 
definition of “cultural objects.” Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural 
objects unlawfully removed from the territory o f a Member State adopts the 
same definition.83 These Directives therefore recognise the role of religion in 
national culture by including church records and religious objects as parts of 
national heritage the preservation of which the Union acknowledges as a 
legitimate ground for departure from normal rules of the free market. Thus, the 
Union attempts to shelter certain elements of national culture, including 
religion, from the impact of the exercise of its powers to regulate the Single 
Market. In doing so it recognises a specific religious heritage as part of the 
collective identity of the state which the institutions of the state are entitled to 
promote and protect on grounds of cultural autonomy.
EU legislation does not merely see religion as a historical and symbolic 
element of identity. It has also recognised religion, as an element of a broader
80 Ibid. para. 5.
81 n. 76 above.
82 Article A 2 of the Annex to Council Regulation 3911/92 of 9 December 1992 on the export 
of cultural goods OJ L 395.
83 See preamble to Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State OJ L 074, 27/03/1993 P 0074-0079
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cultural communal way of life which Member States are entitled to seek to 
maintain. As noted in Chapter III, this includes the promotion of particular 
views of “public morality” which may be religiously influenced. It also 
includes the protection of certain market structures which may also be linked 
to particular religious traditions. Thus, Directives 94/33EC on the protection
84of young people at work and 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects o f the 
organisation o f working time85 both enable Member States to designate 
Sunday as part of the weekly rest period if they so choose (although in doing 
so they are required to take account of “the diversity o f cultural, ethnic,
o / r
religious and other factors”). These directives establish exceptions which 
enable Member States to promote communal practices which result from 
particular religious practices and to shield such practices from the impact of 
the a-religious free market orientation of EU law. The Court of Justice, in line 
with it’s anthropological definition of culture in Eman, has taken a similar 
approach categorising a decision to ban Sunday trading by a local authority as 
an instance of:
“certain political and economic choices in so far as their purpose is to ensure 
that working and non-working hours are so arranged as to accord with
87national or regional socio-cultural characteristics”
Such an approach sees the regulation of workplace practices in a manner 
which is influenced by a particular religious tradition as a legitimate exercise 
of cultural autonomy by Member States whose regulatory approach is to be 
permitted to promote a particular communal identity for the state. The 
Christian Sabbath can therefore be legally protected not on the basis of its 
religious significance per se, nor on the basis of a duty to respect individual 
choice (though this right may be protected by other EU laws) but due to its 
status as a collective “regional socio-cultural characteristic”. The provisions 
of the Framework Directive relating to indirect discrimination in the
84 Directive 94/33EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ L 216.
85 See preamble to Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of 
the organisation of working time OJ L 307.
86 Ibid.
87 Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v B & Q  pic  [1989] ECR 3851.
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workplace do place some limits on the degree to which Member States will be 
free to define general rules which disadvantage adherents of minority 
religions,88 nevertheless, Directives 94/33/EC and 93/104/EC make it clear 
that EU law does enable Member States to take account of and grant legal 
privilege to practices linked to certain religious traditions in defining general 
rules such as those relating to weekly rest periods and to shield such 
facilitation of religious practices in the marketplace from the operation of 
commercial market norms.
While such an approach enables certain denominations to use the power of the 
state to regulate the market to promote their specific religious practices, it does 
not grant rights to religions as religions but instead empowers the state to 
define its identity and public culture in such a way as to benefit specific 
religions should it choose to do so. It therefore enables the promotion of a 
religiously specific identity in public matters and the embrace of a religious 
element to the identity of the state at the same time as enabling the refusal to 
grant a public role to religions which are seen as either culturally or 
ideologically incompatible with the predominant ideological or cultural norms 
of this culturally specific state. Certain religions may therefore access 
significant legal privilege in the communal life. However, they do so not as 
religion per se but merely as elements of the broader communal identity of the 
state which is equally free to exclude religious elements from the public order 
should it choose to do so.
3.1.1 Institutional Arrangements as Culture
The recognition by EU law of the religious element of national cultural 
identity has extended to cover not merely religious practices but to particular 
institutional arrangements between certain religions and Member States. In
OQ
Council Decision 1982/2006 which related to the Union’s actions in relation 
to research and technological development, the Council of Ministers called for
88 See Section 2.2 above.
89 Decision No 1982/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2006 concerning the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for 
research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) OJ 30.12.2006 
L412/1.
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activities which would promote “the citizen in the European Union” including 
promotion of:
“respect for Europe’s diversities and commonalities in terms o f culture, 
religions, cultural heritage, institutions and legal systems, history, languages 
and values as building elements o f our European multi-cultural identity and 
heritage”.90
This recognition of religion as an element of culture and the Council’s placing 
of religion in the context of notions of “diversities”, “multi-cultural identity” 
and “institutional and legal systems” is also consistent with the Declaration on 
the Status o f Churches appended to the Amsterdam Treaty91 and included in 
the Lisbon Treaty92 which, as noted above,93 provides that:
“The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law o f churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States”.94
thus linking existing institutional arrangements such as those surrounding the 
role of certain religions in individual Member States to broader issues around 
the Union’s obligation to respect Member State identity in the exercise of its 
powers. Indeed, the fact that the right to grant or to withhold the exemptions 
from the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 4.2 of the 
Framework Directive is given to Member States underlines the fact that these 
institutional religious privileges can equally be seen as recognition within EU
90 Ibid. section 8, page 25.
91 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration 
No.l 1 to the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133.
92 Article 16C, Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, OJ C 306/42 17.12.2007.
93 n. 58 above.
94 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration 
No.l 1 to the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133. 
The declaration also states “The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical 
and non-confessional organisations” however, such organisations do not have the institutional 
and legal status held by various denominations under Member States’ laws meaning that the 
inclusion of this rider could be seen as something of a meaningless gesture designed to lessen 
the degree to which the Union appeared to be granted special treatment to religious bodies.
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law of Member State cultural autonomy rather than the institutional autonomy 
religions.
3.2 Culture as Discrimination between Religions
3.2.1 Culture, Insider Religions and Compatibility with the Public Order 
Culture therefore, is seen in EU law both as contemporary habits, ideas, 
customs and institutional structures which distinguish particular groups, as 
well as containing important elements from the past which give meaning to 
such habits, ideas, customs and structures. Thus, it is a dynamic phenomenon 
in which present interpretations of a collective past are constantly reinvented 
and renewed. Recognition of a practice or structure as part of national or 
European culture is also a privileged category in legal terms with the Union 
permitting the exemption of such cultural phenomena from the standards 
which its law applies to other matters.95 There is no legal definition of the 
contents of such culture, indeed given its dynamic and non-rational nature, it is 
difficult to imagine how such a definition could be arrived at. Accordingly, 
political understandings of what is and is not part of such culture play an 
important role in determining what will be recognised as coming within this 
legally privileged category. Nevertheless, despite its influence over law, 
culture is viewed as in some way separate from the rationalism and ideological 
nature of political sphere.96 The strong historical and cultural role of the 
mainstream Christian denominations mean that the public role of Christian 
institutions is likely to be recognised as part of the national cultural identities 
which EU Single Market law is bound to respect. However, despite the 
recognition of the promotion of an elevated cultural and social status for
95 See for example the manner with which the Framework Directive exempts discriminatory 
actions motivated by religious ethos from the generally applicable standards of having a 
legitimate aim and being reasonably necessary (section 2.3.3 above), the exemption of 
religious slaughtering practices from animal cruelty legislation (section 2.3.1 above) or the 
deference to religious choices in relation to rest days (section 3.1 above).
96 See A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (New York, International 
Publishers, 1971) 238 and S. Zizek, In Defence of Lost Causes, (London, Verso, 2008) 21 
both of whom acknowledge that despite this perception culture is a site of political power and 
is not ideologically neutral.
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religion as an element of the public good and the accommodation of religious 
perspectives in Single Market law noted above,97 such culturally characterised 
religious privilege is, like other religious privileges in this area, subject to real 
limitations in the name of the protection of the principle of balance and the 
liberal democratic values to which such balance is viewed as giving rise. 
There are strongly humanist and secular elements of the public order of the 
EU which are themselves seen as part of European culture and identity. As 
shown in Chapter VI, Enlargement policy, migration legislation and the 
rulings of the Court of Human Rights make it clear that religious domination 
of politics and law is incompatible with EU membership. Furthermore, as 
noted above, the provisions of Article 2.5 do provide limitations on religious 
privilege in the name of the “rights and freedoms of others” and the needs of a 
“democratic society”. However, it is also noticeable that the secular elements 
of the European public order are imposed to a greater degree against 
“outsider” religions whose large scale presence in Europe is a more recent 
phenomenon than against the historically entrenched “insider” religions which 
play large cultural roles at Member State level. EU law’s culturally saturated 
view of religion and the view of the influence of cultural norms over law as in 
someway non-political lead to a situation where “insider” religions are seen in 
cultural and markedly less ideological and poltical terms than “outsider” 
faiths. Such “outsider” religions are viewed, both within the legal and political 
arenas, much more in terms of their ideological elements and consequently are 
seen as greater threats to the humanist secular elements of the public order 
which require limitations on religious influence in the political arena.
Therefore while, in its regulation of employment and gambling, the Union has 
been willing to carve out exemptions from liberal or market principles to 
enable Member States to allow religion to continue to play an active public 
role, in dealings with religions whose large scale presence in Europe is a more 
recent phenomenon and which have not been subject to the same historical and 
cultural forces, European officials and institutions have demonstrated a 
concern that granting similar exemptions to such religions may pose a greater
97 See section 2.3.3 above.
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threat to the overall principle of balance and therefore to the liberal democratic 
nature of the public order.98 In other words, mainstream Christianity, as a 
formative influence on European culture, is seen as consistent with the 
European public order, including its humanist and secular elements, to a 
degree to which other religions are not. For instance, the Union’s approach to 
the issue of religious offence in advertising contrasts sharply with the attitude 
taken by some of its institutions to the controversy surrounding the publication 
of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by the Danish newspaper Jyllands 
Posten. In a statement on the issue to the European Parliament Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso stated:
“Our European society is based on respect for the individual person’s life and 
freedom, equality o f rights between men and women, freedom o f speech, and a 
clear distinction between politics and religion. Our point o f departure is that 
as human beings we are free, independent, equal and responsible. We must 
safeguard these principles. Freedom o f speech is part o f Europe’s values and 
traditions. Let me be clear. Freedom o f speech is not negotiable.
These views were repeated almost verbatim by Franco Frattini, a Vice 
President of the Commission in an interview with the EU’s official anti­
racism body, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (the 
EUMC). Although the Commissioner did criticise the publication of the 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten 
as “thoughtless and inappropriate”, he went on to say:
“During the debate, we have recognised that the publication o f the cartoons 
aggrieved many Muslims all over the world, and that it is important to respect
98 This argument also appears in relation to France, specifically in O. Roy Secularism 
Confronts Islam, (Columbia University Press, New York 2007).
99 Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, Statement on the issue of the 
cartoons of the prophet Muhammed, European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2006, 
Reference: SPEECH/06/86 Date: 15/02/2006
(http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/86&format=HTML&a 
ged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en last visited 5 December 2007).
See also “The EU and the Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed” The European Consortium 
for Church and State Research Newsletter Year 7 Issue 7 July 2007 (http://www.church-state- 
europe.eu/newsletter/Mav2007.HTML (last visited 5 December 2007).
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sensitivities. (...) Equally, we have reaffirmed that our European society is 
based on the respect for the individual person’s life and freedom, equality o f 
rights between men and women, freedom of speech and a clear distinction 
between politics and religion. We have said clearly and loudly that freedom of 
expression and freedom o f religion are part o f Europe’s values and traditions, 
and that they are not negotiable. ”100
Later in the same interview he reiterated the same point saying:
“Let me be clear, even if European societies become multicultural, freedom of 
speech as an essential part o f Europe’s values and traditions, is simply not 
negotiable. ”10]
In relation to Islam, therefore, the right to freedom of expression was 
characterised as non-negotiable elements of Europe’s values and traditions. 
Both the Commission President and Commissioner Frattini furthermore 
seemed to imply that such an approach to freedom of expression was part of 
Europe’s tradition of freedom of religion. The fact that the two statements are 
so strikingly similar suggests that this view is one which has been agreed 
collectively to some degree by the Commission. Given that at the time the 
laws of several Member States and the relevant EU broadcasting legislation 
(the 1989 Broadcasting Directive),102 explicitly restricted statements which are 
offensive to religious beliefs (the changes effected by the 2007 Broadcasting 
Directive are assessed below), it is difficult to see the Commission’s statement 
as a fair depiction of the true situation. Rather it would seem to be the case 
that under EU law some legal suppression of religious offensive material is 
permitted and that freedom of expression can be restricted on this basis. 
However, such protection is contingent on a perceived acceptance on the part 
of such religions of the principle of balance between religious, cultural and 
humanist influences and the non-hegemonic nature of religion’s role in such a
100 See: “Equal Voices” Issue 18 June 2006 published by the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia at page 5.
101 Ibid.
102 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by Law, Regulation of Administrative Action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities Official Journal L298, 17/10/1989
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public order and has been extended to majority, culturally-entrenched religions 
to a greater degree than to less mainstream (in European terms) religions.103 
Furthermore, the granting of such privileges to religion is seen as promotion of 
a goal of promoting respect for culture and identity104 rather than an attempt to 
assert claims of religious truth in the political arena or to subjugate liberal 
principles such as freedom of expression to religious norms as part of a wider 
ideological aversion to the humanist elements of Europe’s public order.
Of course, the statement of individual Commissioners does not necessarily 
represent the view of the Union as a whole. However, the Commissioners’ 
statements in relation to the Jyllands Posten controversy, in the context of the 
toleration of restrictions on expression considered offensive on religious 
grounds by the Court of Human Rights and EU Member State laws, represent 
something more than the conferring of privilege on certain favoured religions. 
It reveals the assumption, noted above, that the exercise of legal privileges 
granted to mainstream, Christian denominations will be tempered by a shared 
approach to liberal enlightenment values such as freedom of expression along 
with a concern that religions such as Islam, which have been less influenced 
by the European social, historical and political norms, might, if accorded 
similar status, make excessive use of such privileges in a way which would be 
incompatible with democratic society. Such views have not been restricted to 
the European Commission. As will be shown below, other European 
institutions also appear to consider that the expectations of Christian religions 
with long histories in Europe in relation to their public role will have been 
conditioned by long exposure to the historical and cultural forces which 
brought about the modern European nation-state.
103 The Court of Human Rights, for example, has upheld denomination-specific blasphemy 
laws Choudry v UK App No 17439/90 12 Hum Rts LJ 172 (1991) while Directive 89/552 is 
likely to benefit well-established majority religions whose services are far more likely to be 
the subject of television broadcasts than the services of minority or non-mainstream faiths.
104 The 1989 Broadcasting Directive (Council Directive 89/552/EEC104) focuses on the need to 
avoid the broadcast of material which is offensive to political beliefs as well as religious ones 
(Article 12(c) and also defends personal identity more generally by prohibiting advertising 
which encourages discrimination on grounds of race, sex or nationality (Article 12(b).
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Ferrari has argued that the “constituent religions” (Catholic, Protestant and 
Jewish) which were then present on the European public scene in the were 
party to “a new Westfalia” which was “genetically inscribed in the crucial 
hairpin bend of the period after the Second World War” under which they 
accepted the political supremacy of the liberal democratic state in return for a 
“constitutional secularism that is less and less interpreted as separation and 
more and more as integration” which enabled them to take a full part in civil 
society.105 Religions such as Islam which were largely absent from the 
European scene at the time are not seen as having curtailed their political 
ambitions in this way and are consequently seen as a greater threat to 
democratic societies. Similarly, in relation to the role of Islam in France, Roy 
argues that suspicion is generated:
“by the appearance o f new communities o f believers who do not feel bound by 
the compromises laboriously developed over the past century between cathos 
and la'iques. ”106
While Martin has argued that Christianity was particularly well-suited to adapt 
to secularism,107 as Roy points out, the embrace by mainstream Christian 
religions of the principles of liberal democracy has as often been for reasons 
of realpolitik as for theological reasons. Nevertheless, they appear to be 
viewed in Europe as being more likely to have reconciled themselves to the 
limitations on their political and social influence which have emerged in 
Europe since the Enlightenment and therefore as being more trustworthy 
recipients of access to legal or political privilege. Roy notes how even political 
stands of Christian denominations are not seen as threatening to the state. The 
opposition of the Catholic Church to the policies of many Member States in 
relation to abortion for instance is not seen as evidence of its threatening
105 A. Ferrari “Religions, secularity and democracy in Europe: for a new Kelsenian pact” Jean 
Monnet Working Papers Program NYU School of Law 2005.
106 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007) 6.
107 See D. Martin, On Secularisation: Towards a Revised General Theory” (Aldershot, 
Hampshire, UK, Ashgate, 2005).
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nature “because the two parties accept precisely that the debate will not turn
108into opposition to the political system”
In this vein, the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in relation to blasphemy laws109 suggested that “blasphemy, as an 
insult to religion, should not be considered a criminal offence”} 10 It noted that 
several Member States of the Council of Europe Member States do criminalise 
blasphemy but also significantly that “Even though today prosecutions in this 
respect are rare in member states, they are legion in other countries o f the 
w orld '}n In other words, such laws are dead letters in the mainstream 
European cultural context but, as the Mohammed Cartoons controversy (which 
party prompted the resolution in question) showed, these cultural values are 
not universally shared. As noted above, such ideas would seem to have been 
influential in the Union’s Enlargement policy112 and are, I would suggest, also 
to be seen in its attitude to freedom of speech. Whether such assumptions in 
relation to the attitudes of adherents of traditional European religions are 
justified is not for this work to assess. It must be noted that satire and ridicule 
of elements of the Christian religion is far more common in Europe than is 
similar treatment of Islam in Muslim majority countries. However, on the 
other hand, although the Catholic Church has been exposed to and participated 
in the conflicts surrounding the emergence of the modem European state, its 
attitude to the Jyllands Posten controversy demonstrated that it may still be 
striving for more extensive use of the law to suppress criticism or mockery of 
religion; Vatican representatives at the United Nations used the controversy 
generated by the cartoons and subsequent protests to call for legislation to
108 Ibid. 21-22.
109 Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion, 
Recommendation 1805 (2007), Assembly debate on 29 June 2007 (27th Sitting) (see Doc. 
11296, report of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education, rapporteur: Mrs 
Hurskainen, Doc. 11319, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
rapporteur: Mr Bartumeu Cassany, and Doc. 11322, opinion of the Committee on Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men, rapporteur: Mr Dupraz). Text adopted by the Assembly 
on 29 June 2007 (27th Sitting). Available at:
http://assemblv.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/EREC 1805.htm 
(accessed 11 July 2007)
110 Ibid. para. 4.
111 Ibid.
112 See Chapter VI.
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suppress expression considered offensive to religion. Yet as Roy notes 
European States appear to believe that:
“Christian dogma is compatible with lai'cite or that the Church’s political 
acceptance o f lai'cite exonerates it from any suspicion about theological 
content.”114
While the comments of Commission President Barroso and Commissioner 
Frattini do not necessarily represent the view of the Union as a whole, they 
along with the approach of the Council of Europe’s Assembly, provide neat 
examples of concerns that “outsider” religions present a greater threat to 
individual rights and European liberal democracy than culturally entrenched 
Christian denominations. Furthermore, their views are very much in line with 
the approach of EU institutions in other areas such as the emphasis placed by 
the Council of Ministers on the need for liberal and secular values to trump 
religious beliefs in relation to the integration of migrants from outside the 
EU115 and the Commission’s declaration that “democratic secularism” was a 
condition of Turkey’s accession to the Union, despite the lack of consensus 
around issues of secularism and church-state relations amongst existing 
Member States.116 All of these approaches seem to posit a degree of symbiosis 
between versions of Christianity traditionally dominant in Europe and liberal 
democracy which enables exemptions from generally applicable liberal norms 
to be granted to such religions without imperilling the overall liberal 
democratic nature of the public order. The implication appears to be that a 
condition of the privileged status granted by EU law religion in public life, is
113 See “Intervention of the Holy See at the ordinary session of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council on Religious Freedom, Address of H.E. Msgr. Silvano M. Tomasi, Geneva, 22 
March 2007”. Available at:
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/secretariat state/2007/documents/rc seg- 
st 20070322 religion en.html (accessed 1 May 2007).
Above Note 98, 22.
115 See Chapter VI.
116 Speech by Olli Rehn, Commission for Enlargement in the Open Debate on Enlargement, 
European Parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee, Brussels, 7 May 2007, Reference 
SPEECH/07/287, Date 07/05/2007.
Available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/287&format=HTML& 
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 30 July 2007).
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an acceptance by such religions of the legitimacy of humanist perspectives and 
of the non-hegemonic role of religion in the overall public order. European 
institutions appear to consider that through a combination of realpolitik, 
historical experience or even theological conviction, mainstream Christian 
denominations accept this peripheral status and can therefore be trusted to 
moderate the use they may make of such public privilege. On the other hand 
religions such as Islam which have not been subject to similar pressures and 
experiences would appear to be seen as less “trustworthy” in this regard, the 
suggestion being that its adherents may use such privileges in ways which 
might impact on the overall principle of balance between religious and 
humanist influences to a greater degree.
The characterisation of the public role of certain denominations at Member 
State level as a matter of national culture exacerbates this tendency by 
characterising the ideological preferences of culturally entrenched religions in 
respect of gender or sexuality as instances of culture and accommodating them 
in the marketplace on this basis while categorising similar ideological 
preferences of non-culturally entrenched faiths as ideological aims 
incompatible with the principle of balance and with liberal norms of equality. 
There are indications that existing model of European secularity under which 
the cultural roots of historically European faiths obscure the ideological 
elements of such faiths is coming under pressure in a more multicultural 
context. Klausen’s study of European Muslims involved in public life noted 
arguments that worries around the role of Islam in Europe were pushing many 
European states towards a more comprehensive secularism with a resultant 
reduction in the public role of culturally-entrenched faiths. She quotes a 
Muslim member of the Bundestag who suggests that:
“when the history o f how Muslims changed Europe will be written [sic], the 
conclusion will be that they promoted secularism and the separation o f church
117and state.”
117 J. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 2005) 179.
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There is indeed some evidence that such a process may be underway and may 
lead to a strengthening of the humanist and secular elements of the European 
public order. In the aftermath of the Mohammed cartoons controversy not 
only, as noted above, did the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe call for the abolition of blasphemy laws, EU law broadcasting 
legislation was amended so as to reduce significantly the restrictions it 
imposed on free speech in order to prevent criticism of or insults to religion. 
In the 1989 Broadcasting Directive778 the Union used its powers to regulate 
television advertising to restrict expression which would be “offensive” to 
religious beliefs. Article 12(c) of the Directive provided that “Television 
advertising shall not be offensive to religious (...) beliefs.”119 When a revised 
version of the Directive was under consideration in 2007 this prohibition was 
initially retained.120 Several secularist groups objected to the retention of 
Article 12(c) on the basis that there was no valid distinction to be drawn 
between religious and political beliefs and the article in question offered:
' far too strong a power o f suppression of legitimate communication to people
121who are liable to be ultrasensitive” 
and noting that:
“the idea o f protecting political beliefs is dangerous. Politics is a realm o f
robust debate and those putting forward political views must be open not just
122to criticism but to mockery etc. ”
The final version of the 2007 Directive, while retaining the prohibition on 
transmitting advertisements during the broadcast of religious ceremonies, 
deleted Article 12(c)’s prohibition of expression which is offensive to
118 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by Law, Regulation of Administrative Action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities. Official Journal L298, 17.10.1989.
119 Ibid.
120 Coordination of certain of the Member States' provisions on television broadcasting 
(amend, direct. 89/552/EEC, regl. 2006/2004/EC), ("Television without Frontiers") (COD 
2005/260).
121 Ibid.
122
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religious beliefs.123 While too much should not be read into a single piece of 
legislation, it is notable that in deleting article 12(c), European institutions 
implicitly changed the balance between liberal the principle of free speech and 
that legal enforcement of respect for religion in a secular direction. 
Furthermore, in doing so the Union also drew the line at the facilitation of 
religious identity rights at the point at which such rights could impact on 
political debate and therefore the autonomy of and equality of participants in, 
the public sphere. Such an approach further underlines the Union’s distinction 
between the cultural and the political in relation to its facilitation of religion.
3.2.2 Culture and Religions viewed as contrary to the Public Order 
The use of culture as a means through which religion can access privileges 
within in the Single Market has nevertheless created a hierarchy under which 
the practices of culturally-entrenched religions receive significantly greater 
protection within the market than those of “outsider” religions which have 
fewer cultural links to Member States. Furthermore, the rights granted to such 
“insider” religions are seen as part of the state and its public order and as more 
cultural and less ideological than outsider religions. Thus, their public 
privileges are not subject to the same degree of limitation on the grounds the 
need to protect the liberal democratic state as are those of outsider religions 
which are seen in more ideological terms.
Although religions such as Islam may have less access to public privileges 
than culturally entrenched religious denominations, they are, nevertheless 
recognised as by EU law as religions and are capable of accessing the 
significant privileges outlined above which are granted to religion in general 
by EU law in areas such as employment, broadcasting, ritual slaughter. While 
EU law does seem to attribute theocratic ambitions to such outsider religions 
to a greater degree than insider religions such as the Catholic Church, Islam is 
not in general seen as something which is intrinsically threatening to Europe’s
123 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007
amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities, OJ L 332/27 (18.12.2007).
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public order. On the other hand, despite the Union’s commitment to the 
protection of religious freedom and the recognition of respect for religion in 
general as a part of the public order,124 newer religions which lack institutional 
links to the state or a long history in Europe have been characterised as 
actively hostile to the public order and have received scant protection of either 
the public or private elements of their religious freedom in many EU Member 
States. Such religions have been excluded not merely from the marketplace 
benefits accorded to dominant, culturally-entrenched religions but from 
recognition as religions at all.125 The Church of Scientology in particular has 
been the target of significant restriction of religious freedom. The German
19 f%government denies that Scientology is even a religion and has been accused 
of “harassing and intimidating members o f the Church o f Scientology merely 
because o f their belonging to an organisation (...) not because of any actions 
[Scientologists] have taken” by the US State Department.127 Allegations that 
Scientologists who are civil servants have been disciplined by the Bavarian 
Government were also noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance in 1994.128 The authorities in other Member States have also 
manifested a strong degree of hostility towards newer religions.129 Such
125 “The New Europe: Sects, Orthodoxy and Discrimination by the State”, paper presented by 
the Rutherford Institute to the OSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Constitutional and 
Administrative aspects on the Freedom of Religion, Warsaw 16-19 April 1996 at 4. Quoted in 
Peter Cumper “The Rights of Religious Minorities: The Legal Regulation of New Religious 
Movements” in P Cumper and S Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the New Europe, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague London, Boston, 1999 at 171.
126 See: The Scientology Organisation, paper submitted by the German delegation at the 
OSCE Seminar on Religious Freedom, Warsaw, 16-19 April, 1996 at 6 where the German 
Government states: “goals are clearly oriented to economic activity and its claim to be such a 
denomination or community is simply a pretext.” .. .’’it is straightforward profit [rather than 
religion or faith] that lies at the heart of scientology”.
127 Peter Cumper “The Rights of Religious Minorities: The Legal Regulation of New 
Religious Movements” in P Cumper and S Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the New Europe, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague London, Boston, 1999) 171.
128 See the report of Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to the UN  
Commission on Human Rights, 22 December 1994, E/CN.4/1995/91.
129 See: Les sectes en France. Rapport fa it au nom de la commission d'enquete sur les sectes 
(Paris: Les Documents d'information de l'Assemblee Nationale, 1996). For criticism by 
scholars and by the mainline churches see Massimo Introvigne and J. Gordon Melton (eds.), 
Pour enfinir avec les sectes. Le debat sur le rapport de la commission parlementaire, 3rd ed. 
(Paris: Dervy, 1996) and Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Enquete parlementaire 
visant a elaborer une politique en vue de lutter contre les pratiques illegales des sectes et le 
danger qu 'elles representent pour la societe et pour les personnes, particulierement les 
mineurs d'age, 2 vols. (Brussels: Chambre des Representants de Belgique, 1997)
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religions are, as Ferrari notes, generally opposed on the basis that they tend to 
isolate their adherents from society, or as he himself states, because they 
represent “centrifugal forces which estrange individuals from the circuits o f 
democratic citizenship”.130 In other words, the failure of adherents of such 
religions to accept the peripherality of religion in terms of the public life of the 
state and their individual public duties as citizens, renders the religion a threat 
to the principle of balance between religion and humanism and therefore a 
threat to the public order. Indeed criticisms of Scientology by the German 
authorities explicitly make this point arguing that it “engenders a marked 
friend-foe mindset in its members” which can cause a weakening of links to 
family and society.131 These concerns that the individual’s role and 
responsibilities as citizen may be overwhelmed by their religious beliefs have 
it must be conceded also been seen in the approach of several Member States 
to Muslim migrants who have been required, through residence and 
citizenship exams, to indicate their acceptance of secular, liberal values as a
1 ^9precondition of citizenship or residence rights. Nevertheless, no Member 
State has considered subjecting Islam, which despite its status as a minority 
religion has a long cultural history in Europe, to the kind of restrictions faced 
by newer religions such as Scientology. Despite the Union’s commitment to 
upholding religious freedom, EU institutions have failed to intervene or to 
criticise Member State actions in this area.133 This contrasts strongly with the 
strongly worded warnings to respect European human rights norms in other 
areas. The Polish Government for instance was warned by the Commission 
that it would have to uphold gay rights or risk losing voting rights in the 
Council of Ministers following the election victory of conservative parties in 
2005.134
130 A. Ferrari, “Religions, secularity and democracy in Europe: for a new Kelsenian pact” Jean 
Monnet Papers Series, NYU School of Law, 2005.
131 The Scientology Organisation, paper submitted by the German delegation at the OSCE 
Seminar on Religious Freedom, Warsaw, 16-19 April, 1996 quoted in Cumper, note 117 
above.
132 See Chapter VI.
133 See J. T. Richardson and M. Introvigne “’’Brainwashing Theories in European 
Parliamentary and Administrative Reports on “Cults” and “Sects”” Journal fo r  the Scientific 
Study of Religion 40 (2): 143-168.
134 See “EU Warns Poland on Gays”, 26 October 2005, available at: 
http://www.365gav.com/newscon05/10/102605poland.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).
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The caselaw of the Court of Justice also indicates that Member States appear 
to have a relatively free hand to restrict the religious liberty of newer, non­
mainstream religions in the context of the Single Market. In contrast to courts 
in other jurisdictions,135 the Court has never attempted to define religion and 
has appeared willing to ignore the issues of religious freedom raised by the 
treatment of new religions such as Scientology. In early 1996 the Association 
Eglise de scientologie de Paris and the Scientology International Reserves 
Trust asked the French authorities to repeal a French law which enabled the 
authorities to require that prior authorisation be given to all international
financial transactions deemed by the government to represent a “threat to
1 ^ 6public policy [and] security”. The French government refused to do so and 
the proceedings taken by the two Scientologist organisations were referred to 
the Court of Justice for preliminary ruling.137 The applicants alleged that the 
law in question represented an impermissible interference with the free 
movement of capital. The relevant Treaty provisions permitted Member States 
to maintain such restrictions as were justified on grounds of “public policy or 
public security”.138 The Court noted that:
“while Member States are still, in principle, free to determine the 
requirements o f public policy and public security in the light o f their national 
needs, those grounds must, in the Community context and, in particular, as 
derogations from the fundamental principle o f free movement o f capital, be 
interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by
139each Member State without any control by the Community institutions.” 
and that:
135 See for instance the decisions of the US Supreme Court in US v Seegar 380 US 163. 180-1 
(1965), Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 203, 215-216 (1972) and Thomas v Review Board of the 
Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 US 707, 714 (1981). See also the decision of the 
Australian High Court in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner fo r Pay-Roll Tax (Vic), 
154 CLR 120, 173 (1983).
136 Article 5 -l(I)(l) of Law No. 66-1008 introduced by Law No 96-109 of 14 February 1996 
on financial relations with foreign countries in regard to foreign investments in France.
137 Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de scientologie de Paris and Scientology International 
Reserves Trust v The Prime Minister ECR [2000] 1-01335.
138 Ibid. para. 16 (the relevant Treaty article is 73d(l)(b).
139 Ibid. para. 17.
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“Public security may be relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently 
serious threat to a fundamental interest o f society “,140
Such measures were furthermore, subject to a proportionality test with the 
Member State being required to show that its restrictions were:
“necessary for the protection o f the interests which they are intended to 
guarantee and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less 
restrictive measures. ”141
Given that the impugned measures were intended to restrict the ability of the 
Church of Scientology to function in France, one might have anticipated the 
issue of religious freedom to have played a prominent role in this case as for 
instance, potential restrictions on freedom of expression were considered in 
the Court’s judgment in the ERT case.142 At the very least one would have 
expected, given the fundamental nature of the right to religious freedom, that 
the proportionality argument would have played an important role and that the 
French authorities would be asked to justify their failure to take less draconian 
measures in their attempts to prevent the transfer of funds to the French 
Scientology organisation. The Court did strike down the relevant French 
legislation. However it did so on the basis that:
“the essence of the system in question is that prior authorisation is required 
for every direct foreign investment which is such as to represent a threat to 
public policy and public security, without any more detailed information. (...) 
Such lack o f precision does not enable individuals to be apprised o f the extent 
of their rights and obligations deriving from Article 73b o f the Treaty. That 
being so, the system established is contrary to the principle o f legal 
certainty. ”143
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. para. 18.
142 See Chapter IV section 3.
143 Above n. 127, para.s 21 and 22.
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No mention of the religious aspect of the case appears anywhere in the 
judgment. Given that, as noted above, the aim of the actions of the Member 
State authorities were intended to restrict the capacity of a religious 
organisation to operate in the state in question, the absence of any mention of 
the issue of religious freedom is remarkable. This lack of concern for the 
institutional rights of minority religions contrasts strongly with the strong 
protection afforded to the institutional interests of the more established, 
Member-State-favoured churches by Single Market law, most notably under 
the Framework directive. Indeed, in the Eglise Scientologie case it appears 
that the Court of Justice simply did not consider that issues of religious 
freedom were raised by attempts to impede the functioning of the Church of 
Scientology. This is despite the fact that, under its ruling in the ERT case,144 
measures such as those in this case, which are adopted by Member States in 
derogation from their duty to respect the four freedoms under EU law, are 
subject to compliance with EU fundamental rights norms. The relevant 
fundamental rights clearly include the right to freedom of religion145 yet the 
Court failed even to mention religious freedom as a pertinent issue.146
It is true that the Court of Justice has, on occasion, preferred to side step 
sensitive topics in its judgments and has, perhaps deliberately, in cases such as 
Grogan147 which dealt with Irish anti-abortion legislation, tended to base its 
decisions on less controversial areas of the law. Nevertheless, even in Grogan, 
the Court did acknowledge the wider controversy, albeit only to state that
1 4 Rarguments about the moral nature of abortion were irrelevant. In Eglise 
Scientologie, the Court failed to make any such acknowledgement despite the 
clear status of freedom of religion as a part of EU law. If one considers a 
scenario under which the Court was required to assess Member State
144 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR1-2925.
145 Freedom of religion is recognised in specific articles by both the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Article 10) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 9).
146 The ECJ recognised as much in the case of Prais v Council in 1975 (see Chapter IV). 
Furthermore freedom of religion is protected by Article 9 of the ECHR whose role in the 
determination of the content of the EU’s fundamental rights norms was recognised in Rutili v 
Ministre de Vlnterieur Case 36/75 [1975] ECR 1219.
147 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v Stephen 
Grogan and Others [1991] ECR 1 04685
148 Ibid. para. 20.
217
legislation which imposed similar financial penalties on the Catholic Church 
on the basis that the Member State in question felt that it represented a threat 
to public policy, it is difficult to imagine the case being decided without some 
mention of the principle of religious freedom or some attempt to seek 
justification from the member state in question for its characterisation of the 
church in those terms.149
The Union’s linking of issues of culture and religion would appear therefore to 
have influenced not only its view of the appropriateness of the role of certain 
denominations in the public sphere but has also conditioned its view of what 
can be considered to be religion with knock-on consequences for the 
protection provided by EU law to both the public and private elements of 
religious freedom in the Single Market. It is true that in the context of 
employment discrimination individual adherents to newer religions may be 
able to access some protection from direct discrimination under the provisions 
of the Framework Directive.150 Nevertheless, while religion may be seen as 
part of the public order and even allowed a certain degree of societal, legal and 
political influence on this basis, religions such as Scientology which are 
identified as contrary to this public order receive scant protection of their 
communal or institutional rights. The Union’s categorisation of religion as a 
cultural matter, and its failure to recognize newer religions as religions at all, 
avoids the necessity of addressing awkward questions posed by its partial and 
compromised secularity. By recognising religion as a matter of culture and 
identity the Union allows certain religions to play a privileged role in the 
within the public order and facilitates the maintenance of culturally and 
religiously specific element to the identity of the state. However, religion 
cannot be seen in purely cultural terms. Religion is also ideological and, as the 
Union has emphasised in other areas, it can also pose a threat to liberal 
democracy and fundamental rights on this basis. While it may be happy to 
recognise a religious tradition discouraging work on Sundays as a “regional
149 In Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (note 1 above), the Court similarly ignored the 
element of religious freedom in coming to its decision that the applicant’s work in a religious 
commune for which he received food and accommodation was “employment” for the 
purposes of Community law.
150 See section 2.2 above.
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socio-cultural characteristic”, the EU would surely hesitate to defer on a 
similar basis to a legislative recognition of religious traditions discouraging 
women from working in the labour market or from venturing outside 
unaccompanied.
The European Union has declared equal treatment to be one of its fundamental 
principles. On the face of it, the granting of much broader rights to certain 
selected faiths would appear to contravene this principle. On the other hand, 
the rights which some religions may seek may place greater pressure on 
humanist elements of the European public order, most notably values such as 
individual autonomy and non-discrimination on grounds of gender or 
sexuality, than those sought by other religions. Categorisation of religion as a 
cultural matter and failure to recognise in all circumstances newer religions as 
religions for the purposes of European guarantees of freedom of religion, 
allows the Union to avoid the politically unpalatable options of stating 
explicitly its view that certain religions are more compatible with the 
European public order than others or of recognizing that its view of the 
appropriate public role of religion is historically, culturally and politically 
specific. While the Union may be motivated by a desire to enable Member 
States to promote and preserve their cultural identities, the results of this 
policy of accommodation cannot but influence the nature of the Union’s own 
public order and undermine claims it may make to be religiously neutral.
4. Conclusion
The regulation of religion within the Single Market is influenced by the wider 
dialectic within EU law between the recognition and facilitation of individual 
and collective religious identity and the desire to maintain certain limits on 
religion’s public role required by the principle of balance between religious, 
cultural and humanist influences which the Union sees as key to its liberal 
democratic public order. Single Market law approaches the regulation of 
religion in two different ways, treating it both as an economic choice which 
can be facilitated by the market and as a phenomenon whose importance to 
individual and collective identity entitles it to protection from the market. 
Legislation prohibiting discrimination against individuals on religious grounds
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in employment, or protecting ritual slaughter methods in food production, 
protects individual religious identity in areas beyond the purely private 
contexts in which the European Convention on Human Rights requires that it 
be protected. The Union has also recognised collective religious identity and 
has, in some contexts accorded it a degree of priority over individual identities 
by curtailing the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination to 
religious bodies. However, although the Union does recognise the promotion 
of a particular public status for religion as an element of its own public order 
and is willing to accommodate religious perspectives in its regulation of the 
market, the public role allowed to religion under Single Market law is, in 
accordance with the religion limiting elements of the balance to which to 
Union is committed in relation to religion, limited by the need to respect the 
overarching structures of the market and to respect the humanist and cultural 
influences which are also part of the EU’s public order.
Religion also achieves recognition within the Single Market through the 
confluence of the recognition accorded to its role in national culture and the 
Union’s commitment to deferring to national cultural autonomy. This 
deference towards national cultural autonomy extends to the facilitation of 
significant aspects of the public role of individual religions within the public 
life and public orders of the Member States. In line with the leeway given to 
states by the European Court of Human Rights,151 EU law has recognised the 
right of the state to define national collective identity and to promote this 
identity, which can include the promotion of particular forms of religion, 
through law. This involves the recognition by EU law, and the accommodation 
within the regulation of the Single Market, of religion as sets of practices and 
as a way of life and the facilitation of particular institutional arrangements 
between certain denominations and Member States which enable religions to 
play important public roles in areas such as health and education. Such 
recognition can significantly undermine the potential of the prohibitions on 
discrimination on grounds of religion recognised elsewhere in EU law to 
destabilise established religious privileges.
151 See Chapter IV.
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Nevertheless, in accordance with the overall approach of EU law to the 
accommodation of religion in public life, this cultural role is also subject to 
limitations. Restrictions on grounds of the need to respect the structures of the 
market are somewhat limited as EU law specifically recognises that cultural 
matters should not be subordinate to market forces. Nevertheless, the broader 
approach of EU law of seeking to impose limits on the public role of religion 
in order to safeguard the principle of balance, does limit the privileges which 
religion can assert in this way. Limitation on this ground is however, less 
stringent than that which applies in the case of the rights provided to religion 
which are not linked to respect for national cultural autonomy. First, there is a 
degree of circularity as institutional privileges granted by Member States to 
certain denominations are reflective of the important role played by such 
denominations in the very public orders which could act as a source of 
limitation on these privileges. Second, the religion-limiting elements of the 
EU’s dialectical approach to the issue of religious privilege are at least partly 
based on the notion of religion as a potential ideological threat to the humanist 
elements of the Union’s public order, including key liberal values such as 
equal treatment, personal autonomy and the autonomy of the public sphere 
from religious domination. As culture is seen as in someway non-political and 
non-ideological, the recognition of the public role of “insider” faiths as a 
cultural matter obscures the ideological element of the exercise of public 
influence by such denominations, thus limiting the scope for restricting the 
role of culturally-entrenched religions on the basis of the need restrict 
religious influence within the political arena. Indeed, EU institutions have in 
general seemed to assume a compatibility between culturally entrenched 
religions such as Roman Catholicism and the humanist elements of the 
Union’s public order, even when the privileges they seek to assert are 
inconsistent with such humanist values (as in the case of the desire to 
discriminate against employees whose behaviour is inconsistent with the ethos 
of their organisations or in relation to the criminalisation of blasphemy). On 
the other hand, they have been quicker to recognise the ideological elements 
of outsider religions such as Islam and the threat which these elements can 
pose to such values. Even more notably, new religions such as Scientology
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which have few cultural roots and which are seen as actively contrary to the 
liberal democratic public order have, in some circumstances, not even been 
recognised as religions and have received scant protection of their rights in the 
marketplace. Thus, EU Single Market law can be seen as establishing a 
hierarchy of privilege within the market which grants culturally entrenched 
Christian religions at the top and newer religions such as Scientology firmly at 
the bottom.
Therefore, the overall picture is one in which the right to individual religious 
identity and the sometimes competing right to collective religious identity are 
protected by EU law. The balance between these two sets of rights takes place 
within the context of the Union’s commitment to the notion of balance 
between religious, cultural and humanist influences and of the recognition of 
the right of states to promote particular forms of religion as an element of their 
national cultures. Therefore, although individual religious identity is protected 
on a denomination neutral basis by Single Market law, this protection must 
adapt itself to predominant market structures and humanist influenced political 
and constitutional norms. The protection of collective religious identity in the 
form of religious notions of morality, communal religious practices and 
institutional religious structures are also accorded protection the Single 
Market, but largely on the basis of respect for the established religious 
structures in the marketplace and national cultural autonomy. Thus, it is 
largely those values, institutions and practices which are compatible with pre­
existing practices, values and institutional structures recognised by the 
Member States, many of which retain close identifications with and promote 
important public roles for certain Christian denominations, that will be 
recognised. While it is therefore arguable that the Single Market could be seen 
as a “Christian Market”, such an approach would go too far. It is certainly true 
that Christian denominations exercise significant religious privilege within 
Single Market law and that other religions are accorded much lower levels of 
privilege. However, many of these collective rights (such as exemptions from 
anti-discrimination legislation), are characterised by EU law, in so far as they 
clash with the right to individual identity, as anachronistic and anomalous 
exceptions to established humanist elements of the Union’s public order such
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as individual autonomy and equal treatment. Furthermore, although there is a 
reluctance on the part of EU institutions to recognise the ideological nature of 
the influence over law wielded by culturally entrenched Christian 
denominations, the continued exercise of privilege by such denominations 
within the Single Market can be seen as contingent. Acceptance of the notion 
of balance and the limitation of religious influence and truth claims in the 
political arena which such balance involves, has been attributed to such insider 
denominations by EU law and they must therefore avoid seeking a degree of 
privilege which would be inconsistent with these principles. Indeed, these 
privileges may, as the changes made in relation to religiously offensive speech 
in the 2007 Broadcasting Directive indicate, be vulnerable to rising fears in 
relation to the role of religion in public life and perceived threats to humanist 
elements of Europe’s public order which may result in more vigilant policing 
of the limitations on religious influence over the political sphere and a 
consequent restriction of the cultural influence of insider religions over law.
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1. Introduction
Previous chapters have shown the significant facilitation of both religious 
identities and religious influence over law that is provided by the public order 
of the EU. However they have also indicated that such facilitation is limited by 
the humanist elements of that public order. In particular the accommodation of 
the promotion of collective religious morality, by virtue of the status of such 
morality as a part of national cultural identity, has been limited by the need 
respect the autonomy of the public sphere from religious domination and the 
principle of individual private autonomy. This chapter shows how, in its
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dealings with outsiders, the Union has both identified the principles of respect 
for public and private autonomy as fundamental elements of its public order, 
thereby highlighting the distinction between its acceptance of religious 
influence over law as a matter of culture, and its desire to restrict religious 
attempts to influence the political and legal arenas. It does so by analysing the 
Union’s approach to the issues of Enlargement and the integration of 
immigrants.
The chapter demonstrates how the Union has regarded attempts to legislate for 
religious morality to an extent which is overly intrusive in relation to personal 
private autonomy, as incompatible with a desire to join the EU. The Union has 
identified a desire to subordinate the political sphere to religious influence or 
to legislate on explicitly religious grounds as similarly inconsistent with EU 
membership. Therefore, provided the principle of individual autonomy is 
respected, religious influence over law and promotion of religious morality by 
religious means as an element of cultural identity, are permitted by EU law. 
On the other hand, religion’s ability to achieve the same ends in its capacity as 
a political or ideological movement, is considerably more restricted. Such a 
restriction on religion’s political role impacts more heavily on outsider 
religions whose demands cannot as readily be characterised as elements of 
national culture.
This is seen particularly strongly in relation to the Union’s dealings with 
Turkey and the influence of Islam whose influence, the chapter shows, has not 
been seen as part of European culture or as compatible with the Union’s public 
order to the same degree as mainstream Christian denominations such as 
Roman Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity. The Union’s hostility to 
religious attempts to influence law in ways which cannot be characterised as 
promotion of national culture is also seen in relation to the issue of the 
integration of immigrants. The chapter demonstrates how EU law has 
facilitated measures requiring migrants to indicate their acceptance of 
principles such as gender-equality and individual autonomy in private matters 
even when such principles, which are rejected by many mainstream European 
faiths, contradict their religious beliefs. The Union has therefore sanctioned
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far-reaching state interference in the private sphere of beliefs and opinions in 
order to protect the general principle of the autonomy of the individual in the 
private sphere.
These measures indicate that the Union regards limitations on the influence of 
religion over law and politics as fundamental elements of its public order. 
Limitations in relation to the protection of individual autonomy are applied to 
all religions. Within the political arena, the Union’s hostility to theocracy 
similarly restricts recourse to religious arguments of all faiths. However, by 
requiring outsider religions to foreswear any desire to achieve through 
political means the degree of influence over law which the Union’s deference 
to Member State identity rights enables insider religions to retain on grounds 
of cultural autonomy, the approach of EU law raises significant issues of 
discrimination and implicitly identifies particular religious traditions, most 
notably Islam, as especially threatening to its public order.
2. Enlargement and Religion in the Public Sphere
As has been shown in Chapter II, since the Reformation and Enlightenment, 
relations between religious institutions and those of the state have been 
characterised in Europe by a gradual decline in religious power and the 
establishment a legal order in which humanist notions such as individual 
autonomy and the authority of secular political institutions achieved major 
influence.1 Although the balance between religious, humanist and cultural 
influences which the EU sees as having emerged from European history 
enables religious institutions continue to play a role in law-making, including 
at EU level, religious bodies have much lower political impact than in other 
areas of the world. The limited nature of religious influence over legal norms 
in Europe is shown by the fact that, even in relation to the law governing what 
Casanova terms “lifeworld!” issues (namely those relating to the beginning and 
end of life, family and sexuality) which are the highest political priority for 
mainstream European religious2 and which embodied the largely conservative 
approach of the Abrahamic religions to a significant degree as recently as 60
1 See Chapter II.
2 Ibid.
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years ago, liberal norms of personal autonomy, privacy and equality have 
become increasingly dominant. This approach embodies the arguably Western 
notion of religion as a largely private matter with limited influence over law 
and political life and contrasts markedly with the situation in much of the rest 
of the world,3 most notably the Islamic world4 where religious principles 
continue to exercise a much greater influence over certain areas of law.5
2.1 Enlargement, Conditionality and Human Rights
Even prior to 1989, it was clear that the criteria for inclusion in the European 
Community amounted to more than adoption of a market economy. As far 
back as the 1960s, the Community was stressing the importance of respect for 
democratic principles and human rights in assessing Greece’s application for 
membership.6 From the 1970s onwards Human Rights achieved an increasing 
prominence in the Community.7 Following the collapse of Communism, the 
speed with which newly liberated countries sought membership of the Union, 
meant that European institutions were required to make explicit the criteria 
which would be used to determine who could and could not become a member 
of the Community. The resulting “Copenhagen Criteria” were outlined in that 
city at the European Council of June 1993.
3 P. Berger and G. Weigel (eds.) The Decsecularization of the Modern World: Resurgent 
Religion and Modem Politics (Grand Rapids Michigan, Erdemans Publishing Company and 
Public Policy Center, 1999). See also P. Norris and R. Inglehart Sacred and Secular: Religion 
and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
4 Ibid. Norris and Inglehart. See also B. Lewis The Crisis o f Islam: Holy War and Unholy 
Terror (London, Phoenix, 2003) 14-17.
5 Private consensual sexual behaviour continues to be regulated by the criminal law to a 
significant extent in many largely Muslim societies. For instance, homosexuality remains a 
crime in the largely Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Somalia, the United 
Arab Emirates and Yemen see http://www.gavlawnet.com/ (last visited 14 December 2006).In 
relation to the greater level of religiosity found in societies outside Europe see P. Norris and 
R. Inglehart Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, n.4 above.
6 For an account of how democracy and human rights moved from implicit to explicit 
conditions of EU membership see H. Sjursen ‘Enlargement in Perspective: The EU’s Quest 
for Identity’. Paper given as part of the European Institute Research Seminar series, at the 
London School of Economics 24 May 2006
7 See the 1977 Tripartite Declaration on Human Rights of the Parliament, Council and 
Commission (OJ C 103, 27. 4. 1977, 5 April 1977). This process continued into the 1990s 
with direct reference being made to the European Convention on Human Rights in the 
Amsterdam Treaty and with the adoption of a Bill of Rights for the EU in the Nice Treaty. See 
also the series of rulings the ECJ in cases such as Stauder v City of Ulm-Sozialamt, [1969] 
ECR 419 through to ERT Case [1991] ECRI 2925.
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The criteria specified that:
“Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule o f law, human rights and 
respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence o f a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
o
forces within the Union.”
The act of setting out such explicitly political criteria represented a recognition 
by Member States that a state which was economically eminently suitable for 
membership would not be permitted to join the Community unless it showed a 
commitment to certain ideals (democracy, protection of human rights etc.) 
adherence to which was deemed necessary for the proper functioning of the 
European polity. These criteria have played a prominent role, not only in the 
enlargement process but also in the Union’s view of itself. The Maastricht 
Treaty gave this process constitutional status stating in Article 6 that the Union 
was “founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” and pledging in the same 
article to respect the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Copenhagen Criteria themselves have, according to both academic 
commentators and the Commission itself, also been turned into principles of 
European constitutional law.9 The European Commission is charged with 
assessing whether candidate countries meet these conditions. It makes a 
recommendation to the Member States who must unanimously decide to open 
negotiations.10 Formal accession negotiations have never been opened by the
8 See European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1. Available at
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921 .pdf (last visited 20 June 2008).
9 See the Commission Regular Report of 2002 COM(2002)700 which states ‘since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999, these [political] requirements have been 
enshrined as constitutional principles in the Treaty on European Union.’ See also C. Hillion 
The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny’ in C. Hillion (ed.) European Enlargement: A 
Legal Approach (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004), where it is argued that ‘The novelty of the 
Copenhagen criteria also lies in the way the obligations they embody have been enforced: 
their gradual ‘constitutionalisation’ has resulted in them being applied more strictly’ (3) and 
that “ One may suggest that the political conditionality has been implicit in the Community 
legal order from the very outset, and made progressively more explicit’ (4).
10 Article 49 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, OJ C321 E/35, 29.12.2006. See “How Does a
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Union with a state that has not been judged by the Commission to be in 
compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria.
The criteria themselves do not, on their face, appear to mandate any particular 
approach to management of the relationship between religion, law and politics. 
However, at certain moments in the accession process, the EU has indicated 
that adherence to the criteria and the liberal democratic values underlying 
them require limitations on the role played by religion and religious norms in 
lawmaking.
2.2 Romania and Homosexuality
In 1996 the Romanian legislature amended Article 200 of the Penal Code to 
criminalise private homosexual acts and outlawed membership of gay and 
lesbian organisations. This law was strongly supported by the Romanian 
Orthodox Church with a former foreign minister identifying ecclesiastical 
opposition as a key factor behind the retention of the law.11 The Romanian 
government attempted to repeal article 200 in 1998 but this was rejected by 
parliament after a vociferous campaign by the Orthodox Church. Church 
officials referred to gays and lesbians as “the ultimate enemy” and “Satan’s 
army” and accused legislators of being “scared by the huge European 
pressures”.12 Again in September 2000 the Orthodox Church intervened 
forcefully appealing to legislators not to amend Article 200. Acknowledging 
the European dimension to the controversy Archbishop Nifon stated that he 
did not “believe that European Union integration hinges on the
i q
[homosexuality] issue”.
Country Join the EU” European Commission, DG Enlargement, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/questions and answers/background en.htm last accessed 12 
September 2007).
11 See ‘It’s Still No Breeze for Gays, Even Diplomatic Ones’ in The New York Times, 17 
October 2001. Note in particular the comments of former Foreign Minister Mircea Geoana 
attributing key importance to the Orthodox Church in the debate over decriminalisation.
12 See Florian Buhuceanu ‘ACCEPT Country Report on the Status of LGBT’ at 
http://www.globalgavz.com/romania-news.html (last visited 14 June 2006).
13 See ‘Romanian Orthodox Church Denounces Homosexuality’ Reuters News Agency 13 
September 2000 at www.ilga.org (last visited 14 June 2006).
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At the time of the announcement of the Copenhagen Criteria in June 1993, the 
European Union had no competence in relation to sexual orientation 
discrimination.14 Neither had criminalisation of homosexuality been raised as 
an issue in any previous enlargement.15 However, notwithstanding this lack of 
internal competence or consensus amongst member states,16 the Union 
embraced the repeal of laws criminalising homosexual activity as part of the 
accession process. Importantly however, it did so on the grounds that such 
laws constituted an interference with the human rights of gays and lesbians. In 
its 1998 report on Romania’s progress towards accession, the Commission 
noted that a proposal to reform the penal code which included a proposal to
17decriminalise homosexuality had been rejected by the Romanian parliament 
and that there were “reports o f inhuman and degrading treatment by the 
police, especially o f Roma, children, homosexuals and prisoners” by the 
police. These references were made in the section of the report dedicated to 
“Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities” and not in the section which 
covered “Democracy and the Rule o f Law” indicating that the Commission 
saw the matter as a question of interference with the fundamental rights of a 
minority rather than a structural question relating to the role of religious norms 
in legislation.
The European Parliament was also particularly active on this issue. In 
September 1998 it adopted a resolution calling on Romania and Cyprus to 
abolish their anti-homosexual legislation. The resolution “deplored the refusal 
o f the Romanian Chamber o f Deputies to adopt a reform bill presented by the 
Government to repeal all anti-homosexual legislation provided by Article 200
14 The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 did widen the scope or the Union’s ability to legislate 
against discrimination to include discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation but such 
legislation required unanimity in the Council and was not enacted until late in the year 2000 
(Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303)).
15 Homosexual acts were illegal in Scotland and Northern Ireland at the time of the accession 
of the United Kingdom in 1973. A similar prohibition was part of the law of the Republic of 
Ireland until July 1993.
16 Ibid.
17 See Section 1.2 of Regular Report from the Commission on Romania’s Progress towards 
Accession at
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kev documents/1998/romania en.pdf (last 
visited 24 October 2006).
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of the penal code.”n  It also specifically linked the issue of decriminalisation to 
the question of accession expressing the Parliament’s refusal to “give its 
consent to the accession of any country that, through it legislation o f policies,
violates the human rights o f lesbians and gay men”.19 The Parliament repeated
20these sentiments in subsequent resolutions in March 2000 and July 2001. In 
the summer of 2001 the Parliament’s Intergroup for Lesbian and Gay Rights 
held a hearing on the situation of lesbians and gays in the accession states. 
These activities contributed to an increase in pressure on the Commission to 
take a more proactive stand in relation to the issue of homosexuality and 
enlargement.21 Like the Commission, the Parliament’s resolutions were 
phrased solely in terms of the implications of criminalisation for the human 
rights of gays and lesbians and did not address the controversy’s religious 
aspects.
In remarks to the European Parliament in September 2001, the Commissioner 
responsible for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, stated that he wished to make 
it clear that the Commission would continue to press for human rights and 
non-discrimination in enlargement negotiations, including on grounds of 
sexual orientation.22 The Commissioner’s representative to the Intergroup on 
Gary and Lesbian Rights further stressed that there would be “no flexibility” 
on this issue on the part of the Commission. Commissioner Verheugen was 
even more explicit in a letter sent to the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association in which he stated the applicant states would be expected to 
accept the elimination of discrimination based upon sexual orientation and that 
“Equal treatment o f gays and lesbians is a basic principle o f the European 
Union”.23 In December 2001 faced with the determined opposition of the 
Orthodox Church and conscious of its failure to push decriminalisation
18 Res. B4- 0824 en 0852/98 adopted 17 September 1998. See in particular para. F.
19 Ibid. para. J.
20 Res. A5- 0223/2001, adopted 5 July 2001, para.s 80 and 83 and Res. A5- 0050/2000 
adopted 16 March 2000, para.s 59 and 60.
21 See J. Sweibel ‘Gay and Lesbian Rights and EU Enlargement’ at 
http://www.eumap.org/iournal/features/2002/april02/gavlesbeu (last visited 14 June 2006).
22 Quoted in Sweibel ibid.
23 See International News Report ‘Anti-Gay Nations May Not Join European Union’ R. 
Wockner, 31 July 2001 at http://gavtodav.badpuppv.com/garchive/world/073101wo.htm (last 
visited 14 June 2006).
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through the parliament on the previous occasion, the Romanian government 
resorted to an emergency ordinance to amend Article 200 and finally 
decriminalised homosexuality.24
European institutions had therefore succeeded in forcing the Romanian 
authorities to remove from their statute book a legal measure which enshrined 
in the criminal law religiously-influenced norms against homosexuality. They 
had done so in the face of a vociferous and popular campaign by religious 
leaders of Romania’s state church in favour of retaining the law. However, 
despite this, the Union saw the issue not as a primarily religious one but as a 
question of human and minority rights. It was to take a somewhat different 
approach in its dealings with Turkey.
2.3 Turkey and Adultery
2.3.1 Background: Turkey and EU Membership
The issue of Turkish accession is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
entire enlargement process. Although its first attempt to join what was then the 
EEC predate the collapse of Communism in Europe by almost thirty years,25 
Turkey has seen the traditionally Christian countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe all overtake it in the race to join the movement. The prospect of 
Turkish accession has proved far more unpopular with European electorates 
than any previous enlargement and has triggered the opposition of many 
prominent figures in European politics such as Valery Giscard d’Estaing, 
Jacques Delors and Angela Merkel. Much of this opposition has centred on
24 Government Emergency Ordinance no. 89/2001. The Romanian also introduced an 
ordinance to enact a law prohibiting discrimination (including discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation) (Government Ordinance no. 137/2000). For details see http://www.accept- 
romania.ro/news.htm entry of 1 February 2002 (last visited 14 June 2006).
25 Turkey made its first application to join the EEC in 1959 and concluded an association 
agreement with the Community in 1963. It applied for membership again in 1987. It was not 
recognised as a candidate from membership until 1999. Membership negotiations are still 
ongoing. See “Turkey and EU” from the website of the Turkish Embassy in Washington DC 
available at:
http://www.turkishembassv.org/index.php7option-com content&task=view&id-57&Itemid= 
235#ankara (accessed 17 January 2007). Although the membership applications of the 
formerly communist states of Eastern and Central Europe all post dated Turkey’s 1987 
application some 10 such states had become Member States by January 2007.
2 See for instance the opposition of Valery Giscard d’Estaing stated in an interview with Le 
Monde newspaper “Pour ou contre l’adhesion de la Turquie a l’union europeenne” Le Monde, 
9 November 2002. Available at http://www.medea.be/index.html?page=&lang=&doc=1298
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the idea of the cultural incompatibility of Turkey as a large state with an 
overwhelmingly Muslim population.
While Turkey is officially a secular republic, religion plays a far larger role in 
its political life than in most EU member states.27 Furthermore, the state is 
heavily involved in managing religious affairs and while this state of affairs is 
not unusual in Europe, the Turkish state does impose certain restrictions on the 
practice of religions other than Sunni Islam which have been highlighted by 
groups opposed to its admission to the EU 28 Others have rejected the notion 
of Turkish membership outright on the grounds that Europe’s identity and 
foundations are Christian and that a mainly Muslim country is therefore, by its 
nature an inappropriate candidate for membership of the EU.29 Nevertheless, 
since the rejection of its membership bid of April 1987 on human rights and 
economic grounds, Turkey has made strenuous efforts to bring its human 
rights standards up to the levels required by the EU. Restrictions on the use of 
the Kurdish language have been removed, the death penalty has been 
abolished as part of wide ranging legal and administrative reforms. This has 
allowed Turkey to make significant progress along the road to membership. A 
customs union with the EU was agreed in 1995 and in 1999 the Tampere 
European Council declared that Turkey was a candidate for membership. The 
Copenhagen European Council in late 2002 declared that negotiations with 
Turkey could begin if the December 2004 European Council decided (on the
(accessed 6 October 2006). Sjursen has noted how member states described the accession of 
the historically Christian states of Eastern and Central Europe as a process of “rejoining” a 
from which they had been artificially separated Europe while Turkish accession is seen as 
“joining” a Europe of which it had not previously been part.
27 See A. CDarkogDlu and B. Rubin (eds.) Religion and Politics in Turkey, (London, 
Routledge, 2006).
28 The Conference of European Churches (the CEC-KEK) which represents Protestant 
churches in Europe issued a report which was highly critical of restrictions on religious 
freedom in Turkey and which questioned whether Turkey could acceded to the Union in the 
absence of fundamental change in the situation in this regard. See The Relation of the 
European Union and Turkey from the Viewpoint o f the Christian Churches, Discussion Paper, 
February 2004. Available at http://www.cec-kek.org/pdf/EUandTurkev.pdf (accessed 6 
October 2006).
29 Then Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Bendedict XVI) argued that Turkey always represented 
another continent throughout history” and that accession by Turkey would be “a mistake”. See 
“Ratzinger Asserts Vatican Stand against Turkey EU Membership” Catholic News 16 August 
2004, available at: http://www.cathnews.com/news/408/96.php (accessesd 6 October 2006).
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basis of a report from the European Commission) that Turkey fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Criteria.30
2.3.2 The Criminalisation of Adultery and the EU Response
In the autumn of 2004, the Turkish government presented its overhaul of the 
criminal code to parliament as part of its attempt to win the backing of the 
European Council (scheduled for later that year) for the opening of accession 
negotiations with the EU. Despite the limited nature of EU competence in this 
area, it was the criminal law as it related to the “lifeworld” issues of gender
O 1
and sexuality, that received the greatest attention. Indeed as Deutsche Welle 
newspaper noted “with pressure from the EU, women’s rights groups were 
able to outlaw rape in marriages and get old fashioned terms like “chastity”, 
“honor” and “moral” out of criminal law books.” However, despite the fact 
that the Turkish Constitutional Court had abolished the crime of adultery in 
1996 (on the grounds that it unfairly penalised women), the 2004 reforms 
proposed that it be recriminalised. Prime Minister Erdogan defended the 
measure on the grounds that the law represented a “vital step” towards 
preserving the family and “human honour”. He further argued that although 
Turkey wanted to join the European Union it did not have to adopt its 
“imperfect” Western morals.”34 Although several EU member states retained 
laws criminalising adultery until relatively recently35 the European 
Commission reacted strongly to this proposal with the Commission’s official 
spokesman stating that the proposal “certainly cast doubts on the direction of 
Turkey’s reform efforts and would risk complicating Turkey’s European
30 See Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December 2002, Presidency Conclusions 
15917/02 at page 5 para. 19. Available
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf (accessed 6 November 
2006).
31 See ‘Turkey Changes Laws to Meet EU Standards’ Deutsche Welle 1 September 2004 at 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1314044,00.html (last visited 19 June 2006).
32 Ibid.
33 See ‘Verheugen Warns Turkey on Adultery Law’ Deutsche Welle 10 September 2004 at 
http://dw-world .de/d w/article/0.1564,1324102,00.html (last visited 19 June 2006).
34 Quoted in ‘Turkey’s Adultery Ban Splits the Nation’ The Age newspaper, 7 September 2004 
at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/09/06/1094322712399.html?from=storvlhs 
accessed on 19 June 2006.
35 Irish law criminalised adultery until 1981, French law until 1975 and Austrian law until 
1997. In the United States, 23 states have similar laws. See K Gajendra Singh “EU-Turkish 
Engagement: A Must for Stability of the Region”, South Asia Analysis Group Papers 
http://www.saag.org/papersl2/paperll27.html accessed on 19 June 2006.
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prospects.”36 Certain Member States also expressed reservations with UK 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw asserting that the proposal “would create 
difficulties for Turkey’'?1 However, although Turkish women’s groups had 
been amongst those most strongly opposed to the law, the EU response did 
not stress the impact of the law on women or ideas of gender equality. Instead 
the response of Gunther Verheugen, the Commissioner with responsibility for 
the Enlargement process, consisted of an uncompromising attack on the 
proposal which focused on the need to separate religious from legal norms. 
The Commissioner described the proposal to criminalise adultery as “a joke” 
and that he ‘Ycould] not understand how a measure like this could be 
considered at such a time” While stating that he was not “defending adultery” 
Verheugen went on to note that it was important that “Turkey should not give 
the impression...that it is introducing Islamic elements into its legal system 
while engaged in a great project such as the ELF\ 39 The Commissioner further 
characterised such a move a completely out of step with Europe and as 
unacceptable to the EU.40
According to Commissioner Verheugen therefore, the feature of the proposed 
changed which was most unacceptable to the EU was not the repression of 
adultery. After all, the EU has very limited competence in this area and the 
Commissioner made it clear that he was “not defending adultery”. What was 
out of step with European values and inconsistent with membership of the EU 
was to attempt to introduce “Islamic elements” into the legal system. Faced 
with this reaction from the Commission and certain Member States, the 
proposal was withdrawn within a matter of days.41
36 See “Adultery Fault Line with EU” Turkish Daily News, 18 September 2004, available at: 
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=37707 (last visited 18 October 2006).
37 See “Turkey Backs off Plan to Outlaw Adultery”, Associated Press, 14 September 2004, 
available at: http://www.wwrn.org/article.php7idd-7164&sec=36&con-54 (last visited 18 
October 2006).
38 See ‘Verheugen Warns Turkey on Adultery Law’ Deutsche Welle 10 September 2004 at 
http://dw-world.de/dw/article/OJ 564,1324102,00.html (last visited 19 June 2006).
39 Ibid.
40 See ‘EU Warns Turkey Not to Recriminalize Adultery’ D. Wes Rist, 8 March 2005 
http://iurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/03/eu-warns-turkev-not-to-recriminalize.php (last 
visited 19 June 2006).
41 n. 32 above.
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2.4 A Difference in Approach?
Therefore, the manner in which the Copenhagen Criteria have been interpreted 
by the institutions of the EU means that a measure of respect for a private zone 
of autonomy within which the individual citizen is free to define his or her 
own sexual existence without being forced to adhere to religious norms, is 
seen as a fundamental requirement of accession to the Union. As the EU’s 
own practice of consulting extensively with religious organisations shows, this 
does not require a complete removal of religious influence from the 
lawmaking process. However, such influence has, in line the principle of 
balance between religious, cultural and humanist influences, to be constrained 
by the principles of personal autonomy, political pluralism and the respect for 
privacy rights. Accordingly, while religious bodies are welcome to contribute 
to the law-making process, religious claims to a monopoly on truth cannot be 
accommodated nor can religious dogma cannot be the sole determinant of the 
content of such laws, particularly when the demands of such dogma are 
inconsistent with the autonomy of the individual to determine his or her 
identity and private conduct. As the case studies show, these principles were 
applied to both Romania and Turkey as part of the Enlargement process.42
However, there remain striking differences in the approaches adopted by the 
Commission in dealing with the two countries. In both cases religious 
elements in societies with single dominant religion (Sunni Islam and Orthodox 
Christianity respectively) had succeeded in pressuring the government into 
attempting to enact (or to retain) legislation giving religiously-influenced 
norms, which condemned certain private sexual behaviour, the force of law. In 
the Romanian case, the EU viewed this solely as a question of the human right 
of gays and lesbians to be left alone by the state. In the Turkish case however, 
the proposal was seen not as a human rights issue or even an issue of privacy, 
but was instead framed as an issue of the general relationship between religion
42 This analysis is further supported by the limited caselaw in this area. In EFTA Surveillance 
Authority Decision 336/94 it was held that restrictions imposed by Member States on slot- 
machines could not be justified solely on religious grounds, while the rulings of the Court of 
Justice in Case C-260/04 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR 1-07083 (para. 35) and Case C- 
65/05 Commission v Greece make it clear that ‘religious factors’ can be taken into account by 
Member States exercising their margin of appreciation in regulating gambling. See the 
discussion in Chapter IV, Section Four.
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and the law. While the problem with the Romanian law was that it violated 
gay and lesbian human rights, the problem with the Turkish legislation was, 
according to the Commission, that it appeared to be “introducing Islamic 
elements into its legal system”. Despite the leading role played by the 
Orthodox Church in the campaign to retain Article 200, Romania was never 
warned against introducing “Orthodox elements” into its legal system and the 
systemic relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Romanian State 
was assumed to by the EU to be in accordance with acceptable norms. The 
attempt to criminalise adultery on the other hand was viewed as emblematic of 
a wider potentially systemic problem in the relationship between the law and 
religion in the Turkish State, the inclusion of Islamic elements in the legal 
system being seen as incompatible with the balance between religion, 
humanism and culture which characterises the public order of the EU. A right 
to be free from religiously inspired rules was upheld for “sinners” in both 
Romania and Turkey to be sure, but the manner in which EU framed its 
demands that this right be respected differed markedly.
2.4.1 Sexual Orientation Discrimination : A European Norm?
The difference in approach may of course be explained by the fact that 
homosexuality had already been the subject of debate within the Union for 
some years during which time a distinctive EU norm in relation to gay and 
lesbian rights had emerged. Although the Union’s acquisition of substantive 
powers in relation to sexual orientation discrimination post dated the 
controversy in relation to Romania, its institutions had since the early 1980s, 
been debating and formulating an approach to the issue of gay and lesbian 
rights which by 1998 had, in certain respects, become relatively liberal. By 
1998, outright criminalisation had been condemned by the European Court of 
Human Rights, the European Parliament had voiced its support for gay and 
lesbian equality on several occasions and the treaties had been amended so as 
to enable the Union to legislate in this area. 43 There had been no similar
43 In relation to the acquisition of powers in relation to sexual orientation discrimination see 
n.15 above. In relation to the activity of the European Parliament on this issue see "Resolution 
on Human Rights in the Soviet Union" of 17 May 1983 [OJ No. C 161 20.6.1983 pp 67 et 
seq., Document 1-1358/83, Rapportuer: Vera Squarcialupi at the request of the Committee on 
Social Affairs and Employment 13 February 1984. Available at:
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process in relation to the laws regulating adultery which had not been the 
subject of any debate at EU level nor had adulterers either organised 
themselves or been recognised as a minority group to the same degree as gays 
and lesbians. It is therefore arguable that the Union’s characterisation of the 
Romanian issue solely in terms of its human rights implications arose from the 
fact that the Union had already established a common approach on this issue 
under which discrimination against gays and lesbians was seen as a violation 
of human rights. This certainly chimes with Commissioner Verheugen’s 
statement in the summer of 2001 that “equal treatment o f gays and lesbians is 
a basic principle o f the European Union”?* As Romania was seeking to join a 
polity which increasingly defined itself as a “Community of Values”, a failure 
to decriminalise homosexuality could be seen as a failure to adhere to the 
common value that the Union had established in relation to sexual orientation. 
An attempt to criminalise adultery did not involve such an established value 
and was therefore approached in a different manner from that of the 
criminalisation of homosexuality.
However, despite the Commissioner’s assertion that equal treatment of 
homosexuals was “a basic value of the European Union”, in the period in 
which the Commission was dealing with the issue of Article 200 of the 
Romanian Penal Code, acceptance of the principle of equal treatment of gays 
and lesbians in the EU was in fact quite limited. In its 1997 decision in Grant 
v South West Trains?5 the ECJ specifically ruled that discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation was not prohibited on by the treaty and that gay 
and lesbian equality was not a fundamental principle of EU law. Indeed at 
paragraph 31 of the judgment the Court specifically stated:
“ While the European Parliament, as Ms Grant observes, has indeed declared 
that it deplores all forms o f discrimination based on an individual's sexual
http://www.xs4all.nl/~heinv/hearingintergroup/documents/squarcialupi.pdf (accessed 23 
October 2006), and A3-0028/94 Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in 
the EC, 8 February 1994.
44 n.24 above.
45 [1998] ICR 449, Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains [1998] ECR 1-00621.
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orientation, it is nevertheless the case that the Community has not as yet 
adopted rules providing for such equivalence. ”
While the Treaty of Amsterdam did provide the Union with competence to 
legislate in this area, it could only do so on the basis of unanimity and did not 
do so until late 2000. Even when it did finally act in this area, the EU deferred 
significantly to religious sensibilities giving religious bodies (including 
institutions such as healthcare and educational establishments whose purposes 
were not exclusively religious) scope to continue to discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation in the Employment Directive46 and allowing member 
states not to recognise civil partnerships between same sex couples in the 2004 
Citizenship Directive.47 A norm relating to the equality of sexual orientations 
had not therefore, been definitively embraced by the Union at the time during 
which it pressured Romania to decriminalise homosexuality and was, at most, 
emergent and subject to continuing dispute.
2.4.2 Religion in General or Islam?
A second explanation for the difference of approach outlined above is that the 
EU saw, in the attempt by the Turkish authorities to criminalise adultery, 
something very different from that which they saw in the efforts of Romanian 
leaders to retain the ban on homosexuality. More specifically, the 
criminalisation of adultery may have been seen as representative of a wider 
desire to increase the influence of religion over the Turkish state to a degree 
which might threaten the balance between religious, humanist and cultural 
influences which underpins the liberal democratic nature of the Union’s public 
order. The idea that a failure to maintain religious influence within certain 
bounds represents a potential threat to the Union’s balance-based public order 
and to the liberal democratic system, is seen in other contexts. As will be 
shown below, both the law of the EU and of certain member states in relation 
to migration as well as the caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights
46 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, Article 4(2).
47 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 2004/58/EC of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, articles 2(2)(b) and 3(2)(b).
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suggest that the according to religious precepts of an overly influential role in 
public life represents a threat to the the public order, to the rights of others to 
freedom from religion and to the liberal democratic system of government in 
general. Furthermore, in both cases the law has been applied in such a way 
that suggest that this threat is seen as being present to a greater degree in Islam 
as opposed to other religions.
Turkey is, of course, a secular republic, however many in Turkey perceive the 
state’s secularity to be under threat.48 The army in particular has intervened on 
several occasions to “defend” the country’s secular system from what it sees 
as the threat of Islamic movements. The Turkish government which sought to 
criminalise adultery was made of the AKP or Justice and Development Party. 
The AKP is the successor to the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) a party which 
had been forced out of office in 1997 by the Turkish military and later banned 
for threatening the secular nature of the Turkish republic. The AKP’s Islamist 
past has meant that although it now portrays itself as a moderate conservative 
party which supports democratic principles, it has been viewed with extreme 
suspicion both by Turkey’s secular elite and by some EU governments. This 
past may have caused the EU (along with many in Turkey) to view the attempt 
to criminalise adultery as part of a wider strategy aimed at increasing the role 
of Islam in public life in Turkey and undermining the secular nature of the 
state. Of course, as shown in Chapter II, many current EU member states are 
far from officially secular with official state churches and close institutional 
and financial links between certain denominations being a prominent feature 
of the European constitutional landscape. Moreover, explicitly Christian 
parties are part of governments in several EU states such as Germany, Sweden 
and the Netherlands. However, EU law has tended to see in Islam, a greater 
threat to the notion of balance and therefore to the liberal democratic order, 
than other religions. Seen in this way, Commissioner Verheugen’s statement 
that Turkey could not afford to give the impression that it was “introducing 
Islamic elements into its legal system” can be seen as reflecting a view on the 
part of the EU that an Islamically-influenced legal system might fail to respect
48 See for example E. Ozbudun Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic 
Consolidation, (London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
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the degree of public and private autonomy by respect for the humanist 
elements of the Union’s liberal democratic public order.
The compatibility of Islam with Western liberal democracy has been the 
subject of much debate in recent years. The role played in Islam by the sharia 
with its interventionist and conservative approach to issues of gender and 
sexuality, has been a prominent aspect of discussion in this area. Those who 
assert that a degree of incompatibility exists have focused on two main 
aspects. The first relates to the low level of secularisation experienced by 
largely Muslim societies. In a protracted process beginning with the 
Enlightenment and Reformation, the major Christian denominations in 
Europe, either voluntarily or after protracted conflict, have accepted 
significant limitations on the scope of religious authority in relation to matters 
of public policy.49 Lewis argues that this process has not occurred to the same 
extent in the Muslim majority countries (which also provide many of Europe’s 
immigrants). Such societies are he believes “still profoundly Muslim, in a way 
and in a sense that most Christian countries are no longer Christian”.50 The 
second (and possibly related) argument asserts that, mainstream Islamic 
theology is incompatible with the secular state and the notions of personal 
autonomy and distinction between public and private morality underlying the 
liberal democratic project. Joffe argues that “representative democracy is seen 
as alien to Islam”51 and that “the holistic nature of normative Islamic society 
does not accept the premise of the socio-political atomism that is implicit in 
the democratic and capitalist projects”. Gabriel notes that “in modem 
western societies many matters that are considered as more liable to moral 
scrutiny and judgment rather than legal investigation” but that such matters
53“are still within the ambit o f law in Islamic societies”. In a similar vein 
Lewis and Roy argue that “few [...] practising Muslims are interested in a
49 n. 2 above.
50 B. Lewis The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (Phoenix, London 2003) 14.
51 G. Joffe ‘Democracy. Islam and the Cult of Modernism’ in Democratization Vol.4, No.3, 
Autumn 1997, 134. Quoted in P. van Ham European Integration and the Postmodern 
Condition (London and New York, Routledge, 2001) 211.
52 Ibid.
53 T. Gabriel ‘Is Islam against the West?’ in R. Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. Idleman 
Smith (eds.) Islam and the West Post 9/11 (Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, England, 2004) 15).
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privatized faith as it is experienced by most Western Europeans and 
sometimes advanced as a model for Muslims”.54 All of these views of point to 
a potential incompatibility between Islam, as a faith based on an all- 
encompassing system of holy law (the Sharia) and the liberal democratic 
system acceptance of which is a prerequisite for EU membership. Indeed, the 
influential Muslim theologian Tariq Ramadan has argued that to require 
European Muslims to adopt the Western “privatised” approach to religion 
effectively requires Muslims to “be Muslim without Islam” and that such an 
approach is based on “a widespread suspicion that to be too much a Muslim 
means not to be really and completely integrated into the Western way of life 
and its values” 55 However, the idea that Islam is in some way incompatible 
with the modem state or liberal democracy is, notwithstanding its high levels 
of popular support,56 highly controversial, with many commentators arguing 
that such views are tainted with orientalism and even racism.57
The truth or otherwise of these assertions is not for this work to address. What 
is important for our purposes is to note that the campaign by the Romanian 
Orthodox Church to retain legislation criminalising homosexuality was viewed 
as an individual instance of interference by the state (albeit largely at the 
behest of religious authorities) with the privacy rights of a minority group. The
54 J.S.Fetzer and J.C. Soper Muslims and the State in Britain France and Germany 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 150 summarising the arguments made by 
Lewis in Islam and the West, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993 at 173-186 and O. Roy, 
Vers un islam europeen, (Paris, Editions Esprit, 1999) 89-103.
55 T. Ramadan, 'To Be a European Muslim’ (Leicester, Islamic Foundation, 1999) 184-185.
56 A poll of French citizens done for the newspaper Le Monde in November 1989 showed that 
tow thirds of French people had a very negative view of Islam, see S. Allievi, ‘Relations 
between Religions’ in B. Marechal (ed.) Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and 
Society, (Leiden, Koninlijke Brill NV, 2003) at 323). A 1990 poll showed that 65% of Swedes 
had a negative view of Islam and 88% considered it to be incompatible with the democratic 
system (Ibid.). A Pew Research poll in 2006 interviewed some 14,000 people in 13 countries 
across the world. European respondents showed very high levels of hostility towards and fear 
of, Islam amongst Europeans. Relations between Muslims and Westerners were seen as 
‘generally bad’ by 70% of Germans, 66% of French people, 61% of Spaniards and 61% of 
British people. Clear majorities in Germany, Britain and Spain also agreed that there was ‘a 
conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society’ (although a large 
majority of French respondents rejected this view). High percentages of respondent in all 
countries stated that they considered Muslims to be fanatical (Spain 83%, Germany 78%, 
France 50% and Britain 48%) (See ‘The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View 
Each Other’ Pew Research Foundation. Released 22 June 2006 available at: 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/displav.php?ReportID=253) (last visited 22 November 2006).
57 See R. Geaves, ‘Who Defines Moderate Islam ‘post’ September 11?’ in R. Geaves, T. 
Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. Idleman Smith (eds.) Islam and the West Post 9/11 (Aldershot, 
Hants, England, Ashgate, 2004) at 66).
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attempt by the formerly-Islamist governing party of Turkey to enact legislation 
criminalising adultery was, on the other hand, seen as representative of a far 
wider and more serious issue; the maintenance of the more general limitations 
on Islamic influence over the legal system which were seen as necessary for 
Turkey to remain eligible for EU membership (the introduction of “Islamic 
elements” into the Turkish legal system being seen by the Commission as ipso 
facto inconsistent with its desire to join the Union). This objection to “Islamic 
elements” contrasts strikingly with the acceptance by the Union of the specific 
invocation of Christian influence in the constitutions of EU member states 
such as Ireland, Germany and Spain whose constitutions, to varying degrees 
name the Christian God as a source of fundamental values or authority. 
Indeed, the government of the German State of Baden-Wurttemberg justified 
the retention of crucifixes in state schools, despite a ban on the Muslim 
headscarf on the grounds that human rights, democracy and German
CO
constitutional values derive from Christian norms. If anything, the difference 
in treatment has become even clearer in more recent times. In May 2007, 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, while discussing Turkish membership 
in the European Parliament, stated that “if a country wants to become a 
member o f the EU, it needs to respect the principle o f democratic secularism, 
part o f our Copenhagen Criteria” thus identifying secularism as a part of the 
Criteria for the first time.59 The Commissioner’s statement was supported by 
Dr Hannes Swoboda MEP, a Vice-President of the Party of European 
Socialists, despite his acknowledgement that there was no common approach 
to secularism amongst existing Member States and that the Union had not 
stressed secularism in previous Enlargements.60 Thus the approach of the EU 
to these issues seems, at least in part, to be influenced by notions of a potential 
incompatibility between Islam and the values of liberal democracy which view
58 J. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford and New York, 2005 at 177. Irish abortion law is also arguably 
heavily influenced by Catholic teaching in this matter.
59 Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, Open Debate on Enlargement, 
European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Brussels, 7 May 2007. Reference 
SPEECH/07/287 Date 07/05/2007, at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference-SPEECH/07/287&format=HTML& 
aged-Q&language=EN&guiLanguage-en (last visited 1 August 2007).
60 See ‘Democratic Secularism is a Copenhagen Criterion for Turkey’, Turkish Daily News, 10 
May 2007, at http://www.turkishdailvnews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=72817 (last visited 1 
August 2007).
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Islamic influence over the legal system as more threatening to the European 
public order than Christian influence.
2.4.3 The European Convention on Human Rights, Islam and Militant 
Democracy
The perception the Islam and the role of sharia therein are inconsistent with 
the notions of personal autonomy, privacy and pluralism which underlie the 
European public order is also to be seen in several of the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights whose decisions, while not part of EU law, 
are very influential in determining the scope the Union’s human rights 
obligations.61 Most notably, in the case of Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey62 
the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court upheld the dissolution of the 
predecessor of Erdogan‘s AKP by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the 
grounds that it was a “centre of activities contrary to the principle o f 
secularism".63 The European court’s judgment reflected a profound fear of the 
political nature of Islam and made, in debates in which euphemism normally 
plays such a dominant role, strikingly clear pronouncements in relation to the 
role of sharia and Muslim values in European political life.
In 1995 the Refah Partisi won the largest number of votes (22%) in the 
Turkish general election. It subsequently entered into a coalition government 
with another party and its leader became prime minister. In May 1997 the 
Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation brought proceedings in the 
Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve Refah, on the grounds that it was “a 
centre o f activities against the principle o f secularism”. The application cited 
acts and speeches by leaders and members of the party which were alleged to 
show that the party aimed to introduce sharia law and to a theocratic regime 
both of which were said to be incompatible with a democratic society.64
61 See Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I -05769.
62 (2003) 37 EHRR 1.
63 Para. 12 ibid.
64 See the summary of the facts of the case available at the Court’s website at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2003/feb/RefahPartisiGCiudgmenteng.htm (last visited 14 
December 2006).
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Refah applied to the European Commission on Human Rights in May 1998. In 
July 2001 the a Chamber of the Court held by four votes to three that there had 
been no violation of Article 11 of the Convention (which protects the right of 
freedom of association) and (unanimously) that no separate claim arose under 
Articles 9, 10, 14, 17 or 18).65 Refah’s lawyers appealed this decision to the 
Grand Chamber of the Court which unanimously held that the actions and 
speeches which formed the basis of the decision of the Turkish Court showed 
the party to have a long term aim of setting up a regime based on sharia. It 
further found that such a system would be incompatible with the democratic 
values of the Convention and that the opportunities which Refah had to put 
such policies into practice meant that its dissolution could be considered to 
have met a “pressing social need’ and to have been within the restricted 
margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting States in this area.
The degree to which the Court viewed an Islamist political orientation as 
threatening to the European political order is shown by the fact that on the 
three previous occasions on which the Strasbourg institutions had been called 
upon to rule on the compatibility of the decision by the Turkish authorities to 
dissolve a political party (all non-religious parties), it found a violation of the 
Convention in each case.66 Furthermore, it noted that the dissolution of a 
political party was “a drastic measure” and that such severe measures could 
be used “only in the most serious cases”. The Court noted that democracy 
was the “only political model contemplated by the Convention and,
f\ Raccordingly, the only one compatible with it”. It also appears to endorse a 
secular model of church-state relations in stating that had “frequently 
emphasized the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organizer o f the 
exercise o f various religions” and characterizing the adoption of such a role as
65 Ibid.
66 See C. Moe ‘Refah Partisi and Others v Turkey’ The International Journal of Not-for-Profit 
Law, Vol.6 Issue 1, September 2003 at http://www.icnl.org/iounral/vol6issl/rel moeprint.htm. 
The cases in question are: United Communist Party o f Turkey and Others v. Turkey 
(133/1996/752/951), January 30, 1998; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey 
(20/1997/804/1007), May 25, 1998; Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey 
(Application no. 23885/94), December 8, 1999.
67 n. 62 above, para. 133.
68 Ibid. para. 86.
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a “duty”.69 Recalling previous decisions in which it had upheld limitations on 
the right to wear an Islamic headscarf in certain contexts70 the Court declared 
that in the Turkish context:
“the Convention institutions have expressed the view that the principle o f 
secularism is certainly one o f the fundamental principles o f the State which 
are in harmony with the rule o f law and respect for human rights and 
democracy. An attitude which fails to respect that principle will not 
necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one’s
71religion. ”
Accordingly, the political order upheld by the Convention may require 
religions to adapt and submit to secular government in order to be covered by 
the protection provided to religion under the Convention system. The 
Convention instruments may therefore refuse even to recognise as religious 
(for the purposes of the protection of article 9), a movement which, like some 
interpretations of Islam, does not recognise the legitimacy (and supremacy 
within its sphere) of the secular state. In taking such an approach the Court 
seems to adopt a singularly “Western” view of religion. As Esposito points 
out, the notion of religion as a system of personal beliefs as opposed to a 
comprehensive phenomenon “integral to politics and society” is both “modem 
and Western in origins” J 2 Moreover, he argues that such a view of religion 
causes secularist Westerners to view religions which do not adhere to such an
73approach, as “incomprehensible, irrational, extremist, threatening”.
The Court went on to declare explicitly its belief in the incompatibility of 
sharia with democracy and human rights noting in particular the issues of the 
pluralism of the public sphere and protection of private autonomy which have
69 Ibid. para. 91.
70 Dahlab v Switzerland, Application 42393/98, Judgment of 15 February 2001 and Yanasik v. 
Turkey, no. 14254/89, Commission decision of January 6, 1993, DR 74.
71 n. 62 above, para. 93.
72J. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality 2002, Oxford University Press, Oxford and 
New York, at 199.
73 Ibid. 198.
246
also been a key element of the Union’s approach to religion’s participation in 
the public sphere.74 It stated that:
“considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules 
laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in 
the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place 
in it. [...] It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human 
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which 
clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its 
criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status o f women 
and the wav it intervenes in all spheres o f private and public life in 
accordance with relisious precepts. In the Court’s view, a political party 
whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the 
Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the 
democratic ideal that underlies the whole o f the Convention.” (emphasis 
added)75
The Court further endorsed its essentially “Western” definition of religion and 
its view of limitations on the public role thereof as a necessary part of the 
European public order stating that ‘ freedom of religion, including the freedom 
to manifest one’s religion by worship and observance, is primarily a matter o f 
individual co n sc ien ce and that “the sphere o f individual conscience is quite 
different from the field o f private law.”76
The degree to which Islamic religious law is identified as incompatible with 
the European public order envisioned by the Convention is striking. While 
elements of the Court’s reasoning could be applied to religion in general, it is 
nevertheless clear that the danger to the democratic human rights based order 
protected by the Convention was seen by the Court as coming from Islam. The 
judgment specifically problematises sharia and notes specific elements of 
Islamic law which its sees as incompatible with the ideals of the Convention.
74 See section 3 of Chapter III.
75 n. 63 above, para. 123.
76 Ibid. at para. 128.
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77 In particular the judgment highlights the manner in which it believe sharia 
violates the key Convention norms of privacy and personal autonomy.
Not only was sharia considered to be incompatible with European values, as 
Boyle points out the Refah party was dissolved not for actual attempts to 
introduce Islamic law “but rather because o f what it might do, should it, at
78some point in the future, become the outright party in power”. The threat 
posed by a party which was thought to harbour concealed desires to introduce 
Islamic was therefore considered by the Court to be such that the “drastic” 
measure of dissolving a political party which had won a plurality of votes in 
the most recent election was justified. In upholding the dissolution of a 
political party which had recently won a fair and free election on the grounds 
that its Islamic ideology represented a threat to the democratic order, the Court 
of Human Rights not only appeared to embrace the highly controversial notion 
of “militant democracy”79 but also appeared to give implicit credence to the 
notion of the existence of a degree of incompatibility between political 
religion in general, political Islam in particular, and the liberal democratic 
norms on which the Council of Europe is based. The views of the Court of 
Human Rights on these questions has the potential to influence the approach 
of EU institutions to these matters to a significant degree.80 Furthermore, the 
Strasbourg Court’s approach in this area is strikingly similar to the approach 
adopted by the EU to the adultery issue where the legislation in question was 
viewed as being representative of broader but concealed desires to introduce 
“Islamic elements” into the Turkish legal system.
77 While explicitly Christian political parties in existing Member States may, due to the 
influence of their religious texts, have an similarly conservative approach to sexual morality, a 
desire to introduce biblical sexual morality into the secular law has not been attributed to them 
by European institutions.
78 K. Boyle ‘Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case’, Essex Human 
Rights Review, Vol 1. No. 1.
79 See for instance: P. Macklem, ‘Militant democracy, legal pluralism and the paradox of self- 
determination’ International Journal of Constitutional Law IJCL 2006, 4(3), 488-516, P. 
Harvey ‘Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights’ European Law 
Review E.L. Rev. 2004, 29(3), 407-420, M. Kocak and E. Orucu, ‘Dissolution of Political 
Parties in the Name of Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ European Public Law, E.P.L. 2003, 9(3), 399-423.
80 n.62 above.
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The notion that EU law perceives Islam to be potentially threatening towards 
public and private autonomy and therefore to the balance between religion and 
humanism which characterises the Union’s public order, does not rely merely 
on extrapolation from the approach of the institutions of the Council of 
Europe. It is also to be seen in developments in the law of migration both of 
the Union itself of individual EU member states which are the subject of the 
second set of case studies in this chapter.
3. Migration, Integration and the EU
This section will assess the development of the law of the EU governing 
migration and the rights of long-term residents from non-EU countries. It will 
show how EU law in these areas increasingly demands explicit reassurances 
from individual migrants that they are personally committed to the limitations 
on religious influence inherent in the Union’s commitment to the notion of 
balance between religious, cultural and humanist influences which it regards 
as underpinning its liberal democratic values. The section will then examine 
similar developments in the law governing citizenship and the integration of 
migrants at Member State level (with particular emphasis on developments in 
the Netherlands and Germany) in order to show how emerging trends at this 
level have influenced and been facilitated by the Union’s law in this area.
In recent years, the question of the integration of immigrant communities has 
been particularly prominent in European politics. Much of this concern has 
centred on a perceived incompatibility between what are seen as the liberal 
democratic values of Europe societies and the more intensely religious and 
conservative values adhered to by some Muslim immigrant communities. 
Kofeman has noted that the increased diversity of migration to Europe has led 
European states to create more complex systems which differentiate between 
migrants on the basis of their mode of entry and legal status and which grant 
differential access to civil, economic and social rights on this basis.81 This 
section argues that, in addition to distinguishing between migrants on the basis 
of mode of entry and legal status, the migration law of both the EU and several
81 E. Kofmann, ‘Contemporary European migrations: civic stratification and citizenship’
(2002) 21 Political Geography 1035.
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Member States, has begun to differentiate between migrants on the basis of 
their adherence to certain values, with those who fail to hold certain 
“European” values being disfavoured in relation to the granting of citizenship 
and residence rights. Furthermore, just as the Commission sought a wider and 
more exacting standard of a-religiosity from Muslim Turkey than from 
Christian Romania, the migration laws of Member States and the EU have 
been applied to a greater degree to Muslim than non-Muslim immigrants.
This section further argues that one of the key “European” values in question 
is the acceptance of limitations on the public role of religion and of the 
legitimacy of a zone of inidividual freedom from religion and its prescriptive 
norms. It suggests that just as the EU saw a threat to “European norms” in the 
attempt by the Turkish government to criminalise adultery, EU migration and 
integration law, having been influenced by emerging trends at Member State 
level, sees the failure of individual immigrants to adhere to such norms 
(particularly in relation to gender and sexuality where the views of devout 
Muslims diverge most notably from those of indigenous Europeans), as a 
threat to public and private autonomy and therefore to the humanist elements 
of the Union’s public order. Under this view, the holding of private views 
becomes a matter of concern for the state which justifies the penalisation of 
the holding of such beliefs through withholding benefits such as citizenship or 
residence rights. Thus, in order to protect the privacy rights of personal 
autonomy of individual citizens guaranteed by its public order, the Union 
either interferes with, or facilitates efforts by individual Member States to 
interfere with, the private views and conduct of individual (generally Muslim) 
immigrants. This making of “windows into men’s souls” problematises not 
merely Islam, but individual Muslims who are required to demonstrate a 
personal commitment to certain ideas and whose private views and behaviour 
become public matters. Like the European Court of Human Rights’ embrace 
of the notion of “militant democracy such an approach has the potential to 
undermine, to a degree, the private/public distinction which such laws are 
intended to protect.
3.1 The Union’s “Basic Principles on Integration”
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In recent times both migration policy statements and substantive Community 
legislation in this area have increasingly emphasised the need for migrants to 
adopt “European values” and have viewed a failure to do so as a threat to 
European societies. Although less explicit than the measures adopted in the 
Netherlands and parts of Germany (which will be discussed below), the output 
of Community institutions has nevertheless, in common with the emerging law 
in these Member States, clearly seen a failure to restrict the public role of 
religious principles (particularly in relation to gender and sexuality) as a 
potentially threatening phenomenon which can be the subject of regulation in 
the interests of disempowered groups and the development of European 
society as a whole.
In 2003 the Commission began to monitor the integration policies of member
82states through its “Synthesis Report on National Integration Policies”. The 
European Council of June 2003 added to this development by stressing the 
need to for the “issue of the smooth integration of legal migrants into EU 
societies [to be] further examined and enhanced”.83 The conclusions also sated 
that:
“integration policies should be understood as a continuous, two-way process 
based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations o f legally residing
Q A
third-country nationals and the host societies.”
However, the later development of this principle of mutuality indicates that 
dilution of the principle of freedom from religion is not what the Union had in 
mind in endorsing such mutuality. The conclusions of the European Council 
held at Brussels on the 4th and 5th of November 2004 called for the 
establishment of “the common basic principles underlying a coherent 
European framework on integration” which were to “form the foundation for
82 ‘2003 Synthesis Report on National Integration Policies’ Annex 1 to ‘Communication on 
Immigration, Integration and Employment’ Com (2003) 336 Final, p44 et seq. (section 2.6).
83 Council of the European Union, Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, 
Presidency Conclusions 11638/03 POLGEN 55 at para. 9.
84 Ibid.
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future initiatives in the EU9*}5 It then set out a list of basic minimum elements 
of such principles. This basic minimum restated the conclusion of the
Thessaloniki Council that integration was “a continuous, two-way process”
86and stressed ‘frequent interaction and intercultural dialogue”. However, it 
supplemented these rather multicultural principles with an assertion that 
integration also “implies respect for the basic values o f the European Union
0 7
and fundamental human rights”. The delineation of the precise relationship 
between these potentially conflicting principles was left for the Justice and 
Home Affairs Council.
The Justice and Home Affairs Council met later the same month and, in a 
meeting chaired by Dutch Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk, agreed on the 
content of the “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration in the
QO
European Union”. The principles noted that “the precise integration
measures a society chooses to implement should be determined by individual
Member States” but also stated the Union’s interest in the issue, noting that
“The failure of an individual Member State to develop and implement a
successful integration policy can have in different ways adverse implications
89for other Member Stats and the European Union”. In a theme that would 
become more explicit in the principles themselves, it stated that such failure 
“can have impact [sic] on the economy and the participation at [sic] the 
labour market, it can undermine respect for human rights (...) and it can 
breed alienation and tensions within society”.90 The invocation of the state 
interest in the promotion of respect for human rights as a relevant factor in 
relation to immigrant integration is particularly relevant as the this interest 
provides the basis for the interference with the religious beliefs and cultural 
practices of individual immigrants which the principles on integration 
authorise.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 See: Press Release, 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 19 
November 2004. 14615/04 (Presse 321).
89 Ibid. 16.
90 Ibid.
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The principles themselves clearly endorse a model of immigrant integration 
under which the religious beliefs of immigrants, in so far as they appear 
inconsistent with the notion of balance in relation to religion and may thereby 
affect the freedom from religion of others or cause the evolution of society in 
undesirable directions, are seen as a legitimate subject of state regulation. The 
first principle restates the conclusion of the Thessaloniki and Brussels 
Council’s that “Integration is a dynamic, two-way process o f mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents o f Member states”91 
However the explanation provided by the Council for this principle makes it 
clear that what is envisaged is not a process of mutual transformation of 
political, legal and cultural values. The explanation states that:
“the integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and 
women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new 
country o f residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should 
create the opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and
92political participation”.
Therefore, integration is seen as a process of adaptation on the part of 
immigrants coupled with facilitation on the part of the native population. 
Native populations are required to facilitate the participation of immigrants in 
their societies but are not required to adapt their own values or culture. 
Immigrants on the other hand are under an obligation to engage in a process of
93“adaptation (...) in relation to their new country o f residence.”
The second principle makes this point even more clearly. It states that 
“Integration implies a respect for the basic values o f the European Union” 9A 
The explanation states that:
“Everybody resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the basic 
values o f the European Union as well as to Member State laws. The provisions
91 Ibid. 19.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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and values enshrined in European Treaties serve as both baseline and 
compass, as they are common to the Member States.”95
The adherence to the values of the EU is therefore categorised as an individual 
duty to which residents must adapt if necessary. The explanation goes on to 
assert that:
“Member States are responsible for actively assuring that all residents, 
including immigrants, understand, respect, benefit from and are protected on 
an equal basis by the full scope o f values, rights, responsibilities, and 
privileges established by the EU and Member State laws. Views and opinions 
that are not compatible with such basic values might hinder the successful 
integration of immigrants into their new host society and might adversely 
influence society as a whole. 96
There are a number of important features of this principle. First, while the 
Member States are required to ensure that all residents (and not just 
immigrants) understand and respect the Union’s basic values, a failure to 
adhere to these values on the part of immigrants is seen as more serious on the 
basis that such a failure will “hinder their integration into their new host 
society” and “might adversely influence society as a whole”. Adherence to the 
Union’s basic values is seen under these principles as a important part of the 
society which the Union and its Member States are trying to build. More 
importantly, the principles make it clear that it is the holding of “views and 
opinions that are not compatible with such basic values” which constitutes the 
threat to immigrant integration and the construction of the kind of society 
desired by the Union and its member states. The mere holding of such views 
therefore generates a sufficient state interest to justify regulation by the law of 
the Member State or the Union. This approach clearly chimes with the 
approach of the governments of the Netherlands and certain German states 
outlined below which sees in the ongoing adherence to religiously-influenced 
conservative attitudes to sexuality and gender by certain immigrant
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
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communities, a threat to the continued acceptance of key values. The idea that 
the promotion of certain values is an important goal of the state is also seen in 
other principles. Principle 5 notes the importance of education to immigrant 
integration and states that:
“Transferring knowledge about the role and working o f societal institutions 
and regulations and transmitting the norms and values that form the binding 
element in the functioning of society are also a crucial goal o f the educational
0 7
system.”
Having defined individual adherence to certain views, opinions and values as 
an important goal for the state and as a potential site of legal regulation, the 
crucial question becomes how far the duty to accept such values should prevail 
over the rights of migrants to cultural and religious freedom. Principle 8 has a 
definite answer. It states that:
“The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the 
Charter o f Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices
”98conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
The requirement of respect for diverse religions and culture is therefore 
specifically subordinated to the need to protect “other inviolable European 
rights’'’ or “national law”. This notable rejection of multiculturalism’s aversion 
to the imposition of host society standards on migrant communities is made 
even more explicit in the accompanying explanation which states:
"Member States [...] have a responsibility to ensure that cultural and 
religious practices do not prevent individual migrants from exercising other 
fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is 
particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality o f women, the
97 Ibid. 21.
98 Ibid. 23.
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rights and interests o f children, and the freedom to practice or not to practice 
a particular religion”99
The explanation also expresses a preference for the use of non-coercive 
measures as a means of “addressing issues relating to unacceptable cultural 
and religious practices that clash with fundamental rights” but goes on to 
state that “however, if necessary according to the law, legal coercive measures 
can also be needed”100 The Union’s policy framework for the integration of 
immigrants therefore, specifically subordinates the religious autonomy of 
individual migrants to the need to protect European basic values and the 
fundamental rights of others. While not naming any religion in particular, the 
framework does deliberately emphasise issues such as the equality of men and 
women which have been prominent in debates around the practice of Islam in 
Europe.101
3.2 The Refugee, Long-Term Residents and Family Reunification 
Directives
Although the basic principles are not binding the ideas underpinning them are 
clearly visible in the “hard law” enacted by the EU in this area. Indeed, the 
principles themselves are specifically referred to in the preamble to the 
directive establishing minimum standards for the granting of refugee status 
which anticipates the establishment of such principles in paragraph 36 which 
states that:
99 ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 This decisively non-multicultural approach and the importance of the idea of limitations on 
the public role of religion in this area have been further underlined by the statements of 
Commissioner Fratini in relation to the controversy which erupted in relation to the 
publication of cartoons by the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten which were perceived as 
being insulting towards the prophet Muhammed by many Muslims. While recognising that ‘it 
is important to respect sensitivities’ the Commissioner went on to state: ‘Equally, we have 
reaffirmed that our European society is based on the respect for the individual person’s life 
and freedom, equality o f rights between men and women, freedom of speech and a clear 
distinction between politics and religion. We have said clearly and loudly that freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion are part o f Europe’s values and traditions, and that they 
are not negotiable’ (emphasis added). See the interview with Commissioner Fini in Equal 
Voices Issue 18 June 2006 published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC). Available at:
http://eumc.eu.int/eumc/index.php?fuseaction=content.dsp cat content&catid=4498115372af 
1  (accessed 6 October 2006).
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“77ie implementation o f the Directive should be evaluated at regular intervals,
taking into consideration in particular (...), the development o f common basic
102principles for integration.'’'1
This section will show how in a number of directives relating to the legal 
status of immigrants, EU law has defined a failure on the part of individual 
immigrants to indicate acceptance of humanist influenced liberal and 
egalitarian values, as a threat to key public policy goals, particularly the right 
of individuals to live their lives in ways which conflict with religious doctrine. 
In particular, the directives in question legitimise actions on the part of 
individual Member States which seek to penalise those immigrants who fail to 
indicate their acceptance of limitations on the influence of religious principles 
on law and public policy and their acceptance of liberal democratic values 
such as pluralism and individual autonomy. Under this approach, the private 
views of immigrants become a legitimate site of state regulation 
notwithstanding the Union’s commitments to freedom of conscience.
Two directives in particular have been distinctly marked by the decidedly non- 
multicultural ideas on which the basic principles are based. In September 2003 
the Council adopted a directive on the right to family reunification of third 
country nationals residing in the EU.103 The preamble of the directive states 
that “Member States should give effect to the provisions o f this Directive 
without discrimination on the basis o f sex, race, colour, [...] religion or 
beliefs, political or other opinions,”104
This would seem to indicate that the religious or political views of those 
seeking family reunification are not a basis on which such a benefit could be 
refused. However, the provisions of the directive to which this non­
discrimination principle apply, indicate that such views can indeed be taken
102 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted.
103 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right of family reunification.
OJ L251/12 3.10.2003.
104 Ibid. preamble to the directive at para. 5.
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into account by Member States in considering applications under this 
directive. Paragraph 11 of the preamble states thalt:
“the right to family reunification should be exeircised in proper compliance 
with the values and principles recognised by the Member States, in particular 
with respect to the rights o f women and children; such compliance justifies the 
possible taking o f restrictive measures agaiinst applications fo r  family 
reunification of polygamous households”.
While the issue of polygamy is singled out, it is; nevertheless made clear that 
the need to comply with “the values and principlles recognised by the Member 
States” applies across the board.
The general grounds for refusal of family reumification are set out in the 
directive. Paragraph 14 of the preamble states thatt:
“the person who wishes to be granted famiily reunification should not 
constitute a threat to public policy or public seciurity. In this context it has to 
be noted that the notion o f public policy and pubilic security covers also cases 
in which a third country national belongs to am association which supports 
terrorism, supports such an association or has extremist aspirations.”
Thus it is made clear that supporting an organisation which supports terrorism 
or holding certain political views (“extremist aspirations”) can be sufficient 
grounds for the refusal of family reunification. TThe substantive article of the 
directive dealing with refusal of applications for ; family reunification (Article 
6) does not specifically mention the holding of extremist opinions as a ground 
for refusal stating instead that “Member States miay reject an application [...] 
on grounds o f public policy, public security orr public health” 105 and that 
“when taking the relevant decision, the Member State shall consider, [...], the 
severity or type o f offence against public policy <or public security committed 
by the family member, or the dangers that are emianating from such a person”
105 Ibid. Article 6(1).
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Taken together paragraph 14 of the preamble amd the provisions of Article 6 
endorse the view that the holding of certain opimions by migrants is seen as a 
threat to either public security or to public policcy both of which are seen as 
dependent on the continued attachment of citizens to the liberal democratic 
system. This approach lies at the heart of recentt changes in immigration law 
and policy at member state level which are outliined below. References to the 
rights of women in paragraph 11 of the preamble further support the view that 
such policies are necessary for the protection olf certain groups who may be 
victimised should the “extremist” worldview of’ certain migrants increase its 
influence in the host society.
As well as endorsing the notion of private opimions of migrants as a valid 
subject for state regulation, the directive also contains measures designed to 
facilitate member state efforts to encourage integration on the part of their 
migrant populations. Article 4(1) provides that: member states may require 
children over the age of 12 satisfy “a condition fo r  integration provided for by 
existing legislation on the date o f implementation o f this Directive”. This is 
supplemented by a more general provision in Artticle 7(2) which provides that 
“Member States may require third country nationals to comply with 
integration measures, in accordance with natiomal law, ” thereby protecting 
the religion-related measures taken at member state level outlined below. The 
compatibility of certain cultural/religious practiices with the aim of greater 
integration is directly addressed in Article 4(5) which states that “In order to 
ensure better integration and to prevent forced rmarriages Member States may 
require the sponsor and his/her spouse to be cof a minimum age, and at a 
maximum 21 years, before the spouse is able to jo in  him/her.”
Articles 4(1), 4(5) and 7(2) were all absent from tthe Commission’s initial draft 
of the Directive but were included at the behesst of certain Member States. 
Germany and Austria pushed strongly for Articles 4(1) and (along with the
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Netherlands,) 7(2) which were inserted in September 2001106 and November 
2002107 respectively. Article 4(5) was inserted during the final stage of 
negotiations in February 2003 by the Dutch and German governments.108 
These three member states have, as will be shown below, taken a leading role 
in changing domestic immigration law in such a way that Muslim migrants in 
particular are required to give assurances that they are willing to place limits 
on the public and political role of their religion as a prerequisite for the 
granting of residence or citizenship rights.
These provisions have proved highly controversial. As noted above, many of 
the provisions which permitted the imposition of integration requirements 
were introduced by the Council at a very late stage in the legislative process. 
Indeed the insertion of the relevant provisions came so late that Parliamentary 
debates on the subject focused almost exclusively on the question of the 
acquisition of competence in the native languages of member states by 
immigrant populations. Furthermore, Article 4(6) which enabled Member 
States to place an age limit of 15 years on applications for reunification as 
minor children, was inserted after the consultation of the European Parliament 
which had advocated a less restrictive approach.109 In December 2003, the 
Parliament applied to the Court of Justice to annul certain aspects of the 
Directive which, it alleged, violated the right to respect for family life and the 
non-discrimination principle both of which were asserted to form part of the 
general principles of law protected by the Court.
The Parliament did not seek the annulment of the directive as a whole but 
sought instead to have the provisions allowing for the imposition of 
integration conditions (along with a further provision allowing Member States 
up to three years to process applications) struck down and severed from the
106 See Council document 12022/01 of 24 September 2001 see also K. Groenendijk ‘Legal 
Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law’ European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol.
6 No. 2 2004 at 119.
107 See Council document 14272/02 of 26 November 2002. For an account of the disputes 
amongst Member States in relation to this measure see Groenendijk, ibid. 119-120.
108 See Council document 6912/03 of 28 February 2003. See also Groenendijk ibid.
109 The Rapporteur backed the idea of language integration but balked at the idea that failure 
to meet it could result in a refusal of a permit. See the report of Baroness Ludford MEP (COM 
(2001)127-C5-0250/2001-2001/0074(CNS)) (A5-0436/2001).
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rest of the directive which was to remain in force. The specific provisions 
challenged by the Parliament were:
-the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) enabling Member States to require that 
a child aged over 12 who arrives independently from the rest of his/her family, 
meet an integration condition before he or she is granted entry and residence. 
-Article 4(6) which allowed Member States to request that applications under 
the Directive for reunification of minor children be submitted before the child 
reaches the age of 15.
-Article 8 which enables Member States to provide a waiting period of no 
more than three years between the making of an application and the issuing of 
a permit.110
The Advocate General advised the Court to dismiss the application on the 
grounds that it was not possible to sever the impugned provisions without 
altering the substance of the Directive and thereby trespassing on the territory 
of the Community legislature. In relation to the merits she found that the 
failure to consult the Parliament in relation to Article 4(6) rendered its 
adoption by the Council void111 (though this point had not been argued by the 
Parliament’s lawyers and was not taken up by the full court). She also found 
that Article 8 potentially permitted a situation where Member States could 
violate the fundamental rights of applicants under the directive by applying a 
waiting period of up to three years and that it was therefore contrary to 
Community law.112 Most importantly for our purposes, the Advocate General 
upheld paragraph 4(1) as a proportionate means through which Member States 
can pursue their legitimate desire to “to integrate immigrants as fully as 
possible”.113
The Grand Chamber of the Court issued its judgment at the end of June 
2006.114 The Court resolved the admissibility question by holding that:
110 Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR 1-05769.
111 Ibid. para. 59.
112 Ibid. para. 105.
U3 Ibid. paras. 112-113.
114 Ibid.
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“the fact that the contested provisions o f the Directive afford the Member 
States a certain margin o f appreciation and allow them in certain 
circumstances to apply national legislation derogating from the basic rules 
imposed by the Directive cannot have the effect o f excluding those provisions 
from review by the Court o f their legality as envisaged by Article 230 E C \U5
and that the issue of severability could only be resolved by consideration of 
the substance of the case.116
As noted above, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a very 
particular approach to the issue of Islam and liberal democracy. In its ruling in 
relation to the family reunification directive, the Court of Justice went out of 
its way to stress the importance of the role played by the European Convention 
of Human Rights in the determining the substance of the general principles
117which form part of EU law and which are upheld by the ECJ.
Thus, the ECHR was recognised by the Court as being of special significance
in the determination of the substance of the human rights norms protected in
EU law. Furthermore, in its analysis of the provisions of the directive
impugned by the Parliament, the Court showed a striking degree of deference
to the decisions of the Strasbourg court. The judgment noted that the preamble
to the directive states that it: “respects the fundamental rights and observes
the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 o f the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
118and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights o f the European Union”.
Although it failed to ask the Court to annul Article 7(2) of the Directive which 
allows Member States to impose integration conditions on third country 
nationals, the Parliament argued that, in relation to the right to family life of 
applicants under the directive:
115 Ibid. para. 22.
116 Ibid. para. 29.
117 Ibid. para. 35.
118 Ibid. para. 38.
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“a condition for integration does not fall within one o f the legitimate 
objectives capable of justifying interference, as referred to in Article 8(2) if 
the ECHR, namely, national security, public safety, the economic well-being of 
the country, the prevention of health of morals and the protection o f the rights 
and freedoms o f others 119
which seemed to indicate a somewhat wider objection to such measures. The
Court explicitly relied on several rulings of the Strasbourg Court in coming to
its decision not to annul the relevant parts of the Directive. In particular in
noted the decisions in Sen v the Netherlands, Gill v Switzerland and Ahmut v
the Netherlands from which it concluded that Article 8 “may create positive
obligations inherent in effective “respect” for family life” and that “regard
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing
interests o f the individual and o f the community as a whole; [in relation to
120which] the State enjoys a margin of appreciation”
It found that Article 4(1) of the Directive merely partially preserved this 
margin of appreciation in circumstances where a child over 12 arrives 
independently of the rest of his or her family. Accordingly:
“the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) o f the Directive cannot be regarded as 
running counter to the right to respect for family life. In the context o f a 
directive imposing precise positive obligations on the Member States, it 
preserves a limited margin of appreciation for those states which is no 
different from that accorded to them by the European Court o f Human 
Rights."121
The Court specifically endorsed the compatibility of integration conditions 
with the ECHR in paragraph 66 where it stated that: “It does not appear that 
such a condition is, in itself, contrary to the right to respect for family life set
119 Ibid. para. 42.
120 Ibid. para. 54.
121 Ibid. para. 62.
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out in Article 8 o f the ECHR(...) In any event, the necessity for integration 
may fall within a number o f legitimate objectives referred to in Article 8(2) o f 
the ECHR”. This does not however indicate that there Member State discretion 
in this area is unfettered as the Court points out in paragraph 70:
‘‘The fact that the concept o f integration is not defined cannot be interpreted 
as authorising the Member States to employ that concept in a manner contrary 
to general principles o f Community law, in particular to fundamental rights. 
The Member States which wish to make use o f the derogation cannot employ 
an unspecified concept o f integration, but must apply the condition for  
integration provided for by their legislation existing on the date o f 
implementation o f the Directive in order to examine the specific situation o f a 
child over 12 years o f age arriving independently from the rest o f his or her 
family.5,122
The directive does therefore act as a kind of “stand still” measure with 
Member States being unable to introduce further restrictions in this area. 
However the stand still provision as the Court made clear, applies only in 
relation to the relatively narrow area of the directive and does not affect the 
right of individual states to introduce other restrictive measures in the 
immigration arena in general. Moreover, the idea of compulsory integration, 
including a duty to adhere to “European” or national values (which was 
already a feature of national legislation in certain Member States), was not, of 
itself contrary to Community law.
The Grand Chamber also rejected the Parliament’s arguments in relation to 
Article 4(6) on the basis that an age limit on applications interfered with 
family life and was discriminatory. The Council argued that encouraging 
immigrant families to bring their children at a young age in order to facilitate 
their integration was a legitimate objective under Article 8(2) ECHR.123 The 
Court held that “It does not appear that the contested provision infringes the 
right to respect fo r  family life set out in Article 8 o f the ECHR as interpreted
122 Ibid. para. 70.
123 Ibid. para. 79.
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by the European Court of Human Rights” and that the fact that Article 5(5) of 
the Directive requires Member States to take the best interests of the child into 
account meant that: “Article 4(6) cannot be regarded as running counter to the 
fundamental right to respect for family life”.124
Article 8 of the Directive was upheld on similar grounds. The Court held that 
the provision:
“preserves a limited margin o f appreciation for the Member States by 
permitting them to make sure that family reunification will take place in 
favourable conditions, after the sponsor has been residing in the host State for  
a period sufficiently long for it to be assumed that the family members will 
settle down well and display a certain level o f integration. Accordingly, the 
fact that a Member State takes those factors into account and the power to 
defer family reunification for two or, as the case may be, three years do not 
run counter to the right to respect for family rights set out in particular in 
Article 8 o f the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 125
The judgment is notable in several respects. First the ECJ endorses integration 
of immigrant communities as a legitimate objective which can be pursued by 
states under Article 8(2) of the ECHR. It seems willing to uphold relatively 
substantial interferences with the Article 8 rights of immigrants in order to 
enable to Member States to pursue the integration policies which they see fit. 
Moreover, the Court’s heavy reliance on the judgments of the Strasbourg 
Court in order to determine the content of the Union’s fundamental rights 
guarantees may prove important for the future development of the EU law as it 
relates to the interaction of questions of religion, integration and the right of 
states to require adherence to certain religion-related norms from individual 
immigrants. The primary reason given by the Court for upholding the three 
impugned provisions of the directive was that each complied with Article 8 of 
the ECHR as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. The ECJ judgment therefore 
appears to indicate that legislation which appears to comply with the standards
124 Ibid. para. 90.
125 Ibid. para. 98.
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set down by the Strasbourg court will, almost inevitably, not be found to be in 
violation of the fundamental rights norms which form a part of EU law. The 
judgment in the Refah Partisi case indicates that the Court of Human Rights is 
willing to uphold extensive interferences with ECHR rights in order to defend 
the liberal democratic order, including the principles of public and private 
autonomy, from what it sees as the threat of political Islam. Should EU law 
follow this approach, interference by Member States with rights to religious 
liberty and to privacy in the defence of “European” values are unlikely to fall 
foul of EU human rights norms.
The approach adopted by the Council in relation to the family reunification 
directive has been repeated in a second directive which established the rights
1 Of*of third country nationals who are long-term residents of the EU. Like the 
family reunification directive, the preamble to the long term residents directive 
which was adopted in late 2003, contains a paragraph noting that Member 
States should not discriminate, inter alia, on grounds of religious or political 
beliefs in giving effect to the directive.127 However, it also subordinates this 
duty to a requirement that third country nationals seeking to use the terms of 
the directive “should not constitute a threat to public policy or public 
security”.128 Article 5(2) of the directive specifically states that “Member 
States may require, third country nationals to comply with integration 
conditions, in accordance with national law”.
Article 6 provides the grounds on which long-term resident status may be 
refused. It states that “Member States may refuse to grant long-term resident
129status on grounds o f public policy or public security.” Member States 
therefore, can refuse long term resident status on the ground that the applicant 
is a threat to public policy or public security. At the same time, Article 5 
makes it clear that applications may be refused if integration conditions are not 
met. A failure on the part of migrants to integrate is, as a permissible ground
126 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third 
country nationals who are long-term residents OJ L16/44 23.1.2004.
127 Ibid. para. 5 of the preamble.
128 Ibid. para. 9. Para. 21 also mentions public policy and public security as relevant factors 
along with public health.
129 Ibid. Article 6(1).
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for refusal of status under ground 6, therefore seen as a threat to either public 
policy or public security. Furthermore, Article 9(3) makes it clear that long­
term resident status can be withdrawn from those who constitute a threat to 
public policy while Article 12 permits the expulsion of such people provided
they are shown to constitute “an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public
1 ^ 0policy or public security.”
As with the family reunification, the requirement contained in Article 5(2) was 
not present in the Commission’s initial draft of the legislation but was inserted 
by Member States. Indeed, at the insistence of the Austrian and German 
governments the phrase “integration measures” was strengthened to 
“integration conditions” in order to emphasise that failure to adhere to such 
conditions could potentially result in a refusal of the relevant permit.131 The 
Court of Justice’s ruling in relation to the family reunification directive make 
it unlikely that such provisions will be held to fall foul of the Union’s human 
rights commitments.
Therefore, in the light of both the statement of basic principles and the ruling 
of the ECJ in the family reunification case, the directives passed in this area 
clearly provide space within EU law for member states to take active steps to 
regulate the religious views of individual migrants and to refuse concrete legal 
benefits to those migrants whose views do not adhere to the fundamental 
values of the Union or individual member state. By categorising a failure on 
the part of such migrants to adhere to the fundamental values of the Union as a 
threat to public policy and/or public security, EU legislation provides 
justification for laws aimed at limiting the degree to which those who adhere 
to conservative religiously-influenced norms in relation to gender and 
sexuality can either attempt or even simply desire to enshrine such norms in 
public policy. As Groenendijk points out, previous migration related 
legislation in the Union had focused on integration primarily as something 
which could be encouraged by enhancing the residence status of immigrants 
and providing for equal treatment. Regulation 1612/68 for instance (which
130 Ibid. Article 12(1).
131 See Groenendijk n. 107 above, 122-123.
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enshrines free movement of EU citizens) does not allow for any integration 
tests and restricts language examinations to situations where a knowledge of 
the language of the relevant member state is necessary to carry out the relevant 
employment.132 However, since 2003, EU law has increasingly adopted an 
approach under which “the lack of integration or the assumed unfitness to
133integrate are grounds for refusal o f admission to the country”. The heavy 
reliance by the Court of Justice on the jurisprudence of the Court of Human 
Rights in order to determine the limitations that the fundamental rights norms 
of the EU will place on such a policy substantially lessens the likelihood of 
large scale interference with this policy on the part of the ECJ.
4. Developments at Member State Level
4.1 The Netherlands
The increasing emphasis placed by EU law on integration and adoption of 
“European Values” by immigrants has occurred against a background of 
similar developments at Member State level. In recent years several member 
states have radically overhauled their approach to migrant integration and have 
placed the question of religion at the centre of such changes. The approach of 
the Netherlands to these issues of religion, migration and citizenship has been 
extremely influential. The Netherlands is a country with a libertarian and 
egalitarian approach to questions of sexuality. Prostitution and pornography 
are tolerated while same sex marriage has been legal since 2001. It also has a 
Muslim population of over one million (out of a total of approximately 16 
million). A series of events in the late 1990s and early 2000s the murders of 
and death threats against figures such as Pirn Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh and 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali who were severely critical of Muslim attitudes towards 
gender, sexuality and freedom of expression.
These trends and events led to a situation where “old-style multiculturalism” 
was as Fukuyama says, “widely seen as a failure in Holland\ 134 Dutch 
government policy changed radically to deal with these concerns. In 2000,
132 Ibid. 116.
133 ibid. 113.
134 F. Fukuyama ‘Europe vs. Radical Islam’ in Policy Review, 27 February 2006.
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2002 and 2003 legislative changes were introduced which required applicants 
for naturalistion to indicate their “integration” into Dutch society by means of 
a series of exams examining knowledge of Dutch society and the Dutch 
language.135 Worries that the “importation” of spouses by Muslim immigrants 
from their countries of origin was hampering integration efforts led to an 
increase in the minimum age after which spouses could benefit from family 
reunification. Tighter rules were introduced providing that religious preachers 
from abroad had to attend integration courses in which Dutch values would be 
explained to them. Most strikingly, a new test for immigrants with 
accompanying explanatory video was introduced in 2006.
The immigration test required immigrants to answer a series of questions 
about the Netherlands such as its provincial structure and the role of the 
monarchy. It also requires immigrants to show an awareness of Dutch norms 
in relation to sexual liberalism and gender equality. Questions in the exam ask 
how people should react if the see two men kissing or whether hitting women 
or female circumcision are acceptable practices.136 Those who wish to sit the 
exam are required to take extensive language classes and are sent an 
instructional video which shows footage of topless bathing and a same-sex 
couple kissing. Those who pass the test will be required to swear allegiance to 
Holland and its constitution within five years.
The claim that the test is aimed at Muslims is strengthened by the fact that 
immigrants from non-European “Western” countries such as the United States, 
Canada and Australia are exempt.137 Muslim groups severely criticised the 
proposal. The Islamic Human Rights Commission, a British-based
135 Royal Decree of 14 April 2002, Staatsblad 2002, no. 197, Royal Decree of 15 March 2003 
Staatsblad 2003, Royal Decree no. 118 on the entry in to force of the Act of 21 December 
2000, Staatsblad 2000, no. 618.
136 See ‘The Civic Integration Exam Abroad’ published by Immigratie-en Naturalisatiedienst 
(the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service), available at:
http://www.ind.nl/en/Images/bro inburgering tcm6-105967.pdf (last visited 7 June 2007). In 
particular see page 23 which specifies that in addition to EU citizens, American, Canadian, 
Australian, New Zealand, Japanese, Norwegian and Swiss nationals are exempt from the test. 
See also ‘Holland Launches the Immigrant Quiz’ The Sunday Times, 12 March 2006 at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0„2081496,00.html (last visited 16 June 2006).
137 “Dutch Immigration Kit Offers a Revealing View” The New York Times, 17 March 2006 at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/news/dutch-5852942.php (last visited 6 October 
2006).
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organisation, described the test as “Islamophobic” and said that it sent out a 
message that “Muslims are not only unwelcome ... but those that are already 
[in the Netherlands] do not conform to a uniform idea of what should be a
11Rcitizen” [sic]. It also alleged that “this type o f treatment denies primarily 
Muslims, but in fact also many others, the rights to freedom o f religion, belief 
and expression and political thought.”139 Dutch theologian Karen Steenbrink 
of Utrecht University also criticised the video on the grounds that it was 
“offensive to Muslims” and noted that topless bathing is in fact rarely seen in 
the Netherlands”.140 Emecmo, a group which represents Moroccans in the 
Netherlands described the video as provocation rather than education and said 
it was clearly intended to stop Muslim immigration.141 This was denied by the 
government. Rita Verdonk the then immigration minister asserted that “It is 
important to make clear demands of people. They need to subscribe to our 
European values, respect our laws and learn the language.”142
Religion in general and Islam in particular have therefore been prominent 
elements in the debate around the new Dutch policy in relation to immigration. 
While part of the overall objective of these measures has been to decrease 
immigrant numbers (visa fees were also significantly increased), the central 
role accorded to gender and sexuality in the measures adopted demonstrate 
that an equally important objective of the policies in question has been to 
make acceptance of sexual liberalism, gender equality and the restriction of 
religious influence on public policy into prerequisites for the acquisition of 
Dutch citizenship. While it is clearly unable to determine the political and 
religious views of established citizens, the Dutch government has made it clear 
that, in so far as immigrants are concerned, Dutch citizenship is available only
138 See Arzu Merali of the Islamic Human Rights Commission quoted at 
http://www.is1amweb.net/ver2/archive/article.php71an g=E&id=l23732 6 April 2006, (last 
visited 16 June 2006).
139 Ibid. The film however received the backing of Mohammed Sini, chairperson of Islam and 
Citizenship (a national Muslim organisation) who described homosexuality as ‘a reality’ and 
who called on immigrants ‘to embrace modernity’. See ‘Netherlands Issues Immigration Test’ 
Washington Times, 16 March 2006 at http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060315- 
100027-7407r page2.htm (last visited 23 October 2006).
140 Ibid.
141 n.136 above.
142 See ‘Europe Raises the Bar for Immigrants’ The Boston Globe, 22 May 2006 at 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/05/22/europe raises bar for immig
rants/ (last visited 1 May 2007).
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to those who are willing to accept these values or who are, at the very least, 
willing to place limitations on their desires to see religious norms hostile to 
such values reflected in public policy. The tests clearly make the holding of 
certain views by individual migrants the subject of a degree of state regulation. 
The focus on requiring acceptance of gay relationships or the freedom of 
women to wear revealing clothing indicates that what is being sought is 
acceptance on the part of individuals of the right of others to engage in 
conduct thought sinful by many religions (most notably mainstream Islam). A 
failure to adhere to such libertarian values can result in a denial of the right to 
live in the Netherlands.
As both the exemption of “Western” immigrants from the tests and the 
reactions of Muslim leaders show, these requirements are either aimed at or 
prove most challenging for, Muslim immigrants and represent an implicit but 
clear assertion by the Dutch government that adherence to the values of many 
of the current interpretations of the Islamic religion are incompatible with 
Dutch citizenship. As Klausen’s research has shown, even amongst otherwise 
moderate Muslims, many do find it difficult to accept the concept of gay 
rights,143 yet this is exactly what the Dutch government now requires them to 
do on pain of denial of the right to immigrate to the Netherlands. Under this 
approach, the protection of the personal autonomy and freedom from religion 
of Dutch gays and lesbians is seen as requiring a degree of interference with 
the personal autonomy of those who cannot or will not confine their 
disapproval of homosexuality to the private sphere.
143 Klausen’s survey of European Muslims who were actively engaged in civic life (a group 
which she acknowledges to be made up of a disproportionate number of moderate and more 
western-oriented Muslims) also showed little evidence of an acceptance of sexual liberalism 
on the part of European Muslims. Even interviewees who expressed views which were 
otherwise liberal were unequivocal in their opposition to greater toleration of homosexuality, 
with some going as far as suggesting that no secular state had the right to impose toleration of 
gays and lesbians on Muslims (J. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in 
Western Europe, (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2005). See interview with 
young Danish Imam at pages 15 and 16, the opposition of the Muslim Council of Britain to 
gay rights at page 34, the description of the opposition of ‘the voluntarists’ to all gay rights at 
page 92). Hussein attributes some of the decline in support for the Labour Party amongst 
British Muslims to the Blair government’s support for gay rights legislation (D. Hussein ‘The 
Impact of 9/11 on British Muslim Identity’ in R. Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. 
Idleman Smith (eds.) Islam and the West Post 9/11 (Ashgate, Aldershot, Hants, England, 
2004) 120.
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4.2 Germany
The Dutch approach to these issues has been very influential both on the 
policies of other member states and on the approach of EU policy and 
legislation in this area. In Germany changes in the nationality laws which 
came into force on 1 January 2000 loosened the link between blood line and 
nationality but made “proof of commitment to the values of the Basic Law”144 
a prerequisite of citizenship. There is at least some evidence that elements of 
Islamic belief and practice are seen potentially inconsistent with these values. 
Klausen has noted how the requirement has been “a sticking point” for many 
German Muslims. Moreover, the federal agency for the protection of the 
Constitution {Bundesamt Fur Verfassungsschutz) has blacklisted Milli Goriis, 
one of the largest Muslim organisations in Germany describing its as an 
“Islamist” organisation whose social work amongst the young is 
“disintegrative.. .antidemocratic and antiwestem”,145
The CDU Federal minister for the Interior Wolfgang Schauble praised the new 
Dutch immigration regulations saying that Germany “can learn from the 
Netherlands”.146 Under German law individual states have power to assess 
whether potential citizens truly accept the principles of the Basic Law to 
which federal law requires them to sign an oath of allegiance. The state of 
Baden-Wurttemberg was the first to use these powers to propose a citizenship 
which examined the compatibility of the values of aspirant citizens with 
“German values”. It was quickly followed by the State of Hesse which 
proposed a similar examination. Tests in both states were again clearly aimed 
at assessing the degree to which Muslims were willing to separate religious 
attitudes towards gender and sexuality to the private sphere and to accept 
liberal notions of individual self-determination. Indeed in Baden-Wurttemberg 
the state government explicitly mentioned Muslims as the targets of the new 
policy.147 Questions in the Hesse examination for example, asked immigrants 
“A woman should not be allowed to move freely in public or travel unless
144 Ibid. Klausen, 21.
145 Ibid. 43.
146 See ‘Testing the Limits of Tolerance’ Deutsche Welle 16 March 2006 at: http://www.dw- 
world.de/dw/article/0,2144.1935900,00.html (last visited 16 June 2006).
147 See ‘New Rules for Muslims in German State Blasted’ Deutsche Welle, 5 January 2006 at: 
http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,2144,1840793,00.html (last visited 2 June 2006).
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escorted by a close male relative. What is your standpoint on thisT  and “ What 
possibilities do parents have to influence their sons ” or daughters ” choice of
1 A O
partner? Which practices are forbidden?”. Similarly, the Baden- 
Wurttemberg test asked questions relating to forced marriage (“What do you 
think o f the fact that parents forcibly marry off their children?”), 
homosexuality (“Does the holding o f office by open homosexuals disturb 
you?”) and women’s rights (“Do you think that a woman should obey her 
husband and that he can beat her if she is disobedient?”)149. Both tests also 
focused on other issues seen as particularly relevant to Muslims. The Hesse 
test examined attitudes towards Israel (“Explain the term “Israel”s right to 
exist”“) and Holocaust denial (“if someone described the Holocaust as a myth 
or a fairytale, how would you respond?”)150 while the Baden-Wurttemberg 
exam asked whether the September 11th hijackers were “terrorists or freedom 
fighters”.151
As in the Netherlands, the proposals were severely criticised for interfering 
with private attitudes and stereotyping Muslims.152 Volker Beck, a leading 
member of the Green Party noted that the anti-gay attitudes of Baden- 
Wurttemberg’s (Christian) interior minister meant that “he himself would 
probably fail the test”.153 The Federal Parliament took up the issue in February 
2006 with the CDU minister for integration policy Maria Bohmer noted how 
“the United States gives courses in the constitution, history, culture and values 
o f the country” 154 In May 2006 the federal and state governments worked out 
a series of guidelines which fell short of introducing a federal immigration test 
but which included an “integration course” which was intended to focus on
148 See: ‘Becoming German: Proposed Hesse Citizenship Test’ Der Spiegel 5 September 2005 
at: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/Q, 1518,415207.00.html (last visited 2 June 
2006). The guidelines for the test provided by the Baden-Wurrtemberg government can be 
accessed at: http://www.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/Meldungen/171636.html (last accessed 10 
October 2007).
149 n.142 above. See also the guidelines provided by the Baden-Wurrtemberg government ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 See ‘Europe Raises Bar for Immigrants’ Boston Globe, 22 May 2006 at: 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2006/05/22/europe raises bar for immig 
rants/ (last visited 2 June 2006)
152 See ‘How To Be a German’, Inter Press Service News Agency, 31 May 2006 at: 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp7idnews-33203. (last visited 3 June 2006)
153 n.147 above.
154 n. 148 above.
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“the German constitution and German values such as gender equality”155 In 
June 2008 the federal government introduced a citizenship test which required 
applicants to demonstrate knowledge of German legal and political structures. 
Although the test did not itself address issues of conscience and religion, it left 
in place the requirement that potential citizens demonstrate a commitment to 
upholding the values of the German constitution.156
4.3 Other Member States
The French government has adopted a similar approach. As far back as the 
year 2000, the government began to seek assurances from Muslim groups in 
relation to their commitment to “French Values”. In January of that year the 
minister for the interior Jean Paul Chevenment concluded an agreement with 
Muslim organisations which sought to establish principles on which a 
structured relationship with state institutions could be based. The French 
Government proposed that all Muslim groups participating in the exercise 
would be obliged to sign up to a statement of “Fundamental Principles” 157 
which:
“Solemnly confirmed their attachment to the fundamental principles o f the 
French Republic and especially [...] to freedom of thought and religion, to 
Article 1 o f the Constitiution which affirms the secular character o f the 
Republic and the respect this principle accords to all beliefs and finally to the 
provisions o f the law of 9 December 1905 concerning the separation o f the
1SRchurches and the State ”
155 n. 152 above.
156 See “Germany to Introduce Controversial New Citizenship Test” Der Spiegel, 11 June 
2008, (last visited 17 June 2008).
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,559021,00.html
157 See S. Ferrari The Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim Representative 
Organizations in Western Europe’ in J Cesari and S McLoughlin (eds.) European Muslims 
and the State 2005, Ashgate, Aldershot, England at 16-17. The statement was called
‘Principes et fondements juridiques regissant les rapports entre les pouvoirs public et le culte 
musulman en France ’ and is available at:
www.pourinfo.ouvaton.org/immigration/dossierchenement/chevenment.htm. Cesari also notes 
that: ‘Many Muslim representatives considered the request to sign this declaration a 
demonstration of suspicion' see: J. Cesari 2002 ‘Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious 
Minority’ in Y. Yazbeck Haddad Muslims in the West from Sojourners to Citizens, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 40.
158 Ferrari, ibid. My own translation. The original French version reads: ‘conferment 
solennellement leur attachement aux principes fondamentaux de la Republique frangaise et
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Other religious groups were not required to make similar declarations. 
Chevenment justified this targeting of Islam on the grounds that the country 
was faced with an “exceptional” situation and that unlike Christianity, Islam:
“has experienced neither the Renaissance or the Reformation. Certainly, 
Islam does distinguish between the religious and temporal domains. However, 
there is no shortage o f Muslims to show that this distinction calls for a level o f 
coordination [between the two domains] and consequently permanent 
involvement o f religion in the temporal sphere.”159
Cesari notes that several Muslim organisations considered that this request 
showed that they were viewed with suspicion by the French authorities.160
In 2003 media attention in relation to the question of the role of Islam in 
French society focused on a law to ban the wearing of “ostentatious” religious 
symbols in public schools which was widely seen as targeting the Muslim 
headscarf. However, in the course of proposing this ban to parliament, then 
Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin placed the issue of the headscarf into the 
wider context of immigration, citizenship and common values saying 
“Integration is a process that presupposes a mutual wish to [integrate], a shift 
towards certain values, a choice o f a way o f life, a commitment to a certain 
view o f the world proper for France.”161 At the same time he announced that 
the government would be introducing a “contract” for immigrants under
notamment [...] a la liberte de pensee et a la liberte de religion, a l ’art. 1 de la constitution 
affirmant le caractere lai'cque de la Republique et respect par celle-ci de toutes les croyances et 
enfin aux dispositions de la loi du 9 decembre 1905 concernant la separation des Eglises et de 
l’Etat’
159 My own translation. The original French version is: a la difference du christianisme, n’a 
connu ni la renaissance ni la Reforme. Certes, lTslam distingue le domaine religieux et le 
domaine mondain. Mais il ne manque pas de musulmans pour faire observer que cette 
distinction appelle une coordination et, par consequent, une implication permanente du 
religieux dans le mondain.’ From speech of Minister Chevenment of 28 January 2000 
available at: www.pourinfo.ouvaton.org/immigration/dossierchenement/chevenment.htm. See 
Ferrari Ibid.
160 Many Muslim representatives considered the request to sign this declaration a 
demonstration of suspicion and lack of trust a quote from J Cesari 2002 at 40 ‘Islam in France: 
The Shaping of a Religious Minority’ in Y Yazbeck Haddad Muslims in the West from  
Sojourners to Citizens, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002).
161 Klausen,. n 144 above, 176.
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which learning the French language and “attachment” to France and French
162values would be preconditions for the granting of residence permits. The 
announcement of measures to encourage immigrants to adopt French values at 
the same time as legislation targeting the headscarf on the basis of its 
incompatibility with secular values was being introduced, gives the clearest 
possible indication of the thinking of the French authorities. Along with their 
colleagues in other EU member states, they viewed (rightly or wrongly) 
elements of Islam (and in particular those relating to gender and sexuality), as 
incompatible with native values. Furthermore, the solution to such 
incompatibility lay in the adoption by immigrant communities of the secular 
values whose acceptance was to become prerequisite of citizenship. Thus in a 
move which certain commentators have seen as at least partly prompted by the 
importance accorded to integration in the EU directives on long term residents
1 f \Xand family reunification, France amended its 1945 law to require 
immigrants to satisfy a condition of “Republican Integration”.164 In July 2008, 
the Conseil d’Etat upheld a refusal to grant French nationality to a woman on 
the grounds that her “radical ” practice of Islam, which included the wearing 
of a niqab, was incompatible with the basic values of French society including 
gender equality.165
The trend towards incorporating an acceptance of the idea of the right of 
freedom from religion as part of citizenship can also be seen in other member 
states. In 2002 for example, Austria introduced a compulsory “Integration 
Agreement” as part of reforms of its Aliens Act166 while in 2005 Britain 
introduced a “Life in the UK Test” which examines the knowledge of 
applicants for British citizenship of British values, culture and history. 
Included in the tests are questions probing acceptance of principles such as the
162 Ibid. at 123-124. These measures were introduced in April 2006.
163 See S. Barbou des Places and H. Oger ‘Making the European Migration Regime: Decoding 
Member States’ Legal Strategies’ European Journal o f Migration and Law, Vol. 6 No.4 2004, 
361.
164 See article 6(3) of Loi no. 2003-1119 du 26 novembre 2003 relative a la maitrise de
1’immigration, au sejour des etrangers en France et a la nationality, Journal Officiel no 274,
27 novembre 2003).
165 Section du contentieux, 2me et 7eme sous-sections reunies. Seance du 26 mai 2008.
Lecture du 27 juin 2008, Mme. M. Available at :http://www.conseil- 
etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld0820.shtml (last visited 19 July 2008).
166 Ibid. 360.
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1 f\7gender equality and importance of tolerance. In late 2006, then Prime 
Minister Tony Blair stressed the importance of these principles in a speech in 
which he criticised a “new and virulent form of ideology associated with a
minority o f our Muslim community” and warned migrants that “our tolerance
168is part o f what makes Britain, Britain. Conform to it; or don't come here”.
These laws have focused on actual or perceived resistance amongst Muslim 
populations to gender equality and sexual liberalism which have become 
emblematic of wider fears around the willingness of some Muslims to respect 
the notion of an individual right to a zone of freedom from religious norms. 
The response of some European governments has been to stipulate acceptance 
of liberal values in these areas as a prerequisite of citizenship in order to test 
the willingness of Muslim immigrants to accept limitations on the use of 
religious precepts as a basis for public policy (on the basis that it is in relation 
to areas such as gender and sexuality that religiously inspired views are 
strongest) and thus to accept the kind of limitations on public religion which 
have evolved in Europe over recent centuries. These countries see in the 
religious views of certain migrants, a threat to the humanist and liberal 
characteristics of their societies and the rights to privacy and individual self- 
determination which such societies uphold. Their desire to protect these 
humanist and liberal elements (which is seen as important both culturally and 
as a means to protect certain groups such as women and homosexuals), 
renders the private views of potential citizens and residents a legitimate 
subject of legal regulation. Therefore, the linking of acceptance of the 
principle of freedom from religion to the granting of citizenship or residence 
rights, potentially interferes, in the name of protecting the privacy and 
autonomy of one set of individuals, with the privacy and autonomy of those 
who hold views which are condemnatory towards the conduct of others.
167 See: ‘Core British Values’ BBC News, 17 May 2006
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/politics show/4988946.stm (last visited 27 November 
2006) and also ‘New UK Citizenship Testing Starts, BBC News, 1 November 2005 at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/43917lO.stm (last visited 27 November 2006).
168 See: ‘Conform to Our Society Says PM’ BBC News 8 December 2006. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/6219626.stm (last visited 11 December 2006).
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These developments have influenced EU law in this area in two ways. First, 
EU legislation has been careful not to impinge upon the ability of member 
states to regulate the religious beliefs of migrants.169 Second in both 
substantive legislation170 and in its broader statements of policy171 the Union 
has endorsed the view of a failure to adopt certain “European Values” and to 
confine one’s religious convictions to the private sphere, as a threat to public 
policy justifying legal intervention. Furthermore, EU law has in turn 
influenced national laws with certain member states using what has been 
termed the “alibi” of restrictive European legislation in relation to integration 
matters to introduce such an approach into national law.
5. Conclusion
As has been shown in previous chapters, the notion of balance between 
religious and humanist influences is a central element of the approach of EU 
law to the role of religion in its public order. The EU’s approach to the issues 
of Enlargement and immigration demonstrate that it regards this notion of 
balance as requiring certain limitations on religious influence over law and 
politics which are therefore seen as necessary elements of membership of the 
Union. In particular it has evinced a concern that certain kinds of religious 
identities might pose a threat to core elements of this balance such as 
pluralism in the public sphere as well as to the key liberal democratic values of 
personal autonomy, equality and respect for privacy. The history of the 
Crusades and Inquisition as well as more contemporary examples such as law 
and government in modern day Saudi Arabia and Iran, show that religion can 
both provide the basis for many serious violations of human rights and 
exercise a degree of control of the political and personal spheres which is 
incompatible with liberal democratic values. As the judgment of the Court of 
Human Rights in Refah rightly pointed out and as the restrictions on the role 
of religion in the political arena outlined in Chapter III underline, the 
enactment of “divine” law as the basis of the legal system is inconsistent with 
the openness to change, pluralism and equal participation in public debate
169 See the provisions of the family reunification and long-term residents directives allowing 
for the imposition of integration conditions by individual member states above.
170 See discussion of the grounds for refusing status in the directives above.
171 See JHA council policy statement n. 89 above.
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necessary to liberal democratic systems. As a polity committed to balance in 
religious matters and to the protection of fundamental rights, the EU is entitled 
and possibly obliged, to ensure that those states that seek to join it impose the 
limitations on religious influence over law and politics necessary for liberal 
democratic values to thrive. Its dealings with Romania and Turkey, 
demonstrate that the Union has used the Copenhagen Criteria on Enlargement 
to ensure that applicant states balance their desire to promote religious 
morality through law with respect for notions of individual equality and 
autonomy. The introduction of a mechanism to deprive those states which fail 
to respect fundamental rights norms in Article 7 of the Nice Treaty172 provides 
the possibility that such requirements will be more actively imposed on 
existing Member States, as is indicated by the Commission’s 2005 warning to 
the Polish government that that risked losing voting rights in the Council 
should it fail to respect gay rights.173
In the area of immigration, the approach of the Union has shown similar 
concerns. It has encouraged Member States to require migrants to the Union to 
indicate that they accept the principles of the autonomy of the public sphere 
and individual private autonomy and the limitations on the reflection in law of 
the conservative, interventionist and patriarchal approaches of many religions 
to issues of gender and sexuality which such principles entail, as a prerequisite 
to the granting of residence rights or citizenship. This approach does involve a 
significant degree of interference with individual religious liberty and with the 
private views and identity rights of individual migrants. However, in an 
approach analogous to the “militant democracy espoused by the Court of 
Human Rights in Refah, the Union has permitted Member States to interfere 
with private views and individual autonomy in order to secure respect for 
these principles in relation to issues such as gender and sexuality. Indeed, in 
the context of migration, states regularly select migrants on the basis that they 
have certain desirable traits (the youthful, highly skilled and those with
172 Article 7, TEU, as amended, Council of the European Union, Brussels, Consolidated 
versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union, 15 April 2008, 6655/08.
173 See “EU Warns Poland on Gays”, 26 October 2005, available at: 
http://www.365gav.com/newscon05/10/102605poland.htm (accessed 6 April 2007).
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cultural or ethnic ties to certain states are often granted favourable treatment 
under immigration laws). It is not therefore, inherently objectionable for EU 
Member States to select migrants on the basis of commitment to certain basic 
values or for the Union to encourage the selection of migrants committed to 
the values of its own public order such as respect for a the notion of balance 
between religious and humanist influences.
However, the policing of these limitations on religious influence over law is 
rendered complex by the Union’s attempts to distinguish between religious 
claims which are parts of Member State cultures and those that are political in 
nature. The facilitation of religion under the EU’s public order has included 
the promotion of religious morality as part of a broader public morality which 
Member States are entitled to promote as part of their cultural autonomy. This 
has enabled faiths which are culturally-entrenched at Member State level to 
promote their religious notions of morality as part of national cultural identity. 
On the other hand, similar claims on the part of outsider religions which are 
not seen as part of national culture to the same extent are seen as political and 
therefore as representative of a desire to subject the political arena to religious 
domination. Such religions are therefore seen as potentially threatening to a 
public order which regards balance between religious, humanist and cultural 
influences as requiring limitations on religious influence over the public 
sphere. Indeed in relation to Turkey, a desire to promote the Islamic values 
seems to have been regarded as unacceptable despite Islam’s status as the 
dominant national religion and major element of Turkish culture, thus giving 
the impression of a degree of incompatibility between the Union’s public 
order and Islam itself rather than merely political Islam. In a similar vein, the 
retention by immigrants (and particularly Muslim immigrants) of views hostile 
to notions such as gay rights or gender equality are seen as evidence of a 
failure to accept the limitations on religious influence over law and society 
inherent in the EU’s public order rather than private religious beliefs.
It may well be the case that European believers in religions which are 
culturally entrenched within EU Member States have come to accept 
limitations on their influence over law as a result of historic exposure to the
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secularising forces that have marked European history.174 The cultural role of 
such faiths may therefore be less threatening to the notion of balance between 
religious and humanist influences than the public ambitions of faiths whose 
followers’ expectations of legal and political influence have had less exposure 
to such forces, particularly as the influence of such insider religions over law 
is felt only as part of wider national cultures most of which have been marked 
by intensive secularisation. It is certainly true that the passing of laws on 
explicitly religious grounds would damage the ability of adherents of minority 
faiths and non-believers to take part in the political process in a meaningful 
way, even if the resulting laws respected the principle of personal autonomy. 
Accordingly, and in the light of the fundamental importance of the principle of 
equal dignity in the public sphere, the greater intensity of the Union’s 
restrictions on religious influence in the political sphere compared to those 
applied in relation to national culture, are not necessarily unjustifiable. 
However, the fact that the sometimes similar claims of insider and outsider 
faiths are treated in a different manner does raise serious issues of equal 
treatment and risks exposing the EU to charges of discrimination. There is 
however no easy solution to the Union’s difficulties in this regard. It is 
committed to respecting Member State cultural autonomy which includes the 
promotion of partly religiously influenced notions of public morality. At the 
same time it has a strong humanist tradition which requires that religious 
influence in the public sphere be limited. The Union’s attempt to adhere to 
both of these principles has led to a degree of unequal treatment between 
insider and outsider faiths. However this inequality is reflective of the reality 
that some faiths maintain a privileged position at Member State level and the 
pluralist nature of the Union’s public order means that such privilege will 
inevitably be seen, to some degree, at EU level.
174 Indeed several commentators have noted that rejection of ‘live and let live’ privatised 
religion is not restricted to Muslim immigrants by any means but is in fact prevalent amongst 
immigrants of many religions. See G. Davie ‘Religion in Britain: Changing sociological 
assumptions’ Sociology, 34/1:113-128. She further argues that the difference in attitude to 
religion of native Europeans and immigrant communities ‘has led to persistent and damaging 
misunderstandings’ (ibid). See also P. Norris and R. Inglehart Sacred and Secular: Religion 
and Politics Worldwide Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
1. Introduction: Religion and Humanism: The Twin Pillars of the Union’s 
Public Order
2. The Effects of an Identity-Based Approach to Religion
3. Competing Identities Limiting Religious Influence within the EU Legal 
Order
4. The Problems, Power and Limits of Religion’s Cultural Role
5. Conclusion
1. Introduction: Religion and Humanism: The Two Pillars o f the Union’s 
Public Order
This thesis has been an endeavour to provide a broader account of the 
relationship between religion and the public order of the European Union. It 
has sought to go beyond issues of religious freedom to consider the complex 
relationships between religion, individual rights, democracy and collective 
(particularly national) identities seen in the context of the EU's sui generis and 
highly pluralist legal order. It has demonstrated how, in a context of increasing 
religious and cultural diversity in Europe, the EU has constructed a public 
order which aims to balance the two major influences on contemporary 
European approaches to the relationship between religion, law and state; a 
mainly Christian religious tradition and a humanist tradition which sprang 
from, but nevertheless has often come into conflict with, Christianity.1 These 
two traditions are present in the legal systems of all Member States.2 However, 
the relative importance accorded to each, along with the degree of cultural 
identification with particular faiths, varies greatly from country to country.3 
The EU lacks the authority to reconstruct the relationship between the state, the 
law and religion in a fundamental fashion. It is therefore required to devise an 
approach which synthesises the national traditions of its Member States.
1 These two influences are discussed in the work of LeGoff discussed in section 2 of Chapter 
II.
2 See section 4 of Chapter II which details the contemporary role of religion in EU Member 
States.
3 Ibid.
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The Union’s public order seeks to uphold its commitment to balancing its 
religious and humanist traditions and to give scope to Member States to 
continue to pursue their own particular relationships to religion, by treating 
religion as a form of identity. Approaching religion in this way contributes to 
balance between these traditions by restricting religious influence in the 
political arena while facilitating religion’s cultural role, in particular its role in 
national cultures. In line with predominant anthropologically-focused 
approaches, culture in general and therefore religion’s cultural role, is seen 
under EU law as separate, to a degree, from the rationalism of the political 
sphere and the economic imperatives of the market.4 This cultural role allows 
religion to be recognised as part of the EU’s public order in its own right. 
Although protection of religion’s cultural role does allow it to achieve a degree 
of facilitation within both the market and the political arena, including 
recognition of religion’s historical role in defining communal moral standards,5 
such facilitation must also respect and adapt to the commercial needs of the 
market and to the strong humanist and secular elements, including respect for 
individual autonomy, which are part of the same public order and which 
restrict religious influence over law and politics.6 This balancing of religious 
and humanist influences is seen as part of Europe’s ethical identity and 
inheritance and as normatively desirable in its own right.7
2. The Effects o f an Identity-Based Approach to Religion 
Treating religion as a form of identity impacts on the nature of the role played 
by religion within the EU legal order. Identity covers both individual self­
definition (“who am I?”) and broader shared identities which provide a 
framework for and give meaning to, individual identities and choices (“what
4 EU legislation has repeatedly recognised that cultural goods and activities must not be treated 
solely on the basis of their commercial value and that culture is entitled to protection from the 
free market (see section 3.1 of Chapter V). See also the discussion in section 4 of this chapter.
5 EU law has recognised that religious bodies make a “particular contribution” to policymaking 
and has facilitated religious participation in this field (see section 3 of Chapter III).
6 Facilitation of the religious identity of employees under EU law is limited by the need to 
respect the commercial nature of the market (see section 2.3.1 of Chapter V). The Union has 
made it clear that religious domination of the public sphere and excessive interference with 
private autonomy in order to promote religious norms are incompatible with EU membership 
(see Chapter VI).
7 The Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty recognises both religious and humanist influences as 
elements of its constitutional values (see section 2 of Chapter III). For a discussion of the 
importance of the principle of balance in EU law (see section 5.2 of Chapter III).
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am I?”). While respecting individual self-definition can be seen as a humanist 
goal (albeit one with which individual religions may agree), protecting 
collective identities can, in addition to respecting human choices, involve 
valorising factors such as national or religious identities which are seen as 
having significance beyond subjective human experience and is not necessarily 
therefore entirely humanist in its orientation. The fact that viewing religion as a 
form of identity covers both of these individual and collective aspects can pose 
problems for religions in terms of the coherence of the demands which they 
may make of the law, as the individual identity rights underpinning individual 
claims to facilitation of religious identity may clash with the collective identity 
rights through which a particular religion may seek to play a broader role by, 
for example, operating public institutions such as schools and hospitals or by 
promoting the use of the law to enforce its theological norms.
The form of the recognition accorded to religion by EU law as a consequence 
of its status as a form of identity, is marked by these tensions. As a form of 
identity, religion can claim a degree of protection from the law. Such 
protection can involve the defence of individual religious identity rights, as in 
relation to the prohibition on discrimination on religious grounds in 
employment.8 However it can also involve claims for the protection of 
collective rights which restrict such individual identity rights, as in the case of 
the rights to promote particular notions of public morality9 or to operate 
religious institutions in accordance with the ethos of a particular faith.10 
Religion’s status as a form of identity also enables it to claim a degree of 
special treatment under the law. In individual terms this is seen in the 
prohibition of indirect discrimination on religious grounds which enables 
individuals to be treated in accordance with their religious characteristics 
rather than in the same way as all other individuals.11 Such claims to 
differential treatment are also seen at a collective level where Member States 
are permitted to invoke religious elements of their cultural identity in order to
8 See section 2.2 of Chapter V.
9 See section 4 of Chapter III.
10 See section 2.3 of Chapter V.
11 See section 2.2 of Chapter V.
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derogate from EU law duties on grounds of public morality12 and are also
permitted to excuse religious institutions from the duty to respect the identities
1 ^of employees in order to promote the identity of such institutions. The 
Union’s recognition of religion as a form of identity also entitles religion to a 
place in Civil Society where it has been recognised as making a “particular 
contribution” and has been facilitated on this basis.14
3. Competing Identities Limiting Religious Influence within the EU Legal 
Order
EU law therefore enables religion to influence law both through its status as an 
element of individual identity, which entitles it to protection on grounds of 
respect for individual autonomy and on the basis of its role in collective 
identity, particularly national cultural identity, which permits facilitation of 
religion’s institutional role and its contribution to notions of public morality. 
However, these roles are limited by other elements of the Union’s public order, 
including the importance of the market economy and those which reflect 
Europe’s strong humanist and secular traditions of protecting individual 
autonomy and of questioning and limiting religious influence over law and 
politics. Indeed the strong, though not exclusively, humanist orientation of an 
identity-based approach to religion, means that restrictions on the facilitation 
of religion are likely to be greater when the facilitation in question involves 
greater intrusion with key elements of human identity.
Therefore, in relation to the interests of the competitive market, which is a 
relatively impersonal, technical phenomenon and is somewhat removed from 
core issues of identity, the facilitation of religious identity is permitted to 
demand relatively significant accommodation. Although in certain instances 
EU law has recognised religion as an economic choice,15 it has repeatedly 
stated that culture is not a purely commercial matter and by recognising 
religion as an element of national culture, has suggested that there are limits on
12 See section 4 of Chapter III.
13 See section 2.3 of Chapter III.
14 See section 3 of Chapter III.
15 See the discussion of the ruling in Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie Case 196/87 
ECR [1988] 06159 in section 2.1 of Chapter V where religious choices were characterised as 
economic choices by the Court of Justice.
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extent to which religious and cultural actions can be quantified and 
transacted.16 Direct discrimination on religious grounds in matters of 
employment is not permitted even when such discrimination could be 
necessary to protect the commercial interest of an employer.17 Even in relation 
to indirect discrimination, an employer must show an “intolerable burden” or
TO
show an inability to perform “the essential functions ” of a post in order to 
restrict the religious identity rights of an employee.
In contrast, in relation to the public sphere, which is of vital importance to 
notions of equality of citizenship, equal respect and dignity,19 religious claims 
to special treatment have been restricted to a far greater degree. Indeed, as the 
Union’s commitment to respecting religion as an element of identity is merely 
the predominant mechanism through which it puts its wider commitment to 
balancing Europe’s religious and humanist traditions into operation, EU law 
has made it clear, both internally and externally, that the facilitation of 
religious identity must give way to the protection of the autonomy of the public 
sphere and the equality of all participants therein. Internally, this approach is 
seen in the framework provided by the Union to enable religious bodies to 
contribute to law and policy making. While the EU recognises the “particular 
contribution” of religious bodies, it has refused to grant religious bodies 
similar exemptions from the principle of mutual respect for all identities to 
those it provides in relation to the rights of religious institutions in the context 
of the labour market and has required religions to make their contributions to 
lawmaking through structures which require them to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of different religious choices and forms of identity and which 
therefore preclude the assertion of claims to a monopoly of truth on the part of 
particular faiths.20 Externally, this principle has been seen in relation to the
16 See the discussion of EU legislation in this area in section 3.1 of Chapter V.
17 See section 2 of Chapter V.
18 Section 2.3.1 of Chapter V.
19 See for instance J. Rawls Political Liberalism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1993) and R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 
1977).
20 The structures provided by the Union in this regard are open to all religious and 
philosophical groups, including secularist and humanist groups. Such structures cannot 
therefore readily accommodate contributions based on the claims on the part of a particular 
faith to a monopoly on truth (see section 3 of Chapter III).
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Union’s approach to Enlargement and particularly in relation to the 
requirements it has sought from Turkey concerning the limitation of religious 
influence over the Turkish legal and political systems.21
In a similar vein, the Union has also required that religious influence over law 
be limited by the need to respect the principle of private autonomy which has a 
strong tradition in European humanism. The leading religious traditions in 
Europe continue to seek to mould the law in accordance with their theological 
convictions, particularly in areas such as sexuality and the beginning and end 
of life which are closely linked to individual identity and autonomy.22 The 
EU’s identification of respect for personal autonomy as a key element of the 
Union’s public order and of EU membership has placed restrictions on the 
degree to which religious bodies can realise such goals. The commitment of 
EU law to personal autonomy is manifested both in the protection of the right 
of individuals to choose between national moral frameworks through free 
movement rights23 and through the Union’s fundamental rights commitments 
which have been interpreted so as to require Member States to refrain from 
legislating to force compliance with religious, or indeed, cultural norms to a 
degree which impinges on individual autonomy to too great an extent. Thus the 
criminalisation of private adult sexual conduct such as adultery or 
homosexuality by candidates for EU membership has been identified as 
inconsistent with accession to the Union.24
These restrictions underline the limitations on the political role of religion 
inherent in the notion of balance between Europe’s religious and humanist 
traditions. They are based on the recognition of the particular characteristics of 
religion as a form of identity. In particular, the facts that religion is such a 
powerful form of identity and that religious arguments are neither amenable to 
debate on rational grounds nor accessible to non-believers, mean that
21 The Union has required Turkey to maintain its secular system as a condition of membership 
and has warned it against introducing “Islamic elements” into its legal system while the 
European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that theocracy is repugnant to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (see section 3.2 of Chapter V and section 2.3 of Chapter VI).
22 See section 4.2 of Chapter II.
23 See section 4 of Chapter III.
24 See section 2 of Chapter VI.
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unrestricted religious influence over the political arena could both preclude the 
meaningful participation of all groups in the political process and violate the 
anti-totalitarian principles of personal autonomy and privacy which have been 
central to Europe’s postwar legal order. Europe’s humanist tradition requires 
that facilitation of religion cannot go so far as to override the notion of the 
individual as autonomous in private matters and as an equal in the legal and 
political arenas. The fundamental importance of humanist ideas (some of 
which may be shared by particular faiths) to Europe’s legal order means that 
religions which are seen as failing to respect these principles of public and 
private autonomy are not merely excluded from the public role and influence 
accorded to religion by EU law. Such religions are in fact seen as threats to the 
Union’s public order and have faced restriction on this basis.25 Indeed, despite 
(or perhaps, because of) the importance placed on the notion of individual 
autonomy by the Union, EU law has been willing, in the context of 
immigration policy, to require individual migrants to indicate their willingness 
to respect gender equality and gay rights thus interfering with the personal 
autonomy of individuals whose religious beliefs are seen as inconsistent with 
respect for public and private autonomy and therefore as threatening to the 
limits on religion inherent in the EU’s public order. This apparently 
contradictory approach highlights the ambivalent nature of the relationship 
between many forms of religion and private autonomy within the EU legal 
order. On the one hand, religious identities can be protected on the basis of 
their status as elements of identity which our respect for individual autonomy 
requires us to protect. Religious identities can however face restriction on the 
basis of collective interests. Such collective interests can relate to the 
preservation of the autonomy of the public sphere or promotion of principles 
such as gender equality. However, such collective values can also include 
religious ideas which are recognised as part of public morality. Religion can
25 See the failure of the Union to intervene in relation to the suppression of religions such as 
Scientology even in areas governed by EU law (section 3.2.2 of Chapter V), the identification 
of religions which seek restrictions on freedom of speech or the introduction of Sharia as 
contrary to the Union’s public order (section 3.2.1 of Chapter V and section 2.4 of Chapter VI) 
and the Union’s principles on immigrant integration require Member States to ensure that 
individual migrants subjugate religious objections to a duty to respect private autonomy in 
relation to issues of gender and sexuality (section 3 of Chapter VI).
26 See sections 3 and 4 of Chapter VI.
288
therefore be both a beneficiary of the protection of private autonomy and a 
reason for the curtailment of such autonomy.
4. The Problems, Power and Limits o f Religion's Cultural Role 
It is at this point that the Union’s cultural identity framework for dealing with 
religion’s public role becomes problematic. As national cultures have been 
recognised by EU law as being entitled to protection from market forces, 
recognising religion as an element of national culture entitles the practices of 
those faiths which are culturally entrenched to a greater degree of protection 
than those of “outsider” faiths and provides scope for the promotion of 
religious morality through law on grounds of cultural autonomy. In relation to 
the protection of public and private autonomy, the approach adopted by the EU 
faces significant difficulty in distinguishing between the reflection in law of 
religious ideas on the basis of religion’s role in cultural identity and political 
attempts to use law and the political process to enforce compliance with 
religious teachings. The Union’s recognition of the reflection in law of 
religious teachings which are predominant in a particular Member State as a 
legitimate exercise of cultural autonomy, enables the promotion of religious 
norms through law on the part of culturally entrenched faiths.27 Accordingly 
such “cultural” attempts to influence the law to religious ends are not seen as 
representative of a desire on the part of religion to dominate the public sphere 
or to pursue theocratic agendas. On the other hand, equivalent attempts on the 
part of outsider religions which are not similarly culturally entrenched are seen 
as political, not cultural and are therefore restricted by the limitations28 on 
religion’s political role imposed by the Union’s public order. Furthermore, the 
fact that such outsider religions are seen as having political aims means that 
they are susceptible to being regarded as potential threats to the non-theocratic 
nature of the Union’s public order and to restriction on this basis. Such an 
approach raises serious issues of equal treatment.
27 See section 4 of Chapter III. Note however the limitations of such national public morality 
on the basis of respect for individual autonomy and free movement rights described in section
5 of Chapter III.
28 See n. 25 above.
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Such fear of the consequences of enabling outsider religions to play the same 
public role as culturally entrenched faiths is part of a broader context in which 
the relationship between religion, law and state in Europe is in a state of flux 
due the pressure which increasing religious diversity has placed on established 
patterns of dealing with religion. In particular, the common European pattern 
of church-state relations based on an exalted symbolic status for particular 
faiths moderated by shared cultural conceptions around religion’s role in 
society which limit the political influence granted by such status, has come 
under some pressure as European populations come to be made up of larger 
numbers of people whose religious experience has not been marked to the 
same degree by the religion-limiting influences of European history.29 In such 
a context, the symbolic status granted to religion by the state, or previously 
largely symbolic laws relating to matters such as blasphemy, have come to be 
seen in a new light as the cultural consensus which limited their impact breaks 
down. Therefore, just as the unused and symbolic powers of the British 
monarchy would be threatened by the arrival to the UK of significant numbers 
who genuinely believed in monarchical government, similarly the symbolic 
status of European religions has been called into question by the increase in the 
number of adherents to religious traditions whose relationship to politics and 
law has not been moulded by the same conflicts and compromises which 
influenced the relationship between culturally entrenched forms of Christianity 
and the state in Europe.
The European Union has therefore had to develop its balance and identity 
focused approach to religion and to distinguish between cultural and political 
religious influence over law in this context where increasing cultural diversity 
is contributing to the highlighting of the ambiguities and contradictions of the 
established system. Addressing the issues of unequal treatment which the 
current approach entails could involve a “levelling up” of religious influence 
where restrictions on religion’s political influence are relaxed in order to
29 Davie has argued that the difference in attitude to religion of native Europeans and 
immigrant communities “has led to persistent and damaging misunderstandings, not least 
amongst groups whose religious commitments form the very core of their existence and for 
whom a pick-and-mix, live-and-let-live attitude simply will not do” G. Davie, “Religion in 
Britain: Changing Sociological Assumptions” Sociology, 34/1:113-128.
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enable outsider religions to achieve a comparably broad role to that of insider 
faiths. It could also involve a degree of “levelling down” under which the 
influence of insider religions over law is more strictly controlled with 
consequent restriction of Member State derogations from EU law obligations 
on cultural grounds.
To date no consensus has emerged in this regard. Some have argued that the 
more muscular religiosity of many immigrants may lead to a process in which 
the secular elements of the European public order are made more explicit. 
Indeed an un-named German politician quoted by Klausen in her study of 
politically active European Muslims, predicted that the result of the increased 
presence of Muslims in Europe will be the institution of greater separation 
between church and state.30 However, such an outcome is far from inevitable. 
Powerful voices have spoken out against the notion of a more secular Europe 
and have called for a reassertion of Europe’s Christian identity31 while the 
Catholic Church has, at times, used controversies such as that surrounding the 
publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in the Danish press, to push 
for measures to restrict freedoms such as the right to ridicule religion which 
emerged from past conflicts between Christianity and secular forces in 
Europe.32
The option of “levelling up” and significantly reducing restraints on religious 
influence over law and politics brings with it major drawbacks. Such an 
approach is inconsistent with the overall notion of balance between religious 
and humanist influences which underpins the overall approach of the EU in 
this area. As non-believers cannot contribute meaningfully to the formation of 
laws justified on religious grounds, it also risks compromising the ability of all 
groups to participate in public debate. Furthermore, given that major European
30 J. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge .'Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford and 
New York, Oxford University Press,'2005) 179.
31 See Charter III, sections 2 and 3, in particular the arguments of J.H.H. Weiler in Un Europa 
Cristiana (Milano, Biblioteca Universale, 2003).
32 See “Intervention of the Holy See at the ordinary session of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council on Religious Freedom, Address of H.E. Msgr. Silano M. Tomasi, Geneva, 22 
March 2007” Available at:
http://www.vatican.va/roman curia/secretariat state/2007/documents/rc seg- 
st 20070322 religion en.html (accessed 1 May 2007).
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religions such as Roman Catholicism and mainstream versions of Islam, retain 
ambitions to use the law to enforce compliance with their teachings in relation 
to “lifeworld” matters, “levelling up” risks imperilling the valuable European 
tradition of protection of privacy and individual autonomy.33 On the other 
hand, to attempt to cure the political inequalities which result from the ill- 
defined nature of the boundary between the cultural and political realms by 
insisting on absolute equality of religions in the cultural arena represents the 
kind of radically multiculturalist approach which has not found favour with 
European electorates in recent times34 and which would deny the right of 
nation states to develop their own cultural identity. Such an approach would be 
politically impossible for the EU and would violate its longstanding and 
valuable commitments to pluralism and to respecting the cultural autonomy of 
its Member States.
A degree of unequal treatment may therefore be inevitable. The Union is an 
organisation of limited competence with limited authority to reshape European 
approaches to religion. Whether or not the continuing privileged status of 
particular faiths in various Member States is desirable and whether or not such 
status promotes inequality in the public sphere, it is a reality with which the 
Union must live and one which it has specifically undertaken to respect.35 By 
defining religion’s role as cultural, EU law recognises religion as part of a 
specific and particular identity shared by a particular society (or for the 
purposes of EU, a particular Member State) which need not necessarily be
o r
shared by others. As respecting the cultural identity of Member States is 
acknowledged by the Union as one of its duties, its definition of the
33 See section 4.2 of Chapter II. See also the Vatican’s opposition to a United Nations motion 
calling for an end to the criminalisation and punishment of individuals on the grounds of their 
sexual orientation, “The Pope’s Christmas Gift: A Hard Line on Church Doctrine”, Time 
Magazine, 3 December 2008.
34 Parties running on anti-multiculturalist platforms have had significant success in the 
Netherlands and Denmark. Policies in relation to immigration have increasing stressed 
integration over multiculturalism in recent years (see section 4 of Chapter VI).
35 Article 17(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
OJC 115/47 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=QJ:C:2008:l 15:0047:0199:EN:PDF. See 
discussion in Chapter III, sections 2 and 3.
36 Inglis and Barker both note how such specificity and particularlism are intrinsic to cultural 
identity. See F. Inglis, Culture (Cambridge UK and Malden MA, USA Polity Press, 2004) 
28-29. See also C. Barker “Culture” in The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies Sage. 
(London, New Dehli, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 2004) 45. Similarly Taylor’s
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institutional role and the influence over public morality matters granted by a 
Member State to a particular religion as a cultural matter, means that such 
particularities do not have to be characterised as appropriate for all Member 
States, or as justifiable in rational terms, but are protected purely as a result of 
their status as a part of the identity of that Member State. However, the Union 
does not merely passively reflect Member State religious identities. The 
characterisation of religion’s influence over law as a cultural matter also 
involves the characterisation of this role as non-political and non-ideological in 
nature. Gramsci37 and Zizek38 have noted the degree to which cultural norms 
and practices are thought of as non-political and non-ideological. Of course, as 
both authors acknowledge, such ostensibly non-ideological and non-political 
matters are in fact far from ideologically and politically neutral. Nevertheless, 
within the explicitly political context of the public sphere, the Union has been 
notably less accommodating of the particularism and exemption from the 
requirements of rational justification and general applicability which it is 
content accommodate in relation to cultural claims on law, including such 
claims with religious aspects, and has thereby reinforced the notion of cultural 
claims as being non-political in nature, or at the very least, less of a threat to
39the autonomy of the public sphere than purely religious claims. By adopting 
this approach, the Union establishes some limits on religion’s role within the 
overtly political public sphere and provides some protection to the principle of 
formal political equality between religions and between individuals. Though it 
cannot ensure the equal influence of all religious traditions, the distinction 
drawn by the EU’s public order between the cultural and political elements of 
religion’s influence over law, enables it to oblige religious participants in its 
own public sphere to provide rational and generally applicable justifications 
for their claims and to recognise the validity of the contributions and claims of 
other forms of identity.40 Although it does not impose the same constraints on
37 Gramsci speaks of culture as “a network of cultural values and institutions not normally 
thought of as political” see A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (New York, 
International Publishers, 1971) 238.
38 Zizek argues in relation to cultural norms that “in a given society certain features, attitudes 
and norms of life are no longer perceived as ideologically marked, they appear as neutral ” see 
S. Zizek, In Defence of Lost Causes, (London, Verso, 2008) 21.
39 See chapters III, V and VI.
40 See section 3 of Chapter III. This separation of the political from the religious has been cited 
by Habermas and Derrida as one of the foundation elements of a common European identity,
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religious claims made under the guise of Member State cultural autonomy, this 
approach also permits the EU to require Member States to maintain the 
autonomy of their public spheres from the explicit domination of any particular 
faith without removing religious elements of Member State identity.41 Thus, by 
distinguishing between explicitly religious claims and cultural claims which 
may include religious elements, the Union attempts to reconcile the notion of 
balance between religious and humanist influences and the limitations on 
religious influence over the public sphere which this principle entails, with 
respect for the role of religion in Member State identity.
Although this approach does inevitably involve a degree of inequality between 
insider and outsider faiths, such a situation is not immutable and routing 
religious claims through the notion of culture can help to ensure a greater 
degree of inclusion of minority groups than would otherwise be the case. 
While national cultural identities do have strong links to the past, culture is an 
evolving phenomenon which is constantly subject to change and development, 
as occurred for example in relation to gender equality when longstanding 
patriarchal European traditions were replaced by more egalitarian approaches. 
While individual religions can also evolve and can encompass widely 
divergent world views, participation in this evolutionary process is only open 
to those who accept the divinely-inspired nature of that religion’s founding text 
or basic beliefs. Participation in the process of cultural evolution and change is 
not necessarily similarly restricted and can be open to the contributions of all. 
Even in a society in which a particular faith has been dominant, the cultural 
role of this dominant faith may evolve and take on board the viewpoints and 
traditions of minority groups. Such developments will however have to take 
place at Member State level and cannot be imposed by EU law whose public 
order will therefore continue to be influenced by the religious particularities of 
its Member States.
see Mai 2003, in English in J. Habermas and J. Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds 
Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’, 
Constellations 10:3, 2003, 291-7.
41 See section 3.2 of Chapter V and section 2.3 of Chapter VI.
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Furthermore, in a Union of 27 states, no one cultural approach may claim 
automatic acceptance at EU level, meaning that the possibility of exclusion of 
those who dissent from particular national cultural norms from public debate at 
EU level is significantly reduced. Moreover, cultural claims in respect of EU 
law relate largely to claims for exemptions and derogations from Community 
law obligations on the part of individual states. Such derogations are limited in 
effect to such states and do not therefore involve the same degree of risk of the 
imposition of a particular cultural approach on all as would be posed by the 
acceptance in the law-making arena of religious truth claims whose effects 
would not be similarly restricted. The Union’s embrace of the principles of the 
autonomy of the public sphere, and the protection of fundamental rights, 
particularly individual private autonomy, as both basic principles of its public 
order and as prerequisites of EU membership, also provide a bulwark against 
large scale expansion of the influence of a particular faith over law and 
political life and the subjugation of individual autonomy to the promotion of 
collective religious and cultural goals at Member State level, thereby 
promoting the degree of pluralism necessary for cultural evolution to remain 
and open and reflexive process. These requirements do show that certain 
constraints on Member State choices regarding the relationship between 
religion, the individual and the law, including those which are culturally-based, 
are part of the Union’s public order. While these features do not entirely cure 
the inequality caused by the Union’s facilitation of religion’s cultural influence 
over law, in the light of the EU’s limited authority and commitment to 
respecting Member State autonomy, they may represent the maximum degree 
of regulation of such relationships of which the Union is capable.
5. Conclusion
The relationship between religion and the Union's public order revealed by 
these chapters is unmistakably linked to a Christian humanist tradition which 
seeks to balance Europe's dual tradition of largely Christian religiosity on one 
hand, with a strong humanist tradition that stresses notions of individual 
autonomy and the separation of religion and law on the other. The identity- 
focused framework through which the Union pursues this balance recognises 
religion as an element of communal identity and thus as a contributor to the
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definition of shared norms. Such an approach enables the pursuit of religious 
goals and the promotion of religious morality through law. On the other hand, 
this approach also limits religious influence over law by restricting the degree 
to which claims to religious monopolies on truth can be asserted in the political 
sphere and by its emphasis on respect for choice and identity rights which 
strengthens claims to individual autonomy and freedom from religious norms. 
This gives the Union a public order which both facilitates the predominantly 
Christian cultural role of religion in influencing law but which is also 
avowedly non-theocratic. Such a public order is therefore able to accommodate 
the requirements of cultural and legal pluralism which are particularly 
important in the light of the diversity of approaches to the relationship between 
religion and law shown by the Member States. Although this approach comes 
at the cost of a degree of inequality between religions, such a situation is the 
inevitable outcome of the Union’s limited authority and need to defer to the 
cultural autonomy of its Member States.
This thesis contributes to our knowledge both of the Union and to debates in 
relation to the relationship between religion, politics, the state and the law in 
liberal democracies. The highlighting of the difficulties of adhering to a 
principle of equal treatment of religion in the light of the differing cultural 
roles and theological and political ambitions of various faiths, raises interesting 
issues for further study, particularly comparative studies. The thesis has 
highlighted the pluralism of the Union’s constitutional order and the significant 
facilitation of religion’s cultural and political role which the EU law provides. 
It therefore shows that the EU’s approach to the regulation of religion does not 
represent the kind of secularist break with the past which some have alleged.42 
However, it also demonstrates that the humanist tradition of challenging and 
limiting religious influence over law and politics is a key element of the 
Union's public order which precludes the reversal of principles such as respect 
for the autonomy of the public sphere and for individual autonomy in the 
private sphere as well as the limitation of the accommodation of religious
42 See n. 24 above. See also, The Catholic Communications Office, "Address of Cardinal Sean 
Brady to the Humbert Summer School" 24 August 2008, available at: 
http://www.catholiccommunications.ie/PressreI/24-august-2008.html (accessed 8 October 
2008).
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claims to a monopoly of truth in the political arena. In recent years, religion 
has come to occupy a level of importance in global politics which would have 
shocked the legions of sociologists who confidently predicted its demise.43 
Some have proclaimed the return of religion to the political sphere.44 Others 
have argued that immigration and demographic factors make it inevitable that 
European democracies will have to accommodate and accord greater political 
and legal power to religious movements in the future.45 Although this thesis 
has demonstrated that the European Union’s public order is far from strictly 
secular, the Union may well prove to be a limiting factor on should such a 
broad return of religious influence come to pass. In particular, the Union’s 
recognition of the legitimacy and worth of Europe’s humanist tradition and its 
commitment to individual autonomy are inconsistent with wholesale 
enforcement of religious morality by legal means on the basis of either 
explicitly religious or cultural claims. As importantly, its adherence to strict 
formal neutrality in its own public sphere, its identification of the autonomy of 
the public sphere from religious influence as a necessary condition of 
accession and its valorisation of religion on the basis of its significance to 
human identities and consequent unwillingness to facilitate the assertion of 
religious claims to truth in public debate, all establish the notion of a degree of 
separation between religion and the law as an indispensable element of 
Europe’s public order. Indeed, the weakness of the Union’s own cultural 
identity and the diversity of the identities of its Member States mean that EU 
law is created within a political system within which no one religious or 
cultural tradition can assume automatic acceptance. In this sense it can be seen 
as encouraging participants in its political sphere to repackage particularist 
religious or cultural arguments into forms which are, in theory, accessible to 
all, including those who do not share such a cultural or religious background. 
Therefore, despite the significant accommodation of the religious and cultural 
particularities of its Member States that it offers, such a public order is a
43 P. Berger and G. Weigel (eds.) The Decsecularization of the Modern World: Resurgent 
Religion and Modern Politics (Grand Rapids Michigan, Erdemans Publishing Company and 
Public Policy Center, 1999).
44Ibid.
45 See for instance, G. Davie, “Religion in Britain: Changing sociological assumptions” 
Sociology, 34/1:113-128, B. Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the 
West from Within, (New York, Doubleday, 2006) and The Sunday Times, “Down with 
Godless Government” 22 April 2007.
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promising environment for the promotion of ideas such as that of public reason 
which require religious justifications for law to be “translated”46 so that they 
are in principle accessible to those with differing religious views. The Union 
may therefore help to maintain the reflexivity of European culture while acting 
as a bulwark against any theocratic tendencies which may emerge in the future 
and is likely to be an important site in future conflicts in relation to religion’s 
role in European liberal democracies.
46 For discussion of this notion of translation see J. Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere’ 
European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 1-25 (2006).
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